Posted on 01/07/2005 5:32:54 PM PST by prairiebreeze
Jihad Watch’s Robert Spencer reports further on two separate Islamist terror organizations moving into the tsunami ravaged Indonesian city of Banda Aceh. Both groups are related to Indonesian cleric and terrorist Abu Bakar Bashir, the leader of al Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah, and mastermind behind the terrorist attacks in Bali and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. The first group of Islamist “humanitarians” is the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). Not only do they smash up bars and discos, they really care. Note how military training takes precedence over relief efforts, and that Indonesia has facilitated the movement of this group to the region.
At Banda Aceh's airport, trucks with supplies to be ferried to disaster-struck areas by US Navy helicopters have been unloaded by members of Bashir's group, the MMI, including one man proudly wearing an Osama bin Laden T-shirt... about 250 members had come to Aceh with tickets provided by the Government; 800 more on board an Indonesian warship would help clean up the devastated province... "FPI is not only an organisation that destroys bars and discos, it has a humanitarian side as well that the media is not happy to expose," Dr Almascaty said…Early yesterday 50 of his troops wearing FPI shirts went through a series of military drills before heading off to the city to help collect corpses still not recovered from the millions of tonnes of rubble.
The second group of “humanitarians” (they are humanitarians when they are not busy butchering Christians, that is) is the Laskar Mujahidin. "Islamic Law Enforcement" is a high priority for the Laskar Mujahidin, so much so that they took to time to print up a sign in English to accentuate this point.
Amid hundreds of aid workers near the airport in Banda Aceh, Laskar Mujahidin posted an English-language sign that reads "Islamic Law Enforcement." The group, known for hunting down and killing Christians during a long-running sectarian conflict in another part of Indonesia, said yesterday it is collecting corpses, distributing food and spreading Islamic teachings among refugees.... Laskar Mujahidin was once headed by Abu Bakar Bashir, an Islamic cleric now on trial as a suspected leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, which has close links to al Qaeda. Some Jemaah Islamiyah members helped the September 11 hijackers.
Note how the AP blurs the lines with respect to the connection between al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, and cites a report by the International Crisis Group.
The group has been accused of having links to terrorist groups outside Indonesia, including al Qaeda, according to a report by Sidney Jones, an analyst with the International Crisis Group. It also reportedly accepted aid offered by an emissary of Osama bin Laden, Miss Jones wrote in a recent report.
Jemaah Islamiyah hasn’t “been accused of having links to terrorist groups outside Indonesia”, they are al Qaeda’s regional affiliate. Perhaps the AP should check the 9-11 Commission Report (PDF format) to see what it had to say about Jemaah Islamiyah’s relationship to al Qaeda and the inrodes al Qaeda has made in South East Asia. A full reading of the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed section, (pages 145 to 150), and the Hambali section (pages 150 to 151) provides great detail on this relationship, as well as the relationship with other Islamist organizations in South East Asia:
Page 149 - Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, “the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks”:
After meeting with Bin Ladin, KSM says he journeyed onward to India, Indonesia, and Malaysia, where he met with Jemaah Islamiah’s Hambali. Hambali was an Indonesian veteran of the Afghan war looking to expand the jihad into Southeast Asia….Similarly, KSM’s proposals to Atef around this same time [during the planning for 9-11] for attacks in Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Maldives were never executed, although Hambali’s Jemaah Islamiah operatives did some casing of possible targets….Al Qaeda’s success in fostering terrorism in Southeast Asia stems largely from its close relationship with Jemaah Islamiah (JI).
Pages 151 & 152 - Hambali, “the key coordinator” between al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah:
Al Qaeda’s success in fostering terrorism in Southeast Asia stems largely from its close relationship with Jemaah Islamiah (JI). By 1998, Hambali would assume responsibility for the Malaysia/Singapore region within Sungkar’s newly formed terrorist organization, the JI. Also by 1998, Sungkar and JI spiritual leader Abu Bakar Bashir had accepted Bin Ladin’s offer to ally JI with al Qaeda in waging war against Christians and Jews. Hambali met with KSM in Karachi to arrange for JI members to receive training in Afghanistan at al Qaeda’s camps. In addition to his close working relationship with KSM, Hambali soon began dealing with Atef as well. Al Qaeda began funding JI’s increasingly ambitious terrorist plans, which Atef and KSM sought to expand. Under this arrangement, JI would perform the necessary casing activities and locate bomb-making materials and other supplies. Al Qaeda would underwrite operations, provide bomb-making expertise, and deliver suicide operatives. The al Qaeda–JI partnership yielded a number of proposals that would marry al Qaeda’s financial and technical strengths with JI’s access to materials and local operatives. Here, Hambali played the critical role of coordinator, as he distributed al Qaeda funds earmarked for the joint operations. In one especially notable example, Atef turned to Hambali when al Qaeda needed a scientist to take over its biological weapons program. Hambali obliged by introducing a U.S.- educated JI member, Yazid Sufaat, to Ayman al Zawahiri in Kandahar. In 2001, Sufaat would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for al Qaeda in a laboratory he helped set up near the Kandahar airport. Hambali did not originally orient JI’s operations toward attacking the United States, but his involvement with al Qaeda appears to have inspired him to pursue American targets. KSM, in his post-capture interrogations, has taken credit for this shift, claiming to have urged the JI operations chief to concentrate on attacks designed to hurt the U.S. economy. Hambali’s newfound interest in striking against the United States manifested itself in a spate of terrorist plans. Fortunately, none came to fruition. In addition to staging actual terrorist attacks in partnership with al Qaeda, Hambali and JI assisted al Qaeda operatives passing through Kuala Lumpur. One important occasion was in December 1999–January 2000. Hambali accommodated KSM’s requests to help several veterans whom KSM had just finished training in Karachi. They included Tawfiq bin Attash, also known as Khallad, who later would help bomb the USS Cole, and future 9/11 hijackers Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. Hambali arranged lodging for them and helped them purchase airline tickets for their onward travel. Later that year, Hambali and his crew would provide accommodations and other assistance (including information on flight schools and help in acquiring ammonium nitrate) for Zacarias Moussaoui, an al Qaeda operative sent to Malaysia by Atef and KSM. Hambali used Bin Ladin’s Afghan facilities as a training ground for JI recruits. Though he had a close relationship with Atef and KSM, he maintained JI’s institutional independence from al Qaeda. Hambali insists that he did not discuss operations with Bin Ladin or swear allegiance to him, having already given such a pledge of loyalty to Bashir, Sungkar’s successor as JI leader. Thus, like any powerful bureaucrat defending his domain, Hambali objected when al Qaeda leadership tried to assign JI members to terrorist projects without notifying him.
The media consistently downplays the operational relationship between al Qaeda and its regional affiliates, sabotaging efforts to prosecute the war on a global scale. An admission that the enemy is greater than just al Qaeda would provide ammunition to the Neoconservative view on the reach and scope of al Qaeda, and force liberals to recognize the magnitude of the threat arrayed against us. As the liberal vision on the War on Terror is one of policing and disengagement from military action, the operational relationships between the various groups of the International Islamic Front are suppressed.
As stated on Wednesday, the threats to American forces providing relief to the victims of the tsunami are real, and American forces must take great care to protect their personnel. The movement of Islamists into Banda Aceh to provide “humanitarian assistance” underscores this point. The Indonesian government has facilitated the movement of Bashir’s terrorists into Banda Aceh, and must be held responsible if these terrorists decide to strike.
If they try anything there, I pray that the President has the fortitude to smoke those mothers out. It really could lead to some people waking up if the islamofascists do something. Continue to pray for our troops and people everywhere.
We need to have a B-52 "accidentally" drop about 50 tons of MRE's right on top of "Camp Islamic Law Enforcement".
OOOPs.
ping
Just read your blog post about the complaints of the aid food not being Halal.
That would make a good thread. Post it?
But believing in the fight keeps a newbe struggling...thx for the ping.
I'm not familiar with the Jihad Watch blog which is what opens up on the link you are referring to, I think.
Banda Aceh remains off limits - The only distributors of relief aid must have a (red and white) authorization card issued from the Indonesian military.
(It's a can of worms.)
I'm trying to decide whether I'd rather we did something extremely politically incorrect so I can hear liberals howl, or just kept a low profile and let the CIA infiltrate them in the chaos and get a bead on them and get some useful intelligence while they're all busily being wonderful humanitarians, so we can snuff the lot of them later...
bttt
Ping
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.