Posted on 05/09/2005 2:51:43 PM PDT by Excuse_My_Bellicosity
PEARL HARBOR, Hawaii (NNS) -- The U.S. Navy announced May 9 the completion of the investigation into the Jan. 8 accident aboard the submarine USS San Francisco (SSN 711) that claimed the life of one Sailor.
San Francisco struck an undersea mountain about 360 miles southeast of its Guam homeport because its leaders and watch teams failed to develop and execute a safe voyage plan, the command investigation into the incident concluded.
"The findings of fact show that San Francisco, while transiting at flank (maximum) speed and submerged to 525 feet, hit a seamount that did not appear on the chart being used for navigation," the 124-page report said of the incident in the vicinity of the Caroline Islands.
"Other charts in San Francisco’s possession did, however, clearly display a navigation hazard in the vicinity of the grounding," it said. "San Francisco’s navigation team failed to review those charts adequately and transfer pertinent data to the chart being used for navigation, as relevant directives and the ship’s own procedures required.
"If San Francisco’s leaders and watch teams had complied with requisite procedures and exercised prudent navigation practices, the grounding would most likely have been avoided. Even if not wholly avoided, however, the grounding would not have been as severe and loss of life may have been prevented."
Machinist's Mate 2nd Class Joseph Allen Ashley, 24, of Akron, Ohio, died aboard the submarine Jan. 9 from an "inevitably fatal" severe head injury sustained during the accident.
"Earlier evacuation or arrival of medical officers would not have changed the outcome for [Petty Officer] Ashley" the investigation said in regard to the two additional medical personnel flown aboard by helicopter and two attempts to medically evacuate him by helicopter.
Another 97 of 137 crew members reported injuries ranging from minor bruising and muscle strains to two who suffered dislocated shoulders. Sixty-eight of them were evaluated and treated aboard, while the remaining 29 were treated at Naval Hospital Guam when San Francisco returned to port under its own power Jan. 10. Just three of them were admitted overnight for further evaluation and treatment.
As a result of the collision, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert relieved Cmdr. Kevin Mooney of his command of San Francisco Feb. 12 following non-judicial punishment proceedings in Yokosuka, Japan. Mooney also received a letter of reprimand.
But Greenert, in his endorsement of the investigation, also praised Mooney’s prior record and performance following the impact.
"Although the grounding incident compelled me to punish [him] and remove him from command, in my opinion it does not negate 19 years of exemplary service," the admiral wrote. "Prior to the grounding incident, USS San Francisco demonstrated a trend of continuing improvement and compiled an impressive record of achievement under [Mooney’s] leadership. Moreover, the crew’s post-grounding response under his direct leadership was commendable and enabled [the sub’s] recovery and safe return to port."
Greenert also criticized the executive officer and navigation team for their share of the responsibility, saying their "failure to adequately and critically review applicable publications and available charts led to submission of an ill-advised voyage plan and hindered the commanding officer’s ability to make fully informed safety-of-ship decisions."
Six crew members were punished March 22 by Capt. Bradley Gehrke, commander of Submarine Squadron 15 on Guam, to which San Francisco was assigned. None were identified due to privacy reasons, but they included enlisted, senior enlisted and officer. The punishments included reduction in rate and punitive letters of reprimand.
San Francisco remains in drydock in Apra Harbor, Guam, under repair.
For more news from around the fleet, visit the www.navy.mil.
Thanks for your reply. I agree with you and thought the same thing that the steel dome might be a temp fix to get it back to the states. I'm almost positive I read that the sub was a complete loss but I'm not going to go back through the five or six threads on this topic.
I'm an old E-6 Army puke. REFRAD ACTDUTRA in '71 but had several years in 3 different state NG units. I'd do it all again.
"The findings of fact show that San Francisco, while transiting at flank (maximum) speed and submerged to 525 feet, hit a seamount that did not appear on the chart being used for navigation," the 124-page report said of the incident in the vicinity of the Caroline Islands.
"Other charts in San Francisco’s possession did, however, clearly display a navigation hazard in the vicinity of the grounding," it said.
"San Francisco’s navigation team failed to review those charts adequately and transfer pertinent data to the chart being used for navigation, as relevant directives and the ship’s own procedures required. "If San Francisco’s leaders and watch teams had complied with requisite procedures and exercised prudent navigation practices, the grounding would most likely have been avoided. Even if not wholly avoided, however, the grounding would not have been as severe and loss of life may have been prevented."
I do not see the correlation you are trying to make between the report and the Admiral's remarks on why he disciplined the skipper. The report mentions preventing the loss of life, whereas the Admiral didn't make a single reference to the loss of life as being a factor in his decision to hold NJP and relieve the CO of his command.
I think it's a stretch to conclude that the admiral has failed to appropriately consider the accompanying death and injury just because he abreviates his reference to the incident as a gounding incident.
Maybe you have knowledge of other things that leads you to believe Vice Adm. Jonathan W. Greenert has a lack of concern for personnel, but simply refering to the incident as a "collision" or a "grounding" is pretty slim evidence of that.
What's the reason for your criticism of Greenert?
How many charts does you NAV gang have to choose from? Thought your course/depth/speed were preprogrammed in runs like this one.
If there was an outdated chart, why in the hell was it aboard?
I agree and see where you're coming from... I got out of the CG as a 2nd class QM. This story is a heartbreaker on lots of levels.
I agree that the skipper is only being fried because it's his job to be the scapegoat. The mistakes, if they really were mistakes, were made at a far lower level.
But from other reports I've read, this business of "hazards" noted on "other" charts than the ones they were using for the nav plot weren't maybe so cut and dried.
A report, as I understand it, in a Notice to Mariners about an area of 'discolored water' in such-and-such a place is hardly an automatic indication of a hazard there. Such things, when they are reported, are generally wildly imprecise, and have many possible causes.
It is one of those bits of information that may or may not be meaningful, but nonetheless is almost impossible to account for in the voyage plan. From the original story... there was some question about the depth indication, as it didn't match the charted depth, and they rose to take a GPS position to confirm position. But... they were still in several thousand feet of water under the keel. This was only minutes before the impact.
The charted depth didn't match the sounding, but they were still in very, very deep water. As a QM, I can recall daily situations when recorded depth didn't match charted depth. It happens all the time, because in many places around the world... the charts really suck.
I'm not a submariner, but I thing I can answer the questions.
How many charts? Several. Generally they are due to different scales of chart printed for the same place. You pick a chart for nav depending on how far you are from shore and how fast you wanna take fixes. Generally speaking, open ocean sailing is done on pretty small-scale charts. The close you get to shore the larger scale charts you use, because you need to show more and more detail in the hazards and your movements.
There are no preprogrammed runs. Every voyage is different.
Outdated charts: Every chart is outdated before it is even printed. Corrections to charts are published weekly in the Notices to Mariners, and those corrections are manually done to charts onboard ships.
This isn't a final repair by any means. The folks in Guam are making it ready to transit back to the mainland, probably on the surface. I seriously doubt this boat will ever dive again.
Who told you that? Whoever it was, lied to you.
Another thought... I agree with your sentiment about feeling bad for the nav gang. I've come close to making mistakes like this myself, and only didn't by the greatest strokes of luck. --none of which could have been predicted or prevented if it had gone badly.
Something that I think has been lost in all the babbling about this sad set of events has been the absolutely heroic actions of the Captian, officers and crew of this boat.
This boat suffered a catastrophe that might well have ended in the loss of the whole boat and all aboard. That they were able to survive this event is testament to the outstanding damage control training and drilling of that command. This skipper saved many many lives, along with the submarine. He deserves some credit for that.
....whereas the Admiral didn't make a single reference to the loss of life as being a factor in his decision to hold NJP and relieve the CO of his command.
I was Naval Air. We had charts too but also an advantage (most of the time), the eyeball.
Subs are different and if IonGuru and Doohickey can round up some NAV guys, you and I will be in for an interesting read. No disrespect to you or your navigation abilities.
You're right on that every voyage is different; so are flights. I've had some I'd rather forget but those are the memorable ones.
Roger that. It would be interesting to hear from the Nav gang on a sub... though... I suspect it is closer to surface nav than we might have guessed. Charts is charts... :-)
Temporary GRP dome. After breaching the sonar sphere and 2 MBTs, SSN721 will need a full shipyard period before she'll ever dive again.
You're making a good point. While you might use a few different scale charts to review a voyage plan... you don't ever really compare point-for-point an entire voyage on various scales of charts... unless you're traveling through known hazardous waters.
I give the Captain and Crew a BZ for getting SF under control and returning to port. I know the Navy is unforgiving in these incidents. I read the mixed message in the Admiral's remarks in this thread.
I've friends who are former submariners but not NAV who tell me there's a preprogrammed course plot and redundant systems. There are changes in the sea floor over time; if that chart was from 1960 and that sea mount grew 10 feet....well, go figure.
Good chat, Ramius. Let's see what we can find out.
Nice tag. Let's start with Walker - and go down to test depth.
Clue me in, SmithL; who's Walker?
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