Posted on 02/27/2006 2:46:42 PM PST by dukeman
America has been embroiled in a seemingly endless debate over the issue of abortion for four decades now, but the most fascinating dispute on this issue may now be among those who consider themselves, in one way or another, advocates of abortion rights.
An unprecedented view into this debate is available on the pages of Slate.com--a prominent Web site that features some of the liveliest reporting available anywhere today. Nevertheless, this exchange between writers William Saletan and Katha Pollitt did not begin on the Internet, but in the pages of The New York Times and The Nation.
Saletan fired the first salvo, suggesting in an op/ed commentary published in The New York Times that pro-choicers should admit that abortion is "bad" and that those who support abortion rights should work toward a truly dramatic reduction in the total number of abortions.
Saletan's argument is not exactly new, either for himself or for the movement he supports. In his 2004 book, Bearing Right: How Conservatives Won the Abortion War, Saletan offered some of the most incisive and perceptive analysis of the national abortion debate. In essence, Saletan argued that America has settled on a fragile consensus he described as "conservative pro-choice." Americans are quite squeamish about abortion itself, but have resisted efforts to eliminate access to abortion altogether.
Even those who disagree with Saletan must take his argument seriously. Those of us who yearn to see America affirm the sanctity of all human life, born and preborn, must acknowledge that we have much work to do in terms of changing public opinion--the task of reaching the hearts and minds of millions of individual citizens.
That process of reaching hearts and minds is Saletan's concern as well, even as he is a strong defender of abortion rights. As he sees it, support for abortion rights is diminishing as the pro-life movement has been largely successful in focusing upon the moral status of the fetus and the objectionable--even horrible--nature of abortion itself.
Writing on the thirty-third anniversary of Roe v. Wade, Saletan boldly argued: "It's time for the abortion-rights movement to declare war on abortion."
That was a rather amazing statement, and Saletan clearly intended to catch the attention of abortion-rights advocates.
"If you support abortion rights, this idea may strike you as nuts," Saletan acknowledged. "But look at your predicament. Most Americans support Roe and think women, not the government, should make abortion decisions. Yet they've entrusted Congress and the White House to politicians who oppose legal abortion, and they haven't stopped the confirmations to the Supreme Court of John G. Roberts Jr. and . . . Samuel A. Alito Jr."
In terms of political analysis, Saletan reminded his pro-choice readers that abortion may have been a "winning issue" for their side sixteen years ago, but no more. "You have a problem," he advised.
His candid analysis was offered so that the pro-abortion movement might awaken from its slumber. "The problem is abortion," he summarized. In order to make his point, he raised the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and the Unborn Victims of Violence Act--both passed overwhelmingly by Congress and signed into law by President Bush--and reminded: "And most Americans supported both bills, because they agree with your opponents about the simplest thing: It's bad to kill a fetus."
Significantly, Saletan then offered his own moral analysis. "They're right. It is bad," he confirmed. "This is why the issue hasn't gone away. Abortion, like race-conscious hiring, generates moral friction. Most people will tolerate it as a lesser evil or a temporary measure, but they'll never fully accept it. They want a world in which it's less necessary. If you grow complacent or try to institutionalize it, they'll run out of patience. That's what happened to affirmative action. And it'll happen to abortion, if you stay hunkered down behind Roe."
Instead, Saletan argued that the pro-abortion movement should coalesce around an agenda of lowering the total number of abortions and increasing the use of contraceptives.
All this was just too much for Katha Pollitt, a fire-brand liberal who serves as a regular columnist for The Nation, one of America's most influential journals of liberal opinion.
Pollitt was shocked--absolutely shocked--that Saletan was ready to speak of abortion in moral terms. This is a move she emphatically rejects. "Inevitably, attacking abortion as a great evil means attacking providers and patients. If abortion is so bad, why not stigmatize the doctors who perform them? Deny the clinic a permit in your town? Make women feel guilty and ashamed for choosing it and make them sweat so they won't screw up again?"
Furthermore, she warned that abortion might soon "join obesity and smoking as unacceptable behavior in polite society."
Taken by itself, this is a truly amazing comment. At the very least, it suggests that, in Katha Pollit's social circle, obesity and smoking are taken as genuine moral issues, when abortion--the killing of an unborn human--is not.
But there's more. Consider this statement: "The trouble with thinking in terms of zero abortions is that you make abortion so hateful you do the antichoicers' work for them. You accept that the zygote/embryo/fetus has some kind of claim to be born." Did you get that? Any honest reading of her words would lead to the inevitable conclusion that Pollitt believes that the unborn human has no "claim to be born."
Pollitt was responding directly to Saletan's op/ed in The New York Times. In her view, Saletan was simply giving away the store by admitting that abortion was indeed a serious moral issue and that it is a "bad" reality in and of itself.
From their initial exchange in the Times and The Nation, Saletan and Pollitt continued their debate at Slate.com. Their exchange took the form of lengthy letters addressed to each other, with Saletan first clarifying what he really intended to say as he argued about abortion in moral terms. "I'm no fan of the language of sin," he clarified. "But I don't see why we have to shrink from words like good and bad. It's bad to cause a pregnancy in a situation where you're going to end up having an abortion. It's bad to cause a pregnancy in a situation where you can't be a good mom or dad. Our high rates of unintended pregnancy and abortion are a collective moral problem. If we don't want the government to tell us what to do, we'd better address the problem individually."
Beyond this, Saletan also told Pollitt that his purpose was not to create a movement that would combine pro-choicers with the pro-life. Instead, "I'm trying to form a coalition with the public," he suggested.
Saletan is an ardent supporter of abortion rights, but he positions himself in something of a centrist position--at least his position looks somewhat centrist with Katha Pollitt as background. He is concerned that when Pollitt dismisses any claim to life on the part of the fetus, she confuses the fetus with the zygote, "alienating people who see the difference and might support us if they realize we care about it." This is an interesting move, and a move I believe to be destined to fail.
Why? Because Saletan's effort to suggest that the fetus might have some claim to life while the zygote evidently does not, is based in no clear or compelling scientific definition of life. The human continuum begins with the union of the sperm and the egg and continues throughout gestation and life until natural death. At no point along this continuum does the life suddenly "become" human. Such arguments are based upon convenient abstractions or arbitrarily chosen capacities or characteristics. Pollitt's position is truly abhorrent and radical, but it is at least consistent.
Responding to Saletan, Pollitt accuses him of offering no real rationale for why abortion should be seen as "so outrageous, so terribly morally offensive, so wrong." She is willing to speak of abortion as a "difficult" decision, but that is about all. She explains that opposition to abortion is really an extension of an effort to deny sexual freedom to women, and to stigmatize sex outside of marriage. She identifies this with what she sees as the nation's "already broad, deep strain of sexual Puritanism, shame and blame."
Responding to Pollitt, Saletan clarified his position: "This is why I use the word 'bad.' It upsets many people on the left, but for the same reason, it wakes up people in the middle. It's new, and in my opinion, it's true. (I don't use the word 'wrong,' because to me that implies a prohibitive conclusion. 'Bad' is a consideration. Abortion can be a less-bad option than continuing a pregnancy. In that case, it's bad but not wrong.)"
Pollitt remained unmoved. "Morality has to do with rights and duties and obligations between people," she insisted. "So, no: I do not think terminating a pregnancy is wrong. A potential person is not a person, any more than an acorn is an oak tree. I don't think women should have to give birth just because a sperm met an egg. I think women have the right to consult their own wishes, needs, and capacities and produce only loved, wanted children they can care for--or even no children at all. I think we would all be better off as a society if we respected women's ability to make these decisions for themselves and concentrated on caring well for the born. There is certainly enough work there to keep us all very busy."
In the end, Saletan appeared to have retreated somewhat from his argument about the moral status of abortion, but the very fact that he addressed the issue so clearly and candidly is telling in itself. As for Pollitt, she was eventually willing to admit that abortion is "icky." As she explained this term: "I think that expresses rather well how lots of people feel about abortion: They may not find it immoral or want to see it made illegal, but it disturbs them. It just seems like a bad thing."
Why should pro-lifers pay attention to this debate among advocates of abortion rights? The answer to that question is simple--the exchange between William Saletan and Katha Pollitt demonstrates the inherent weakness of the pro-abortion argument, or its pro-choice variant. Lacking any objective definition of human life and the status of the unborn, the pro-abortion movement is mired in a pattern of endless internal debates and confusions. Saletan's argument is less radical than Pollitt's, but his position is morally arbitrary, based more in pragmatic concern than in moral philosophy.
In any event, the exchange between William Saletan and Katha Pollitt indicates that the pro-abortion movement knows that it has work to do in reaching the hearts and minds of Americans. The pro-life movement had better remind itself of the same challenge. Both sides are locked in a race to reach the hearts and minds of those still stuck in the middle.
MHG, I'm sure you could give a good rebuttal to my arguments here.
Are all group moralities merely "rationalizations"?
That's a fine philosophic point. But if you live in a totalitarian state that does not recognize "rights endowed by the creator", then what good are such "rights"?
In the end, if the government does not recognize such rights, or the people do not rise up and seize them (as the Founders did), then in practical terms they don't exist. Which is the current case for an unborn human in this country, that has no rights at all. That needs to change.
I've seen this argument before, and don't accept it simply because virtually everything is defined as an "arbitrary" point in time. Quite frankly I can't think of anything that's defined by a single, instantaneous event off the top of my head (but I'm sure you or others could if I were to press that point).
The point is though that I see nothing wrong with defining human (or any sexually reproduced) life as beginning at fertilization. Fertilization being defined (for the purposes of this post) as when all the chromosomes in question have fused to form a new genome. Whenever that is in the microcosmic world is rather irrelevant, because I know of no biochemist, microbologist, or physician that would argue that "one" event takes more than an hour after the initial invasion of the sperm through the egg's membrane. An hour at most.
I put the word one in quotes in that last sentence because you're correct palmer, that it doesn't happen "instantaneously", but that biological fact is irrelevant to this conversation, unless somehow we could have the ability to abort a fertilized egg before the chromosomes fully assembled, something that's simply impossible, by all practical means. I suppose it could biologically be done, in a lab, but why? The only thing I could think of that could come close in the real world would be the "morning after pill", but even that doesn't actually stop the process of proper chromosomal formation, it merely prohibits implantation.
Now you may return to your original point that it's merely an arbitrary time point selected, thus not really "scientific", but as you admitted in your first post, your 8-10 week point is arbitrary as well. You may say, "It's not only arbitrary but scientific because of the formation of neurons". Well, what's wrong with the scientific fact that all humans have 46 (or sometimes 47) chromosomes, and thus anytime that such a cell is formed, it's a unique human life? Why can't that be used to "scientifically" validate the arbitrary "life begins at fertilization" argument, just as you use a scientific fact to validate your arbitrary "8-10 week" argument?
You either support abortion or you're against it. There is no middle ground. There is no reason to draw the line anywhere other than at fertilization, or at actual birth, 9 months later. Anywhere inbetween is just hazy, feel good rationalization and comprimise. But when talking about babies, there can be no comprimise (or at least there shouldn't be).
No, I'm only suggesting rationalization has occured when people admit that they have empathy that matches their group morality but insist that their group morality is not (or can't be) derived from the empathy of individuals in the group.
My definition does not do that. It relies on the human form and human functions to help protect humanity. I aim specifically at protecting rather than definitions because empathy is a protective emotion that will protect unborn children which laws will always fail to do. You may call that hazy feel-good rationalization, but empathy, like other emotions is not triggered by a microscopic physical change occuring at some arbitrary point in the course of an hour. It is, like all emotions, a "hazy feel-good" phenomenon in the brain. That's simply the reality of emotions.
You have just two choices, deny the reality or role of empathy or supress it, or use it and show that empathy is possible at the earliest stages of humanity and harness the power of emotion to protect those earliest human forms.
chromosome not chromozone
That is a silly and specious argument. There is certainly a point in time before which sperm and egg have fused. There is certainly a point in time after which they have unquestionably fused. That there is no single femtosecond at which fusion takes place is beside the point.
Abortion doesn't kill zygotes, anyway. It kills unborn kids long after they look human, have brainwaves, and beating hearts.
You make a compelling argument, but I disagree simply because I don't agree chromosome number is a "metaphysical" distinction.
It's a scientific fact that most humans have 46 chromosomes. Some have 47 (Down's syndrome) and some may have less (I don't know of any less than 46 off the top of my head, but for the sake of argument, let's say you're right there) That's not really a relevant point though, IMO, because the scientific community already knows about such cases. Are you going to say that Down's syndrome babies (or any other humans born with abnormal chromosome numbers) aren't really human?
Of course you wouldn't. So, since we already know of every chromosome number in the human family, why can't we use the completed process of chromosome formation as a starting point? Are you worried that there may be some human down the road born with 50 chromosomes (something not observed presently) that would throw the defintion out of whack?
If that's the case, then you're missing the point of my definition. I'm not saying to define human life by the NUMBER of chromosomes, but rather to define it's beginning at the point when chromosome formation has completed. However many actual chromosome pairs that forms is irrelevant. The point is that in a human woman, once the chromosomes have paired up, I think that's a perfectly valid starting point.
In a human woman, chromosomes fully formed, can only be one thing, human life. Unless you're worried about the possibility of extraterrestrial manipulation or something.
I realize that and I use empathy to protect those children, not metaphysical arguments about sperm/egg fusion.
I agree that a lot of empathy can be generated for newborns. Children who are almost born, or are late term can generate a lot when you study them closely using ultrasound, etc. Obviously a premature birth generates even more empathy since you feel for the struggle and pain that the infant endures. All that understanding does translate back to, and protect the unborn.
Chromosome completion as an metaphysical cutoff for humanness does not leverage empathy per se. It is a metaphysical distinction, not a strong generator of morality like empathy. There are indeed humans with less than 46 chromosomes. My empathy would protect them as strongly if not more strongly than any other human.
Chromosome "formation" is just like chromosome numbers, a metaphysical distinction not definable as a moment in reality. Do you really want chomosome scientists deciding moral issues? I empathize greatly with humans who have incomplete chromosomes, their struggles, their pain, but also their ability to be human (to love, etc).
Yes, I apologize for the confusion. I corrected that in the post above.
A single cell has no human form or function except for same one that almost any other cell in your body have: survival and reproduction mechanisms. But single cells that are human beings are special, I don't mean to trivialize them, they just don't have the human form and function that generates a lot of empathy that would protect them.
Chromosome completion as an metaphysical cutoff for humanness does not leverage empathy per se. It is a metaphysical distinction, not a strong generator of morality like empathy. There are indeed humans with less than 46 chromosomes. My empathy would protect them as strongly if not more strongly than any other human.
First point, maybe it doesn't engender empathy, but it should, that's my point. To simply say, "Oh, this looks like a baby, that makes it a baby" is not a very valid argument. What about babies born without limbs? Are they less a baby because they don't "look the part"?
I'm certain you would answer, "of course not". Thus, the ultimate point is, "What about babies with no discernable features whatsoever? Are they any less a baby simply because they don't look the part?"
I understand your argument, and it's a compelling one. You're saying that to engender support for the pro-life movement, we should make an appeal to emotion. Ultimately appeals to emotion aren't a valid argument and in fact are a common fallacy of logic.
That's my second point. If we rely on the unstable and subjective nature of human emotion, we won't really get anywhere because such a basis is shaky ground. What will we do if in 100 years human emotion becomes so seared that "masses of cells" aren't regarded as human beings, even at 8-10 weeks? Ooops, we're already there in today's society.
You keep saying that as if there are any one moments that define the reality of a situation. I know of very few. Clearly the majority of situations aren't defined by a mathematical instant in time, but a progression through time (admittedly some are nearly instantaneous, but still NOT instantaneous just the same).
Who said anything about chromosome scientists deciding moral issues? We already know that the first process completed by fertilization is chromosome formation. That will never change as a scientific fact, no matter how many "chromosome scientists" say otherwise in the future. So what's wrong with using the very first thing a fertilized egg does as the starting point?
You are trying to use emotion as the basis for your argument. I have addressed that in the post above, please read that as well.
I am not proposing emotion alone, but emotion combined with reason. Appeals to emotion may strictly be fallacies of reason, but they are strong, compelling and essential for a strong moral foundation.
That's my second point. If we rely on the unstable and subjective nature of human emotion, we won't really get anywhere because such a basis is shaky ground. What will we do if in 100 years human emotion becomes so seared that "masses of cells" aren't regarded as human beings, even at 8-10 weeks? Ooops, we're already there in today's society.
We are already desensitized enough to promote murder in the abstract. Empathy is long gone from the media and politics, but exists in large quantities in most all decent Americans, even many mainstream liberals. I propose to cultivate empathy to solve this problem, not ignore the role of empathy in forming personal (and thus societal) moral foundations. The alternative is metaphysical arguments which manifest as scientific measurements. I ask again, do you really want chromosome specialists deciding what is human and what is not?
I didn't address "looking the part". The babies with recently fused chomosomes don't look any different from the eggs without, so there is no way to "look" human at that point. I understand and value the fact that they are human at that point, but I recognize that empathy is difficult (but not impossible) to apply at that point. After that, human form and function always manifest, there is no possibility that it can't and still survive. The earliest formation of neurons (IIRC 8-9 weeks) is an obvious form and function generating empathy. No arms is obviously deserving of empathy, probably more than a baby with arms.
I have never suggested that.
Yours is the last word on this thread though, as I believe we have reached a point where we must agree to disagree. I simply cannot accept that emotion must be part of this argument, because it was emotionalism, whipped up by the feminists in the 70's ("we must let abortion be legal, because what about all those women raped!", and those type of emotional arguments) that got us into this predicament in the first place.
You disagree. So ok. I will never support any comprimise though, especially not one that relies on emotion, even if only as one part of the whole argument, which is what you propose.
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