Posted on 10/20/2005 5:56:08 AM PDT by tonycavanagh
The English Channel meant that these Blitzkrieg tactics could not be continued against Britain. Hitler had great respect for Britain's navy and airforce and feared that his forces would suffer heavy casualties in any invasion attempt. Hitler, who had not seen the sea until he was over forty, lacked confidence when it came to naval warfare. As he told his naval commander-in-chief: "On land I am a hero. At sea I am a coward."
At this stage Hitler still hoped that Britain would change sides or at least accept German domination of Europe.
Immediately after the defeat of France in June 1940, Adolf Hitler ordered his generals to organize the invasion of Britain. The invasion plan was given the code name Operation Sealion. The objective was to land 160,000 German soldiers along a forty-mile coastal stretch of south-east England.
Within a few weeks the Germans had assembled a large armada of vessels, including 2,000 barges in German, Belgian and French harbours. However, Hitler's generals were very worried about the damage that the Royal Air Force could inflict on the German Army during the invasion. Hitler therefore agreed to their request that the invasion should be postponed until the British airforce had been destroyed.
On the 12th August the German airforce began its mass bomber attacks on British radar stations, aircraft factories and fighter airfields. During these raids radar stations and airfields were badly damaged. This attack was followed by daily raids on Britain. This was the beginning of what became known as the Battle of Britain.
Although plans for an invasion of Britain were drawn up Adolf Hitler was never very enthusiastic about them and they were eventually abandoned on October 12, 1940. Instead, Hitler attempted to batter Britain into submission by organising a sustained night-bombing campaign.
A young Marine lieutenant, Victor Krulak, observed the Japanese landings near Shanghai and reputedly sent a model he made of a Japanese landing craft -- complete with a bow ramp -- back up his chain of command. Of course, proving that Andrew Jackson Higgins was influenced by, or even saw, that model would be an interesting piece of historical sleuthing.
bump for later
The common belief is that Barbarossa started late because of Operations Punishment, Marita, and Mercury. They played a role, but the winter of 1940,the very late Spring thaw, and the unfinished equipping of new German formations [especially with trucks] would have delayed the attack until at least June 15th in any case. And remember, the Germans sat in Smolensk for almost a month arguing about what to do before they executed the Kiev encirclement.
I think it was within the last two months.
The order was battle was in the book, "Invasion" [an excellent read by a retired British tanker.
If the Royal Navy sails around Ireland, they ride themselves right out of the battle. The key to the Germans winning, in theory is gaining a foothold and expanding it. The more time they have, the better for them. The Brits would want to disrupt it as soon as possible.
Not for the heavier fleet units, which were based up north anyway. I'd rather send my BB's flying around Ireland than have them run the mine/Luftwaffe gauntlet in the Channel. I'd leave the channel to the CL's & DD's of the Royal Navy. OTOH, the Scharnhorst & Gneisenau managed to run the channel and get away unscathed.
"Thanks another good what if, was the planned invasion of Switzerland by the Germans."
It is said that prior to WWI Kaiser Wilhelm visited Switzerland. As part of his visit he was given a demonstration of Swiss marksmanship. A company of Swiss militia infantry were shooting at targets.
Apparently they were shooting at bull's eyes some 250 meters, and hitting the target (which represented a man) almost every time. Kaiser Bill asked his host "How many men do you have that can shoot like that?"
"100,000" was the response.
"Well, what if I invaded you with 200,000 men?" the Kaiser posited.
Non-plussed, his host responded, "Well, I guess our army would have to shoot twice."
A few years later, when Germany attacked France, they flanked that nation's frontier fortifications by going through Blegium, not Switzerland.
I think the Germans would have mined both side of the projected invasion corridor. And there would probably have bee air recon to the west so the germans would have had notice of the heavies [maybe even a U-boat scree]. Plus, your proposed deployment leaves the Germans with heavier guns against the lighter British units [18 X 11":Scharnhorst and Gniesenau, 12 X 11" Admiral Scheer and Luetzow, total 30 X 11"; and secondary armament on the above and heavy cruisers of 5.9" guns, and main armament on German destroyers -superior to all British destroyers, equal, almost to all British light cruisers].
The other problem the British would have faced is that in the Channel, the Germans would have had interior lines, and could re-deploy east to west much faster than the British could get around them.
I think Sea Lion -- in whatever incarnation -- would have been a loser. By the end of July Britain was ready for a German invasion, and probably would have succeeded in destroying most of the German sealift capability -- even if it cost them most of the Royal Navy.
Even if the Germans succeeded in getting an army in Britain before then, they could not have supplied that army after losing their transports. They lacked the airlift capacity to supply an army the size required to take England (look at what happened at Stalingrad when they tried to sustain that by air.) Once the German forces ran out of munitions and POL products, it would not much matter *how* successful they had been prior to that. They could have been spread from Hastings to York, but without ammo and fuel you are SOL.
What *might* have worked would have been an airborne landing at London, followed up by a couple of regiments sea-lifted there just before or right after Dunkirk. That would have caught the Brits at a psychologically vunerable point, as well as being the one time that Britain literally *was* defenseless. But the Germans were not even thinking of invading at that point, and would not until it became apparent that the Brits were *serious* about fighting on. By then it was too late.
IMHO Hitler would have been a lot better off if Mussolini had sided with the Allies. Hitler wasted a lot of time, men, and resources just bailing Il Duce out of predicaments which he stupidly got himself into.
I can't help thinking that if the Germans had attempted the invasion, it would have played out much like the Guadalcanal campaign. Recall that the USMC got ashore only to have the USN & much of their equipment driven off after the Battle of Savo Island. The fighting after Savo was savage. The Marines could only hang onto Henderson Field while the Japanese couldn't really land enough troops to push them off.
True, but would you want allied forces, particularly air forces, operating from the Po River Valley in 1943 instead of 1945? If Mussolini had flipped or been deposed you might this might have been the result. Also, a good chunk of the Axis forces -- most of the leg infantry -- then operating in Tunisia were Italian. If Italy sits out, what happens to the Afrika Korps? Not all the Italian troops were unwilling to fight...
Graf Spee took on a heavy cruiser and two light cruisers. She seriously damaged the heavy cruiser, and did some damage to the light cruisers, mostly with her secondary armament. Accompanied by destroyers with twin 5.9 turrets, and the other ships I mentioned, the pocket battleships could have played hob with the British light units, especially factoring in air cover.
http://www.wargamesdirectory.com/html/articles/various/sealowe.asp
Operation Sealion
An exercise by the Staff College, Sandhurst, 1974
Introduction
The full text is in 'Sealion' by Richard Cox. The scenario is based on the known plans of each side, plus previously unpublished Admiralty weather records for September 1940. Each side (played by British and German officers respectively) was based in a command room, and the actual moves plotted on a scale model of SE England constructed at the School of Infantry. The panel of umpires included Adolf Galland, Admiral Friedrich Ruge, Air Chief Marshal Sir Christopher Foxley-Norris, Rear Admiral Edward Gueritz, General Heinz Trettner and Major General Glyn Gilbert.
The main problems the Germans face are:
the Luftwaffe has not yet won air supremacy
the possible invasion dates are constrained by the weather and tides (for a high water attack)
it has taken until late September to assemble the necessary shipping
22nd September 1940, morning
The first wave of a planned 330,000 men hit the beaches at dawn. Elements of 9 divisions landed between Folkestone and Rottingdean (near Brighton). In addition 7th FJ Division landed at Lympne to take the airfield.
The invasion fleet suffered minor losses from MTBs during the night crossing, but the RN had already lost one CA and three DDs sunk, with one CA and two DDs damaged, whilst sinking three German DDs. Within hours of the landings which overwhelmed the beach defenders, reserve formations were despatched to Kent. Although there were 25 divisions in the UK, only 17 were fully equipped, and only three were based in Kent, however the defence plan relied on the use of mobile reserves and armoured and mechanised brigades were committed as soon as the main landings were identified.
Meanwhile the air battle raged, the Luftwaffe flew 1200 fighter and 800 bomber sorties before 1200 hrs. The RAF even threw in training planes hastily armed with bombs, but the Luftwaffe were already having problems with their short ranged Me 109s despite cramming as many as possible into the Pas de Calais.
22nd - 23rd
The Germans had still not captured a major port, although they started driving for Folkestone. Shipping unloading on the beaches suffered heavy losses from RAF bombing raids and then further losses at their ports in France.
The U-Boats, Luftwaffe and few surface ships had lost contact with the RN, but then a cruiser squadron with supporting DDs entered the Channel narrows and had to run the gauntlet of long range coastal guns, E-Boats and 50 Stukas. Two CAs were sunk and one damaged. However a diversionary German naval sortie from Norway was completely destroyed and other sorties by MTBS and DDs inflicted losses on the shipping milling about in the Channel. German shipping losses on the first day amounted to over 25% of their invasion fleet, especially the barges, which proved desperately unseaworthy.
23rd, dawn - 1400 hrs
The RAF had lost 237 planes out 1048 (167 fighters and 70 bombers), and the navy had suffered enough losses such that it was keeping its BBs and CVs back, but large forces of DDs and CAs were massing. Air recon showed a German buildup in Cherbourg and forces were diverted to the South West.
The German Navy were despondant about their losses, especially as the loss of barges was seriously dislocating domestic industry. The Army and Airforce commanders were jubilant however, and preparations for the transfer of the next echelon continued along with the air transport of 22nd Division, despite Luftwaffe losses of 165 fighters and 168 bombers. Out of only 732 fighters and 724 bombers these were heavy losses. Both sides overestimated losses inflicted by 50%.
The 22nd Division airlanded successfully at Lympne, although long range artillery fire directed by a stay-behind commando group interdicted the runways. The first British counterattacks by 42nd Division supported by an armoured brigade halted the German 34th Division in its drive on Hastings. 7th Panzer Division was having difficulty with extensive anti-tank obstacles and assault teams armed with sticky bombs etc. Meanwhile an Australian Division had retaken Newhaven (the only German port), however the New Zealand Division arrived at Folkestone only to be attacked in the rear by 22nd Airlanding Division. The division fell back on Dover having lost 35% casualties.
23rd 1400 - 1900 hrs
Throughout the day the Luftwaffe put up a maximum effort, with 1500 fighter and 460 bomber sorties, but the RAF persisted in attacks on shipping and airfields. Much of this effort was directed for ground support and air resupply, despite Adm Raeders request for more aircover over the Channel. The Home Fleet had pulled out of air range however, leaving the fight in the hands of 57 DDs and 17 CAs plus MTBs. The Germans could put very little surface strength against this. Waves of DDs and CAs entered the Channel, and although two were sunk by U-Boats, they sank one U-Boat in return and did not stop. The German flotilla at Le Havre put to sea (3 DD, 14 E-Boats) and at dusk intercepted the British, but were wiped out, losing all their DDs and 7 E-Boats.
The Germans now had 10 divisions ashore, but in many cases these were incomplete and waiting for their second echelon to arrive that night. The weather was unsuitable for the barges however, and the decision to sail was referred up the chain of command.
23rd, 1900hrs - 24th, dawn
The Fuhrer Conference held at 1800 broke out into bitter inter-service rivalry - the Army wanted their second echelon sent, and the navy protesting that the weather was unsuitable, and the latest naval defeat rendered the Channel indefensible without air support. Goring countered this by saying it could only be done by stopping the terror bombing of London, which in turn Hitler vetoed. The fleet was ordered to stand by.
The RAF meanwhile had lost 97 more fighters leaving only 440. The airfields of 11 Group were cratered ruins, and once more the threat of collapse, which had receded in early September, was looming. The Luftwaffe had lost another 71 fighters and 142 bombers. Again both sides overestimated losses inflicted, even after allowing for inflated figures.
On the ground the Germans made good progress towards Dover and towards Canterbury, however they suffered reverses around Newhaven when the 45th Division and Australians attacked. At 2150 Hitler decided to launch the second wave, but only the short crossing from Calais and Dunkirk. By the time the order reached the ports, the second wave could not possibly arrive before dawn. The 6th and 8th divisions at Newhaven, supplied from Le Havre, would not be reinforced at all.
24th, dawn - 28th
The German fleet set sail, the weather calmed, and U-Boats, E-Boats and fighters covered them. However at daylight 5th destroyer flotilla found the barges still 10 miles off the coast and tore them to shreds. The Luftwaffe in turn committed all its remaining bombers, and the RAF responded with 19 squadrons of fighters. The Germans disabled two CAs and four DDs, but 65% of the barges were sunk. The faster steamers broke away and headed for Folkestone, but the port had been so badly damaged that they could only unload two at a time.
The failure on the crossing meant that the German situation became desperate. The divisions had sufficient ammunition for 2 to 7 days more fighting, but without extra men and equipment could not extend the bridgehead. Hitler ordered the deployment of reserve units to Poland and the Germans began preparations for an evacuation as further British attacks hemmed them in tighter. Fast steamers and car ferries were assembled for evacuation via Rye and Folkestone. Of 90,000 troops who landed on 22nd september, only 15,400 returned to France, the rest were killed or captured.
America has got the art of logistics down to a fine point, so fine that many people do not see it as a major problem any more.
First the mine belt, it dent matter how what assets the Germans had , but how many, how fast would they be able to lay two belts and thick belts at that. And keep laying them to protect the initial invasion, follow up units and supplies
The German forces were set up tactical to fight short sharp wars, not strategic, they entered the war with a shortage of those assets deemed necessary.
The Germans had a operation strength of around 30 U-Boats, not all were at sea, and some were on anti convey duty at the time.
The Luftwaffe did not have much experience of attacking shipping.
Also a lot of navel engagements would of been at night, The Royal Navy like the Japanese trained at night as well as at day.
The Royal Navy did not lack for bravery, it would only take a few ships to break through and cause havoc, with the second wave and the supply ships.
As for the land battle, yes the British would of been fighting a static defense, but that is not a draw back if the enemy, the Germans, did not have maneuver room.
Blitzkrieg is all about not letting the enemy know where the point of attack is, in this case the German army would of been confined to a small landing zone easier to contain.
They had no or very little long range artillery.
Most of the first troops forward would be infantry, with very little amour back up it would of turned into a slogging match, with the British fighting over the very terrain they trained in, and the Germans relying on shipping for all there military needs.
The Key to victory in the end would of been logistics something the Germans lacked at that time.
Think of DDAY it was touch and go, and we had total control over the sea and the air, it was launched in June and we had whole variety of ships with heavy lift capacity. And it was on a broad enough front, To allow the maximum=m number of troops to be landed in one day
At that time the Germans had no heavy lift capacity.
Yes the Luftwaffe could fly in extra men, extra men need to be supplied, and aircraft flying in men is not aircraft flying in supplies.
Also Crete was a victory for the Germans but they suffered such a loss in men and aircraft that it put Hitler off further airborne operations.
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