Naval Institute Proceedings: Save the Submarine Industrial Base

Keeping a defense industry going in a democracy has never been easy, but it has always been important. Without two submarine builders, the United States could find itself in a lot of trouble.

The political-military environment in Washington these days is all aflutter with the congressionally-directed study of military strategy and force structure termed the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the more geographically threatening (for certain locales and constituencies) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Some of the defense cognoscenti have warned of a gathering storm that could reach tsunami proportions in which budgetary pressures, a stretched military, and a poisonous political atmosphere combine to wreak havoc on the nation's armed forces as they fight an ongoing war on terrorism and try to hedge against longer-term, emerging threats.

Of course, our military has survived such policy onslaughts in the past, and it is probable that these two deliberative processes will wind up doing more good than harm in preparing the armed forces for an uncertain future. But caveats apply, particularly because some of the very tough choices facing defense decision-makers have been deferred over the last few years. Defense budget analysts argue that there simply is not room for all the fighters, all the ships, all the future combat vehicles and, yes, all the submarines embraced in existing service programs. This top-down review might result in cuts that scrape the bottom.

For a number of reasons, the nation's nuclear submarine force and, particularly the Virginia (SSN-774)-class submarines and the industrial base that supports them, have been seen as a potential bill-payer for other priorities, or, at least, an area where near-term savings can be achieved by moving the planned program to the right, or by diminishing the industrial base. Neither of those proposed policy paths would take us in the right direction. And each involves added cost and risk.

Historically, submarine construction has been a difficult, inefficient, and very expensive proposition. It has often been identified as analogous to building a ship in a bottle, since much of the equipment and piping systems were installed after the pressure hull was essentially completed, bringing bits and pieces through 25-inch hatches to then assemble in place. For instance, and more art than science, a given segment of piping fabricated off-hull to match a heavy wire template would then be bent to shape on the ship to go above, behind, or around other already installed pipes, pumps, and paraphernalia. To allow for unavoidable inaccuracies, the ends of the pipes would have an extra few inches which would then be "dressed" (ground off) by an onboard pipefitter for a custom fit before being welded up by a different tradesman and artisan, who, incidentally, might have had to literally stand on his head to make the joint.

As a result, even within a given class of ship sequentially built at the same shipyard, no two submarines were alike regarding plumbing, wire runs, and other system layouts, much like automobiles before Henry Ford came along. A notable exception to this generalization was within the primary (reactor-associated) propulsion plant, where Admiral Rickover demanded a "non-deviation from plans" approach. Otherwise, with just a bit of exaggeration, building plans only helped assure that submarines of the same class were about the same width, height, and length.

During the period between 1963 and 1978, the author had the experience of both building and conducting refueling overhauls at each of the two shipyards presently involved in producing Virginia-class attack submarines. Each had its own personality at the time, and different internal techniques and procedures. The products from each yard, however, were uniformly good in spite of these different non-nuclear approaches to the task.

The author also saw, but was not directly involved with, the difficulties that originally plagued the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear-powered submarines in the late 1970s and early 1980s when Electric Boat, traditionally the lead design agent for submarines, was building ships to Newport News plans and specifications. This forced marriage resulted in each yard essentially accusing the other of either producing blueprints that didn't match with realities or with an inability to read them correctly. One of the results of this dichotomy was that, for a period, the failure to deliver submarines resulted in the Groton, Connecticut, and Newport News, Virginia, shipyards each having one of the largest four or five nuclear submarine forces in the world. Similar, though less traumatic, problems occurred during the Seawolf design, where "the front end" was designed in Newport News and the propulsion plant in Groton, and there were real or imagined cases where "interfaces" between each shipyard's efforts didn't properly mate up.

For the most part, however, all this changed with the construction of the Seawolf class, and the advanced construction techniques pioneered in that program were further refined in the Virginia class. On 23 October 2004, USS Virginia became the first U.S. nuclear-powered submarine commissioned in seven years. Testifying to this improvement in production is the fact that this "first-of-a-class" ship was delivered within four months of a schedule written six years earlier, and was constructed with more than a 25% savings in labor costs when compared with Seawolf.¹ To thoroughly appreciate the impact of these revolutionary changes in the manner by which submarines are built, consider the findings of the U.S. Navy In Service (INSURV) board. This organization inspects all new and, periodically, already commissioned, ships for their compliance with specifications, safety, and other standards. It is common for newly constructed, particularly first-of-a-class ships, to have far more deficiencies than a ship that has been operating for some period of time. The Virginia, however, had fewer deficiencies than any other operating ship that had been inspected during the previous twelve months. If any further proof is needed that the design and construction of Virginia heralded a true revolution in shipbuilding, it is generally accepted that its techniques and procedures were the reason why the 104-foot USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) "Multi-Mission Platform" insert could be conceived, constructed, and rolled into a Seawolf hull as quickly as it was. This second success story bodes well for generating future versions of Virginia to include those to replace current nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) and strategic missile submarines (SSBNs).

Why, then, is the future of a vibrant and busier-than-ever submarine force, supported by efficiently produced and operationally capable platforms of the Virginia class, threatened by stretched-out production schedules and a weakened industrial base? The reason, as is so often the case, is money and short-range solutions to near-term fiscal shortfalls are now seriously undermining the nation's long-term capability to build and sustain a dominant undersea force. U.S. submarine roles and missions, alternative force levels, and the various options on how to reach and maintain them were the focus of a recent Congressional Research Service report.² In that study, the present method, where the General Dynamics Electric Boat shipyard in Groton and the Northrop Grumman Newport News shipyard co-produce Virginia hulls then alternate final assembly, test, and delivery was compared to alternate schemes. The present arrangement was deemed optimum for what was to be initially a one ship per year buy, but planned to increase to two ships per year (one for each yard) construction rate as early as 2002.

Budgetary pressures, however, have caused planners to keep shifting the transition to the higher rate almost continually to the right. Unless current plans are changed, the earliest fiscal year in which two submarines could be authorized is 2012. A decision to build only one ship per year would result in the present force level of about 54 SSNs (down from 98 in 1990) steadily diminishing to a low of 28 before leveling out at the expected life of a Virginia. This is far below the numbers of submarines that even the most optimistic of Navy and DoD studies show will be required in the future.

One of the tempting short-term options for reducing unit cost of the Virginia-class SSN is to eliminate the present two-shipyard approach to one-ship-per-year construction, assuming that the two-shipyard option would always be available in the future when additional fiscal resources were available or when geopolitical realities made it urgent. This would be a strategic mistake of the first order, with a multitude of unintended consequences. First, to even conceive of a myth that a two-shipyard submarine industrial base could be resurrected in the future, the production line terminated would have to be the Northrop-Grumman Newport News shipyard (presuming the yard could survive on carrier business), since ending the line at General Dynamics Electric Boat would be tantamount to shutting the yard down. If the Newport News submarine production were terminated, however, there would be an inevitable impact on the shipyard's ability to support the two-a-decade nuclear-powered aircraft carrier program, since the steady submarine effort justifies their world-class Apprentice School and maintains nuclear skills between carrier construction.

In this regard, remember that the United kingdom, the world's third largest builder of nuclear submarines, allowed its nuclear shipbuilding skills to atrophy and was obliged to request intervention from U.S. shipyards to get the new Astute-class SSN program back on track. Also, although support of the present two-shipyard concept acknowledges room to fine-tune procedures and practices to gain further savings, those steps pale in comparison to what some say would be as much as $1 billion in "disentanglement costs" associated with breaking the present teaming agreement.

Moreover, the administrative and engineering differences that plagued two-shipyard construction are a thing of the past. Because of the efforts in establishing an entirely digital on-line-data/blueprint base from which both shipyards operate and can exchange engineering changes in real time, there is virtually no difference between the yards in processes, procedures, or product. For the first time in U.S. shipbuilding history, two geographically remote shipyards are producing identical products. As previously touched upon, this achievement will pay significant dividends in the mid- and long-term future as the techniques and procedures created in and for the design and production of the basic Virginia hull (particularly the propulsion plant) support the development of follow-on SSNs, SSGNs, and SSBNs (perhaps all functions being performed by a common hull, serially and identically produced in both shipyards).

Finally, the argument for two separate yards supporting this key element of US strategic dominance must be bolstered by the realities of the threat of terrorism. TOPOFF 3, the largest Homeland Security drill ever conducted, was held recently around the New London, Connecticut, area, which includes Groton. Although this particular simulated terrorist attack was of a chemical and conventional explosive nature, it is clear that a very real terrorist threat exists, particularly in and about seaports, involving nuclear devices or radiological dirty bombs. As a side benefit, nuclear-capable shipyards and naval personnel from nearby nuclear-powered ships might serve as an invaluable "first responder" and subsequent clean-up source. But in the worst imaginable case, with two shipyards forming the industrial base, the resources of one area might compensate for the incapacitation of the other.

Indisputably, there is a delicate balance to be achieved between cost, a continuing design and industrial base, and a militarily necessary force level. The extraordinary present capabilities and room for growth of the Virginia are not to be treated lightly. Just as the late-1950s Skipjack was really the prototype for about 100 subsequent SSNs and SSBNs in the 20th century, essential elements of the Virginia will be with us for the better part of the 21st century in SSN, SSBN, and SSGN variants. The present two-shipyard approach evolving to a two-per-year submarine build rate is the proper means by which to both populate and maintain a minimum force level while maintaining the "cocked" gun industrial surge capability to four or even six a year if a rapid restocking of the nation's military portfolio with these crown jewels (or their evolved relatives) becomes a mandate. The relatively high present unit cost is an unfortunate artificiality caused by a draw-back from the planned build rate, but should be tolerated as the price of admiralty for a nation that hopes to continue to dominate the maritime commons, and to dominate from them.

Captain Patton served on five nuclear-powered attack submarines, two ballistic-missile submarines, and commanded the USS Pargo (SSN-650). A frequent Proceedings contributor, he was the technical consultant to Paramount Pictures for the film version of The Hunt for Red October, which was based on a book first published by the Naval Institute Press in 1984, now in its 39th printing.

"Citizens in Support of the Sea Services"



U.S. Navy	U.S. Marine Corps	U.S. Flag Merchant Marine	U.S. Coast Guard

Archives
The U.S. Engagement Strategy
The Size of the Fleet Really Does Matter!

By JOHN G. KINNEY and GORDON I. PETERSON Cdr. John G. Kinney, USN, is assigned to the Fleet Plans and Policy Division on the staff of the commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Gordon I. Peterson is senior editor of Sea Power. Little more than 13 years ago, with the public release of the U.S. Maritime Strategy, then-Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. effectively argued that a 600-ship Navy was necessary to meet a U.S. national-security requirement for maritime superiority. Remarkably, the Navy today is on the threshold of falling be-low 300 ships--the smallest fleet since 1931. If increased ship-construction funding does not become part of the current Future-Years Defense Plan, the Navy's force structure inevitably will decline below the level specified in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) issued by the Department of Defense (DOD). The Navy-Marine Corps team unavoidably will become less capable of fulfilling its engagement mission as called for in President Clinton's National Security Strategy for a New Century and the U.S. National Military Strategy for a New Era. There is a real risk under this scenario that the burden of extended deployments and inadequate resources will fall on the backs of individual Sailors and Marines--repeating the debacle of the U.S. military's hollow force of the 1970s. Worrisome world events continue apace to present new and disturbing national-security risks--from the Korean peninsula to the Taiwan Strait and beyond to the Indian subcontinent, Southwest Asia, and the Balkans. On average, roughly 50 percent of the U.S. Navy's active fleet is underway on any given day, and more than a third is forward-deployed. Unrelenting operational demands on the Navy-Marine Corps team convincingly demonstrate that the 305-ship Navy postulated by the QDR is inadequate for current and future U.S. security needs. A call is being raised in many quarters for the Navy's top leadership to advocate a fleet sufficiently sized to support the U.S.-engagement strategy--i.e., a Navy large enough to shape world events in a way favorable to U.S. vital interests and to respond to emerging threats to U.S. and allied national security. Some observers, notably former Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb Jr., argue that Navy leaders should press for a Navy of 400 ships or more. In June 1999, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. Jay L. Johnson told the U.S. Naval War College's Current Strategy Forum that there is mounting evidence to suggest that the Navy's 1997 QDR level is not likely to be sufficient for the future. "Simply put," Johnson said, "numbers do matter, especially when it comes to contested littoral warfare." The CNO stated that the Navy's current "downsizing trajectory" must be reversed. Johnson also expressed deep concern about the present practice of sacrificing the readiness of nondeployed Navy units in order to maintain the Navy's forward-deployed forces at a higher state of readiness. Looking to the future, Johnson explained that, because of the ability to execute Network Centric Warfare and employ Information Technology for the 21st Century (IT-21), the value of maritime forces will necessarily increase during the early decades of the next century. At the same time, a "web of interdependence" is being created by the economic globalization of capital, communications, and information networks. "We are leaving behind the days where effects of regional instability are only felt locally," Johnson said. The ongoing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles, he added, also generates heightened security risks and creates new vulnerabilities for the United States. There is a growing strategic imperative, therefore, to maintain a more robust Navy and Marine Corps team capable of responding immediately to stabilize a crisis or engage in combat operations when U.S. vital interests are threatened on or near distant seas. A Strategic Mandate The Maritime Strategy of the 1980s justified a fleet with a sufficient number of ships to execute an aggressive wartime strategy in a superpower conflict. Because the United States is isolated by the oceans from most of its allies and trading partners, the necessity of maintaining a large fleet to sustain overseas presence, control the seas (when necessary), and carry the fight to an enemy at a time and place of America's choosing--horizontal escalation--received generally broad support from DOD and Congressional decisionmakers. Multiple Cold War contingencies in the Atlantic, Pacific, Persian Gulf, and Mediterranean regions added further impetus to the Navy's building plans, if only to ensure that a U.S. presence could be maintained at critical geographic hubs around the world. When the Cold War passed into history, however, the size of the fleet could no longer be based exclusively on warfighting scenarios or on the capabilities of a nuclear-armed adversary with global reach. In a series of seminal strategic papers beginning with "... From the Sea" in 1992, the Navy described how it would deal with post-Cold War challenges. As Johnson explained in his introduction to the 1998 edition of A Program Guide to the U.S. Navy, revised strategic and operational concepts already were transforming the Navy and providing the doctrinal foundation "... to sustain our Navy's operational primacy and ensure our ability to influence events ashore, directly and decisively, from the sea." The collective thrust of those concepts is that today's (and tomorrow's) Navy-Marine Corps team must be forward-deployed and fully engaged in order to carry out the strategic mandate entrusted to it. The emergence of engagement as a valid decisionmaking guide to determine the size of the future fleet complements the traditional assessment by the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) of force-structure needs, which are based on the requirements of a U.S. strategy calling for sufficient force to fight two major theater wars (MTWs) concurrently. As Gen. Henry H. Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Sea Power in February 1999, the realities of today's world dictate that the United States--the world's last remaining military superpower--must retain the capabilities for the possibility of conflict in two geographically separated theaters. Greater Reductions, Increased Risk Because of continued QDR-mandated reductions to U.S. force structure, however, the risk to U.S. warfighters continues to increase. "As we tailored the forces following the QDR," Shelton said, "we have downsized and watched the risks associated with fighting in two MTWs go from moderate, to high, to a solid high in the second MTW." Future MTWs are hypothetical events, however, and--given the difficulty of assessing the possibility that they may eventually come to pass--it is not persuasive to use worst-case MTW scenarios to generate widespread political or public support to increase force structure. Moreover, as Shelton told Sea Power, the National Defense Panel (NDP) criticized U.S. strategy. In Shelton's words, the panel said that the U.S. defense establishment should focus on the future and not on two MTWs. A real-world military engagement strategy would be more responsive to the NDP's criticism and would enable both the forward vision advocated by the panel and a clearer articulation of the forces necessary to achieve it. Reliance on the transition from war-fighting to forward-deployed operations as a central criterion for sizing Navy force structure has been previously recognized. In the 1993 DOD Bottom-Up Review, the value of forward-deployed naval forces was emphasized, and overseas security commitments were identified as valid determinants of force structure. Writing in the June 1994 Naval Institute Proceedings, Rear Adm. Philip A. Dur emphasized that a forward and capable Navy is what serves the United States best. Dur also identified the need for a reliable mechanism to measure the effectiveness of the engagement effort. A 1993 Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study, Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence, also advocated the use of engagement requirements as a determinant of force structure--and pointed out, as well, the continued inability of the Navy to use real-world engagement requirements to make budgetary and force-structure decisions. Elements of Engagement Engagement is now an established element of U.S. national and regional unified command strategies. In fact, the National Military Strategy directs a focus on engagement as the primary peacetime activity of military forces. Moreover, the theater-engagement plans of the nation's warfighting CINCs (commanders in chief) delineate and prioritize appropriate activities. The U.S. naval strategy of operating "Forward ... From the Sea" is, in part, a peacetime-engagement plan. In 1997, the chief of naval operations enumerated specific engagement objectives in the Navy Operational Concept document (see box on page 45). Engagement activity includes diplomatic, economic, and military activities or operations conducted to achieve U.S. national-security objectives. Engagement requirements are situational and can change rapidly. Each engagement element provides an essential contribution to the overall engagement effort--but the various elements are not always, or necessarily, substitutes for one another. Similarly, diplomatic or economic agreements are not always or necessarily substitutes for military presence and engagement. Naval engagement is unique among the defense-engagement options available to U.S. policymakers. Only naval forces offer self-sustained, high-endurance, unfettered, and mobile air-superiority and amphibious platforms. The combination of multimission capability, versatility, and access from the sea offers tactical and diplomatic advantages that often serve to make a carrier battle group, surface action group, or amphibious ready group the force of choice for engagement missions. Insofar as other naval missions are concerned, today's ongoing revolution at sea--with its highly networked forces sharing real-time tactical information, potent missile-defense capabilities, and highly accurate long-range land-attack weapons--will place a growing strategic premium on the availability of U.S. naval forces during the 21st century. Constraints and Innovations Efforts to improve the ability of naval forces to conduct engagement missions have focused on policies that manage fleet operations. Innovative policies--including stationing ships overseas, but rotating crews from the United States--are now under review, but they face major obstacles. The fleet's engagement capability is now constrained by the size of the fleet, limits on personnel days at sea, maintenance needs, transit speed, deployment-turnaround ratios, and forward-basing diplomatic considerations. The Navy is conducting an innovative exchange of crews overseas this year with crew members of the Austin-class amphibious transport dock USS Juneau, based in San Diego, exchanging ships with the crew of Juneau's sister ship, USS Dubuque, based in Sasebo, Japan. Although the ships will be exchanging homeports, Sailors and their families will remain in place. The ship-swap plan will be "best for everyone," said Capt. Alan M. Haefner, the Juneau's commanding officer. "As we approach the actual date for the exchange of command, it is clearly evident that the individuals who envisioned this swap over a year-and-a-half ago had the right idea." Juneau, which deployed in early June, arrived in Sasebo after brief port visits to her namesake city of Juneau, Alaska, and Seattle, Wash. The Juneau has been outfitted to serve as the Navy's first IT-21 amphibious-force ship. Upon the completion of the ship-swap in Japan, the crew of Juneau will become the crew of Dubuque and steam her back to San Diego for an extensive overhaul period. Real-World Requirements Such innovative planning, however, does not alter the fact that the size of the fleet has decreased to the point where its maximum engagement potential already has been reached. Navy policy requires ships to be in homeport 50 percent of the time to maintain quality-of-life conditions for Sailors. Extended maintenance periods regularly take ships out of the deployment rotation. Transit speed affects the time available for engagement missions, especially in the Pacific--where six-month deployments begin and end with transits to and from homeports that can take five weeks. Nuclear-powered carriers routinely conduct 30-plus-knot transits to ensure that requirements of the regional CINCs are met. Aircraft carriers, submarines, surface combatants, and aviation squadrons were shuttled rapidly from theater to theater in both 1998 and 1999 to respond to multiple international crises. According to the director of the Submarine Warfare Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV), "The demand for submarine services continues to grow--there is almost an insatiable demand from the warfighting CINCs." Many port visits, which provide Sailors and Marines with a needed respite from the rigors of forward-deployed operations--and which offer additional engagement opportunities--have been shortened or eliminated to meet the demands of combat taskings or crisis-response operations. To meet emergent requirements, personnel days-at-sea limitations have been exceeded on a number of occasions. Overstretched forces have left critical gaps in presence in the Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf, and Mediterranean Sea. The Navy has pushed both its forward-deployed and nondeployed forces--and people--to the limit to meet the operational demands of the so-called "New World Disorder." The fleet most suitable for naval missions in the 21st century requires a compromise between warfighting and engagement capability. A 1998 CNA study, U.S. Deterrence and Influence in the New Era, offered guidelines to the Navy to invest properly for engagement as one element in an overarching security posture. The study points out that the best force structure for engagement is not necessarily the best structure for warfighting. Investing with engagement as the only priority would result in a sizable fleet with more modest warfighting capabilities--which would not serve U.S. interests. By contrast, to invest for warfighting alone could emphasize more costly technologies and limit the resources available for engagement missions. A Balance of Capabilities A compromise between these competing resource requirements still results in a force structure of aircraft carriers, amphibious platforms, missile-equipped surface warships, and submarines. The Navy's post-Cold War drawdown and future force planning have, fortunately, focused on maintaining balanced capabilities across the fleet adequate both for engagement missions and for warfighting requirements. However, the current balance will not last if projected ship decommissionings are not offset by a larger shipbuilding program--largeenough, in fact, to sustain a fleet of more than 330 ships. As CNO Johnson told Sea Power in October 1998, "There is no substitute for being there"--i.e., for forward presence. Unlike containment, engagement is more difficult to measure and analyze. The results of more than 40 years of the U.S. Cold War containment strategy could be roughly judged by the successful avoidance of a global nuclear war, the net increase or decrease in the number of democratic nations around the world, the state of U.S. international relations--and the eventual demise of the Soviet Union. Measuring the degree to which a region or nation is engaged with the United States, on the other hand, is a tedious task. It is both a subjective-qualitative and an objective-quantitative process. Despite the challenge, it is important to measure the results of U.S. engagement in a reliable way. If engagement requirements can be identified and validated, then the forces necessary to support them can be advocated more effectively. Naval engagement consists primarily of port visits, multinational exercises and conferences, humanitarian-assistance operations, overseas community relations, and navy-to-navy exchange visits. By comparing the planned alternative levels of naval engagement activity with varied engagement requirements, excesses and deficiencies can be identified. The U.S. transition from a national strategy of containment to one of engagement is complete. However, the armed services are still struggling with how to justify the force structure they need, and how to obtain the funding required to support the engagement strategy. Here, economic theory provides a suitable framework. A central tenet in the study of economics is the concept of choice. For peacetime security planners, this entails making decisions after the analysis and comparison of desired outcomes, restricted alternatives, limited resources, and competing priorities. Models have been developed to demonstrate the relationship and interaction of variables affecting economic activity. In his 1890 publication, Principles of Economics, Alfred Marshall introduced the enduring and important economic principle of supply and demand. His model contains numerous examples, valid today, for evaluating naval force-level options, demonstrating the likely outcomes of planning alternatives, and illustrating an engagement strategy's dependence on available force structure. Calibrating the Cost A supply/demand model of engagement demonstrates the relationship between the "amount" of engagement activity that should be provided and the amount that is provided. The model also can identify the opportunity cost (i.e., the value of activities that must be foregone as the result of choosing an alternative) incurred as a result of force-planning decisions. Further, the model can illustrate the impact of national-security decisions that may restrict engagement opportunities, result in inadequate force levels to conduct the strategy, or adversely affect the national-security environment. In short, the model allows decisionmakers to visualize the strategic impact of force-structure adjustments and policies. The objective of the supply/demand analysis is not, however, simply to provide quantitative solutions to engagement options. Rather, the purpose of the model is to illustrate how the engagement system is interrelated so that the impact of change can be understood. The U.S. military's engagement with other nations to shape the regional-security environment in peacetime can be quantified, to some extent, in both fiscal and operational terms. The Engagement Opportunity Cost is defined by the value of opportunities sacrificed when specific engagement choices are made. The resources committed to conduct engagement--ships, aircraft, personnel, and funding--are no longer available for such alternative force-utilization options as training, port visits, and maintenance. The level of engagement activity appropriate to serve U.S. national- security interests may be considered Engagement Demand. An inverse relationship exists between the Engagement Opportunity Cost and the amount of engagement provided. When the Engagement Opportunity Cost is high, the quantity of engagement provided is low. The Engagement Opportunity Cost is low in regions or countries more suitable for additional U.S. engagement activity. Engagement Supply is the term used to define the quantity of engagement provided. Here it is worth pointing out that the amount of engagement is affected by the willingness as well as the ability to make forces available for engagement activities. It is determined by engagement policy decisions and available force levels. Engagement supply has a positive relationship to the opportunity cost incurred. However, resources allocated to conduct engagement are always committed at the expense of other alternatives. Engagement Equilibrium is the point at which the demand for engagement--as determined by U.S. strategy and national security interests--coincides with the supply of engagement activity as determined by the NCA, policies, and forces in place. At equilibrium, U.S. engagement activity can be described as appropriate, based on the opportunity cost incurred. Today, Engagement Rationing occurs because DOD engagement resources are limited (and still decreasing, given the continuing downslide in military force structure). The Search for Equilibrium The U.S. Navy's operations of the past several years demonstrate that a fleet of approximately 330 ships--including at least 12 carrier battle groups, 12 amphibious ready groups, 107 surface combatants, and 65 attack submarines--would be the valid baseline for a Navy able to accomplish its present engagement and warfighting missions. The Navy has effectively responded to NCA taskings related to the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Iraq, and North Korea and simultaneously conducted regional engagement operations. With an appropriately sized fleet, necessary training, maintenance, and quality of life for Sailors can be assured. However, continued reductions in the size of the fleet will make it impossible for the Navy to balance all of its competing priorities and execute U.S. national strategy effectively. Already, storm flags are in the air to signal that the Navy is committed beyond the operational limits it can sustain indefinitely. Adverse trends include inadequate officer and enlisted retention in most warfare specialties, recruitment shortfalls, higher cannibalization rates for spare parts, a decline in the readiness of nondeployed forces, and legitimate operational missions that go unfilled owing to a lack of available platforms. Even at 330 ships, the Navy would not be capable of maintaining the engagement equilibrium called for by U.S. defense strategy. A fleet large enough to maintain engagement equilibrium should be the force-structure benchmark for DOD resource sponsors and force planners. Equilibrium-theory analysis demonstrates that the size of the fleet must be significantly more than 330 ships if the Navy is to fulfill existing and future engagement requirements. A failure to reverse the Navy's continued reduction will result in a diminished forward presence, less effective means for crisis resolution, growing asymmetric threats to U.S. forces, disengagement from regions of vital interest to the United States, and the Navy's continued progression toward a hollow force. Moreover, disengagement will entail a decline in U.S. access and influence in regions where the United States has long sought to maintain a stabilizing influence and to support allied and friendly nations alike. If the U.S. political leadership does not take concerted action to reverse the fall in Navy shipbuilding and to increase the size of the fleet to more than 330 ships, U.S. peacetime disengagement will witness a greater likelihood that regional tensions will increase during the early years of the 21st century. The end result will be that operational necessity will drive the Navy to press its reduced forces even harder in order to respond to crisis or con-tingency. And, as then-CNO Adm. Thomas B. Hayward observed during the late 1970s when the Navy faced a hemorrhage of more than 23,000 middle-grade petty officers, the United States will again find itself trying to meet three-ocean requirements with a two-ocean Navy.


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