N. Korea Already Had 10 Nukes In 1994--Clinton/N.Korea Deal A Big Lie!!

Foreign Affairs Daily ^ | July 31, 1994 | Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS

[SBD1]

1994 Report 1: The North Korean Nuclear Arsenal is Deployed, Despite Face-Saving Agreements With the US The following report appeared in the July 31, 1994, edition of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy .North Korea and the United States were preparing, in August [1994], to sign a deal which would "resolve their differences" over the DPRK's military nuclear development. But the deal is merely intended to save face for all concerned. North Korea -- the DPRK -- already has deployed a substantial number of nuclear weapons and the US is not prepared to confront the matter. Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily November 19, 2002 Tuesday

Copyright 2002 Defense & Foreign Affairs/International Strategic Studies Association
Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily
November 19, 2002 Tuesday
SECTION: Vol. XX, No. 194

LENGTH: 4058 words

HEADLINE: 1994 Report 1: The North Korean Nuclear Arsenal is Deployed, Despite Face-Saving Agreements With the US
The following report appeared in the July 31, 1994, edition of Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy .
North Korea and the United States were preparing, in August [1994], to sign a deal which would "resolve their differences" over the DPRK's military nuclear development. But the deal is merely intended to save face for all concerned. North Korea -- the DPRK -- already has deployed a substantial number of nuclear weapons and the US is not prepared to confront the matter.

BODY:
By Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS. The US And the DPRK were due to agree in August [1994] the outline of a wide-ranging accord to resolve their differences on the North Korean nuclear program. The essence of the deal is that the US will provide North Korea with a light-water reactor, "make arrangements for interim energy alternatives" for the DPRK (euphemism for the supply of oil), and work "to reduce barriers to trade and investment" so as to generally improve the North Korean economy. In return, "upon receipt of US assurances" that the above conditions are being implemented, the DPRK "will freeze construction" of its bigger graphite-cooled reactors, "seal the Radiochemical Laboratory" (its main processing facilities), "forego" reprocessing of the 4,000 rods (even though the IAEA still will not have access to them), and accept a yet-to-be-determined regime of IAEA inspections.

The overriding principle of this new Geneva accord is that North Korea is merely freezing some of its nuclear activities in return for a huge incentive package. None of the DPRK's nuclear installations would be destroyed, while the US and its allies would be providing another reactor as well as resolving many of the DPRK's endemic energy supply and economic problems. Washington seems to believe that once these measures are adopted, Pyongyang would no longer be able to procure nuclear weapons, save for the "one or two" devices it already has.

Little could be further from reality.

North Korea -- the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) -- already has close to 10 operational nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles, and two nuclear devices that can be carried by truck or transport aircraft. All the weapons are 50kt nuclear warheads, each weighing around 500kg (1,100lb.). All the DPRK's ballistic missiles can carry nuclear warheads.

The DPRK already has over 120 NoDong-1s, and a few hundred NK-Scud-Bs and NK-Scud-Cs, in operational service.

In late March 1993, the DPRK completed the development of the upgraded NoDong-1 "which may be equipped with nuclear warhead" with a 1,300km range. The DPRK is also accelerating the development of a new SSM, the NoDong-2, estimated to have a range of 1,500-2,000km. The test launching of the first NoDong-2 prototypes is expected in 1994-95 and, barring a major setback, the NoDong-2 will become operational in 1996-97. Therefore, the NoDong-2 can be pressed into operational service under extreme conditions. The DPRK, along with the PRC and Iran, is also developing a new generation of ballistic missiles far  more accurate than the NoDong family and optimized for nuclear warheads.

The SSMs, the TaepoDong-1 and the TaepoDong-2, will have ranges of 2,000 and 3,500km respectively. A modified TaepoDong-2 will be able to reach a range of 9,600km. More advanced nuclear-tipped SSMs, such as the NoDong-X, are also near entry into operational service.

The proposed closing down of the DPRK's 5mw reactor will have no impact whatsoever on the DPRK's current and near-term operational nuclear capabilities. This discrepancy between the White House's assessment and reality reflects the two fundamental approaches to intelligence analysis. The first relies primarily on finding and verification by technical means: from space-based collection systems to a variety of sensors and measuring systems of such international bodies as the IAEA. The second relies primarily on human sources: defectors, spies, intelligence officers and other resources.

At the crux of the DPRK's nuclear "problem" is the amount of plutonium extracted from the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon. Washington insists that there is no verifiable evidence that plutonium was extracted but once in 1989. Therefore, the DPRK could not have the plutonium needed for nuclear weapons. This approach has already failed two major tests.

Since June 1992, activities intensified in the DPRK's primary nuclear weapons site at Yongbyon, an elaborate underground complex called Building 500. Pyongyang argued that the building was merely a nuclear waste storage site. In early 1993, the IAEA inspectors requested access to Building 500 to confirm what it was. The DPRK not only refused, but announced its withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Korean People's Army (KPA) quickly established 40 military encampments, three airbases, a major ammunition depot, and deployed some 300 heavy anti-aircraft guns around the entire Yongbyon complex. The IAEA's continued insistence on inspecting Building 500 resulted in the DPRK's declaring the Semi-War State, ordering mobilization of its armed forces. Presumably, North Korea would not have risked war over a dump site.

In early May 1994, the DPRK violated the remnants of its agreement with the IAEA. Ignoring warnings from the US and the UN, including explicit threats of sanctions, the DPRK cancelled the IAEA inspections. The North Koreans quickly removed 4,000 fuel rods from the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon, making it impossible to measure if any plutonium had ever been removed. Measuring the extent of a possible removal of plutonium from these fuel rods is the key to verifying through technical means the size of the North Korean nuclear arsenal.

By theoretical calculations alone, the 5mw reactor could have produced since 1990 enough plutonium for four to six nuclear weapons. Defectors insist that plutonium had been extracted clandestinely over the years and used for the production of nuclear warheads. Therefore, only sampling and measurements of the fuel rods undertaken by IAEA inspectors on site in Yongbyon would have been able to either confirm or dispel the defectors' accounts about the size of the North Korean military nuclear program. Pyongyang has repeatedly denied having any military nuclear program, let alone weapons. Therefore, the DPRK's adamant refusal to allow any inspection and measurement of the rods to the point of escalating the crisis to the verge of UN sanctions and possible US military action cannot but indicate that the DPRK has something to hide.

An explanation can be found in the persistent flow of information from North Korean defectors, as well as sources from Russia, the PRC, and other countries, about all aspects of the development of nuclear weapons in Yongbyon.

The DPRK secretly and incrementally removed plutonium from the 5mw reactor. Kim Dai-Ho, a former official at a North Korean reprocessing plant in Yongbyon who defected in May 1994, reported that back in 1988 the DPRK had secretly removed 12 kg [26.4 lb] of plutonium from this reactor. This fuel was used to produce the first two nuclear devices completed in 1990-1. It was recently learned that the DPRK suspended the reactor operation annually since 1989. Stoppages were for 71 days in 1989, 30-odd days in 1990, and 50-odd days in 1991. In these three years alone, the DPRK could have extracted additional 22-27kg (48.4-59.4lb) plutonium, enough for three to five weapons. Comparable quantities of plutonium were since then removed from the reactor incrementally and used in the production of the DPRK's growing arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the DPRK succeeded to acquire 56kg (123.2lb) of plutonium from the CIS in early 1992, sufficient for the production of 10 additional warheads. The first of these was completed in the Spring of 1993.

This data fits closely with a growing volume of information on the DPRK's nuclear arsenal. There is close agreement between the reports on the number of weapons and the reported extraction of plutonium.

A KGB document of February 22, 1990, stated that the DPRK already had nuclear weapons and the "development of the first atomic explosive device [had] been completed" in Yongbyon. The KGB added that Kim Jong-Il "personally controls" the DPRK's military nuclear program which is aimed at "achieving military superiority over South Korea" as well as realizing "the prestigious aim of becoming one of the states possessing such weapons."

Yi Chung-Kuk, a Sergeant in a KPA chemical warfare unit who defected in mid-March 1994, disclosed that he had "heard on several occasions beginning in 1991 from high-ranking military cadres and his senior officers that North Korea has already completed nuclear weapons development." Ko Yong-Hwan, a high level official who defected in the Autumn of 1991, reported that Pyongyang expected to have a nuclear arsenal by 1993, at which point the DPRK would be able to produce three to five "small nuclear bombs" a year. Subsequent improvements raised the annual production rates to about five warheads from plutonium extracted at Yongbyon and another two to three warheads from the plutonium acquired from the CIS.

On the basis of a great volume of data from multiple sources, it was possible to conclude in mid-1993 that the DPRK already had about six nuclear weapons in operational status. Four of them were 50kt warheads for the ballistic missiles. At the very least, the DPRK had already "virtually completed" these six nuclear weapons and they were stored at "laboratory nuclear devices" status. In early 1994 there were specific reports that these warheads were being readied for war.

In order to confirm the status of the North Korean military nuclear capabilities, a high level delegation of West European diplomats and experts based in Beijing visited the DPRK in the early winter of 1993. Returning from Pyongyang in mid-December 1993, the delegation reported that the DPRK had "several atomic bombs and the vehicles to launch them". The delegation confirmed much of the data provided by defectors, including that North Korea "has built several kilo[ton]-size bombs". On the basis of the DPRK's verified plutonium production at Yongbyon alone, the delegation concluded that the DPRK already had "at least half a dozen bombs" to be delivered by a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles.

The latest assessment of the magnitude of the North Korean nuclear arsenal was provided by Kang Myong-To, the son-in-law of Kang Song-San, the DPRK's prime minister, who defected in May 1994. He reported that the DPRK "already [possessed] five nuclear warheads" in October 1993, and would have about 10 warheads by the end of 1994. The delivery platform is "long-range missiles". Kang Myong-To stressed that he had learned this information from "a responsible official of the State Security Department, who is in charge of security of the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon".

Thus, there is ample evidence that the DPRK currently has at least seven or eight nuclear warheads (as well as two devices) and that by the end of the year will have more than 10 warheads. It is noteworthy that the available multiple-source data about the extraction of plutonium, weapon production rates, and the size of the North Korean nuclear arsenal closely fit.

With this in mind, the value of the IAEA inspections should be questioned. Back in February 1990, the KGB already stressed Pyongyang's "interest of concealing from world opinion and from the controlling international organizations the actual fact of the production of nuclear weapons in the DPRK".

In late January 1994, a highly informed Chinese official reported that he had "recently heard from a senior North Korean official that North Korea is hiding nuclear weapons in an underground warehouse in the mountains near Pyongyang and that any thorough inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities by the United States will fail to locate them". Yi Chung-Kuk also learned "from his senior officer that it will be of no use to inspect Yongbyon because nuclear weapons are being produced at another place."

It is known from other sources that the work on the warheads made from the plutonium acquired in the CIS is conducted away from Pyongyang. In the fall of 1993, a defector reported the existence of "a dreadful underground nuclear plant in the Chagang-Do province in the northern area" where the most sensitive weapon-related activities take place.

Indeed, high-level North Korean defectors have always questioned the validity of the negotiations with the US. Ko Yong-Hwan warned already in mid-1991 that as far as Pyongyang was concerned "negotiations for nuclear safeguards are only a delaying tactic". He explained that the highest levels in Pyongyang concluded in around 1985-86 that they "cannot cope with the situation with conventional (classic) weapons; therefore nuclear weapons must be developed . . . [as] the last means for preserving their political system".

Kang Myong-To has a similar explanation. "North Korea's nuclear development is not intended as a bargaining chip as seen by the Western world, but for the maintenance of its system under the circumstances in which it is faced with economic difficulties and a situation following the collapse of Eastern Europe. . . . Therefore, I think that until at least 10 nuclear warheads are produced, Kim Jong-Il will continue to adopt delaying tactics."

Kang Myong-To stressed that the DPRK acquired its nuclear weapons "to secure an advantageous position in its talks with the United States and Japan. North Korea believes the United States would not be able to attack it then because of nuclear [weapons]". Therefore, he concluded, in no way would the DPRK give up its military nuclear capabilities, because Pyongyang "sees nuclear development as the only means to maintain Kim Jong-Il's regime".

Pyongyang's commitment to acquire nuclear weapons has always had a direct and immediate impact on the KPA. According to KPA Special Forces (Spetsnaz)Cpt. Shin Chung-Chol, since 1980, the KPA officers at the Kim Il-Song Military Academy, the DPRK's highest military institution, "attended a lecture on the 'offensive by the army corps with nuclear attacks' in the tactics course of the college". Cpt. Shin stressed that "the lecture was given in anticipation of North Korea's nuclear attacks against enemies". In early 1994, he added that considering the emphasis put on nuclear warfare among the KPA's elite officers by the early 1980s, "there is no doubt that North Korea has already developed nuclear weapons".

Other former North Korean officers who defected recently portray a chilling scenario for the possible use of the DPRK's nuclear warheads in case of a major crisis. They believe that Pyongyang will order a pre-emptive launch of nuclear strikes against a few select objectives in Japan. "As a pre-emptive strike, nuclear [weapons] would [be used to] attack US military bases in Japan and then launch air raids on Japan's major military bases," explained an officer who defected in 1993. According to another former KPA officer who defected in the fall of 1992, it is virtually common knowledge among the elite units of the KPA that their country has nuclear weapons and that "our missiles could destroy even Japan, the United States, or South Korea".

More likely and no less complex is the potential introduction of a North Korean nuclear ultimatum in the context of a surprise non-nuclear invasion of South Korea. A threat from Pyongyang to hit Japan, including Tokyo, and perhaps Russia, Vladivostok for example, with nuclear weapons in case the United States decides to further intervene in the war is bound to attract attention in Washington. At the very least, deliberations in Washington on the appropriate reaction to the North Korean invasion and the new nuclear threats will take long enough for the KPA, by Pyongyang's own worst case calculations, to complete the encirclement of the Korean Peninsula. At this point, Pyongyang is convinced, the US will give up the war. A senior official at the South Korean Ministry of Defense concurs that Pyongyang's strategy is "to initiate surprise attack on the South and occupy some territory and negotiate for the termination of war, or to deny US reinforcement by threatening to use nuclear weapons."

Another disturbing aspect of the Geneva negotiations is the preoccupation with the 5mw reactor in Yongbyon. The DPRK has numerous other reactors and nuclear facilities the contribution of which to the military nuclear effort is far larger than that of the small old reactor in Yongbyon.

In September 1980, the DPRK began construction on a then 30mw gas cooled reactor, a configuration extremely efficient for producing plutonium. Most construction was completed in 1984, and the reactor was activated in February 1987. The US-educated Prof. Kyong Won Ha is one of the key scientists and engineers behind the 30-50mw reactor in Yongbyon and its configuration into a source of plutonium.

In 1984, the DPRK began the construction of a major new military nuclear complex in the Yongbyon area built around a new reactor estimated at the 50-200mw range, and dedicated for weapons production. Construction was near completion in 1989 and the reactor was tentatively activated in 1992. The construction of auxiliary installations for this reactor was expected to be completed in 1994, in the aftermath of a crash program begun in 1993. Within two years after its full activation, now expected to take place in 1995 at the latest, this reactor alone will be producing enough plutonium for 10-12 weapons a year.

As of late-1991, the DPRK began digging deep tunnels near Yongbyon to shield and conceal the key components of its military nuclear program. A new air defense system was deployed in November 1991, and above ground facilities are being hardened. Meanwhile, a prototype reprocessing facility was completed in 1987 and is producing some 15 kg [33 lb] of plutonium annually. The work on a reprocessing facility for nuclear fuels began around 1988 and it is expected to become operational around 1994. The clandestine plutonium factory for the nuclear weapons, which is called by the DPRK "radiological laboratory", is a single story building constructed on top the main plutonium reprocessing facility that is now buried deep underground. Meanwhile, since mid 1993, the DPRK has doubled its capacity to produce plutonium by installing a second production line in the main reprocessing facility.

Moreover, the DPRK also built highly secret underground facilities in Pakchon. Since underground facilities are extremely difficult to reconstruct, the mere fact that the DPRK has committed itself to underground military nuclear facilities reflects self-confidence in its technological capabilities.

Meanwhile, since the early 1980s, the DPRK gained access to both Iranian Western-educated scientists and the Libyan clandestine procurement infrastructure for Western technology. Tehran and Tripoli convinced Pyongyang to significantly expand its military nuclear program even before the initial phase was complete. Consequently, in the mid-1980s, the DPRK had access to Western nuclear technology, mainly West German, through the strategic cooperation between the DPRK, Libya, Syria, and Iran. Indeed, Ko Yong-Hwan confirmed that the North Korean nuclear program utilized diversified technology from West European sources. Indeed, key components of the DPRK's new 50mw research reactor, built near the submarine base in Sinpo, are German-made. Like the Yongbyon complex, the Sinpo reactor is the center of a large scale underground complex. Simultaneously, in May 1989, the DPRK and the GDR signed a comprehensive agreement on the transfer of "substantial" amounts of German nuclear technology and nuclear weapons materials, including enriched uranium, to Pyongyang.

Meanwhile, the DPRK continues to expand its already large nuclear infrastructure. By late 1993, some 20 facilities related to nuclear development were identified and there are not yet fully confirmed reports about several other facilities. Telling is the ongoing construction of large scale reactors, such as the 200mw reactor in Taechon and the 635mw reactor in Simpo. Ostensibly built as commercial-purpose reactors, these are old-type graphite-moderated and gas cooled reactors that are relatively unsafe and their efficiency relatively low when compared to more modern technologies long used in the West. However, reactors of this design produce extremely large quantities of plutonium, the key ingredient in nuclear weapons, as a by-product of their activities even with natural, low-quality uranium. Thus, the reactor building program of the DPRK testifies to Pyongyang's commitment to markedly expand its nuclear weapons program in the very near future, for a few large reactors are expected to become "hot" in the next few years.

Completely disregarding the real magnitude of the North Korean military nuclear effort, the US-DPRK negotiations on nuclear issues were scheduled to resume in Geneva in early August 1994. They are still based on the premise that no North Korean extraction of plutonium from the 5mw reactor has been confirmed except for one case in 1989. The negotiations continue even though the DPRK stresses that it would not permit access to Building 500 or an IAEA examination of the fuel rods (even though all evidence of extraction had already been destroyed). Moreover, the DPRK informed the US that it will continue to expand its nuclear program and complete the 50mw and 200mw reactors in Yongbyon, until it gets a Russian-made modern light-water reactor and other economic incentives. The accord expected to be reached in Geneva in August changes none of these provisions.

The Geneva accord constitutes a profound change in US policy concerning the North Korean nuclear arsenal. Washington gave up on preventing the DPRK from becoming a nuclear power. Washington even no longer insists on verifying the extent of the North Korean arsenal through IAEA inspection. Instead, the US opted to appease and bribe North Korea with the hope that Pyongyang would freeze its nuclear build-up. Washington is buying time while maintaining the charade that the DPRK does not have nuclear weapons. Consequently, the US and its allies have settled into the do-nothing-for-now mode, merely postponing the hour of reckoning.

All that time, Washington is getting used to the fact, although without acknowledging it publicly, that the threat of North Korean nuclear blackmail is already pending.

Meanwhile, the economic crisis in North Korea continues to grow. Only drastic measures can reverse the imminent economic collapse. Currently, Pyongyang has two viable options: to attempt a regional nuclear extortion, demanding that the US, Japan and ROK rebuilds its economy, or to launch an all out effort at the realization of the sacred unification by force.

The Geneva accord seems to be an implicit surrender to Pyongyang's extortion. However, the North Korean economy is in such a dismal state, that the West cannot afford the investments required for a short term reversal, even at the price of a debilitating recession in the US and the Pacific Rim. The Geneva accord simply creates false expectations and pushes the hour for drastic measures further away.

Kang Myong-To relayed that, according to the above cited official of the State Security Department, Pyongyang's position is that "by 1994, if we are capable of possessing about 10 [nuclear weapons], we will be able to make it known to the international community, and to hold the North-US talks or South-North summit talks from a position of advantage".

Left unclear is in what form will such announcement take place. Given the overall context of Pyongyang's acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is quite likely that the announcement will come as a nuclear ultimatum, perhaps during an invasion.

Moreover, even if the Geneva record is implemented, and even if there is no new Korean War in 1994, the North Korean nuclear threat to the US will only continue to rise. Most important, by the mid to late 1990s the DPRK will field the nuclear-tipped NoDong-X ICBM that, with a range of over 6,000 km, is capable of reaching the continental US. Considering the intensity of the development work, barring a major setback, early models of the NoDong-X may become operational as early as 1996-97. This fact alone will introduce a whole new dimension to the crisis in Korea. Hence, the looming specter of the new Korean War, with its nuclear component, remains with us for as long as Kim Jong-Il and his Administration remain in power in Pyongyang.

LOAD-DATE: November 18, 2002

[Marine_Uncle]

He and his administration got away with so much. I cannot figure out how GB senior and junior even want to stand in the same room with this American traitor. They treat him with a respect he does deserve.

[Ernest_at_the_Beach]

Guessing you meant... Does Not deserve....

[Marine_Uncle]

Yep. Sorry. As for Albright. She should be hold off in leg irons with the rest of the band of misfits. Frigen clowns.