Posted on 05/31/2005 5:33:35 PM PDT by RWR8189
The phrase Weimar Russia first appeared about 13 years ago, at the height of the confrontation between then President Boris Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet that ended when Yeltsins tanks shelled the parliament. The meaning was clear to all: Weimar Russia, like Weimar Germany, signified a weak republic attacked from within by nationalists yearning to restore authoritarian ways.
In the late 1990s and the early years of this decade, the problems that incited fears of a dysfunctional state seemed to fade. But over the past 18 months, the specter of Weimar has once again begun to haunt Russia.
If taken to extremes, Russian societys response to its wrenching modernization could degenerate into a nationalist revolution led by xenophobes. A different and healthy conservative response is possible if the tattered remnants of old threads, torn apart in the course of postcommunist modernization, can reconnect and grow together in a new way.
The problem is that everyone writes history in their own manner, and that there are no scales that can fix the precise point at which the remedy of unifying patriotism turns into the lethal poison of rabid nationalism. Weimar Germany blindly poisoned itself.
In the period from 1991 to 1993, nationalism was on the rise because Yeltsins infant democracy seemed weak, with the country in the throes of a deep economic crisis, as well as an acute confrontation between different branches of government. But what explains todays resurgence of nationalism, when the regime and economy are strong, and all branches of government appear to operate in total unity?
Indeed, there are no practical reasons for Russias current system of governance to fall into crisis (although such reasons may emerge in the event of an economic downturn). But there is another reason, no less important, that concerns morals and ideology.
Challenges to established political authority have been chilled, fairly effectively, by means of state-sponsored patriotism. But the virus of nationalism has survived and multiplied.
Opinion polls, for example, indicate that 50% of Russians support the slogan Russia for Russians. Moreover, nationalism has spread from the streets into the elite. Nationalist statements that would have been confined to the extremist newspaper Den in the early 1990s are now considered normal, centrist, even commonplace.
Todays hardcore Russian nationalists consider Putins regime too soft, too pragmatic, too reasonable in their language, weak and indecisive. They loathe it for its surrender in Ukraine to the Orange Revolution, and they condemn the decision to give land along Siberias Amur River to China.
The Putin Center can be displaced. Recall that Russias pro-Western liberals, ascendant a decade ago, have been relegated to the ideological fringe, with the very word democrat (let alone pro-West) now a term of abuse.
Fortunately, there is no sign yet (not even on the horizon) of a charismatic leader capable of forging the scattered energies of national-socialist grievances into a critical mass of hatred and national revival. Stalins ghost is no substitute for a real live leader; he will never leap out of his portraits, no matter how often they are waved.
Moreover, times have changed. For example, no one even mentions the idea of introducing a dictatorship, abolishing elections, and so on. No matter how harshly Russias democrats are abused, the word democracy remains a sacred cow.
Instead, a populist-nationalist revolution might resemble the attempt to overthrow Mikhail Gorbachev in August 1991, or a Russian version of Ukraines Orange Revolution. It might be some sort of democratic nationalist revolution spontaneous, and not made by any one political party but by a popular mass movement. It would be anti-bureaucrat, anti-oligarch, anti-West, and staunchly pro-nationalist. These are the key ingredients in the nationalist stew that seems to appeal to Russians nowadays.
Judging by Putins most recent address to parliament, his regime is fully aware of the danger posed by populist nationalists. It is likely that the regime will attempt to counter this eruption of nationalism while maintaining its strong statist rhetoric. But, in order to defeat the far right, Putins regime will be forced to take its stand on more or less liberal ideological grounds. This wont be easy for a regime based on the twin pillars of bureaucracy and the security apparatus.
What liberals should do in these circumstances is obvious: support Putins regime insofar as it maintains the foundation and institutions of a liberal order. The populist nationalists, because they reject these fundamentals, are the unremitting political antagonists of all liberals.
Yet an alliance with the nationalists against Putin currently tempts many Russian liberals. Indeed, the most popular tactic among liberals nowadays is to unite with all opponents of the regime.
That scheme is both absurd and dangerous. After all, the word Weimar draws its infamy from the pact with the devil that German conservatives and royalists made by backing Hitler.
Leonid Radzikhovsky is an independent Russian political analyst.
Opinion polls, for example, indicate that 50% of Russians support the slogan Russia for Russians.
Opinion polls don't mean squat, try this,
Opinion polls, for example indicate that 100% of Muslims
support the slogan, "Earth for Islam".
Not goin to happen.
By lowering vodka price the potreotic [spelling intentional, per M. E. Shchedrin] spirits could be both strengthened and quenched at the same time. This has been a traditional, centuries-old solution - if only the state of the economy allows it.
The "nationalism" was aimed at not following the Clinton "advice" and giving everything away to the Oligarches. The answer was tank shells.
"What liberals should do in these circumstances is obvious: support Putins regime insofar as it maintains the foundation and institutions of a liberal order. The populist nationalists, because they reject these fundamentals, are the unremitting political antagonists of all liberals."
How Putin policies support "the foundation and institutions of a liberal order" ? It seems that Radzikhovskiy not sure what he is talking about.
Recall that Russias pro-Western liberals, ascendant a decade ago, have been relegated to the ideological fringe, with the very word democrat (let alone pro-West) now a term of abuse.
Pro-Western liberals (freemarketeers) have shown their true bloodthirsty nature when they staged the free market coup of 1993. In 1993 Yeltsin at the request of Western leaders and corporations, MASSACRED the Russian Parliament in order to transfer the national assets into hands of organized crime and foreign speculators.
So the Russians have seen it all and are less likely to be fooled by the various colors of Rainbow Revolutionaries no matter if the red, orange, blue or brown is picked.
"Judging by Putins most recent address to parliament, his regime is fully aware of the danger posed by populist nationalists. It is likely that the regime will attempt to counter this eruption of nationalism while maintaining its strong statist rhetoric. But, in order to defeat the far right, Putins regime will be forced to take its stand on more or less liberal ideological grounds. This wont be easy for a regime based on the twin pillars of bureaucracy and the security apparatus."
In other words according to Radzikhovsky, Putin is the last hope of liberals (in classical sense of the word) -:))))) After Putin grabbed power in his and his associates hands, it's really a very logical conclusion (sarcasm) !
The liberals ran on their "Perfect" track record of corruption and graft and poverty that spanned 10 years and you wonder why they lost?
I don't wonder--everyone who followed the situation in Russia more or less knows what Yeltsin regime really was. However, Yeltsin is gone for 5 years and Putin regime that rose after Yeltsin is another case of seemingly neverending Russian nightmare cycle of chaos followed by totalitarianism.
How is cutting taxes, reforming (even if limited) the courts, setting up private property and cutting government down a chaos/nightmare? Putting Russian interests in trade at the front of things is also good for Russia. I might remind you that the oil boom really took off in 2003, the economic growth in Russia took off in 2000. The price boom has helped, absolutely no doubt, but it is far from the only thing driving the Russian economy. Also, I hope you don't use nations like Poland as an alternative, nation's who's "growth" is based upon EU handouts not sustainable restructuring.
How much lower do you want it to go?! The rot gut vodka is practically free (40 rubles).
In Gslob's case? Till everyone in Russia is dead from alcohol poisoning, then he'll be happy.
If you're going to quote Shchedrin quote him properly - it's "Tak vykatit im TRI bochki pennogo! - voskliknula neustrashimaya nemka, obrashchayas' k soldatam, i ne toropyas', vyexala iz tolpy."
You robbed them odna bochka...
kstati, you confuse "patriots" and "nationalists" there is a significant difference.
Ah, but the quote you use is from "Istoriya odnogo goroda"
Patriotism is the love of one's country and respect for other countries. Nationalism is love of one's country and hate of others. You're incorrectly labelling Russians (the dominant ethnic group) as being Nationalists. There are nationalists there - "Russia for Russians" etc., but they're in the minority. However, just as most vocal minorities they get a lot of air time in the media.
Russian patriots, on the other hand, don't care whether one is a "Russkiy" or a "Rossiyan" - as long as they support Rossiya they're all right.
Your comments bely a taste of what you are criticizing the Russians for - pot meet kettle?
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