Lando 
Posted on 03/23/2005 8:26:31 PM PST by Lando Lincoln
Two big anniversaries this year mark turning points in Australia's strategic history. Two hundred years ago, Nelson destroyed Napoleon's navy at Trafalgar. For nearly a century afterwards, Britain's naval supremacy made Australians secure from the European rivals that seemed, back then, our only potential threats.
Then in 1905, 100 years ago, in the straits of Tsushima, the Russian fleet was destroyed by Japan's new navy. It was the first time an Asian power had defeated Europeans at sea. Australia was shocked.
We might in future face threats from Asia. Britain, now challenged by Germany, might not be there to help. Ever since, Australia's strategic priority has always been to support Britain and America - especially America - to dominate Asia so they could prevent such threats materialising.
1805, 1905, 2005? I'm not a numerologist, but you have to wonder whether we might face another strategically transforming naval battle this year.
And there are no prizes for guessing what it would be: a Battle of Taiwan between the US and Chinese navies, ostensibly over the independence of Taiwan, but in reality over which power would emerge strategically pre-eminent in Asia in the 21st century.
The battle probably will not happen. But in a way it's not needed. The strategic competition is happening anyway. And China is already effectively challenging America as the pre-eminent power in Asia. Even Australia is being drawn into its sphere of influence.
Last week Alexander Downer made it absolutely clear that if the US and China went to war over Taiwan, Australia would prefer to stay on the sidelines.
Last year, when he said the same thing in Beijing, the Americans probably assumed it was just a mistake. Now there is no doubt.
This is good news for China. It is exactly what President Hu Jintao asked for when he addressed the Australian Parliament in October 2003 - for Australia to play "a constructive role" on Taiwan.
Beijing will also have been pleased a few weeks ago when the Howard Government declined America's request to urge the Europeans to maintain their arms embargo against China.
How far John Howard's Government has come since March 1996 - just a few weeks after it won office - when the US and China last went toe to toe over Taiwan. Then Australia gave America swift and unconditional support. Now we are closer to Beijing than to Washington.
This tells you something about Howard. He supported George Bush over Iraq, but history will say Howard's biggest legacy in foreign policy has not been to move us closer to the US, but to move us closer to China.
Of course we all know why.
China is seen as the key to Australia's economic future, and Beijing has made it clear that economic opportunities are conditional on strategic and political alignment. China is using its economic potential to build a sphere of influence, and we are being drawn in by our purse strings.
They are watching in Washington. They will not be happy. Downer's view that we might not help the US against China directly contradicts American doctrine.
For them, ANZUS is not an "a la carte" alliance: you can't pick and choose. Or as Bush says, you are either with us or against us. So they must be wondering where on earth Australia is heading.
America has recently been shoring up support among other Asia-Pacific allies. Last month it persuaded Japan to formally affirm its support for the US over Taiwan.
But as they watch the way Australia and other regional countries are going, American policymakers must start to ask themselves whether they are not already losing the race with Beijing for regional influence.
In fact America, preoccupied with terrorism, has underestimated China. With unchallenged global power, Washington has assumed that it could dictate the pace and terms of China's engagement with its Asia-Pacific neighbours. But the Chinese have proven better than the US at using the "soft power" of trade and diplomacy, which was supposed to be an American strong-point.
China is using this soft power to build a new regional political order with China itself at the lead. And as long as China's economy stays on track, there does not seem to be much that the US, for all its power, can do to stop the process.
In Australia's case, for example, would we accept a Chinese invitation to join the new "ASEAN Plus Three" regional political grouping that excludes the US? Of course we would.
This tells us how far we have come already from our post-Tsushima strategic policy paradigm. For 100 years we have supported American primacy in Asia. Now we seem happy to be drafted into a Chinese sphere of influence that directly challenges that primacy.
This is not necessarily a mistake. Australia has no choice but to adjust our policies to the raw facts of China's growing power. But we need to be careful how we do it. In particular, we need to be careful to make sure that America does stay effectively engaged on our region, if not in a position of outright primacy, then at least as an influential member of a sustainable regional power structure.
If America cannot dominate Asia, it can help to maintain a strategic balance among the major powers. That would be overwhelmingly in Australia's interests. But this is a new role for America - different from the kind of role it has played in the past, and the role it has been expecting to play since it won the Cold War. Washington will need to start thinking about its power in different ways.
We will need to think about our alliance with the US in new ways, too. And we had better start a serious, frank, private dialogue with them about these new realities, if we want our alliance to adapt to the new circumstances.
Washington will need reassurance and new ideas. This is a major priority for Australian diplomacy. If we can make headway on that in 2005, we might just enjoy a happy anniversary.
Hugh White is visiting fellow at the Lowy Institute and professor of strategic studies at ANU.
Lando
If the Aussies do what the article suggests, maybe it's time for us to rethink the alliance too. Right now, our two most logical allies, Japan and Taiwan, are in northern Asia. Why spread out to cover the Aussies, if they won't help us with the Chinese. Guess they forget that Churchill was willing to sacrifice Australia to save the Empire, and we covered them from the Japanese Navy. They may not be happy if we follow Churchill's example, but like Jacob Marley, there's only so much dead weight we can drag around.
This article, in my view, is basically garbage based on trying to do that.
Australia certainly wants a friendly relationship with China - if we can have one. We don't want war with China, and they are potentially a very major trading partner for us.
If a situation develops where Australia has to choose the United States or China as a friend and ally, there is no choice at all. We will stand with the US.
Our foreign policy with regards to China is basically based on the idea that there's no sense in a country of 20 million people deliberately seeking problems with a country of over 1 billion. But that doesn't mean we won't face them if it becomes necessary.
Just give me a break.
How far John Howard's Government has come since March 1996 - just a few weeks after it won office - when the US and China last went toe to toe over Taiwan. Then Australia gave America swift and unconditional support.
True enough - but that is because in 1996, the Howard government was, as far as the United States was concerned, a completely unknown quality. Howard had only just been elected, and frankly, had a reputation as a bit of a wimp. We'd also had a socialist government in Australia for the previous 13 years. A combination of these factors meant that back in 1996, it was critically important for Australia to stand up and make it absolutely abundantly clear that we were supporting the US - because the US had every reason on Earth to doubt it.
In 2005, the situation is very different. In 1999, Australia, under John Howard's leadership lead a military operation into East Timor to protect the local people from the depredations of pro-Indonesian militias. Following the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, Australia activated the ANZUS Treaty and went to war in Afghanistan because of that treaty. Australia has also gone to war alongside the United States in Iraq in 2003, in a situation was not relevant.
There should no longer be any reason for the United States to doubt either the strength of John Howard, nor the fact that Australia most definitely values its relationships with the United States.
In 1996, Australia needed to make a symbolic stand over a relatively minor issue to send that message.
In 2005, Australia doesn't need to do that at such an early stage of what is going on now.
...agreed. The writer behind the following (link) shed a little more accurage light on the situation, IMO. There's also the proposal offered by Madhav Das Nalapat for NAATO: the North America-Asia Treaty Organization, possibly including India, Australia, the USA, South Korea, Japan, Singapore and others. ...must keep tactical ocean routes in that part of the Pacific Rim free for all and not dominated by China.
China Threatens U.S. Alliances [Background regarding Australia, Philippines,...]
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1369397/posts
What a load of crap. Australia wasn't even in the Empire in WW2. How could Churchill sacrifice it?
By World War II, Australia was an equal part of the empire (that is, legally speaking, Australia was just an important as the United Kingdom) but it was still part of the Empire. A loose parallel might be drawn by saying that legally Wyoming is as important as New York State, of course - there's a lot of difference between being legally as important and as powerful and significant).
Legally Australia was entitled to have its own defence policy. However the Dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa) had voluntarily chosen to remain part of an imperial defence system. We were free not to - but we'd decided that we would be involved.
Basically the Empire's defences were considered to be all of one piece, not separate national forces.
Britain was committed to defending Australia from attacks in South East Asia. In return Australia was committed to working to defend British interests anywhere in the world.
What wasn't considered was what would happen if there was a situation where Britain was under threat - and Australia was under threat at the same time.
When World War II started, Australia responded under its obligations to fight in support of Britain - this was done in Britain, and in Africa mostly.
When the war in the Pacific started, Britain was so intent on home defence, it couldn't meet its commitments to defend Australia.
But we were part of the empire and our forces were part of Imperial forces.
If neutrality is an option, that might taken, yes, although I'm not sure it would be. But I was talking about a situation where things have developed to the stage where a clear choice has to be made.
For example, a war.
Unless (and this seems vanishingly unlikely) the United States acted aggressively and started such a war, I am convinced Australia would choose to side with the US in that type of situation.
Australia has 6 states (New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland, Tasmania) and 2 major territories with some state-like characteristics (The Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern Territory). The Northern Territory was recently offered the chance to become a state but declined, the ACT is broadly speaking similar to the District of Columbia in US terms - hypothetically I'm not sure what would happen, it might revert to NSW (it's completely surrounded by NSW), because it would be a rather insignificant state.
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