WAR ON TERROR: 9/11 COMMISSION MEMBERS WANT CLAIM ON ATTA PURSUED

WASHINGTON – Members of the commission that uncovered the government's failures to share intelligence among agencies before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks want to know whether U.S. defense intelligence officials knew for more than a year that four of the hijackers were part of an al-Qaeda cell but failed to tell law enforcement. Lee Hamilton, co-chairman of the now-disbanded commission, said Tuesday that members of the Sept. 11 commission could issue a statement by the end of the week after reviewing claims that defense intelligence officials had identified ringleader Mohammed Atta and three other hijackers.

"The 9/11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell," said Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana. "Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation."

The commission's report on the terrorist attacks, released last year, traced government mistakes that allowed the hijackers to succeed. Among the problems the commission cited was a lack of coordination across intelligence agencies.

Rep. Curt Weldon, a Pennsylvania Republican who serves as vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees, said a classified military intelligence unit known as "Able Danger" identified the men in 1999.

That's an earlier link to al-Qaeda than any previously disclosed intelligence about Atta if the information, which Weldon said came from multiple intelligence sources, is true.

A group of 9/11 widows called the September 11th Advocates issued a statement Wednesday saying they were "horrified" to learn that further possible evidence exists, and they are disappointed the 9/11 Commission report is "incomplete and illusory."

"The revelation of this information demands answers that are forthcoming, clear and concise," the statement said. "The 9/11 attacks could have and should have been prevented."

With the 9/11 commission disbanded for a year under provisions of the legislation that created it, some of the panel's members have said congressional committees should investigate Weldon's assertions.

According to Weldon, Able Danger identified Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdar and Nawaf al-Hazmi as members of a cell the unit code-named "Brooklyn" because of some loose connections to New York City.

Weldon said that in September 2000 Able Danger recommended that its information on the hijackers be given to the FBI "so they could bring that cell in and take out the terrorists." However, Weldon said Pentagon lawyers rejected the recommendation because they said Atta and the others were in the country legally, so information on them could not be shared with law enforcement.

Weldon did not provide details on how the intelligence officials identified the future hijackers and determined they might be part of a terrorist cell.

Defense Department documents shown to an Associated Press reporter Tuesday said the Able Danger team was set up in 1999 to identify potential al-Qaeda operatives for U.S. Special Operations Command. At some point, information provided to the team by the Army's Information Dominance Center pointed to a possible al-Qaeda cell in Brooklyn, the documents said.

However, because of concerns about pursuing information on "U.S. persons" – a legal term that includes U.S. citizens as well as foreigners admitted to the country for permanent residence – Special Operations Command did not provide the Army information to the FBI. It is unclear whether the Army provided the information to anyone else.

The documents provided no information on whether the team identified anyone connected to the Sept. 11 attacks on New York City and Washington that killed nearly 3,000 people.

If the team did identify Atta and the others, it's unclear why the information wasn't forwarded. The prohibition against sharing intelligence on "U.S. persons" should not have applied since they were in the country on visas and did not have permanent resident status.

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said he was unaware of the intelligence until the latest reports surfaced.

But Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said the 9/11 Commission looked into the matter during its investigation into government missteps leading to the attacks and chose not to include it in the final report.

Hamilton said 9/11 Commission staff members learned of Able Danger during a meeting with military personnel in October 2003 in Afghanistan, but that the staff members do not recall learning of a connection between Able Danger and any of the four terrorists Weldon mentioned.

What in the heck are the commission members doing, going to Afghanistan on our$$$$$$$$???????

It wasn't the Commission members who went - it was some staffers. And they went to Afghanistan because that's where the people who knew about Able Danger were. It was probably cheaper to send a few staffers there than to bring all of the sources back here to just to find out if they knew anything. I have no trouble with that at all.

What does bother me is why they weren't competent enough to find this information and pass it on to the Commission members, as they clearly didn't do. We always focus on who is on the Commissions and Committees, when often the real problem is with the staffers. Most staffers are career Hill employees, and not answerable to voters.

they should have listened to me:

April 18, 2004

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
Washington Office: Tel: (202) 331-4060 Fax: (202) 296-5545
New York Office: Tel: (212) 264-1505 Fax: (212) 264-1595

To: The Commission Leadership
CC: Ms. Jamie Gorelick, Commission Member (also high-ranking member of previous Administration)

Dear Commissioners:

I have been disturbed by the revelations of this past week that Ms. Gorelick deliberately withheld specific information about her past responsibilities from the people that appointed the people to this commission.

Her job title alone should have been enough to disqualify her, it is apparent that she was in a position of very high power within the Administration just previous to the present one. It is also readily apparent that she is tightly related to many members of the previous Administration—many of whom were held over by the Bush Administration to maintain a level of continuity on these important tasks.

Her letter in the Washington Post this morning raises more questions than it resolves, making it obvious why Ms. Gorelick must not remain on this Commission and must be a Witness. It is readily apparent that:

Ms. Gorelick is unable to impartially judge people that she knew closely and worked with.

Ms. Gorelick will be unable to impartially judge people she worked for.

Ms. Gorelick never belonged on this Commission and does not belong on this commission now.

The fact that she had to write her letter for the Washington Post to defend herself is proof that the Commission is tainted beyond repair by her continued presence. It is also proof that she is under great pressure to do the right thing.

This is not a witch-hunt that is bringing her demise even though that is what will be reported by the partisan press. This is a basic question of fairness and conflict of interest. When she is removed, I hope that Commission leaders will keep this in mind as they announce this to the world. To suggest that this was in any way partisan or a political witch hunt or McCarthyism will only serve to further taint the Commission.

Did Ms. Gorelick disclose to any of you that she was so tightly involved in the “Wall” or that she prepared and signed the memo adding to it, or did you find that out from Mr. Ashcroft like the rest of us? Was she forthcoming that she might be an important witness before the Commission? Did she ever object to being named and have to be talked into it?

It is past time for Ms. Gorelick to do the right thing and resign. She should have refused service when asked but she didn’t so now it up to her to fix the situation or have it fixed for her.

Ms. Gorelick is knowledgeable about Conflicts of Interest. It is my understanding that she wrote a book on this very subject. Her continued presence can only mean that she is trying to make sure that the previous Administration is not examined fairly. Or she is afraid of being a witness and this is her best defense.

With her biased perspective removed, maybe the Commission can continue your work to help prevent the next 9-11. That is the important reason to be doing this now (while we are still fighting this War)—isn’t it?

If your purpose is instead to provide political ammunition for campaigning, then I can see why multiple TV appearances on cable and network news and opinion shows by all the members of the Commission would be a wise strategy. But, if you are trying to prevent the next 9-11, as charged, then you should stay away from the TV cameras and the easy sound-bites.

Once Ms. Gorelick resigns, or is forcibly removed from this Commission if she refuses to do the honorable thing, then she needs to be called as a Witness. I would also like to see her explain why she hid her previous activities from the people who appointed her.

All across America, people have seen what a partisan circus many aspects of this Commission have become. In this one area, you need to take steps to reduce this perception—remove Ms. Gorelick and call her to testify.

Sincerely,
A concerned American

Rob

Christopher Kojm Deputy Executive Director Christopher Kojm served from 1998 until February, 2003 as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Policy and Coordination in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
He served previously in the Congress on the staff of the House International Relations Committee, under Ranking Member Lee Hamilton as Deputy Director of the Democratic staff (1997-98), as Coordinator for Regional Issues (1993-1997) and under Chairman Hamilton on the Europe and Middle East subcommittee staff (1984-92).

From 1979-1984, he was a writer and editor with the Foreign Policy Association in New York City. He has a Masters in Public Affairs from the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University (1979) and an A.B. from Harvard College (1977).

Cris Kjon.Deputy Exe.Dir.for National Commission on Terrorist Attacks.

Tight knit little group we had here on this 911 commission.

Philip D. Zelikow Executive Director, National Commission on Terrorist Attack

Philip Zelikow is the executive director of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, better known as the "9/11 Commission." He is also the director of the Miller Center of Public Affairs and White Burkett Miller Professor of History at the University of Virginia. After serving in government with the Navy, the State Department, and the National Security Council, he taught at Harvard before assuming his present post in Virginia to direct the nation's largest research center on the American presidency. He was a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and served as executive director of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform, chaired by former Presidents Carter and Ford, as well as the executive director of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. Zelikow's books include The Kennedy Tapes (with Ernest May), Germany Unified and Europe Transformed (with Condoleezza Rice), and the rewritten Essence of Decision (with Graham Allison). Zelikow has also been the director of the Aspen Strategy Group, a policy program of the Aspen Institute

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