all i can say is... THANK YOU!!!More background http://rayrobison.typepad.com/ray_robison/2006/04/iraq_document_o.html
Update: globalsecurity.org
"During his 05 February 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council, Secretary of State Powell stated that "I'm going to show you a small part of a chemical complex called "Al Musayyib", a site that Iraq has used for at least 3 years to transship chemical weapons from production facilities out to the field. In May 2002, our satellites photographed the unusual activity in this picture. Here we see cargo vehicles are again at this transshipment point, and we can see that they are accompanied by a decontamination vehicle associated with biological or chemical weapons activity. What makes this picture significant is that we have a human source who has corroborated that movement of chemical weapons occurred at this site at that time. So it's not just the photo and it's not an individual seeing the photo. It's the photo and then the knowledge of an individual being brought together to make the case. This photograph of the site taken 2 months later, in July, shows not only the previous site which is the figure in the middle at the top with the bulldozer sign near it, it shows that this previous site, as well as all of the other sites around the site have been fully bulldozed and graded. The topsoil has been removed. The Iraqis literally removed the crust of the earth from large portions of this site in order to conceal chemical weapons evidence that would be there from years of chemical weapons activity. " [Powell]
On on 10 February 2003 a joint UNMOVIC team of 10 inspectors visited the Al-Musayyib Ammunition Depot, located in the province of Al-Musayyib (Babil Governorate). Inspectors questioned the site custodian about the number of warehouses and the number of new buildings at the site, as well as the types of ammunition stored there, the Iraqi Foreign Ministry stated. Inspectors reportedly searched the warehouses using chemical sensors and X-ray devices and collected samples from an 81-millimeter missile, the ministry added.
Al Atheer and Al Musayyib were merged into the the Motassim company which was part of the al Rashid State Establishment. "
Ray: The document lists one of the receiving depots as "Al Mussayeb" which is probably al Musayyib in Powell's speech.
STL - you've GOT to check out JVeritas' work. He's translating Iraqi prewar documents and there's some seriously mind-blowing stuff here. The world NEEDS to know about this.
I didn't do it, you never saw me, you can't prove a thing.
Now let's... moveon.org
Bump.
bookmark
major bump!!
bookmark
Keep hammering them J. Great great stuff.
Thank you very much for all the work you have done on this issue!
We;re getting closer to the truth here!
Am I correct in believing that you are the only one doing any translation? Are there others? Who might they be? What have they found?
Interesting translation.
Clearly part of a general movement of ammunition from where it was to where the Iraqi military wanted it prior to Coalition attacks.
Two parts to this specific order, artillery shells denoted "special ammunition", and ammunition for air defense weapons. Transfers of air defense amunition are of little interest.
Transfers of "special ammunition" are from general stockpiles at An Najaf, "To the depots and storage of the Second Corp and the two ammunition depot groups Dijla/2/3".
From at least 1998 through February of 2003, the Iraqi II Corps was responsible for and deployed in Iraq's Diyala region. Alternate spellings include "Deyala", "Diayala" and possibly "Dijla".
As of 1998, II Corps headquarters was located at Al Yarmouk, with component unit commands as follows: Iraqi 3 AD was headquartered at Jalawa, 15 ID headquartered at Amerlii and 34 ID was headquartered in the Khanqin/Alsadia area.
The command centers and areas of responsibility all indicate that these weapons were to be shipped to areas NE of Baghdad, south of and not including Kirkuk, north of and not including Kut. As a defensive measure, these weapons were being emplaced against an attack from western Iran, or from Kurdish areas near Iran.
At the time this order was issued, Iraq knew that Coalition forces were massing in Kuwait, and suspected that Coalition Forces could possibly mass in Turkey. Neither Coalition force would have any reason to traverse the Diyala area of responsibility or affect the Iraqi II Corps command or component units. Therefore, this order probably reflects an intent other than dispersal of special ammunition for II Corps defense against Coalition units.
One possibility is that this order represents an intent to defend against or preemptively attack Kurdish forces or population center at the extreme southeastern extent of the Kurdish controlled area.
A second possibility is that this order was a single component of a much larger set of similar orders transferring special ammunition to Iraq's general forces, that similar orders went out to special weapon storage areas such that all commands received an allotment of special ammunition.
A third possibility is that this order was a compartmentalized subset of orders for a larger operation intended to transfer the special weapons to another country, notably Iran. There is precedent for this in the following US intelligence advisory from 1991:
IIR 2 201 0744 91/TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
Filename:22010744.91r
PATHFINDER RECORD NUMBER: 11224
GENDATE: 950504
NNNN
TEXT:
ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX212 MCN = 91180/10752 TOR = 911800937
RTTSZYUW RUEKJCS7780 1800934- --RUEALGX.
ZNY
HEADER R 290934Z JUN 91
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUETIAQ/MPCFTGEORGEGMEADEMD
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CARA//
RHEPAAB/TAC IDHS LANGLEY AFB VA//IDHS//
RUFTAKA/USAINTELCTRE HEIDELBERG GE
RUFTAKC/UDITDUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY//
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 280815Z JUN 91
FM CDR[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]USAOPSGP INSCOM ALEX VA //[
(b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]//
TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ2-OS/ECJ2-JIS//
INFO RUFGAID/RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN
RUFDAAA/RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG//AEAGB-C(CM)//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N2/N24
RHFPAAA/UTAIS RAMSTEIN AB GE//INT-CMO/INO/INOS//
RUCBSAA/FICEURLANT NORFOLK VA
RUQYSDG/FOSIF ROTA SP
RUFDAAA/RUFDAAA/USAINTELCTRE HEIDELBERG//AEAGB-PD-CUR//
RUEDADA/RUEDADA/AFIA-AMHS BOLLING AFB
RUEOFAA/RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG//J2//
RUCJAAA/RUCJAAA/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB//SOJ2//
RUEOMMA/RUEOMMA/CDR4THPSYOP FT BRAGG//ASOF-P G-SB//
RUEAIJA/RUEAIJU//NPIC WASHDC//IEG//
RHCDAAA/RHCDAAA/USAFSOS HURLBURT FLD
RUEKJCS/RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP:ISA//
RUEHS/RUEHS/SECSTATE WASHDC//PM//
RUCJACS/RUCJACS/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB//CCJ2-ISM//ISA//
RUEAIJU/RUEAIJU/NPIC WASH DC
RUDMNSS/RUDMNSS/NAVTECHINTCEN WASHDS//30/40/50//
RUDMNOP/RUDMNOP/NAVOPINTCEN SUITLAND
RUETIAA/RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT MEADE
RUERAAA/RUERAAA/DIA FT RITCHIE//ANMIS/JSJ-3//
RUEADWD/RUEADWD/HQDA WASHDS//DAMI-POH//
RUEADWD/RUEADWD/CSA WASHDC
RUDMNIS/RUDMNIS/COMNAVINTCOM WASHDS//NIC-03//
RUENAAA/RUENAAA/CNO WASHDS//OP-092//
RUFRQJQ/RUFRQJQ/COMSIXTHFLT
RUEACMS/RUEACMS/CMC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEBJFI/RUEBJFI/CDRUSAOPSGP FT MEADE//AGPC-CM/IAGPC-S//
RUEORDA/RUEORDA/AFMIC FT DETRICK//S AND TI//
RUEORDA/RUEORDA/AFMIC FT DETRICK//GMI//
RUEAHQA/RUEAHQA/HQAFIA WASHDS//INKT//
RUEAHQA/RUEAHQA/HQUSAF WASHDS//IN//
RUEOAYB/RUEOAYB/FSTC INTEL OPS CHARLOTTESVILLE//AIFICB//
RUCIAEA/RUCIAEA/FTD WPAFB//SCIS/NIIS//
RUCIAEA/RUCIAEA/DET22AFSAC WPAFB//INO//
RUDHAAA/RUDHAAA/CDRINSCOM FT BELVOIR VA//IAOPS-H-S//
RHDLSKA/RHDLSKA/NAVENVPVTMED UNIT SEVEN NAPLES
BT
CONTROLS
QQQQ
SERIAL: (U) IIR 2 201 0744 91.
X-
BODY PASS: (U) DIA FOR DB-8C, DAH-6 FOR INFO.
X-
COUNTRY: (U) IRAQ (IZ); IRAN (IR).
X-
SUBJ: IIR 2 201 0744 91/TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND
CHEMICAL (NBC) MATERIEL DURING DESERT STORM (U).
X-
WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFO REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DOI: (U) 910000.
X-
REQS: (U) C-SW9-1620-12-90: D-T5A-1610-02-90: G-OSG-1610-19-88;
G-AIF-1620-02-90; D-T1A-1540-13-88; U-UPH-1620-03-88:
M-5AX-1620-03-90; G-OGS-43304.
X-
SOURCE: //2 243 0834//[ (b)(1) sec 1.3(a)(4) ]
[ (b)(7)(D) ]
X-
SUMMARY: THIS REPORT DESCRIBES THE TRANSFER OF NBC
MATERIELS FROM IRAQ TO IRAN BEFORE AND DURING THE GULF WAR.
X-
TEXT: (U)
1. TWO INDEPENDENT SOURCES HAVE REPORTED THE TRANSFER OF
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL CARGO FROM BAGHDAD AND MOSUL,
IRAQ, TO THE VICINITY OF TEHRAN, IRAN. THESE TRANSFERS TOOK PLACE
BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR IN THE GULF. AT LEAST FOURTEEN TRUCKS
WERE IDENTIFIED AS HAVING NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL CARGO'
BOXES LABELLED "TULAREMIA," "ANTHRAX," "BOTULINUM" AND "PLAGUE"
WERE LOADED INTO CONTAINERS ALONG WITH PRODUCTION PROTOCOLS AND
OTHER EQUIPMENT (NFI) AND SENT TO THE SAME LOCATION IN IRAN.
((SOURCE COMMENT) - IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THE BOXES CONTAINED
INDIVIDUAL CULTURES OR BULK AGENT). A HEWLETT PACKARD COMPUTER AND
A LINATRON X-RAY MACHINE WITH A MARK "PBG" WERE SENT FROM A
FACILITY IN MOSUL TO IRAN. ((SOURCE COMMENT) - THE NUCLEAR CARGO
WAS URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE OR YELLOW CAKE).
2. THE TRANSFERS WERE DONE IN SEALED CONTAINER VANS BY
THE IRAQIS AND LOADED INTO CIVILIAN IRANIAN TRUCKS, DRIVEN BY
IRANIANS. DRIVERS DID NOT KNOW THE CONTENTS OF THEIR CARGO. TWO
SPECIFIC CONVOYS WERE IDENTIFIED WITH EACH MADE UP OF AT LEAST
FIVE
TRUCKS. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE MAKE, YEAR, CABIN AND CONTAINER
COLOR
OF THE TRUCKS OF ONE OF THE CONVOYS -- SCANIA 1983, RED CABIN,
WHITE VAN; SCANIA 1985 WHITE CABIN, RED VAN: MAC 1975, ORANGE
CABIN' ORANGE VAN; SCANIA 1986, ORANGE CABIN, ORANGE VAN; VOLVO
(YEAR UNKNOWN) WHITE CABIN, BROWN VAN: AND SCANIA (YEAR UNKNOWN)'
ORANGE CABIN AND RED VAN' A SECOND CONVOY CONSISTED OF THE
FOLLOWING TRUCKS -- VOLVO 1987 RED CABIN; VOLVO 1988, BLACK CABIN;
SCANIA 1987, WHITE CABIN; MAC 1985, BROWN CABIN; SCANIA 1987, RED
CABIN.
3. THE TRUCKS WERE CAMOUFLAGED WITH MUD DURING THEIR
TRAVEL THROUGH IRAQI TERRITORY. THE CONVOY MOVED ONLY AT NIGHT'
THE MUD WAS WASHED OFF AFTER RE-ENTRY INTO IRANIAN TERRITORY'
4. THE FREIGHT WAS DELIVERED TO THE SHAHID MOSTAFA
KHOMEINI (PHONETIC) REVOLUTIONARY CORPS (PASDARAN) BARRACKS,
LOCATED ABOUT 30 KILLOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF TEHERAN, ON THE ROAD
BETWEEN THE TOWNS OF SHARIYAR (ALSO KNOWN AS SHAHR E REY) AND
ROBATE KARIM. THE TRUCKS WERE DRIVEN BY IRANIAN CIVILIANS UP TO
THE TOWN OF HAMADAN WHERE THE REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TOOK CONTROL OF
THE CONVOY. THE BARRACKS ARE USED BY THE GUARDS AS A MILITARY
TRAINING FACILITY. THERE ARE ROOMS FOR STORAGE AND WAREHOUSES.
((SOURCE COMMENT) - ACCORDING TO THE GAZETEER OF IRAN, THE TOWN OF
SHAHRYAR AND ROBATE KARIM ARE THE SAME. THE ALTERNATE SPELLING
GIVEN BY THE SUBSOURCE FOR THE TOWN OF SHAHRYAR (SHAR-E-REY) IS
INDEED THE TOWN SOUTH OF TEHRAN THAT THE SOURCE MEANT TO USE AS
PART OF THE REFERENCE FOR THE LOCATION OF THE BARRACKS).
X-
COMMENTS: (U) NONE.
X-
//IPSP: (U) PT 1620; PT 1610: PT 1610: PT 1620; PT 1540; PT 1620:
PT 1620; PT 1610//.
//COMSOBJ: (U) 141; 141: 141; 141: 452; 143; 143: 140//.
ADMIN PROJ: (U) 202029.
INSTR: (U) US NO.
PREP: (U) 2-10463.
ACQ: (U) ALEXANDRIA, VA (910626).
DISSEM: (U) NONE: FIELD: NONE SENT TO: NONE.
X-
WARNING: (U)
A fourth possibility is that this order was a compartmented subset of a larger group of orders intended to remove special ammunition from storage areas in An Najaf for the purposes of hiding them in Iraq, out of the projected path of Coalition troops.
In the first possibility, preparations for defending against or attacking Kurds, other orders should exist or have existed in the past, transferring special ammunition to I Corps in Kirkuk, V Corps in Mosul, and the RGFC Northern Corps, commanded from Baghdad and Tikrit.
In the second possibility, preparations for an Iraq wide defense or attacks using special ammunition, orders should exist or should have exised transferring special ammunition to all commands.
In the third and fourth possibilities, preparations for tansferring WMD stockpiles to Iran or into hiding within Iraq, other orders hsould exist or should have existed transferring special ammunition from all storage sites to II Corps control, for transport to Iran or into hidden stockpiles.
It is interesting to note that no order is given to fill the special ammunition with chemical radiological or biological agent. There is no pursuasive body of evidence to suggest that Iraq achieved binary capability in it WMD delivery systems. Since many chemical and biological agents degrade significantly over time periods as short as a few weeks, Iraq historically used a "just in time" production and delivery method for these agents, allowing the munitions to be filled immediately prior to use, to ensure delivery of viable agent upon the enemy.
From there, one of two assumptions seems safe. Iraq either:
A. Completed work on a binary capability, allowing them to utilize non-degrading agent components which would mix and become lethal on delivery,
or
B. Issued other orders in conjunction with this order, other orders being necessary to ensure that the special ammunition (inert while stored at the An Najaf facility) was filled prior to, or shortly after transportation, or else other orders pursuant to destroying, hiding, or transporting to Iran the inert special ammunition.
Obviously, a great deal depends on the the nature and type of "the special vehicles to transfer the SPECIAL AMMUNITION and the people assigned to supervise and execute
the transfer" mentioned as populating the other 8 or 9 pages of tis memo.
If the "special vehicles" were negative airflow, refrigerated transporters, and chemical or biological or radiological decontamination units, it would be logical to assume that the speial ammunition was active and dangerous during it's storage at An Najaf, therefore an assumption that Iraq did develop a binary capability would not be unreasonable.
If the "special vehicles" were security personnel transports, vehicles equipped with heavy conventional weaponry, or designed to transport detachments of MI personnel, then a safer assumption would be that the special ammunition was transported unfilled and inert for purposes of disposal, hiding, or transport to Iran.
For these reasons, further analysis is not possible without a translation of te rest of this memo, specifically the part relating to the "special vehicles" and specific units assigned to supervise the execution of this order.
all i can say is... THANK YOU!!!Hello MSM (ABC, NBC, CBS, CNN, MSNBC, NYTs, et al)!
Like what you see? You all look a bit sweaty. How come? Your years of LYING about to implode on you right before election 2006!
WELL GOOD FOR YOU! YOU WORKED HARD FOR THIS MOMENT YOU FREAKIN' LYING COWARDS!
bump & a ping
Maybe Muslims who compliment their Allah with the characteristics of "Mercy" and "Compassion" could find a way to incorporate these attributes, and make themselves Merciful and Compassionate.....
Strange preamble for a military document in a "secular" country, that would have nothing to do with the likes of the fundamentalist Jihadies, isn't it?
Based on this and due to the lack of further and stronger evidence in the 262 pages document that support the theory of Transfer of Special Ammunition (or Chemical Weapons), and because we need to maintain the credibility of the translation and FR, I would like to ask the Admin Moderator to retrieve this thread from FR files.
I apologize for any problems I have caused.