Does al-Qaida have nukes?

With all of our pressing focus on events in the War on Terror overseas, that is the most important question here at home. Historically the pattern of WMD proliferation in the world has been principally state to state: China to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and possibly North Korea; or North Korea to Pakistan, and maybe a former Soviet Republic to North Korea. I would have assessed it as a “low probability” that al-Qaida has a nuclear weapon, but potentially “high impact” if they do. With that probability assessment, however, I also would have low confidence in given the intelligence gaps and demonstrated U.S. intelligence shortfalls that have been publicly and exhaustively examined with respect to Iraq.

But the intelligence shortcomings detailed in the report released on March 30 by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction not only indicates that the state of our knowledge is worse than previously understood; but reading the commission’s own evaluation of the intelligence analysis, information and circumstances in Afghanistan pre- and post invasion actually leads me to raise the probability that al-Qaida has a nuclear weapon from low to a moderate probability [50-50]. Far from allaying my fears, it heightened them.

If I were asked to assess the question as an “intelligence judgment” based on what I have seen and heard in the news over the last several months on television, other publicly available sources and the Commission’s report I would state it this way:

“United States Intelligence and law enforcement leaders have provided strategic warning of the clear and present danger that al-Qaida has or may get nuclear weapons and intends to use them inside the United States.”

1. Al-Qaida has the desire to acquire nuclear weapons, as already publicly stated by Osama bin Laden 2. It is moderate probability that they may possess one or more nuclear weapons, as already publicly stated by Laden 3. It has a fatwa that grants religious approval and authority for the weapon’s employment against the United States 4. It has access to sympathizers within the nuclear development structures of emergent nuclear states 5. It has the funds to purchase finished weapons and hire sympathetic experts to train them on the handling and employment of the weapons 6. The intelligence community cannot fully assess with a high degree of confidence the availability of nuclear weapons to al-Qaida via criminal or deliberate proliferation activities

The WMD Commission evaluated the intelligence community’s assessments on al-Qaida’s nuclear WMD efforts from a pre-war and post-war perspective beginning on page 271 of the report. Let’s review what the IC said and the commission wrote.

"The Intelligence Community assessed that al-Qaida was unlikely to have built a nuclear device or obtained sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon, and was 'significantly less likely" to have acquired a complete nuclear weapon.'"

Yet the Commission notes up front in beginning their lengthy report that the IC has and still has today, serious deficiencies in acquiring and evaluating intelligence about WMD proliferation. It said: "The bad news is that we still know disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries."

What is ironic is that in the face of serious intelligence gaps and weaknesses, the IC made bold and striking assessments with respect to Saddam’s WMD capabilities, but in the same poor intelligence environment, made rather weak and meager judgments with respect to al-Qaida’s acquisition of nuclear capabilities. With sparse information, how did the IC conclude that al-Qaida was "significantly less likely" to have acquired a complete nuclear weapon? Lack of evidence resulting from little collection capability does not mean an actual lack of activity.

The IC position here appears to have made a best guess. Prior to the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, did we have the capability to collect against al-Qaida's leadership, its intentions and plans? Did the IC dismiss the possibility of al-Qaida acquiring an actual weapon more on hope; maybe even a reluctance to face the consequences of judging that they might have gotten actual nuclear weapons?

The Commission did concede, however, that, “the Community lacked a high confidence level in these judgments because of "substantial" information gaps. Analysts were apparently most worried about the possibility that al-Qaida could obtain nuclear material from outside sources." So while acknowledging what was a known intelligence vacuum, their use of the term "nuclear material" rather than "weapon" or "device," already demonstrates they had analytically dismissed the possibility that al-Qaida was attempting to acquire an actual nuclear weapon and analysts were most focused on al-Qaida having a research and development program [R&D], in the manner of a state entity, or for some type of rather easily fashioned radiological device.

Nonetheless, "Given their level of uncertainty, the Intelligence Community's concerns about al-Qaida’s unconventional weapons capabilities grew in November 2001 when, in an interview with a Pakistani journalist, Osama bin Laden claimed that he had both nuclear and chemical weapons,” stated the Commission.

Therefore, “In response, the CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center and the DCI's Counterterrorist Center produced an assessment speculating about al-Qa`ida’s nuclear options." I would suggest the term “speculating” is the operative word.

The IC “report judged that al-Qa’ida probably had access to nuclear expertise and facilities and that there was a real possibility of the group developing a crude nuclear device." That is but one plausible scenario. However, the WMD Commission Report gives no indication where the advice and expertise might come from though we already know who the proliferating states are: China, North Korea, Pakistan and possibly Russia or a former Soviet Republic.

"The Intelligence Community could not ultimately reach a definitive conclusion about whether al-Qaida possessed radiological material that could be dispersed via conventional weaponry," stated the commission report. Acknowledging the availability of “radiological materials,” the report diverged to discuss the IC view of its use in “assassinations” – again one plausible scenario focused on developing capabilities for radiological terrorism, not on nuclear weapon acquisition.

The post-war analysis, now more clear, because U.S. forces had entered the training camps and begun to exploit documents found at al-Qaida bases and other safe houses, appears to remain focused on the dominant analytic hypothesis that al-Qaida had a nuclear research and development program:

"Documents found at sites used by al-Qaida operatives indicated that the group was interested in nuclear device design.... In addition, al-Qaida had established contact with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hard-to-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.... In May 2002, technical experts from CIA and the Department of Energy judged that there remained no credible information that al-Qaida had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon."

Apparently, the intelligence related to nuclear weapon acquisition was again reviewed, but a re-look of the same limited information would not likely yield a different conclusion. And with respect to this judgment, a key finding of the commission appears highly impeaching: “Analysts writing on al-Qaida’s potential weapons of mass destruction efforts in Afghanistan did not adequately or explicitly state the basis for or the assumptions underlying their most critical judgments.” I consider the statement that there is “no credible information” al-Qaida has acquired a nuclear weapon to be a “critical judgment.” The term “credible,” likewise, turns on one’s standard of credibility, how high the bar is set; it does not necessarily mean the same as “no reporting.”

Recall also, influencing this judgment, was the February 2002 trip of Ambassador Joseph Wilson, whom the CIA sent to Niger to investigate the “yellowcake issue.” Not surprisingly, he came back with the confirmation of the dominant analytic position that al-Qaida did not get access to this material. Incredibly, rather than sending real intelligence collectors to find out what was going on in Niger, if anything, they sent a former ambassador with no known expertise in either nuclear technologies or intelligence collection tradecraft. I submit that illustrates a propensity to sublimely task collection for what one wants to hear -- not what is actually needed -- symptomatic of “group think.”

"Analysts noted that collection efforts in Afghanistan had not yielded any radioactive material suitable for weapons, and that there were no credible reports of nuclear weapons missing from vulnerable countries."

These are the most controversial lines in this chapter and where the Commission report flounders. Apart from the fact that no radiological material suitable for developing a weapon was found in Afghanistan, what does the qualification of “vulnerable country” mean, with respect to missing nuclear weapons? I would deduce, both the commission and the IC were thinking of the former Soviet republics, such as the previous Ukrainian regime. But why not consider a cooperating, proliferating state like Pakistan or North Korea? Pakistan is not a "vulnerable country." It is a denied territory.

Pakistan has been exposed for selling nuclear weapon’s development plans to other countries, including Iran, and possibly an actual weapon to North Korea. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons physicists include some known to be radical Islamic sympathizers, several of whom visited bin Laden in Afghanistan before Sept. 11, 2001. Pakistan will not tell us anything about its nuclear inventory, won't give us access to A.Q. Khan, and still publicly denies all knowledge that A.Q. Khan was involved in proliferation activities. The situation is much the same for North Korea.

The report continues, "Among the nuclear-related documents found by U.S. forces in Afghanistan was a manual that discussed openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues. Collection by media sources also added some details to the intelligence picture surrounding al-Qaida's weapons of mass destruction efforts."

In November 2001, “CNN journalists found hundreds of documents describing al-Qaida's nuclear and explosive development efforts in an abandoned safe house. CNN commissioned three experts to review the documents, including David Albright, an expert on proliferation who had been a consultant to the United Nations organization investigating Iraq's weapons program. CNN published the results of this work in January 2002, concluding that al-Qa’ida was pursuing a "serious weapons program with heavy emphasis on developing a nuclear device."

Here the Commission, relying on CNN obtained documents and analysis, reinforces the R&D thesis of developing a nuclear device, rather than a consideration or evaluation of simple end-item acquisition. Granted the discovered documents on the fuel cycle and the above CNN documents could indicate an R&D program. But since no facilities were discovered in Afghanistan that had any radioactive remnants, nor radiological materials found that would indicate an actual R&D program, the Commission’s own information contradicts the R&D thesis.

In fact, in CNN’s Jan. 26, 2002, report on the discovery, titled “Al Qaida documents outline serious weapons program,” the network portrayed the unknown author of one document as “knowledgeable of various ways to set off a nuclear bomb” who “describes a little-known shortcut to initiate a nuclear explosion.” Whether this is an “en-extremis” technique to “hot-wire” a weapon for detonation is not clear, but if so, would indicate possible possession of a weapon and training for its use.

So what could be an alternative, plausible explanation to account for these WMD Commission Report facts?

The activities and information discovered in Afghanistan could as easily support a theory that a select group of al-Qaida members, with support from nuclear weapons experts from somewhere were being trained on how to store, handle, transport, employ and detonate finished nuclear devices. Under this theory there would be no weapon development materials or radioactive traces found anywhere in Afghanistan. These guys aren't physicists; they’re operatives who needed only to know enough about the weapon to safely handle, employ and detonate it. The “radiological material” -- in the nuclear warhead -- is of course, somewhere else.

Concluding this section of the report is the Commission’s own amazing summation that hopefully is not also -- “dead wrong:”

"The war in Afghanistan and its aftermath confirmed two key intelligence judgments made before the September attacks: al-Qaida did not have a nuclear device, nor did it have large-scale chemical and biological weapons capabilities."

Wrong. It could be said to definitely confirm that al- Qa'ida did not have a nuclear weapon stored in Afghanistan. It does not confirm that they do not have access to a nuclear weapon stored elsewhere-- for which their operatives inside Afghanistan were undergoing basic training for its use, being supported by outside experts.

So let me explain it this way. If I were to take you to Fort Benning, Georgia, the Home of the Infantry, and we go into a classroom, and in the room is a mock-up of an M-16 rifle, on the walls are "exploded picture diagrams" of an M-16, charts on the firing and recoil cycle, how a bullet works, the explosive physics of gunpowder, sighting techniques -- do you conclude that the people in this classroom have a research and development program to design and build an M-16 rifle? Depending on other evidentiary factors, the presence of machine shops, metal-stamping facility and a production line you might. Or do you conclude that maybe the people are there to learn how to store, handle, employ and fire an M-16 rifle?

Given the lack of presence of radiological materials, any found radiological weapon, or production facility in Afghanistan related to a nuclear device, I don’t conclude that al-Qaida’s instructional activities and efforts inside Afghanistan were fully and solely an R&D program, but quite possibly a training program to use one or more nuclear weapons against the United States.

In effect, the Commission may have itself “bought in” to the “inherited positions” of the Intelligence Community, a propensity that was blamed by its predecessor 9-11 Commission as a root cause of the IC’s incorrect assessments on Iraq.

The Commission concludes in Chapter Three, “Al-Qaida in Afghanistan” by saying: “Our study revealed a number of overarching problems that help to explain why the Intelligence Community assessed al-Qaida's capabilities the way it did. These problems are likely to affect the Intelligence Community's future performance with regard to assessing the unconventional weapons programs of al-Qaida, other terrorist groups, and rogue states."

LTC Joseph C. Myers ( Joseph.Myers@maxwell.af.mil) is an Infantry and Foreign Area Officer with extensive overseas experience; he has served at US Southern Command, as the Chief of the South America Division at the Defense Intelligence Agency and recently completed a Senior Army Fellowship at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The recipient of the National Intelligence Medal of Achievement, he is a recognized expert on terrorism and insurgency. The views expressed are solely his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense.

Well, if they do and can move either in pieces or as a unit, it will certainly come across the Mexican border.

Al Qaeda has had a long time relationship with Fidel Castro. Terroorists have rested and trained in Cuba before moving to Mexico for transit across the US border and stealth location in key US target cities.

The Al Qaeda nuke(s) will follow the same path and will be escorted by Mexicans who will have been very well paid (Saudi money) for moving/protecting the weapon(s).

We used an approach with the commies, a nucular attack would guarantee a nucular in response. We should establish the same policy with the Muslims/terrorists/Saudis. A nucular attack on the US will guarantee that Mecca and Medina will be taken out within minutes.

"Well, if they do and can move either in pieces or as a unit, it will certainly come across the Mexican border."

Why? You're about ten times as likely to get caught moving illegally across the Mexican border as you are illegally crossing the Canadian border.

al Qeade doesn't have any nuclear weapon -

However, I do agree with you about needing to secure our borders more -

It is amazing how we are becoming a police State against our own citizens (legal Americans) yet we are doing very little against illegals -

I have had to somewhat recently move to NC for work reasons and I am shocked here how these hill-people put up with routine police checkpoints!

I am talking USSR style checkpoints with police officers stopping every vehicle and asking "can I see ur papers please"..."ur papers please".....(it is like something out of the former USSR or Nazi Germany).

So we are becoming a police State against our own but do little to nothing against illegals.

This is way too long of an article to read when the question isn't even rhetorical. As fast as Al Qaeda gets nuclear weapons you will see explosions around the world, one by one.

They'd want a big show of a target and there is probably some disagreement over whether they should attack the US or Israel.

I won't speculate as to who or what they would want to destroy.

Wasn't there some plot to kidnap Russell Crowe?

"They would already have used it (a nuke) especially given the dire straights they're in..."

"How would that improve their situation?"

It would motivate and inspire their supporters.

The problem for them would be, like 9/11, they would miscalculate the U.S. response.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.