Disaster response (Katrina Busses Alert)

No image of the post-Katrina calamity is stronger than the tens of thousands of urban storm survivors awaiting rescue for days.

Stranded residents at the Superdome, Convention Center, a Metairie interstate intersection and a Chalmette port grew restless and combative as temperatures soared, people died around them and getting basic necessities -- food and water -- became a daily battle.

"They wanted to know where help was. So did we, quite frankly," said Louisiana National Guard Maj. Ed Bush, who shared the nightmare at the downtown Superdome with up to 20,000 stranded people.

Hurricane Katrina slammed into southeast Louisiana early Monday, Aug. 29. Evacuation buses didn't start showing up in large numbers until Thursday. And some people didn't get picked up until Saturday afternoon.

What happened in between? Why did it take so long? Here are some answers, based on interviews and limited public records made available:

# New Orleans Regional Transit Authority buses weren't available. Most were flooded by the same waters that trapped residents. Buses that could have taken people out of the city before the storm did not.

# Buses that the Federal Emergency Management Agency promised reportedly within hours of Katrina's landfall weren't actually ordered until early Wednesday.

# State government didn't have transportation assets to send. It would take days to mobilize a fleet of school buses from throughout the state.

# There was no emergency plan for moving people before or after the hurricane -- just a general framework that was yet to be fleshed out.

It's been almost two months since Katrina. But questions continue about pre-Katrina preparation and post-Katrina response.

The Advocate made public records requests for documents from key state and federal players and agencies. But little information has been provided about what happened immediately before and after the hurricane and the levee breaks that flooded the city.

Gov. Kathleen Blanco refused to release documents requested from her office, citing a state law that shields her office from disclosure.

Blanco's executive counsel, Terry Ryder, said late last week that the governor's office is complying with requests for similar documents from two congressional committees. The many documents are being compiled, and they will be made public, he said.

Federal officials as of last week had not produced records involving the roles played by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and former Federal Emergency Management Agency director Michael Brown and their offices.

But interviews, research of emergency operations plans, and some public documents reveal that the emergency response planners knew what had to happen in the wake of a hurricane that brought such destruction.

It was the delivery of the response -- who, what, when, why and how, as state Office of Homeland Security operations chief Lt. Col. Bill Doran puts it -- that was missing for the gigantic operation that had to occur.

Two weeks before Hurricane Katrina put its indelible mark on Louisiana, and New Orleans in particular, a group of emergency planning officials finished general planning for a disaster similar to that about to unfold. It was the fictitious Hurricane Pam. Federal, state and New Orleans officials were involved in the FEMA-funded project.

Some of the general planning bore fruit, agreed Doran and state medical director Dr. Jimmy Guidry, who participated in the planning exercise.

For instance, the state Department of Wildlife and Fisheries was ready with boats and the U.S. Coast Guard with helicopters for rescue operations as soon as Katrina's winds dropped enough -- not the numbers that would eventually be required, but a quick response.

And responders were ready to set up medical needs shelters and knew what federal resources to tap. Guidry already had sites in mind and medical supplies on standby. He quickly activated a national medical network, with out-of-state hospitals ready to accept patients that would have overwhelmed local facilities.

But the rest of the planning was still a work in progress: How do you move that many people? Where do you take them? How do you get food, water and other essential supplies to tens of thousands of people needing evacuation as well as those trying to help them? How do you handle the basic logistics?

Up to 90 percent, or 1.2 million, of the area's population heeded evacuation warnings, officials estimate. Absent that, the death toll over 1,000 in Louisiana would have been far greater.

But many residents either couldn't or didn't want to evacuate. They became the basis of a real-life exercise that tested the nation's emergency response system.

The Superdome's population was about 10,000 Sunday night, Aug. 28, the day before Katrina hit. The numbers doubled quickly after the storm as more survivors showed up and survivors rescued from rooftops and watery streets were dropped off.

"It was horrible, absolutely unlivable," said Bush. It was a daily struggle to get food and water, but people did, he said. There were six deaths -- including one drug overdose and a suicide jumper, he said. There were fights, but no little girl with a slit throat as was widely reported, he said.

Meanwhile, at Interstate 10 and Causeway Boulevard in Metairie, a State Police trooper reported finding "a large number of hostile evacuees" Tuesday, long before crowds swelled to as high as 10,000. The hostility, the trooper wrote, "could be attributed to the long wait to be rescued and the long wait to be transported to various shelters."

He went on to suggest the obvious: To avoid future hostile situations, get transportation and shelters lined up more quickly.

As thousands of storm survivors waited for transportation out, hundreds of nearby New Orleans transit system buses couldn't be used.

New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin said that, before the storm hit, the buses were moved to higher ground that traditionally didn't flood. But this time the area, like 80 percent of New Orleans, did flood.

Even if the buses hadn't flooded, Nagin said, drivers would have been in short supply because many left town.

FEMA pre-positions supplies ahead of storms so it can be ready to respond quickly afterward. Pre-Katrina water, MREs (meals ready to eat), cots, pallets of tarps, blankets and plastic sheeting were stored as close as Camp Beauregard near Alexandria and as far away as Atlanta, Ga.

Within hours of Katrina hitting on Monday, FEMA promised to deliver buses, according to Blanco.

On Tuesday, Blanco aide Leonard Kleinpeter recalled, the governor asked him to start trying to arrange for use of school buses.

FEMA relies on the U.S. Department of Transportation, which has a contract with a provider to locate for-hire buses and other types of transportation and get them to staging areas.

Federal transportation records show FEMA gave the agency the go-ahead at 12:45 a.m. Wednesday, Aug. 31. Five hours later, buses were being dispatched from points around the country to LaPlace, 25 miles west of New Orleans, and by midnight some 200 buses had arrived.

By the end of Thursday, there were 657 buses on hand. By Friday there were 935 buses and by Saturday 1,094 buses.

In congressional testimony earlier this month, U.S. Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta blamed FEMA for holding up his department's efforts to move people out of New Orleans. He said buses that arrived in the first wave Wednesday sat there because FEMA didn't give orders to move.

"What we heard from drivers who arrived at the rallying point in the first hours of the first day was that dispatch operations of the buses were being handled on a piecemeal basis," said DOT spokesman Brian Turmail.

"Some districts wanted to go ahead and have school. They thought 'It's a hurricane. It's over. We can start school tomorrow,'" Kleinpeter said.

At nearly midnight Wednesday, Blanco issued an executive order commandeering school buses. "We had to move," Kleinpeter said.

"There was no time for negotiation," with school systems, said Ryder, who drafted the order as well as one issued the next day that allowed more types of people to drive the buses.

Blanco's office called Capital Area Transit System CEO Dwight Brashear Wednesday evening as the bus order was being crafted to seek his help coordinating bus rescue missions. He reported for duty at the state emergency operations center early Thursday morning.

That same morning, the state Department of Education official who deals with transportation issues, Donna Nola-Gainey, was called in to make phone calls and get commitments for buses.

"Instead of waiting for a call from school districts to say what's available, we became more aggressive," said Brashear. "Our goal Thursday was getting commitments and getting 1,000 buses coming toward us."

More buses started arriving Thursday, and the numbers continued to increase into Friday, he said.

Nola-Gainey said education officials estimate that approximately 700 buses were dispatched from all over the state. Brashear, who coordinated the movement of the buses with the 5th Army division, puts the number closer to 1,000 buses.

Some 15,000 to 20,000 people were moved using the school buses, according to data received from school systems.

The highway coaches FEMA brought in were being used to transport people to shelters in Houston, Dallas and other cities outside Louisiana, Brashear said. Some school buses made the long hauls into Texas too, he said. But those were exceptions, he said.

"If you got on a school bus, chances are you were headed to the airport and being airlifted out of there," Brashear said.

The first FEMA buses to start moving the crowds didn't show up until Thursday about 10 a.m. at the Superdome, Bush recalls. About 70 buses were filled and sent off. Then it was several hours before others showed up, he said.

But the activity started stepping up and by Saturday evening the Dome rescue was pretty much finished. More people kept showing up even into Sunday needing transportation out, Bush said.

At I-10 and Causeway Boulevard, the once sea of evacuees was pretty much cleared by 1:15 p.m. Saturday, according to news accounts.

By week's end, the wait for a way out was also over for those who had made the New Orleans Convention Center an impromptu shelter and those who had to be ferried, then bused, from the St. Bernard port.

New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin said that, before the storm hit, the buses were moved to higher ground that traditionally didn't flood. But this time the area, like 80 percent of New Orleans, did flood.

Hey genius mayor Nagin, what good were the buses going to do anyone............ parked ANYWHERE (higher ground or lower ground) AFTER the levees broke???

You are "stuck on stupid".

New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin said that, before the storm hit, the buses were moved to higher ground that traditionally didn't flood. But this time the area, like 80 percent of New Orleans, did flood.

Give someone a break enough to understand that everyone has habits. Storm's coming? Park the busses on (what in New Orleans had in the past passed as) high ground.
The problem here was the single ~~decision not to~~ failure to decide to order mandatory evacuation - of the nursing homes in particular - in a timely fashion.
When my Dad died I was stunned at my own indecisive behavior. A friend who had been an officer in the Navy told me, "In the Navy we drilled for emergencies all the time. It was amazing - when the real thing hit you couldn't do things by the numbers." It can just be hard to accept that "this is the real thing."
The famous first report of the bombing of Pear Harbor said, "Air Raid, Pearl Harbor. This is no drill." And after some soldiers struggled to get to the armory to get ammunition to shoot at the Japanese attackers, the sergent in charge wouldn't release the ammo without orders. At a subsequent hearing he was asked under what conditions he would dispense the ammo without a requisition and he replied, "Only in an emergency."
"This is an emergency" is a thought. "You will release those school busses to people you don't know who are willing to drive them - or be arrested" is an emergency action. Nagin and Blanco knew it was an emergency; they just could not get things done in an emergency.

Nagin and Blanco knew it was an emergency; they just could not get things done in an emergency.

I was sitting on the port side of the ship, in the chow line, for lunch. We were slowly heading north, about four miles off the beach, along I-Corps. Suddenly, there were geysers of water shooting up into the sky, near our tin can.

The alarm bells rang, and men leaped to action. I flew over to the starboard side, and went up to the gun director, my station. We skewed it to face the shore, and waited for the gunnies to load the 5 inchers. The steering went out, and briefly, we headed toward the beach, but they got to the after steering, and made the correction. (Note: had we not had a malfunction with the steering, the line of guysers led right to where we SHOULD have been heading...) We returned rapid free fire.

Quickly a bird dog appeared, in a cub (or something similar), and directed our fire. Within minutes, the shore batteries had been idled. We responded as we had been trained, and retrained.

Some people feel like a nut, some people don't!

Why are you an apologist for Nay-gin/Blank-o?

Total bull*&^%! They were certainly available BEFORE the storm but the stuck on stupid mayor allowed them to be flooded instead of using them to evacuate the poor.

# Buses that the Federal Emergency Management Agency promised reportedly within hours of Katrina's landfall weren't actually ordered until early Wednesday.

Possibly true; I have no way of knowing this one way or the other.

# State government didn't have transportation assets to send. It would take days to mobilize a fleet of school buses from throughout the state.

Total bull*&^%! You'd be amazed at how quickly people will respond if asked. Ask and let the paperwork follow later; no decent person would fault you for that in this situation.

# There was no emergency plan for moving people before or after the hurricane -- just a general framework that was yet to be fleshed out.

Total bull*&^%! The plan calls to use city busses and school bussed to move people out BEFORE the storm-I've seen the plan.

# State government didn't have transportation assets to send. It would take days to mobilize a fleet of school buses from throughout the state.
(libertylover replied:)Total bull*&^%! You'd be amazed at how quickly people will respond if asked. Ask and let the paperwork follow later; no decent person would fault you for that in this situation.

What I don't understand that if it took "days" to mobilize a fleet of school buses, then what were they doing in all the DAYS that the weather service said the storm was coming? It's not like they just woke up Sunday morning and said -- Blanco: "have you heard about a hurricane headed this way?" Nagin: "naw, but let me get back to you. I've got my bookie on the other line."

Besides, they still didn't use the transportation IN New Orleans that was available to them on Thursday, Friday or Saturday before the storm hit.

Heck, the plan all along was to blame the Federal government (Repub call the shots don't you know).

If the 'Cane missed no harm, no foul, local authorities come out smelling like roses (To democrat constituents mind you).

Of course the 'cane did hit and plan B was to blame the Feds (Again to democrat constituents).

You could see this a mile away the Friday before the destruction when State and local politicians began positioning themselves for plan A and B.

No, the problem began long before the storm. Too many folks in NO sat around watching the Weather Channel watching that big read dot coming closer and closer, but did nothing to get to safety. Generation after generation has learned to wait for someone else to take care of them rather than doing for themselves.

Evacuation buses didn't start showing up in large numbers until Thursday

It would take days to mobilize a fleet of school buses from throughout the state

----The buses were already there. You CHOSE not to use them
----And this one kills me the most....

Buses are not among the pre-staged supplies

-----A way of transporting your citizens out of harm's way is NOT part of an disaster supply list? Well then I guess the probability of EVACUATION wasn't something you were considering living below sea level?
-----They are going to have an excuse/reason for every one of their actions. It is obvious the TRUTH will never be told by any of them in office down there. They are only thinking of themselves. NOT the people of New Orleans or anywhere in Louisiana. The pictures/videos however do not lie.

Why are you an apologist for Nay-gin/Blank-o?

Neither of them are worth a bucke of warm spit so far as I'm concerned - but I have high regard for people in similar jobs who actually belong in them. New Orleans and Louisiana should have had effective executives, and they did not.
But (and this is the point) I recognize that just because I can sit at my computator and criticize others, that doesn't prove that I am a strong executive. And I think that that is only fair to point that out. Maybe people who voted for Nagin can take my criticism of him better, if I don't sound arrogant and condescending towards him - and by implication, towards them.

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