Posted on 09/02/2005 2:13:10 PM PDT by AmericanInTokyo
Within 48 hours of the tragedy, with news reports still estimating that "20,000 people are feared dead," the U.S. Pacific Command was already establishing a joint task force to coordinate and conduct humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Access approval was requested, and quickly obtained, from the Thai government to allow its massive Utapao Air Base to serve as the regional hub for the relief effort. Meanwhile, U.S. defense attaches were arranging overflight and landing rights and making initial contacts to allow U.S. forces, if and when authorized to assist, to more effectively interact with their regional counterparts. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz subsequently testified, "the ability of the Department of Defense to respond so quickly would not have been possible without the relationships developed over many years with the militaries of countries in the region, particularly with Thailand." The joint force (denoting the involvement of more than one military service) quickly became a combined force as other militaries became involved in the coordination effort. The task force also transformed into a non-doctrinal support force.
Three days after the tsunami struck, Combined Support Force 536, under the command of Marine Corps Lieutenant General Robert Blackman (who also commands the Third Marine Expeditionary Force in Okinawa), was already playing a key role in coordinating the U.S. and initial international effort. Most notably, CSF 536 worked closely with U.S. embassies and with USAID field elements, including deployed USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) to ensure a seamless U.S. response. While Washington bureaucracies are not famous for their ability to work effectively with one another, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios praised the "effective coordination mechanisms, from the tactical field level all the way up to the strategic headquarters level." Cooperation between DOD and USAID brought "the capabilities and expertise of each into an effective partnership," according to Natsios.
The CSF 536's Combined Coordination Center (CCC) at Utapao quickly became the heart of the coordinated international relief effort, with liaison officers from Australia, Britain, Japan, Thailand, and Singapore, along with a Civil-Military Coordination Cell, USAID DART representatives, and a local official from the United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). They met several times a day to coordinate their respective national and institutional efforts. This provided an essential element of on-scene coordination that helped to avoid duplication of effort and facilitated accurate assessments of the extent of the damage and identification of the areas most in need of assistance. The CSF's CCC also helped facilitate the efforts of the international "Core Group" (involving the U.S., Australia, Japan, India, Canada, and others) that was established to coordinate the first stages of the international relief effort, identify and fill gaps, and avoid or break logistical bottlenecks, until the United Nations was able to mobilize and play a more central role in the relief response.
The relief operations also demonstrated the merits of the Pacific Command's Asia Pacific Area Network (APAN). The APAN mission is to share unclassified information electronically in order to facilitate regional understanding, build confidence among Asia-Pacific neighbors and enhance security cooperation. APAN was used extensively by Britain, Canada, Australia and the affected Asian nations while coordinating relief efforts.
In order to more effectively support the multi-nation relief effort, CSF 536 established Combined Support Groups (CSGs) in Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Aceh, Indonesia, headed by one-star officers, to coordinate with local agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and to coordinate the efforts of their own Disaster Relief Assessment Teams and USAID's DARTs. The CSGs were designed "to minimize loss of life and mitigate human suffering, while the resources of other U.S. government agencies, NGOs, and international and regional organizations were brought to bear in the affected areas." They were there to "support host nation-led efforts," but in most instances provided invaluable managerial and coordinating expertise that might otherwise have gone lacking, while augmenting overstretched local assets. Under Secretary of State Alan Larson, in describing the Pacific Command's on-scene efforts, praised "the remarkable things they accomplished to establish the logistical backbone for the entire relief operation and to facilitate to work of the United Nations, NGOs, and other donors."
U.S. military personnel, in every instance, worked closely with their local military counterparts, in some cases overcoming years of suspicion, and once again demonstrating the value of routinizing military-to-military contacts to allow for more effective cooperation during periods of crisis. As Admiral Fargo noted, "one of the reasons [we] have been able to respond effectively is because we have established these habits of cooperation together over many years ... we have built strong partnerships and standard operating procedures and when this disaster occurred we were able to reach back and put those into effect."
A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
The U.S. military is, of course, no stranger to disaster relief operations. One sterling example of prior disaster relief assistance was the mid-ocean diversion of the U.S. First Marine Expeditionary Force returning home after DESERT STORM in 1991 to assist Bangladesh in the wake of a typhoon that killed over 130,000 people. Plans for that operation were literally drafted on-the-go as the marines were rushing into the Bay of Bengal to provide emergency relief. While the operation was deemed a huge success—the rapid U.S. response was credited with saving the lives of thousands of Bangladeshis—it underscored the need for better coordination and advance preparation. Since then, the Pacific Command has put great emphasis on developing its crisis response capabilities, to include its Military Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program, which has created a cadre of professionals who are accustomed to working together on a multinational basis to respond to crisis. As Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz observed, "MPAT experience was put to good use in response to the tsunami crisis."
CSF 536 operations have now drawn to a close. As the immediate emergency effort draws down and the baton is passed to the affected governments and international relief agencies, led by the United Nations, a lengthy reconstruction phase will now get into full swing. As Fargo has noted, "this work can [be] and is done more efficiently by professional relief agencies." However, some U.S. forces, including the hospital ship Mercy, remain on the scene. Meanwhile, despite the overwhelming success of the relief effort, U.S. military planners, with their State Department, USAID, and other counterparts are already examining how things can be done even better the next time that tragedy strikes.
Great Post. Thanks.
I'm struggling, as an American, with the contradictions. (ie. Tsunami vs. Katrina responses)
Yes: I think that was the problem. , Waitijng for the locals to get their act together, Still waiting for that.
Nobody shot at the rescuers in Indonesia.
Also the Governor would have to declare martial law before active duty military could be used.
Still, before the last tsunami wave had reversed course and rushed back to sea, the United Nations had whined about delay.
Thanks for the post. The response and lack of any form of leadership of Katrina is disgusting. What a disgrace. Too much blame to go around.
Part of the reason the tsunami relief was so quick is that they announced 1000's of ESTIMATED deaths and quickly reached up to 100,000+ dead. Plus, at least 50% to 90% of the larger tsunami cities were still intact and the water receded quickly. There was still infrastructure to launch relief efforts and aid from. Plus, the 100,000+ dead didn't need food, water, and shelter. In fact, there was initially extra food for the survivors because the dead were no longer there to eat it. Plus, the locals still had homes because they couldn't afford to live in the tourist areas near the beach. Completely different situation and logistics.
It is hard for people to understand the severity of the situation when all week we hear 40 confirmed deaths and then eventually up to 50 confirmed deaths and so on. IF they had started out estimating 10,000+ dead or missing, the american people would have mobilized quicker. Now, who wants to help out when all they see on TV is looters and thugs?
"Access approval was requested, and quickly obtained, from the Thai government ..."
with this from another thread:
"... (On Wednesday) she actually ... got to talk to a man with the Red Cross with trucks, supplies, etc in their trucks only awaiting the Governor to allow them to get in."
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.