Posted on 09/10/2004 3:46:54 AM PDT by carton253
That is just one of many questions that remain unanswered from the Battle of Gettysburg. First the novel, Killer Angels, then the movie, Gettysburg, has currently painted a distorted picture of Lee’s real strategy, as has many of the books written on this subject. The standard story they all tell is one that has General Ewell failing to take Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill the evening of July 1st. On July 2nd, General Lee then attacked both flanks of the Union Army. Ewell again attacking Culp’s Hill, and General Longstreet attacking the Round Tops. When those attacks failed, General Lee abandoned the flank attacks to desperately march 15,000 men against the Federal center on Cemetery Ridge. This telling of the events, over 140 years old, has left many questions about those three days unanswered.
The first of those questions would be General Hood’s order to attack up the Emmittsburg Road. Let’s look at that order and the remarks that were made during the morning of July 2nd. Lee’s strategy was a simple one. He wanted to converge his forces upon Cemetery Hill…the salient of the Federal position. He did not want to attack the Round Tops. He saw no value in them. It is important to note that this was not the first time Lee had used this strategy in battle. He used it during the Seven Days Battles, during the Battle of Second Manassas, and finally at Chancellorsville, where he sent Jackson marching around the Union flank to push the Union Army into the waiting other wing of the Army of Northern Virginia.
Longstreet disagreed with Lee’s pincher strategy. During the morning meeting, when Lee positioned McLaws on the Emmittsburg Road at right angles to the Peach Orchard and ordered him to gain the orchard, Longstreet chose to direct McLaws parallel to the turnpike. Lee replied, “No, General, no; I want his position perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road.” McLaws’ Division was to aid Hood in an oblique attack on the left flank of the Federal Line in order to force it toward Gettysburg, toward Cemetery Hill, toward Ewell’s waiting corps, who was to make a demonstration against Cemetery and Culp’s Hills until the opportunity came for an attack.
There were many hindrances to Lee’s attack. Over the course of time, history has turned these hindrances into Lee’s overall strategy. The first hindrance came when General Sickles moved the III Corps away from the Round Tops because the ground was untenable. He understood that the high ground was the ridge where the Peach Orchard was based. General Lee shared Sickles eye for good ground. The Peach Orchard was Hood’s objective. Lee planned to use the Peach Orchard as a artillery base to shell Hancock’s flank on Cemetery Ridge. When Sickles moved forward, he extended his line. Meade had no choice but to reinforce the line with over 20,000 soldiers. Soldiers, who were not there when Lee reconnoitered the line earlier that morning.
Another hindrance was the presence of Gregg’s cavalry to the rear and east of Ewell’s position. What this did was force Ewell to position the Stonewall Brigade on Brinkerhoff Ridge to hold the cavalry in check along the Hanover Road. This was a loss of one of the best fighting brigades in the Army of Northern Virginia.
The last hindrance was the early wounding of Hood. This break in leadership caused the course of the attack to drift right – to the Round Tops rather than up the Emmittsburg Road. Since the entire Confederate Line was dressing off one another, when the lead elements of Hood’s Division drifted right, so did Laws’s division. Colonel Oates of the 15th Alabama was so intent on attacking the Round Tops that he refused General Laws direct order to wheel left and continue up the Emmittsburg Road. Hood’s division could not attack Little Round Top and remain attached to the Emmittsburg Road. Neither could Laws. Lee’s Line was already seven miles long and couldn’t afford this diversion away from the planned attack “up the Emmitsburg Road.” The attack failed.
In his official battle report, General Lee wrote, “The general plan was unchanged.” On July 3rd , he still planned to converge both his wings on Cemetery Hill. He did not abandoned his objectives to wage a rash battle to break through as history teaches today. A careful look at the day shows that Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s, and Trimble’s brigades were not sent on a desperate mission to do the impossible. Cemetary Hill was the key to the battle. Gettysburg was a point of strategic importance. Ten to twelve roads concentrated at Gettysburg. An army could easily converge to or diverge from this point. By being at the heart of the crossroads, Cemetery Hill was the most advantageous ground from the beginning. Both Lee, Reynolds, and Hancock recognized the importance of Cemetery Hill.
In his memoirs, Longstreet writes, “I was disappointed when Lee came to me on the morning the 3rd and directed that I should renew the attack against Cemetery Hill.” Longstreet still wanted to move to the right around the Federal Army and get between the Army of the Potomac and Washington. Lee said no, “I am going to take them where they are on Cemetery Hill, I want to take Pickett’s Division and make the attack.”
With the arrival of JEB Stuart’s cavalry, Lee was able to relieve the Stonewall Brigade, who returned to the line at Culp’s Hill. Furthermore, JEB Stuart did something that most historians do not understand. He fired two cannon shots and announced his presence on the field. Why? If one understands that Lee was seeking to converge his two wings on Cemetery Hill, one suddenly understands why JEB Stuart seemed to tell the Union Calvary where he was. His job was to clear Ewell’s rear of Union Calvary and allow Ewell to concentrate all his forces on an attack on Culp’s Hill. JEB Stuart summoned. The Union Calvary answered.
Pickett’s charge bears many resemblances to Hood’s attack up the Emmittsburg Road. What Pickett’s charge did different from Hood’s attack was move the thrust of the oblique battle closer to the mark of the Cemetery Hill. Lee also reinforced Ewell's positions by 6,000 men during the early morning of 7/3. This was not by accident. He fully expected both the II and III Corps to join the battle and attack Culp's Hill. It was to be 2nd Manassas all over again.
General Winfield Scott testified to Congress, “When the columns of the enemy appeared, it looked as if they were going to attack the center of our line (Hancock’s line on Cemetery Ridge and on Cemetery Hill) but after marching straight out a little distance they seemed to incline a little to their left, as if their object was to march through my command and seize Cemetery Hill, which I have no doubt was their intention.”
Looking at drawings that appeared in leading Northern periodicals right after the battle, one can clearly see that the Confederate Line oblique movements put them perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road and not parallel. What changed Pickett’s line was the overwhelming flank fire. It forced the line to the left. When the left collapsed, Pettigrew’s division bore to the right to compensate. They were supposed to dress right to assure a connection with Pickett, but that maneuver is far different from the one that actually took place in the assault’s final stages. It was never Lee’s plan to place the weight of the entire charge in front of the copse of trees. The line ended there as the natural result of the terrible flank fire, and Pickett’s Division movement to the left in order to avoid it.
Of course, such analysis does not change what happened those three days in Gettysburg. But it does allow serious students to understand what Lee intended to accomplish. If one could picture how Pickett’s Division was aligned, one would see that the men were marched toward Cemetery Hill and Ridge at a forty-five-degree angle to the Emmittsburg Road rather than parallel to it. It also causes serious students to see that Lee had a strong objective in the battle and not the three difference objectives as modern history tells us.
He STILL was a great General regardless...
Thanks....here is a link for your interest:
http://www.battleoffranklin.com/
Good luck.
Actually, even great Generals can make mistakes. Napoleon was a military genius, but he did make mistakes. Robert E. Lee did as well at Gettysburg.
Wow! For all that to happen...Lee would have had to be operating under a different stated objective, which he was not.
But breaking a line and exploiting it are two different things. Imagine Armstead's units in a pocket, surrounded by the Union forces on each side with enfilade fire, and in front of them by the entire Yankee reserve, and
Okay...but there is so much you are leaving out... If the plan of attack had been carried out as directed, then Armstead would not have been surrounded. His brigade would have been folding up the Union Line into Ewell's and Hill's waiting arms.
IMHO, Lee was LUCKY he didn't have a reserve, because the entire army would have been annihilated had his forces actually taken a narrow strip of Cemetary Hill and tried to hold it. The war easily could have been over that day if Lee was "successful."
These types of overgeneralizations at the what-if games doesn't leave much room for discussion. I could as easily over generalize and say that Lee would have held the field like he had done in every battle he had fought up to that point.
South=0
What's left to know?
Lee really needed to win this battle and I suspect that he gambled that using the sledgehammer approach was his best option. I'm sure he knew that even if sucessfull, it was going to be costly. Longstreet, from everything I have read, wasn't a happy camper, even years after the battle. Pickett on the other hand, wanted to get his name in the history books and saw this as his best chance to achieve that goal.
Tom
AMEN! I'm inclined, however, to believe that the combination of his heart disease and the loss of Jackson adversely affected his tactical judgment. I'm not always impressed with Lee as a strategist, but as a tactician he was usually on the ball. Sorta like Napoleon :-).
To be sure, the best option for Lee would have been to have withdrawn to a position between Washington and the Yankees, and get a good position on some high ground. I would bet if Stonewall Jackson had been alive at the time, the battle would have been a Confederate victory.
I must add, the way my blog is set up, you must read from the bottom up, because it posts the most recent post at the top.
Realistically, we'd have to say that the "objective" of the campaign as a whole was simply to win a decisive victory over the Union Army.
Well...duh! LOL! I'm sure that Lee wanted a little more than the Peach Orchard, but battles are one an objective at a time.
The whole Gettysburg battle was improvised, after all, once the leading units made contact without any orders from the commanders.
Well, I disagree with this statement. Lee wasn't near Gettysburg by accident. Gettysburg was a strategic town. The armies may have stumbled into battle...but it didn't take Lee long to establish his plan and his objectives.
Official results are written with hindsight, was my point.
Jackson can be forgiven for his performance in the Seven Days battles since he was new to working with Lee. Any mistakes that he made did not affect the outcome at Malvern Hill. That was Lee's decision alone.
Amen.
Lee wasn't using the sledgehammer effect. He was applying strategy that had worked in the past. Gettysburg was not to be Fredericksburg. It was to be 2nd Manassas in the planning and the initial moments. Pickett's men could not stand up to the flanking fire and therefore the line disintegrated... the disintegration of the line has become, to historians, Lee's strategy.
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