Posted on 09/07/2004 3:55:46 PM PDT by Seydlitz
The Powell Delusion
Shortly after Gulf War I, Gen. Colin Powell (then head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff), articulated a formula for future U.S. military interventions that has since become known as the Powell Doctrine. Broadly speaking, the Powell Doctrine stated that the United States would deploy military forces only under the following conditions:
1). There must be a clear threat to US national security.
2). All non-military options must be first exhausted.
3). Overwhelming force should be deployed against the opponent.
4). There must be widespread public support for the military intervention.
5). There must be a clear exit strategy to enable U.S. disengagement.
Sadly, the Doctrine represents more of a JCS fantasy than a real-world approach to military intervention. Worse still, the Doctrine has provided a justification and vocabulary for opponents of any U.S. military action. With Gulf War II, it is time to put this doctrinal dog out of its misery.
As stated above, The Powell Doctrine is first and foremost a fantasy of the Joint Chiefs rather than a thoughtful response to real-world conditions. The legacy of the Vietnam war was one of paranoia among top U.S. military planners. The older generation of officers was somewhat reluctant to blame the war's failure on poor planning and strategy, and instead took comfort in the notion that it was the loss of public support which resulted in defeat. While the change in public attitude towards the war definitely had an impact, the real fault lay within the defense and policy establishment. The Johnson administration failed to articulate clear and concise strategic goals, and the old WW II vets then leading the military (such as the contemptible Westmoreland) tried to apply conventional solutions to an unconventional war. The result was an unnecessary disaster for the United States. The Powell Doctrine, in essence, represents an effort by the JCS to create conditions where it can hardly fail. However, the strategic function of the JCS is more than just avoiding embarrassment for itself.
A little Clausewitz would have saved the United States a lot of pain in Vietnam. One of the most essential functions of Clausewitzian thought is the dialogue it creates between policy-makers and military planners. In Book One, Clausewitz lays out two fundamental principles. First, there is his oft-quoted contention that"[W]ar is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means."[Italics original] Second, he states, "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." [Italics original] Together, these two principles create an essential dialogue between politicians and military planners. The policy-makers must first identify the policy objectives that they wish to achieve. Then, the military planners must calculate what level of force would be required to compel the enemy to acquiesce. If the force level required is too great, then policy-makers must go back and reformulate a more modest set of objectives; ones that are equal to the level of force they are willing, or able, to apply.
Applying this formula to Vietnam, defeating Communism in the South would have required the military defeat and occupation of the North. After all, the Viet Cong were but the unconventional arm of the more conventional aggression by the North against the South. Given the dangers of Chinese and Soviet intervention during such a time of Cold War tension, this fact would have required American policy-makers to settle for more limited goals. Settling for an attritional stalemate in the South could have been achieved with a much more modest investment of Special Forces, military advisors, military and economic aid, all with a little bit of air support. Instead, we over-invested troops and over-sold our policy objectives without accepting the required strategic imperatives (i.e. invading the North, Laos and Cambodia, and a possible war with China). The strategic mis-match resulted in a minor military setback becoming a major foreign policy disaster.
Unfortunately, Clausewitz is a lot like Nietzsche: Everybody quotes him, a few people actually read him, and almost no one understands him. The turgid German prose of an unfinished work doesn't help (only Book One was finished when Clausewitz died, and the entire work was published posthumously). As a testament to this fact, the first time that I read Clausewitz, I thought that it was okay. The second time I read him, I thought that the stuff was pretty good. Only after the third reading did I realize that it was genius.
So, what's the problem with the Powell Doctrine? Basically, it almost amounts to a negation of strategy. The use of military force is a function of the policy goals to be achieved, not of a priori assumptions about the circumstances of military intervention. Worse still, the Powell Doctrine basically amounts to a bunch of canards that add little or nothing to the fundamental decision making process. For example:
1). "Threats" to national security are in the eye of the beholder. More importantly, military intervention is for achieving policy goals, not simply for eliminating what are perceived to be direct threats. Sometimes, in places like Rwanda or Darfur, saving hundreds of thousands of innocent lives may involve the use of military force in the absence of a direct threat to national security.
2). Differentiating between non-military and military options is a false dichotomy. They are all merely tools in the policy-makers' toolkit. Often, the efficacy of non-military options is a function of the possibility that one might resort to military options. Put simply, the velvet glove must enclose an iron fist, and the two act as one.
3). The force level applied should be a function of the policy goal to be achieved. If we merely want to aid a foreign government, but do not wish to invest the full faith and credit of the United States in the operation, then we should not apply overwhelming force. A few Special Forces operators sometimes can be enough to achieve a limited policy goal.
4). If the policy goal is worthwhile, and the case made clearly, then public support will follow. Powell desires to put the cart before the horse. Besides, the public can be fickle, and vital strategic goals cannot always be subordinated to the vagaries of the polls. If policy-makers do not believe that they can garner sufficient public support, then they should adjust their policy objectives and military investment accordingly.
5). Exit strategies are bunk. The only exit strategy is victory. Defining some artificial "exit strategy" achieves little but to signal to your enemies what they have to do in order to get you to leave. Moreover, warfare is a nonlinear phenomenon, and the very existence of a conflict will change its dynamic in unpredictable ways. If you create an "exit strategy" that no longer accords with the reality on the ground, then you will be hoisted by your own petard.
In Iraq, our policy goals were to (1) remove a nasty anti-U.S. dictator; (2) signal to regional governments that the United States is willing and able to smash hostile powers; (3) puncture Arab fantasies about being able to militarily resist the West; and, (4) begin the process of creating functioning, representative governments in the Middle East. The only exit strategy is to transform the Middle East in such a way that it no longer represents a strategic threat to the United States, as we have done in Germany and Japan. Accordingly, let us just take the Powell Doctrine out back and shoot it.
Who exactly died and made Colon Bowell in charge?
Rebuilding the political cultures of brutal and aggressive regimes in Japan and Germany is just fine. However, it makes no sense in the case of Iraq, because...ummm...errr...because...
Because the evil George Bush is president, and Michael Moore showed me what a paradise on earth Saddam had created for his people!
Well now we know everyone in the CIA are Dems -- dare we think the Dept of State is populated the same? I think congress should not only revant intelligence but State while they are at it.
I think that you will find this of interest.
"Overwhelming force should be deployed against the opponent."
We let the Iraqi army "go home" instead of destroying it when it was engaged (those troops are today's "insurgents"), we let stragglers hole up in "shrines" that the rest of us call miltary bunkers, and we relied too much on laser guided bombs and tried to avoid collateral damage.
If Patton, MacArthur, Eisenhower, FDR and Truman relied on precise weapons and political correctness as it pertains to war, we would still be fighting the Germans and the Japanese today.
It is point #3 where America fails the greatest.
Once this nation decides to go to war, it should rely on strategic warfare, not tactical warfare . . .
or, it should not go to war at all.
This leads into your comment that they are all Democrats. No one is more intent on preserving the status quo than Democrats. Whether it's high taxes to keep the rich rich and the poor poor, or protectionism to keep the same ol' dinosaur industries intact, they hate change.
Yes, thanks. Colin and the President might want to discuss which hymnal will appply for services...
If Ronald Reagan didn't have the guts to over-ride State and insist in adding "Tear Down This Wall" to his famous speech, that wall might still be standing...
I, for one, hate status quo in life
I couldn't have said it better myself. What was our "exit strategy" in WW2? We didn't need one because we won.
I wish, next time I hear some Democratic talking head blathering on about "exit strategies", that someone would ask what FDR's exit strategy was for WW II.
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