National Retail Sales Tax - You gotta be kidding!

For quite some time now there has been an organization pushing for a National Retail Sales Tax (NRST) to replace the current income tax in the US of A. The proponents thereof call it a "fair tax", and even have a web site www.fairtax.org. These folks claim that the current income tax structure is a crumbling mess, and that the NRST, a "voluntary" tax is the most equitable solution. For what it's worth, I agree wholeheartedly upon the first premise, but disagree vehemently on the second.

The NRST would be no more voluntary that the current system. What are you gonna do? Buy something and tell the cashier not to add the federal tax? Or not buy anything? (multiply that by every taxpayer and imagine the effect on the economy). And if you believe the proponents claim that they can put enough safeguards in place to make their system painless and equitable, then I have a bridge in New York that you can buy cheap.

The NRST would, by definition be a highly regressive system that would hurt the middle class far more than the wealthy, and if it ain't complicated enough in the planning stage, just wait a few years. Tax accountants wouldn't' be in any real jeopardy under the NRST, they would just have to learn a few new rules. Since the nature of any government program is to increase in complexity, watch for tax changes to increase this or decrease that, then try to factor in the cost of compliance with all this going on - guess who's gonna pay?

The premise that spending is a taxable activity is silly on the face of it. I remember my ex-wife complaining after I spent my last dime on a badly needed item "If you have $50 for that, then I can spend $50 on what I want". The proponents seem to believe that if I have 500 to spend on a badly needed washing machine, that I can also pony up another 40% or so for their agenda. This is ludicrous and insulting to the intelligence of the voting public. Just because I have 500 dollars, doesn't mean that I have 700. Just like my ex refused to believe that if I had 50 dollars for one item that I couldn't magically conjure up another 50 dollars for her. Fifty dollars is fifty dollars. It isn't an indication, hint, or promise that there's a matching fifty dollars lying around for everybody else's ideal. And under the NRST proposal, if I don't have the 700, then I can't buy the 500 washing machine. So since I don't have the 700 bucks, I don't buy the appliance. The seller doesn't make the sale, the manufacturer doesn't' get to make another one to replace it on the shelf, the deliverer doesn't get to deliver it. Everybody loses.

But wait! The NRST proponents cheerfully remind me that "large purchases" such as major appliances and automobiles would be exempt from the NRST. Ah! The first major complication. What is and what is not covered. So maybe a set of dishes would be covered. Would we care to look into what this little statement would mean? In a very few years we will inevitably see merchandise gerrymandering as to what would be taxable and what wouldn't. And someone would have to keep track of all this. I remember in Connecticut where a 75-cent milkshake was taxed six cents for a nickel's worth of malt, but the same sized milk was untaxed. Food was taxed but only if it cost one dollar or more. Clothing was taxed unless it was for a child under ten years of age. One customer buying a jacket had to pay the tax, but another didn't have to because of the age of the child. Can you keep track of this? Multiply this by the political agendas of congresscritters all over the country,. And you can see what I mean by merchandise gerrymandering.

Quite simply, it would mean that the increasing tax burden would be spread to more items of lesser value, therefore having a greater impact upon the final purchase price. So the government would have to get more from less. So the "Fair tax" might end up making that $40 set of dishes cost $80 or more. So what would be the result? Fewer people buy dishes. People who make and sell dishes would do less business, and therefore they would be hurt. The customer would be hurt by the loss of the use of the new dishes, the whole economy would take such a hit that it would take years, if not decades to recover. Discretionary purchasing could evaporate overnight.

Would there be exemptions for lower income people so that each person pays a tax burden more in line with their ability to pay? Would certain people be able to carry a tax avoidance card to not have to pay taxes due to their economic status? How would you protect the poor - who also need to buy things like dishes every now and again?

Let's look at this another way. Perhaps a person like me must spend 80 to 90 percent of their income on living expenses. Much of that would be subject to the NRST. So more of my money, as a percentage of income, would be taxed. Now let us look at someone like Bill Gates, or Ted Kennedy. Since they have vast incomes compared to me, they can afford to shelter more of their income into other areas. If the NRST is the major tax vehicle, then they would only be taxed upon the much smaller percentage of their incomes that they spend on living expenses. Because they can afford to sock away lots more money than I do, that money would not be taxed as it isn't "spent"! Yes, I know that Gates and Kennedy spend more than I do, but as a percentage of their total income, it is less. So the NRST favors the rich at the expense of the middle class!

But the NRST folks won't tell you that. In fact, they'll flatly deny it hoping that you don't notice the vast amounts of income that the very rich sock away into investments, etc. that wouldn't be taxed (unless they want yet another complication in their system), and focus our attention upon their SUV's. The net gain for the rich would have to be made up for by the rest of us - resulting in a higher tax rate for the middle class and for the poor. The poor subsidizing the rich - reverse Robin Hood!

Let's go back now to the concept that people spend a predictable portion of their income. Every person has basic needs - food, housing, clothing, etc. that must be met. These needs are similar for everyone across the income spectrum. To the extent that these items will be subject to the NRST, everybody pays the same flat fee. If your income is above the minimum, then you can spend a little more, which would be taxable, and perhaps sock a little away. That would not be taxable, apparently, so you gain an incentive not to spend, not to buy. That amounts to putting a damper on the economy in the area of discretional spending. Maybe I don't need those new dishes after all. Multiplied by the number of people who would be affected by the NRST, you have a serious downturn in the economy, resulting in loss of jobs, wages, resulting in severe economic hardships for just about all of the middle class. Of course, the rich wouldn't be affected as much.

So let's look again. The more you make, the less a percentage of your income you need to meet your basic needs. That means that you don't have to spend so much of your money to live. You can shelter more from the government, an option not available to the lower income brackets who often lead hand-to-mouth existences. They'd be the ones hit the hardest. This is the definition of regressive taxation. The social consequences are considerable, and beyond what I am prepared to discuss at this point, but there are historical precedents that are not good.

But wouldn't you benefit from an immediate pay raise by the amount you would normally pay in income taxes? Certainly, and I would welcome that. However, since the entire tax burden on the whole country would remain constant (which means ever-increasing), and since the rich would be paying less overall taxes (the richest 5% pay 85% of income taxes, or something like that), that loss of governmental income would have to be made up by people like me, so logically, there cannot be anything but a net loss for me - I'd end up subsidizing the likes of Kennedy and Gates!

And let us not forget that complication in that some things would be taxed while others would not be taxed. This would be a boon to the politicians - in that they can reap huge amounts of revenue simply by adding an item to the "Taxable" column, it would have a huge negative impact upon those who would be doing the collecting. Oh yeah - remember those? That burden would fall upon business owners and establishments that sell taxable items to the public. The reasoning of the NRST crowd seems to be that if they can collect income taxes for the state, they can collect for the feds. No prob. What they overlook is the increased cost to these businesses, many of them barely breaking even, to collect the deferral taxes. Not only must they follow the whims of state politicians, but they would have to attune themselves to the federal politicians as well! They'd have to absorb the costs of the paperwork required, increased bookkeeping, reprogramming computers, etc.. But you and I know full well that these costs would have to be passed on to us customers. So again, we will pay more for less. OR at least the middle class will. And presumably the poor - unless the poor become exempt, in which a whole new level of beauracracy would be needed - and we know who will have to pay those costs!

Let me give you an example. Support toothpaste isn't taxable. Then some politician figures out that the taxes on a three dollar tube of toothpaste can pay for the next congressional pay raise. It's only a buck or so, so the average guy won't get too upset, but that dollar turns into more than one dollar when you factor in the costs of reprogramming grocery store computers all over the country to reflect that this item is now taxable. So the price increase is closer to a buck fifty. Then some other politician wants to be reelected, so he proposes eliminating the tax on laundry detergent. Here we go again. That one - dollar price decrease translates into a mere 50 cents by the time compliance expense is factored in.

And nowhere would there be any addressing the real problem of federal taxation - the spending glut. The feds are simply spending too much money. The more they get, the more they spend, the government simply cannot exercise any fiscal restraint. The federal government has never had a revenue problem they've always had a spending problem. They spend too much. Where would be the incentive for them to spend less if we give them new pockets to pick?

The solution to the tax problem isn't a misnomer - a "fair tax" in name only, it will have to be a system in which everybody bears a share of the burden commensurate to their ability to pay, not their need to spend. It has been said that if everybody had to pay a fair share of the total tax burden, that people would demand reduced federal spending. THAT is the solution to the problem. Or at least, create a viable environment for the kind of fiscal triage that has been sore lacking in all levels of government.

First of all, I would propose to classify all monies coming into an individual as income. Investments, capital gains, interest, wages, compensation - anything coming IN will be classified as income. All incoming monies are income, all income is treated the same. That income would be taxed at a flat percentage, and that percentage would be the same for everybody. If Ted Kennedy pays the same percentage of income that I do, he still pays a lot more, whether he spends more than I do or not. If someone who makes less than I do has to pay the same percentage, they pay less, more fitting to their abilities.

Nothing would affect people's ability to buy dishes, cars, or anything else because purchasing would be relatively independent of taxation. If you don't' tax it, you don't stand in the way of people who want it. You don't collapse the whole economy for the sake of a political agenda. Purchasing would be minimally affected.

If people don't want to pay their fair share (I would even tax welfare because everybody should be stakeholders), then they can get after their representatives to cut spending. I predict a huge groundswell, and things like beekeeper subsidies and research in to the sex lives of insects would be subject to a lot more scrutiny, and spending would go down. That solves the problem.

The "fair tax" is highly unfair. It hurts far more than the middle class. It only helps the rich - those with the highest proportion of discretionary income. The NRST cannot help but hurt the working classes, the welfare classes, small businesses, and the national economy. The proponents of the NRST dangle the tax deductions in your paycheck like a carrot before your eyes, so that you don't see the huge stick that you're gonna get whacked with if this goes through. I predict that if the NRST gets passed, that within two years there will be a depression that would be far worse and longer lasting than the "Great depression" of the 20's.

Oh! And finally - they claim that they will get rid of the IRS. Really? Who's gonna police the collectors to make sure they collect the right taxes from the right goods?

The NRST is passed and enacted. Prior to this you were paying the Widget supplier $10 per widget. Now the widget supplier sells them for $7.

The "embedded taxes" price drop is the biggest myth of the FairTaxer. And it has been debunked. The widget supplier can't sell them for $7 unless he lowers his employee's wages (which ain't gonna happen).

Criticism of the Sales Tax for Residential Real Estate Isn't Built on a Solid Foundation

by Dan R. Mastromarco and David R. Burton
[authors of the FairTax]
Tax Notes, June 29, 1998, p. 1779
Footnote #13: The degree to which after-tax wages will increase is a function of the incidence of both the sales tax and the repealed taxes. If the income tax and payroll taxes are incident on income recipients and the sales tax is incident on consumers, then after-tax wages and returns will go up quite considerably as will tax inclusive prices. If the sales tax is incident on the factors of production, then after-tax wages and the after-tax return to capital will not go up to any considerable degree (at first) but producer prices will fall and retail prices, even including the sales tax, will remain roughly comparable. The real purchasing power of wages will undoubtedly increase considerably over time because of a larger capital stock (increasing productivity), microeconomic efficiencies caused by a more efficient allocation of scarce resources, and higher productivity from lower compliance costs.

The Price Level

Switching to an indirect tax such as a valued-added tax (VAT) or national sales tax will probably cause a one-time jump in the price level, with no permanent change in the inflation rate. By contrast, any consumption-based tax that levies taxes directly on households will probably have little or no effect on the price level.
A VAT or sales tax is likely to boost the price level because each one collects the tax on labor income from the firm or retailer. That treatment represents a change from the current income tax system, which collects tax on labor income directly from the worker. Because the cost of labor to the firm would include the new tax, real compensation paid to workers would initially have to fall to match the value of their so-called "marginal product" and keep them fully employed.
Real compensation can fall in two ways: nominal compensation can drop or the price level can rise. What happens will ultimately depend on the Federal Reserve. If it fixes the price level, nominal compensation will have to fall--an event that workers might accept because they would no longer have to pay income tax and hence would take home about the same pay as now. Most analysts note, however, that workers have resisted cuts in nominal compensation in the past. Those analysts expect that firms fearing morale problems or facing union contracts will hesitate to make such cuts. In that case, nominal compensation may fall slowly to its new level, leading to higher unemployment rates in the interim. To prevent that outcome, the Federal Reserve is expected to allow the price level to rise. For example, a VAT or sales tax of 10 percent would lead to a one-time jump of 10 percent in the price of consumer products.
Further price increases may ensue if compensation is indexed to inflation. In that case, the price rise will cause a corresponding rise in compensation, and real compensation will not drop enough to maintain full employment, requiring a further price rise--that is, a wage-price spiral. That problem occurred in the United Kingdom when it adopted a VAT in 1979, although the extent of indexing there was greater than it is in the United States.
Source: U.S. Congressional Budget Office. (1997). The Economic Effects of Comprehensive Tax Reform. Washington DC: Government Printing Office.

Setting aside for a moment temporary inflexibilites in contracts for wages, bonds, and so forth (we address these later), whether ther overall level of prices changes or not does not materially affect this story.¹⁶ Even if prices do not rise at all, moving to a consumption tax would cause the purchasing power of both wages and existing wealth to decline by an average of 20 percent relative to a situation with no taxes. Nominal wages would be forced down because firms would be earning 20 percent less, after taxes, from the output produced by workers. The nominal value of existing capital assets - in the form of, for example, share prices - which constitute much of old wealth, would also decline because the output they produce provides 20 percent less in after-tax revenues.

Whether in fact consumer prices would rise in the event of tax reform depends on the monetary policy set by the Federal Reserve Board.

Source: Slemrod, Joel and Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Great Debate over Tax Reform, MIT Press: Cambridge, 2004.

Transition Costs and Macroeconomic Adjustments

One of the most difficult issues to address in considering a shift to consumption taxes is the transition from the current system to the new tax regime.⁵ While all shifts to a consumption tax cause some common transitional disturbances and windfall gains and losses, the most serious problems arise from a shift to a national retail sales tax or to a value added tax. In these cases, a tax formerly largely collected from individuals is now collected at the firm level -- either from retailers on total sales or from both final and intermediate producers' value added. Flat taxes avoid this problem but can result in confiscatory taxes on existing assets.
Price Accommodation and Short-run Contractions Under a Retail Sales Tax or VAT
Holding prices fixed, these firms would need to reduce payments to workers to retain profit levels. In fact, many firms would not have enough of a profit margin to pay the tax without something else -- either prices or wages -- adjusting. Consider, for example, a grocery retailer that may have a 1% or 2% profit margin now owing a tax equal to 20% of receipts. This firm simply does not have the cash to pay the tax. If it is difficult to lower wages (and presumably it would be), a significant one-time price inflation, to allow these costs to be passed forward in prices instead, would be required to avoid a potentially serious economic contraction. Note that the price increase, were it possible to implement correctly and precisely, would solve the transition problem because although prices would rise, individuals would have more income to purchase the higher priced goods -- and demand would not fall. It is difficult, however, for the monetary authorities to engineer such a large price change. Moreover, even with the monetary expansion in place to do so, the imposition of such a tax would be disruptive if firms are reluctant to immediately raise prices, again leading to an economic contraction. That is, firms could contract their business, or even close down, until output had contracted enough to raise prices.
These disruptions are not minor in nature -- imagine the difficulties of engineering and absorbing a one-time price increase that is likely to be close to 20% (the level, approximately, that might realistically be needed to replace the income tax).⁶ Even if such an inflation could be managed, there are always concerns that any large inflation could create inflationary expectations -- it's hard to manage a single one-year price increase. In fact, economists who judge a consumption tax to be superior to an income tax may nevertheless be skeptical about the advisability of making the change because of these transition effects.

See CRS Report 98-901, Short-Run Macroeconomic Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform, by Jane G. Gravelle and G. Thomas Woodward for a more detailed discussion of these issues.
The rate would depend on whether and the extent of any family exemption. A 20% tax exclusive rate would correspond to a tax inclusive rate between 16% and 17%.
7 U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Taxation, Tax Modeling Project and 1997 Symposium Papers, committee print, 105th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 20, 1997, JCS-21-97 (Washington: GPO, 1997), p. 24.
Source: CRS Report for Congress: The Flat Tax, Value-Added Tax, and National Retail Sales Tax: Overview of the Issues. Esenwein, Gregg A. and Jane Gravelle.

Prices.

Prices for consumer goods and services quickly rise by the amount of the tax, and then some. The portion of the price increase in excess of the tax is due in part to the higher cost of imports (from the weaker dollar) coupled with the ability of some domestic producers of competing goods to hike their price to that of imports. Consumer prices similarly rise 25 percent -- roughly the nominal rate of sales tax, unadjusted for any exemptions or transition rules -- by 2002 and gradually drop from that peak to a level that remains about 18 percent above the pre-change baseline.
Examined on a year-over-year basis, these price increases generally amount to a large, one-time hike in prices as the NRST is imposed, with some moderation of this increase in the longer run. Due to a weaker dollar, merchandise import prices increase by nearly 4 percent shortly after the NRST is imposed and are 6.5 percent over baseline levels in 2010. Merchandise export prices are also above baseline levels. In 2001 and 2002 they are nearly 3 percent above the baseline. However, due to lower interest rates, which reduce business costs, export prices are only slightly greater than baseline levels for most of the remainder of the forecast period. The overall impact on prices is measured by the change in the GDP deflator, which initially rises 20 percent above the baseline price level before settling back to a 13 percent price rise relative to the baseline.
The notion espoused by some that pre-tax prices would drop some 20-30 percent under a NRST (so that after-tax prices would not rise and may even decline) is a peculiar one. This could only happen if all of the personal income tax, the corporation income tax and payroll taxes are currently embodied in retail prices. Tax incidence -- that is, who actually bears the ultimate tax burden -- is an elusive question that has been the focus of many economic papers, because the answer is not clear. However, the general consensus among economists is that perhaps a portion of the corporate income tax may be passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices, but that the majority is ultimately paid by corporate owners in the form of lower after-tax profits and by employees in the form of lower compensation. Most economists concede that personal income taxes and payroll taxes are ultimately borne by labor and are not passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices.
Source: Statement of John G. Wilkins, Managing Director, Barcroft Consulting Group, on behalf of National Retail Federation. Testimony Before the House Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing on Fundamental Tax Reform. April 11, 2000.

Transitional Issues in Tax Reform

Price Level Effects
Because the flat tax is similar in structure to the existing income tax system, its implementation would have relatively little effect on the absolute price level. Both before- and after-tax wages would be roughly similar before and after reform, so that nominal prices remain roughly constant.
In contrast, the effect of implementing an NRST on the absolute price level is less certain. One possibility is that the tax could be fully shifted forward in the form of higher prices for consumption goods, with no change in the price of investment goods, which are untaxed under the NRST. At the other end of the spectrum of possible responses, nominal prices could remain constant. Under this scenario, before-tax real wages would have to fall roughly to the level of prereform after-tax real wages in response to the elimination of the income tax. Intermediate responses between the "full price adjustment" and "no price adjustment" scenarios are of course also possible.
Choosing between these various scenarios requires making necessarily speculative assumptions about the response of the monetary authorities to the imposition of the NRST. However, most analysts assume that the monetary response would be sufficiently accommodating that the full price adjustment scenario would obtain.
The primary rationale underlying this assumption is the view that the downward flexibility of nominal wages is quite limited, in part because most wage contracts and agreements are specified in nominal terms. Thus, a tax reform that required wage reductions to reach a new equilibrium would be quite costly as these wage reductions would initially be distributed unevenly across industries. This in turn might result in considerable unemployment in sectors characterized by rigid wages, as well as misallocations of labor, at least in the short run. Proponents of the full price adjustment view assume that monetary policy would be expansionary to avoid these costs.
Most observers fall into the full price adjustment camp. For example, McLure (1996, p. 23) concludes that it would be "hard to imagine the monetary authorities not accommodating such an increase in prices." Gravelle (1995, p. 59) argues that full price adjustment is likely because a "national sales tax would tend to produce an economic contraction if no price accommodation is made." In its analysis of the distributional implications of implementing consumption taxes, the Joint Committee of Taxation (1993, p. 59) concludes that, "Unless there are convincing reasons to assume otherwise, the JCT staff assumes the Federal Reserve will accommodate the policy change and allow prices to rise." Finally, Bradford (1996a, p. 135), in discussing the same issue in the context of a value-added tax, observes that, "It is commonly believed that introducing a value-added tax of the consumption type will bring with it a monetary policy adjustment that would result in a one-time increase in the price level ;and no change in payments to workers in nominal terms."
Nevertheless, opinion on this issue is certainly no unanimous. For example, the alternative assumption [that wages will fall] is implicitly made by Jorgenson and Wilcoxen, who argue that implementing a national sales tax would reduce producer prices on average by 25 percent. Auerbach (1996) takes a compromise position by assuming partial price adjustment. In addition, European experience with the introduction of the VAT is mixed, generally suggesting partial price adjustment. On the other hand, Besley and Rosen (1999) find full (or even more than 100 percent) forward shifting of state sales taxes in the United States.
Source: Zodrow, George R. (2002). "Transitional Issues in Tax Reform." In United States Tax Reform in the 21st Century, George Zodrow and Peter Mieszkowski, Editors. Cambridge University Press.

Monetary Implications of Tax Reforms

Does it matter how the central bank responds when the tax system is reformed? Some economists would argue that in a very general sense it does not. Many would argue that the central bank's response would have little long-run effect, because what really matters is the productive capacity of the economy and because there could be no money illusion in the long run.
And, in the short run, the standard relation between prices and money makes it clear that, under limiting assumptions, the central bank need not change monetary policy. Consider the transition from our present tax system to a consumption tax. Ignoring any incentive effects caused by the tax reform, velocity and output are unchanged. With a revenue-neutral tax reform, aggregate after-tax income is unchanged, so there need be no demand-driven effects on consumer prices. Under these conditions, v, y, and q remain unchanged as a result of the tax reform, and thus maintenance of the status quo implies that the central bank need not change its policy. Assuming that output is constant, the central bank could eliminate any transitory price changes in the long run by leaving monetary policy unchanged.
But things may not be that simple. The implied changes to wages and producer prices require a degree of flexibility in the economy that many might find unlikely. Specifically, for the consumer price to stay constant, the producer price must fall by the amount of the tax. And because a drop in the producer price means that the business revenue produced by hiring another worker drops, the before-tax wage must drop by a corresponding amount. Many have argued that such price and wage changes are implausible and that the central bank should "accommodate" a transitory change in the consumer price level by adjusting monetary policy so that it is consistent with constant producer prices and wages.

Source: Bull, Nicholas, and Lawrence B. Lindsey. 1996. "Monetary Implications of Tax Reforms." National Tax Journal 49.3 (September): 359-79.

The Price Level

When Britain adopted consumption taxation in 1979, the price level rose by the amount of the new tax. This jump in prices caused substantial disruption in the economy, partly because it stimulated further rounds of wage and price increases through indexation formulas that failed to exclude consumption taxes from the measured cost of living. Standard macroeconomic analysis suggests that the underlying cause of such a price effect is the contractual determination of wages in money terms. Under an income tax, the wage is set in pretax terms. Workers finance consumption out of what remains of their wages after paying taxes. Under a sales tax or a value-added tax (VAT), the wage is set on an after-tax basis. Workers use their entire wages for consumption and pay their consumption taxes as they consume. When an income tax is replaced by a sales tax or VAT, the wage bargain should be revised to lower the purchasing power of wages or by raising the prices of consumption goods. As a practical matter, the second always occurs.
One of the advantages of a flat tax or a personal cash-flow consumption tax is that both leave the wage bargain in pretax form. There is no disruptive jump in the price level. Unlike other effects I have discussed, the increase in the price level is not intrinsic to a consumption tax, but is the result of a particular choice about how to administer the tax.
Source: Potential Disruption from the Move to a Consumption Tax, by Robert E. Hall. The American Economic Review.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.