Grand Strategy in the Second Term

Foreign Affairs ^ | 12-23-04 | John Lewis Gaddis

[SJackson]

Summary: In his first four years, George W. Bush presided over the most sweeping redesign of U.S. strategy since the days of F.D.R. Over the next four, his basic direction should remain the same: restoring security in a more dangerous world. Some midcourse corrections, however, are overdue. Washington should remember the art of speaking softly and the need for international legitimacy.

John Lewis Gaddis is Robert A. Lovett Professor of History at Yale.

RECONSIDERATIONS

Second terms in the White House open the way for second thoughts. They provide the least awkward moment at which to replace or reshuÛe key advisers. They lessen, although nothing can remove, the influence of domestic political considerations, since re-elected presidents have no next election to worry about. They enhance authority, as allies and adversaries learn--whether with hope or despair--with whom they will have to deal for the next four years. If there is ever a time for an administration to evaluate its own performance, this is it.

[ClaireSolt]

Bush didn't think much of Yale professors when he was a student there. I doubt he asked for this prof's advice either.

[Magnum44]

Good article. You don't have to agree with every point, but his analysis is well thought out. The references to Bismarck are right on, and he clearly points out how Iraq is not Vietnam.

[Southack]

"One is the need for better manners. It is always a bad idea to confuse power with wisdom: muscles are not brains. It is never a good idea to insult potential allies, however outrageous their behavior may have been. Nor is it wise to regard consultation as the endorsement of a course already set. The Bush administration was hardly the first to commit these errors. It was the first, however, to commit so many so often in a situation in which help from friends could have been so useful."

Rubbish. The Bush Administration didn't make "errors" in regards to persuading allies to help us in Iraq; instead, what the Bush Doctrine revealed was that nations such as France and Germany weren't allies at all, but rather, enemies that would do *anything* to counter American military and economic power.

Your article is typical of appeaseniks; if there is international "controversy," then it is because diplomatci mistakes were made, such bureaucrats would attempt to convince you.

But that's not the case at all. The controversy over Iraq, the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Global Warming rubbish, and the ABM treaty that France and Germany and China weren't even signatories to...was due *entirely* to the French and German desire to smack America down at every possible turn in every conceivable manner.

France and Germany are likewise playing this same game against Russia by formenting a Ukrainian breakaway from Moscow. This European powerplay is merely another step in their plan for a Franco-Germanic European central power.

[Tim Mahon]

Oh please! I almost wrote "grow up!" -- but I'll resist the temptation.

France and Germany are not "enemies that would do *anything* to counter American military and economic power" and to characterise them as such displays polarised and muddy thinking of the worst sort. Are they proponents of America's every action? Certainly not -- but neither do they deserve to be characterised as enemies. Many nations -- Great Britain included -- have concerns about the foreign policy of allies, including the United States. After all, the principal duty of every sovereign government is to defend the interests of the people and nation it represents. When a nation legitimately protests and remonstrates with the United States (for example) over policy differences, it strikes me as immature thinking to immediately label them as enemies.

I lived and worked in the United States for ten years, leaving as a direct result of 9/11 (my visa application was frozen) and have a deep and abiding regard for the country. I can't help but feel, however, that labelling two of Europe's major democracies as enemies of the United States, due to severe differences of opinion and policy, does the US enormous disservice. Whilst I understand Southack's vehement dislike of anybody in France and Germany criticising US policies, I don't believe he has any firm evidence for labelling them enemies of his country. This is the 21st century -- not the 18th -- and the world is a complex, dynamic and enormously varied place in which the US has an understandably preeminent position. That position is undermined by dogmatic partisan pronouncements based on little more than circumstantial evidence.

As an Englishman I have my own views on France and Germany and I certainly don't agree with their governments on many issues. However, I certainly don't raise that antipathy to the level of calling them enemies -- largely because I think we should concentrate our efforts on those who have demonstrated their desire and will to be defined as true enemies of my country, my way of life and the aspirations and expectations of my government and its allies. Don't get caught in polemic -- that's what led (in part) to the situation we face today.

America has many enemies and even more detractors (as does Great Britain). Don't fuel the fire by resorting to simplistic name-calling -- it's not worthy of a forum for informed debate.

[Southack]

"Whilst I understand Southack's vehement dislike of anybody in France and Germany criticising US policies, I don't believe he has any firm evidence for labelling them enemies of his country."

Germany's Fischer is a Beider Meinhoff terrorist. Schroeder and Chirac sold weapons to Iraq in violation of the UN arms embargo even when it was clear that the U.S. was going to be invading that country. France and Germany went out of their way to oppose that U.S. attack.

It's one thing to have a difference of opinion. That's fine; voice it. It's another thing entirely to fly around the world drumming up support against the U.S., which is what France did in 2002 and 2003.

Schroeder *campaigned* and won in Germany based upon his strident anti-Americanism; ditto for Chirac in France.

France and Germany are forming an EU-only military that *specifically* excludes the U.S. ala NATO.

France's *stated* public foreign policy is to counter the "hegemony" of the U.S.

France and Germany have already decided to violate the NATO arms sale ban to China.

These are not mere elements from occassional differences among friends; these are prima facia evidence of a break in past alliances and indicate a complete geopolitical realignment.