Posted on 05/10/2006 7:31:03 AM PDT by cryptical
Your problem is that you're confusing what Congress CAN do with what Congress SHOULD do. Take away your emotions and it becomes quite clear.
I've seen it enough times to know what you're going to do with it. If you agree that Congress has the power to "regulate" the private pilot, then you can only be agreeing that they have the power to regulate him at will, for any reason. If you don't agree that they can regulate him at will, for any reason then you must believe they don't even have the power to keep him out of the flight path of commercial airliners.
Everyone would agree that it is both Necessary and Proper for Congress to regulate this type of intrastate activity.
Exactly which kind of "intrastate activity" is it we're agreeing it is Necessary and Proper to regulate?
Your problem is that you're confusing what Congress CAN do with what Congress SHOULD do. Take away your emotions and it becomes quite clear.
Really? I'll remember that the next time Constitutional questions return "It's for the children" moralizations.
Not at all. Congress may regulate the pilot's intrastate activity only if it has a substantial effect on Congress' interstate regulatory efforts.
Private pilots are, by and large, unregulated. Only when their flying affects interstate flights does the FAA get involved.
You seem quite fond of that particular innovation.
Doesn't it make sense? Do you think the Founding Fathers meant for the states (or individuals) to be able to undermine and subvert Congress' interstate regulatory efforts this way?
If the states (or individuals) object to Congress regulating intrastate activities such as growing wheat, or private pilots, or recreational drugs, or guns near schools, certainly there are better ways of resisting Congress other than intentionally engaging in these illegal intrastate acts?
Oh, and I doubt that Washington was directing his remarks to that small minority who, unable to legitimately sway public opinion, take matters into their own hands and subvert constitutional Congressional regulatory efforts. That's not resisting "the spirit of innovation upon its principles" -- that's anarchy, pure and simple.
It is urged that...Congress does not possess the power it has in this instance sought to exercise. The question would merit little consideration since our decision in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 , 61 S.Ct. 451, 132 A.L.R. 1430,12 sustaining the federal power to regulate production of goods for commerce except for the fact that this [Agricultural Act in contention regarding Wickard] Act extends federal regulation to production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm. The Act includes a definition of 'market' and its derivatives... - Wickard @ 119The two principal questions raised by the record in this case are, first, whether Congress has constitutional power to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber manufactured by employees whose wages are less than a prescribed minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are greater than a prescribed maximum, and, second, whether it has power to prohibit the employment of workmen in the production of goods 'for interstate commerce' at other than prescribed wages and hours. A subsidiary question is whether in connection with such prohibitions Congress can require the employer subject to them to keep records showing the hours worked each day and week by each of his employees including those engaged 'in the production and manufacture of goods to wit, lumber, for 'interstate commerce." - Darby @ 108
The case comes here on assignments by the Government that the district court erred insofar as it held that Congress was without constitutional power to penalize the acts set forth in the indictment, and appellees seek to sustain the decision below on the grounds that the prohibition by Congress of those Acts is unauthorized by the commerce clause and is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. The appeals statute limits our jurisdiction on this appeal to a review of the determination of the district court so far only as it is based on the validity or construction of the statute. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 193 , 195 S., 60 S.Ct. 182, 185, 186, and cases cited. Hence we accept the district court's interpretation of the indictment and confine our decision to the validity and construction of the statute. - Darby @ 112
...The power to regulate commerce is the power 'to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed'. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196. It extends not only to those regulations which aid, foster and protect the commerce, but embraces those which prohibit it. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 , 23 S.Ct. 92; Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 , 23 S.Ct. 321; United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 , 29 S.Ct. 527; Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 , 33 S.Ct. 281, 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 906, Ann.Cas.1913E, 905; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 , 37 S.Ct. 180, L.R.A.1917B, 1218, Ann.Cas.1917B, 845; United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420 , 39 S.Ct. 143; McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131 , 52 S.Ct. 522, 87 A.L.R. 448. It is conceded that the power of Congress to prohibit transportation in interstate commerce includes noxious articles, Lottery Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 , 31 S.Ct. 364; cf. Hoke v. United States, supra; stolen articles, Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 , 45 S.Ct. 345, 37 A.L.R. 1407; Kidnapped persons, Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 , 56 S.Ct. 395, and articles such as intoxicating liquor or convict made goods, traffic in which is forbidden or restricted by the laws of the state of destination. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U.S. 334 , 57 S.Ct. 277. - U.S. v. DARBY, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) @ 113
The power of Congress over interstate commerce 'is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed by the constitution.' Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, 9 Wheat. 196. That power can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra. Congress, following its own conception of public policy concerning the restrictions which may appropriately be imposed on interstate commerce, is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or welfare, even though the state has not sought to regulate their use. Reid v. Colorado, supra; Lottery Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, supra; Hoke v. United States, supra.Not long after the decision of United States v. E. C. Knight Co., supra, Mr. Justice Holmes, in sustaining the exercise of national power over intrastate activity, stated for the Court that 'commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business.' Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 , 25 S.Ct. 276, 280. It was soon demonstrated that the effects of many kinds of intrastate activity upon interstate commerce were such as to make them a proper subject of federal regulation. 22 - Wickard @ 123Such regulation is not a forbidden invasion of state power merely because either its motive or its consequence is to restrict the use of articles of commerce within the states of destination and is not prohibited unless by other Constitutional provisions. It is no objection to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the states. Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 514 , 36 S.Ct. 190, 191; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 , 40 S.Ct. 106, 108; United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. [312 U.S. 100, 115] 144, 147, 58 S.Ct. 778, 780; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 , 61 S.Ct. 291, decided December 16, 1940.
...Whatever [Congress'] motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred [to it] by the Commerce Clause. Subject only to that limitation, presently to be considered, we conclude that the prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods produced under the forbidden substandard labor conditions is within the constitutional authority of Congress.
In the more than a century which has elapsed since the decision of Gibbons v. Ogden, these principles of constitutional interpretation have been so long and repeatedly recognized by this Court as applicable to the Commerce Clause, that there would be little occasion for repeating them now were it not for the decision of this Court twenty-two years ago in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 , 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E, 724. In that case it was held by a bare majority of the Court over the powerful and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes setting forth the fundamental issues involved, [312 U.S. 100, 116] that Congress was without power to exclude the products of child labor from interstate commerce. The reasoning and conclusion of the Court's opinion there cannot be reconciled with the conclusion which we have reached, that the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce subject only to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution.
Hammer v. Dagenhart has not been followed. The distinction on which the decision was rested that Congressional power to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to articles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious property-a distinction which was novel when made and unsupported by any provision of the Constitution-has long since been abandoned. Brooks v. United States, supra; Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., supra; Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 303 U.S. 419 , 58 S.Ct. 678, 115 A.L.R. 105; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 , 59 S.Ct. 648. The thesis of the opinion that the motive of the prohibition or its effect to control in some measure the use or production within the states of the article thus excluded from the commerce can operate to deprive the regulation of its constitutional authority has long since ceased to have force. Reid v. Colorado, supra; Lottery Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, supra; Seven Cases v. United States, supra, 239 U.S. 514 , 36 S.Ct. 191; Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., supra, 251 U.S. 156 , 40 S.Ct. 108; United States v. Carolene Products Co., supra, 304 U.S. 147 , 58 S.Ct. 780. And finally we have declared 'The authority of the Federal Government over interstate commerce does not differ in extent or character from that retained by the states over intrastate commerce'. United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 569 , 59 S.Ct. 993, 1011.
The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure from the principles which have prevailed in the interpretation of the commerce clause both [312 U.S. 100, 117] before and since the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled. Darby @ 114-118
Your assertion is a fallacy, moreover, I see a strong argument being made that the very idea being espoused in Wickard has been the prevailing opinion regarding the power of the commerce clause for quite a long time prior to Wickard.
[Footnote 22] Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 , 24 S.Ct. 436; Swift & Co. v. United States, supra; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 , 28 S.Ct. 301, 13 Ann.Cas. 815; Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U.S. 612 , 31 S.Ct. 621; Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 , 32 S.Ct. 2; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co .), 223 U.S. 1 , 32 S.Ct. 169, 38 L.R.A.,N.S., 44; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525 , 33 S.Ct. 141, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 325.
Have you read the cases cited, and can you vouch for the validity of the logic used to arrive at those conclusions? Can you point to any documentation in the Federalist Papers or other writhings of the Founders that supports this? By your own admission, this philosophy renders Marshall's opinion in Ogden v Gibbons incoherent with regard to purely intrastate commerce in that it makes it non-existent for all practical purposes.
In Shreveport, the fact that they were a common carrier was the relevant issue, and the intrastate commerce activity was irrelevant. In applying it to Wickard they turned that upside down.
If the states (or individuals) object to Congress regulating intrastate activities such as growing wheat, or private pilots, or recreational drugs, or guns near schools, certainly there are better ways of resisting Congress other than intentionally engaging in these illegal intrastate acts?
Oh, and I doubt that Washington was directing his remarks to that small minority who, unable to legitimately sway public opinion, take matters into their own hands and subvert constitutional Congressional regulatory efforts. That's not resisting "the spirit of innovation upon its principles" -- that's anarchy, pure and simple.
The objections to the New Deal Commerce Clause are too widely held to be considered "irregular", and the rest of your objections fall squarely into the realm of "specious pretext". You can spare us your claims of protecting the Founder's vision and the noble houses of Congress from the evil machinations of the States and the people.
I respect their wisdom enough to think they were well aware that by denying Congress the authority to regulate intrastate activity they were making SOME interstate regulatory efforts less effective.
At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the Federal commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 194, 195. He made emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes. 9 Wheat. at page 197>. [317 U.S. 111, 121] [Since then] decisions of this Court under the Commerce Clause dealt rarely with questions of what Congress might do in the exercise of its granted power under the Clause and [instead] almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity which it was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate commerce. During this period there was perhaps little occasion for the affirmative exercise of the commerce power, and the influence of the Clause on American life and law was a negative one, resulting almost wholly from its operation as a restraint upon the powers of the states. In discussion and decision the point of reference instead of being what was necessary and proper to the exercise by Congress of its granted power, [insted focused on] some concept of sovereignty thought to be implicit in the status of statehood. Certain activities such as 'production,' 'manufacturing,' and 'mining' were occasionally said to be within the province of state governments and beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.17It is well established by decisions of this Court that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting such prices.28 One of the primary purposes of the Act in question was to increase the market price of wheat and to that end to limit the volume thereof that could affect the market. It can hardly be denied that a factor of such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a substantial influence on price and market conditions. This may arise because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the market and if induced by rising prices tends to flow into the market and check price increases. But if we assume that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce. The stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon. This record leaves us in no doubt that Congress [317 U.S. 111, 129] may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices. - Wickard @ 128,129[The] Interstate Commerce Act [of 1887 was the first act by Congress where]...the interstate commerce power began to exert positive influence in American law and life. This first important federal resort to the commerce power was followed in 1890 by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and, thereafter, mainly after 1903, by many others. These statutes ushered in new phases of adjudication, which required the Court to approach the interpretation of the Commerce Clause in the light of an actual exercise by Congress of its power thereunder.
When it first dealt with this new legislation, the Court adhered to its earlier pronouncements, and allowed but [317 U.S. 111, 122] little scope to the power of Congress. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 , 15 S.Ct. 249. 20 These earlier pronouncements also played an important part in several of the five cases in which this Court later held that Acts of Congress under the Commerce Clause were in excess of its power.21
Even while important opinions in this line of restrictive authority were being written, however, other cases called forth broader interpretations of the Commerce Clause destined to supersede the earlier ones, and to bring about a return to the principles first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. - Wickard @ 120-122
The opinion next cites the following cases:
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., supra (was actually cited as being one of restrictive interpretation)
Swift & Co. v. United States
Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co
None of those have anything to do with common (or uncommon carriers). It is quite apparent that you have this fixation with an alleged unconstitutional New Deal Commerce Clause. I'm not suggesting that you're out to lunch, not by any stretch. I believe your position is that of fallacy. I'm not suggesting that its based on logical fallacy, I believe your opinion to be quite reasonable. I'm using the word "fallacy" in the same context that Rumsfeldt used it at the press-briefing the other day when the report tried to make a point by saying there hadn't been an active duty military leader of the CIA since 1953. That statement is based on a fallacy: misguided presumption. You object to Congress legislating regulations into the local domain, infringing upon State's rights of self-governance. Fair enough as far as I'm concerned, but we part company with aspersions concerning unconstitutionality pertaining to applicability of the commerce clause in general to the war on drugs, and with respect to Wickard specifically.
It appears to me that if you had your druthers, things should run more like they ran under the Articles of Confederacy, or perhaps even with respect to the constitution of the United Confederation of States. I've previously stated this, the issue pertaining to States Rights was already broached concerning the issue of slavery. As heinous as the issue of slavery is, I believe the States had a right to decide that issue themselves. Instead something was rammed down their throats. I'm have no knowledge whatsoever if the commerce clause was invoked concerning any of that. I don't see how, in that slavery would be entirely a manufacturing, production, labor matter. And at the time, none of that was relevent to the issue of commerce. That notwithstanding, that's a moot point at this time: a war was fought over that.
Respecting the issue of State sovereignty, well, o.k., no concessions on my part are necessary; I'm squarely in that camp and have a great deal of sympathy for the States in that regard. So much so that I find popular election of Senators extremely abhorent and repugnant to my sense of architecture of the Republic. I believe that the action that can be undertaken having the greatest impact concerning continued erosion of the States' rights, would be to repeal the 17th ammendment. Frankly, above all else, the 17th ammendment is a far greater anathema than anything else.
That being said, what about these glorious "gardens" of States sovereignty that Congress so obnoxiously trampled into? Where were the States during the Muckraker Era? Why didn't they jump on the bandwagon and legislate regulation immediately after Upton Sinclair published The Jungle? If the States don't act, Congress will. Keep one thing absolutely fore, front and center: politicians are polical animals. They'll do whatever needs to be done to get re-elected (not necessarily what's right). I've heard it said: "It's hard to do what is right." I beg to differ. The hard thing to determine is just what is the right thing to do. Once that is known, its hard not to do it. Frankly, it takes effort not to do the right thing.
I concede nothing respecting the Constitutionality of what Congress did, nor do I condone a great deal of what has been legislated, but I do acquiesce based entirely on pragmatism. I do however concede the point of contention concerning the Welfare Clause granting a mandate to act (I throw out Jefferson's quote in support of that). I don't believe it to be an issue of the "liveing Constitution" on the part of the Supreme Court. How many times was the phrase used "they have this and this power, except for limitations stipulated by other provisions in the Constitution." Are you going to come up to me with your nice guy smile, put your hand on my shoulder and tell me nicely, "Oliver Wendell Holmes knows nothing about the Constitution, but I do."
Where were the State's during the 1930's? How come they didn't legislate their way out of the morass they were in? Kansas is hip deep in wheat, its going to mold, their burning it to get rid of it [entertain my poetic license please], but people in Maine are starving. Kansas says: who cares? Not our problem.
Now I'm going to start pointing fingers at the States, if they don't like what's going on today. I'm not just pointing, I'm stabbing my forefinger into their chest (and I hope it hurts). These are the facts:
It cost money to grow corn and wheat and to harvest it. It cost money to bring in the crop and get it to market. You had to hire men and machines. It cost money to feed cattle and get them to market. Farmers had no money. It was costing them more to stay in business than they could earn by bringing in a crop and getting it to market. What would you do? They let their crops lie in the fields to rot. They killed their animals. They poured milk into the ground. Meanwhile, people in the cities needed food, for which they could barely pay. People were starving. Soup kitchens opened. I had a client describe how his mother would give him a small cold potato in the morning and send him off to school. That was his meal for the day. FDR tried to do something about this, because there were millions of farmers, then, and more millions of people needing food in the cities. The AAA was an effort to regulate prices so that farmers would have an incentive to harvest their crops and animals, bring them to market, and make enough money to do it all over again next year. Price supports, fair trade and marketing regulations, "parity," government subsidized restrictions on what could be grown and how much, were enacted by Congress. Government paid some farmers not to grow unneeded crops. Farmers were being paid not to farm. This still happens, by the way. It's hard to get rid of a government funded program just because the need has disappeared. - Circle of Confusion; Wickard, Raich I throw down right now, with vehemence. If somebody put a gun to most peoples heads and demanded to know who their State Representative was, or who their State Senator was, or precisely what it was that the State legislature was working on, they could not answer. There'd be no better answer if they moved the aim of that speculative gun to their 4 year old daughter's head, and declared unequivocally "I'll pull the trigger if you don't give me the correct answer."
Are you guys so obsessed with smoking dope that you can't see pragmatically passed the end of your noses? "Think globally, act locally." What in the hell does that mean in this day and age? When's the last time you've been to a City Council meeting? What legisltation is under consideration? Is the State infringing on what the local city charter is trying to imlement? What does the local city charter even say? If you talk to 10 people, 9 will tell you they don't have a clue, and 7 will tell you they don't care. At least 6 of those people will be upset their child will be murdered in this hypothetical situation, but 9 will demand to know, "What can I do, I'm just one of the little people."
I guess what it comes down to, there's much bigger fish to fry than the right to smoke dope. Because all things being equal, the powers that be actually want you to smoke dope; it'll keep them in power.
Even so they want you to smoke dope (and its in the politicians best interests their constituents do so), the reason there is a war on drugs is due to the facts that:
1) it generates revenue for the war on drug soldiers 2) a sufficient number of votes are retained by those candidates who advocate the war on drugs so as to win elections.
Respecting Federal encroachment upon State sovereignty, if more people were thinking locally and acting locally, all of this would be mooot.
/end rant
[Footnote 17] Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 573, 574; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 , 20-22, 9 S.Ct. 6, 9, 10.
[Footnote 21] Employers Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois Central R. Co.), 207 U.S. 463 , 28 S.Ct. 141; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 , 38 S.Ct. 529, 3 A.L.R. 649, Ann.Cas.1918E, 724; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 , 55 S.Ct. 758; Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 , 55 S.Ct. 837, 97 A.L.R. 947; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 , 56 S.Ct. 855; cf. United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41; Trade Mark Cases (United States v. Steffens), 100 U.S. 82 ; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 , 42 S.Ct. 453; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 , 260 S., 43 S.Ct. 83, 86; Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172, 178 , 179 S., 43 S.Ct. 526, 529; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 , 52 S.Ct. 548.
[Footnote 28] Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 , 25 S.Ct. 276; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 , 42 S.Ct. 397, 23 A.L. R. 229; Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 , 43 S.Ct. 470; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 , 45 S.Ct. 551; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 , 47 S.Ct. 377, 50 A.L.R. 989; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 , 50 S.Ct. 220; Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 , 51 S.Ct. 421; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 , 59 S.Ct. 379; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 , 59 S.Ct. 648; United States v. Rock Royal Co- operative, supra; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 , 60 S.Ct. 811; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 , 60 S.Ct. 907; United States v. Darby, supra; United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra; Federal Power Commission v. Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 , 62 S.Ct. 736.
Marshall talks about in what seems to be pretty concrete terms a concept of "intrastate commerce" separate from and unrelated to interstate commerce that your theory doesn't even allow for the existence of, yet you insist the two of you are in agreement. I'll grant you it gets complicated, but that doesn't mean it so incomprehensible that it can't rightly be said that when things get that far out of alignment something is fundamentally wrong, and it isn't going to go away or get better by itself.
I do neither. We've made a fool's bargain and I will continue to remind people of the consequences. Maybe some will remember it should the opportunity arise to make another. If I'm going to have to stand accused of advocating or engaging in criminal activity for it, so be it.
Shipping mulch containing fire-ants and termites from the Louisianna debacle to those who want it.
? bumpkin
Not interested, but thanks anyway. Do you do much shipping?
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.