Posted on 04/28/2005 3:23:19 PM PDT by SwinneySwitch
WASHINGTON Army Lt. Gen. David Barno, the commander of coalition forces in Afghanistan, had the task of covering that huge country with just 18,000 troops.
It was possible to do so, he observed, because "airpower from all the services ... have given ground forces ... the ability to operate in smaller units and respond quicker, with more accurate weaponry, than at any other point in history."
Over the last 15 years, many have come to regard airpower as the key to victory, in war zones ranging from the gulf to the Balkans, from Afghanistan to Iraq. Fighter forces, in particular, have proved to be effective, destroying defended targets, supporting fast-moving land forces and dominating the sky.
Yet serious questions keep cropping up. Is the size of the tactical fighter fleet about right or is it "excessive"? The USAF fighter force has fallen from 37 to 20 wings. Navy and Marine Corps aviation arms have shrunk, too.
Top Pentagon leaders claim the armed services invest too much in fighters. They see air dominance as one area in which the U.S. has "excessive overmatch." The new National Defense Strategy, released March 1, suggests cutting some of the overmatch so as to better fund new capabilities and expand ground forces.
According to "Inside the Navy," a newsletter, Deputy Defense Secretary-designate Gordon England recently told reporters he sees great potential in "integrating" Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps and Army aviation. England left no doubt about the basic objective: "If you can gain efficiencies in tactical forces," he said, "what else can you do with the money?"
Any such move now could pit the Air Force, the Navy/Marine team, and, to a degree, the Army against each other, conceivably igniting a dustup over roles.
The last such tussle came in the mid-1990s. It was sparked by Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who lamented, among other things, that America's was "the only military in the world with four air forces." A blue-ribbon Commission on Roles and Missions, or CORM, spent more than a year pondering the subject.
The commission found the supposed "problem" proved to be largely illusory. CORM in 1995 reported, "Inefficiencies attributed to the so-called 'four air forces' were mostly in the infrastructure, not on the battlefield."
Second, CORM concluded that a little redundancy isn't a bad thing. A recent case in point: the pivotal role played by naval air in the first weeks of war in Afghanistan a remote, landlocked nation far outside the Navy's usual mission focus.
Third, overlap fosters interservice competition, often resulting in better systems or concepts of operations, whether they concern close air support, long-range strike or something else.
The Air Force doesn't now nor has it ever claimed a right to monopolize military aviation.
Even so, there are sound reasons to make the Air Force the "keeper" of the tactical aviation art. The air arms of the other services are limited; their primary purpose is to perform missions tied directly to their basic land power, sea power or amphibious roles.
Yet, Pentagon officials should be cautious before tampering too much with the current size and structure of the services' tactical air forces.
They would do well to heed the admonition of Gen. Gregory Martin, who has commanded U.S. Air Forces in Europe and the Air Force Materiel Command and who recently warned:
"Nothing works without air and space dominance. Nothing. We don't want to assume that we will always have it. We want to always understand what it takes to get it, and we want to make sure we are building the systems that will give it to us."
Actually athough the Soviets had "one Air Force" (Not quite true The Air Defense Force (PVO) which controled the Motherland defence Radars, interceptors, and SAMs was entirely separate from the AF), the actual airfroce had several autonomous components.
Long Range Aviation - strategic and theatre bombers
Frontal Aviation - air support to the ground forces (includes local Air to air)
Miltary Transport Aviation - they carry stuff
Naval Aviation = ASW, reconnisance, and strike
Army Aviation - helicopter lift anh attack
Border Guards Aviation
And the carrier force problems were down to shortage of money, and possinbly complications in designing/building the steam cat.
The actual Su-33, MiG 29K aircraft are as good as any designs anywhere.
It's best to leave the services alone, let each of them use their own form of air power. The Air Force has its mission, the Army needs its helicopters, and the Marines use their planes to support Marines. Our system works nicely now, no need to try and change it based on theories.
I do, as well.
Ditto then. Any internal talk in the USAF about a replacement aircraft, or are they still bent on retiring the concept?
Wholeheartedly agree. Gotta believe the Army understand the requirements, necessities and importance of blowing up enemy tanks and artillery much better than the USAF.
Old Airplane Driver
Once Upon A Time, Long Ago
Capt, USAF
535th TAS/483rd TAW
Cam Ranh Bay AB, RVN
And Bou Driver Extraordinaire!
The Canadian Armed Forces already consolidated command.
We now know how well that turned out to be. *eyeroll*
Good history, but I'll bet you that a division or brigade commander wants to control his own air cav. Just faster horses with a louder gallup.
Yes
Everything we do in terms of power projection depends on air superiority.
Hope this helps;
Basic html formatting
http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a38890ecf73d4.htm
The old FB-111(still truckin') is OK. You may mean the F-111B
The Phantom II was developed for the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Bulls***. The Commandant doesn't answer to the CNO.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.