Posted on 09/10/2004 3:46:54 AM PDT by carton253
That is just one of many questions that remain unanswered from the Battle of Gettysburg. First the novel, Killer Angels, then the movie, Gettysburg, has currently painted a distorted picture of Lee’s real strategy, as has many of the books written on this subject. The standard story they all tell is one that has General Ewell failing to take Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill the evening of July 1st. On July 2nd, General Lee then attacked both flanks of the Union Army. Ewell again attacking Culp’s Hill, and General Longstreet attacking the Round Tops. When those attacks failed, General Lee abandoned the flank attacks to desperately march 15,000 men against the Federal center on Cemetery Ridge. This telling of the events, over 140 years old, has left many questions about those three days unanswered.
The first of those questions would be General Hood’s order to attack up the Emmittsburg Road. Let’s look at that order and the remarks that were made during the morning of July 2nd. Lee’s strategy was a simple one. He wanted to converge his forces upon Cemetery Hill…the salient of the Federal position. He did not want to attack the Round Tops. He saw no value in them. It is important to note that this was not the first time Lee had used this strategy in battle. He used it during the Seven Days Battles, during the Battle of Second Manassas, and finally at Chancellorsville, where he sent Jackson marching around the Union flank to push the Union Army into the waiting other wing of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Longstreet disagreed with Lee’s pincher strategy. During the morning meeting, when Lee positioned McLaws on the Emmittsburg Road at right angles to the Peach Orchard and ordered him to gain the orchard, Longstreet chose to direct McLaws parallel to the turnpike. Lee replied, “No, General, no; I want his position perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road.” McLaws’ Division was to aid Hood in an oblique attack on the left flank of the Federal Line in order to force it toward Gettysburg, toward Cemetery Hill, toward Ewell’s waiting corps, who was to make a demonstration against Cemetery and Culp’s Hills until the opportunity came for an attack.
There were many hindrances to Lee’s attack. Over the course of time, history has turned these hindrances into Lee’s overall strategy. The first hindrance came when General Sickles moved the III Corps away from the Round Tops because the ground was untenable. He understood that the high ground was the ridge where the Peach Orchard was based. General Lee shared Sickles eye for good ground. The Peach Orchard was Hood’s objective. Lee planned to use the Peach Orchard as a artillery base to shell Hancock’s flank on Cemetery Ridge. When Sickles moved forward, he extended his line. Meade had no choice but to reinforce the line with over 20,000 soldiers. Soldiers, who were not there when Lee reconnoitered the line earlier that morning.
Another hindrance was the presence of Gregg’s cavalry to the rear and east of Ewell’s position. What this did was force Ewell to position the Stonewall Brigade on Brinkerhoff Ridge to hold the cavalry in check along the Hanover Road. This was a loss of one of the best fighting brigades in the Army of Northern Virginia.
The last hindrance was the early wounding of Hood. This break in leadership caused the course of the attack to drift right – to the Round Tops rather than up the Emmittsburg Road. Since the entire Confederate Line was dressing off one another, when the lead elements of Hood’s Division drifted right, so did Laws’s division. Colonel Oates of the 15th Alabama was so intent on attacking the Round Tops that he refused General Laws direct order to wheel left and continue up the Emmittsburg Road. Hood’s division could not attack Little Round Top and remain attached to the Emmittsburg Road. Neither could Laws. Lee’s Line was already seven miles long and couldn’t afford this diversion away from the planned attack “up the Emmitsburg Road.” The attack failed.
In his official battle report, General Lee wrote, “The general plan was unchanged.” On July 3rd , he still planned to converge both his wings on Cemetery Hill. He did not abandoned his objectives to wage a rash battle to break through as history teaches today. A careful look at the day shows that Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s, and Trimble’s brigades were not sent on a desperate mission to do the impossible. Cemetary Hill was the key to the battle. Gettysburg was a point of strategic importance. Ten to twelve roads concentrated at Gettysburg. An army could easily converge to or diverge from this point. By being at the heart of the crossroads, Cemetery Hill was the most advantageous ground from the beginning. Both Lee, Reynolds, and Hancock recognized the importance of Cemetery Hill.
In his memoirs, Longstreet writes, “I was disappointed when Lee came to me on the morning the 3rd and directed that I should renew the attack against Cemetery Hill.” Longstreet still wanted to move to the right around the Federal Army and get between the Army of the Potomac and Washington. Lee said no, “I am going to take them where they are on Cemetery Hill, I want to take Pickett’s Division and make the attack.”
With the arrival of JEB Stuart’s cavalry, Lee was able to relieve the Stonewall Brigade, who returned to the line at Culp’s Hill. Furthermore, JEB Stuart did something that most historians do not understand. He fired two cannon shots and announced his presence on the field. Why? If one understands that Lee was seeking to converge his two wings on Cemetery Hill, one suddenly understands why JEB Stuart seemed to tell the Union Calvary where he was. His job was to clear Ewell’s rear of Union Calvary and allow Ewell to concentrate all his forces on an attack on Culp’s Hill. JEB Stuart summoned. The Union Calvary answered.
Pickett’s charge bears many resemblances to Hood’s attack up the Emmittsburg Road. What Pickett’s charge did different from Hood’s attack was move the thrust of the oblique battle closer to the mark of the Cemetery Hill. Lee also reinforced Ewell's positions by 6,000 men during the early morning of 7/3. This was not by accident. He fully expected both the II and III Corps to join the battle and attack Culp's Hill. It was to be 2nd Manassas all over again.
General Winfield Scott testified to Congress, “When the columns of the enemy appeared, it looked as if they were going to attack the center of our line (Hancock’s line on Cemetery Ridge and on Cemetery Hill) but after marching straight out a little distance they seemed to incline a little to their left, as if their object was to march through my command and seize Cemetery Hill, which I have no doubt was their intention.”
Looking at drawings that appeared in leading Northern periodicals right after the battle, one can clearly see that the Confederate Line oblique movements put them perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road and not parallel. What changed Pickett’s line was the overwhelming flank fire. It forced the line to the left. When the left collapsed, Pettigrew’s division bore to the right to compensate. They were supposed to dress right to assure a connection with Pickett, but that maneuver is far different from the one that actually took place in the assault’s final stages. It was never Lee’s plan to place the weight of the entire charge in front of the copse of trees. The line ended there as the natural result of the terrible flank fire, and Pickett’s Division movement to the left in order to avoid it.
Of course, such analysis does not change what happened those three days in Gettysburg. But it does allow serious students to understand what Lee intended to accomplish. If one could picture how Pickett’s Division was aligned, one would see that the men were marched toward Cemetery Hill and Ridge at a forty-five-degree angle to the Emmittsburg Road rather than parallel to it. It also causes serious students to see that Lee had a strong objective in the battle and not the three difference objectives as modern history tells us.
Am rereading Killer Angels after buying the trilogy. My interest in the Gettysburg battlefield as limited to after dark parks while in college there. Since maturing,having Maine grandsons and moving here, I gained a new interest because Laurence Chamberlain was introduced. I will read your post to learn more about this contoversal battle. Just this spring I returned to Little Round Top with my 12 yr old grandson.
I was on Little Round Top this summer as well. What Joshua Chamberlain did on that hill was so honorable and brave! Maine has every reason to be proud of him.
I agree. I've been to Franklin, visited the Carter House and toured what's left of the battlefield.
I can't possibly imagine the sound, horror and bloodshed when the Confederates assaulted the Union lines.
Had Sickles not moved forward against his orders and formed the salient, and had Langstreets Corps moved up the Emmitsburg road from the south the ANV forces would have had to march south, then march north along the Emittsburg road with the entire Union position on their flank. This enfilading fire would have wreaked as much, if not more damage on Longstreets Corps. It must be remembered that the Texas and Alabama troops came within a hairs breadth of turning the Union flank at Little Round Top, only the tenacity and valor of the 20th Maine prevented this. In all the histories of Gettysburg which I have read nowhere is this movement up the Emmitsburg road mentioned. The intnt was always to turn the Union left flank and additionally, the peach orchard area is almost equidistant from both the round tops and seminary ridge. I have stood on that ground....and it is not good ground. It is exposed and would be difficult to resupply and defend.
I have seen no orders to that effect in any history of the battle. To attack up the emmitsburg road under constant enfilading fire would have been a disaster.
I refuse to even answer a person of that little intelligence. :)
Keep your powder dry
but he did make mistakes. Robert E. Lee did as well at Gettysburg>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
There were more than enuff mistakes made at Gettysburg on both sides of the line. What turned the battle, in my opinion, were 2 actions fought but Union Commanders that one would never have predicted. Who could have predicted that Buford, who had rode a desk in obscurity for many yrs, would fight a perfect economy of force delaying action on day 1 giving Reynolds troops time to reenforce?
And who would ever have predicted that an inexperienced volunteer, a professor of rhetoric, Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain could, or would, perform in the incredibly courageous manner he did at little round top?
These 2 events won the battle for the Union.
I have always thought that Lee thought that the Union soldiers would flee in the face of a strong, frontal assualt on Cemetary Ridge. They had done so in the past, no reason to think that they would not this time. In any case, it was his best chance for success, and he took it.
Looking across the field, the Union position looks much more vulnerable from the West than it does from the East. From the CSA position the rock wall seems insignificant and the rise very shallow. This is decieving. The field is largely flat and then slopes up toward the end, giving the Union defenders a clear field of fire and a more advantageous position for the critical last 200 yards. Also, the high grass would have obscured the view of what was a very defensible wall. From the Union position, things looked much more defensible, at least to my eyes.
In any case, the Union line held, and the rest is history.
Bump. Just an attempt to start a flame war. Gen. Lee was an honourable man, whose first loyalty was to his state, not to someone intent on subjugating the southern people against their will.
All in all, it was a last ditch effort by Lee, one not very well thought out given his commanders, and not one which was likely to succeed.
I must say I agree.
Personally I feel that Lee should have taken Longstreets advice and move around the Union left in order to put himself between the Union army and Washington. He would have forced Meade to attack him in order to safeguard Washington.
The whole Pennsylvania campaign made little sense, other than feeding the Army of Northern Virginia, and I believe was doomed to failure from the beginning. Lee was in the middle of Northern territory living off the land. Any major battle, regardless of where it was, would consume most of his ammunition and leave him with thousands of wounded to care for hundreds of miles from home. So even if he had won at Gettysburg he couldn't follow up on that. He would still have to go home. If the south was still laboring under the idea that one final battle would end it all then that, too, was a delusion. Had Lee won, the Army of the Potomac would have chalked up yet another loss. Vicksburg would still have fallen, Grant would still have come east, and the war would have ground on to it's inevitable southern defeat.
The initial reason for the invasion of the North was an attempt to get the European Powers to officially recognize the South as an independant Country.
They already did "de facto", but it was never officially stated. Had it been successful, Davis and Lee were hoping that this would have had the effect of Great Britain and France intervening to help settle the dispute and ultimately grant the South's independance.
If it had been for any other reason then yes, I would have to agree that the campaign made little to no sense.
free dixie NOW,sw
That was the thinking of the time, capture the capitol and you win the war. "On to Richmond" and that sort of thing. Grant and Sherman were the ones who turned it away from that. Grant realized that to defeat the confederacy you had to remove their power to make war, take out their army. Sherman realized that in order to win you had to remove the enemy's ability to wage war. Food and supplies were as vital as soldiers and munitions. Take away those and you defeat him as surely as on the battlefield. That was why he marched to the sea.
With respect, the chance of that happening had died the year before. After Second Bull Run, serious consideration was given by the Palmerston government to proposing a negotiated settlement. With the confederate defeat and retreat after their first campaign in the North, the European powers realized that the North wasn't going to be defeated on the battlefield. With the Emancipation Proclamation, the European powers realized that a position for the confederacy would also be a position for continued slavery. And the opportunity was gone for good.
That is true with this thread...perhaps someone could post the "day 1, day 2, and day 3" battle maps of Gettysburg to assist?
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