Unbelievable...we get a double agent deep within Al Qaeda to cooperate with us and the commie rag NY Times decides to blow his cover. Probably done at Kerry's behest, to hurt Bush and the War on Terror.
A contract has to be made on those responsible.
And, tomorrow fools will buy the New York Times in what would have been the shadow of the World Trade Center.
Here's the Slimes original article (emphasis is mine). Reading between the lines, some here (including me) have speculated that the name was leaked to the Slimes by Pakistani intelligence:
August 2, 2004
INTELLIGENCECaptured Qaeda Figure Led Way to Information Behind Warning
By DOUGLAS JEHL and DAVID ROHDE
ASHINGTON, Aug. 1 - The unannounced capture of a figure from Al Qaeda in Pakistan several weeks ago led the Central Intelligence Agency to the rich lode of information that prompted the terror alert on Sunday, according to senior American officials.
The figure, Muhammad Naeem Noor Khan, was described by a Pakistani intelligence official as a 25-year-old computer engineer, arrested July 13, who had used and helped to operate a secret Qaeda communications system where information was transferred via coded messages.
A senior United States official would not confirm or deny that Mr. Khan had been the Qaeda figure whose capture led to the information. But the official said "documentary evidence" found after the capture had demonstrated in extraordinary detail that Qaeda members had for years conducted sophisticated and extensive reconnaissance of the financial institutions cited in the warnings on Sunday.
One senior American intelligence official said the information was more detailed and precise than any he had seen during his 24-year career in intelligence work. A second senior American official said it had provided a new window into the methods, content and distribution of Qaeda communications.
"This, for us, is a potential treasure trove," said a third senior American official, an intelligence expert, at a briefing for reporters on Sunday afternoon.
The documentary evidence, whose contents were reported urgently to Washington on Friday afternoon, immediately elevated the significance of other intelligence information gathered in recent weeks that had already been regarded as highly troubling, senior American intelligence officials said. Much of that information had come from Qaeda detainees in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia as well as Pakistan, and some had also pointed to a possible attack on financial institutions, senior American intelligence officials said.
The American officials said the new evidence had been obtained only after the capture of the Qaeda figure. Among other things, they said, it demonstrated that Qaeda plotters had begun casing the buildings in New York, Newark and Washington even before the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
Among the questions the plotters sought to answer, senior American intelligence officials said, were how best to gain access to the targeted buildings; how many people might be at the sites at different hours and on different days of the week; whether a hijacked oil tanker truck could serve as an effective weapon; and how large an explosive device might be required to bring the buildings down.
The American officials would say only that the Qaeda figure whose capture had led to the discovery of the documentary evidence had been captured with the help of the C.I.A. Though Pakistan announced the arrest last week of a Qaeda member, Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, a Tanzanian wanted in connection with the 1998 bombings of American embassies in East Africa, the American officials suggested that he had not been the source of the new threat information.
An account provided by a Pakistani intelligence official made clear that the crucial capture in recent weeks had been that of Mr. Khan, who is also known as Abu Talha. The intelligence official provided information describing Mr. Khan as having assisted in evaluating potential American and Western targets for terrorist attacks, and as being representative of a "new Al Qaeda."
The Pakistani official described Mr. Khan as a fluent English speaker who had told investigators that he had visited the United States, Britain, Germany and other countries. Mr. Khan was one of thousands of Pakistani militants who trained in Afghanistan under the Taliban in the 1990's, the Pakistani official said.
If indeed Mr. Khan was the man whose arrest led the C.I.A. to new evidence, his role as a kind of clearinghouse of Qaeda communications, as described by the Pakistani intelligence official, could have made him a vital source of information. Since his arrest, Mr. Khan has described an elaborate communications system that involves the use of high and low technology, the Pakistani official said.
The question of how much to rely on information obtained from captured foes has always weighed on the intelligence business. In recent weeks, even as they cited accounts from some captured Qaeda members as the basis for new concerns about terrorism, American intelligence officials have acknowledged that another captured Qaeda figure, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, had recanted claims that Iraq had provided training in illicit weapons to Qaeda members.
Mr. Libi's earlier claims had been the primary basis for assertions by President Bush and his top advisers that Iraq had provided training in "poisons and gases" to Qaeda members.
In explaining the decision to call a new terror alert, American officials would say only that the evidence obtained by the C.I.A. after the arrest of the Qaeda figure in Pakistan had provided a richer, more credible source of intelligence than could have been provided by any single individual. They declined to say whether the "documentary evidence" included physical documents or might also include electronic information stored on computers, such as copies of e-mail communications.
The Qaeda communications system that Mr. Khan used and helped operate relied on Web sites and e-mail addresses in Turkey, Nigeria and the northwestern tribal areas of Pakistan, according to the information provided by a Pakistani intelligence official.
The official said Mr. Khan had told investigators that couriers carried handwritten messages or computer disks from senior Qaeda leaders hiding in isolated border areas to hard-line religious schools in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province.
Other couriers then ferried them to Mr. Khan on the other side of the country in the eastern city of Lahore, and the computer expert then posted the messages in code on Web sites or relayed them electronically, the Pakistani official said.
Mr. Khan had told investigators that most of Al Qaeda's communications were now done through the Internet, the official said. After a message was sent and read by the recipient, the entire communication and related files were deleted to maintain secrecy, he said. Mr. Khan had told investigators that e-mail addresses were generally not used more than a few times.
The young computer engineer, who received a bachelor's degree from a university in Karachi, is the unemployed son of an employee of Pakistan's state airline and a college botany professor, the official said. Heavily built and 6 feet 2 inches tall, he speaks English with a British accent, and was arrested carrying a fake Pakistani identification card.
The Pakistani official said Mr. Khan told investigators that he had received 25 days of training at a militant camp in Afghanistan in June 1998. By the time Mr. Khan had risen to his current position, the official said, Qaeda figures had arranged his marriage and were paying him $170 a month for rent for his house in Lahore and $90 for expenses.
Mr. Khan was in contact with the brother of the Indonesian Qaeda leader Hambali, who was studying in a religious school in Karachi, and who was recently deported. Mr. Khan has told interrogators that his Qaeda handler was a Pakistani he knew as Adil or Imran, who assigned him tasks related to computer work, Web design and managing the handler's messages. His correspondents included a Saudi-based Yemeni, Egyptian and Palestinian nationals and Arabs in unknown locations, and someone described as the "in-charge" in the city of Khost in eastern Afghanistan.
Asked about the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Mr. Khan has told interrogators that even the top Qaeda commanders do not know, the Pakistani intelligence official said.
Douglas Jehl reported from Washington for this article, and David Rohde from Karachi, Pakistan.
Well, I can certainly see how this story would make you frustrated enough to sign up.
CNN
PAULA ZAHN NOW
August 4, 2004 Wednesday
Officials Say Al Qaeda Members May be in U.S
GUESTS: John Gohel
BYLINE: Heidi Collins, Ron Young, Kelli Arena, Dana Bash
HIGHLIGHT:
What important new lead may have triggered America's stepped-up security this week? Officials say al Qaeda suspects contacted someone in the U.S.
(snip)
COLLINS: The threat of a terrorist attack against the U.S. seemed so immediate last Sunday when the alert level went up for financial institutions in three cities. But then we heard that much of the intelligence used to make that decision was three years old.
Today's news might make your sense of whiplash a little bit worse. Two U.S. government sources tell CNN suspected al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan has contacted someone in the U.S. in the past few months.
CNN justice correspondent Kelli Arena was the first to report this information. She joins us in Washington tonight now with the details on this.
Good evening, Kelli. Thanks a lot for being here.
What are your U.S. sources telling you now?
KELLI ARENA, CNN CORRESPONDENT: Well, U.S. officials, senior U.S. officials have told us exactly what you said, Heidi, which is that there is evidence in the intelligence that was gathered in Pakistan that alleged al Qaeda operatives there contacted an individual or individuals here in the United States.
Now, they would not characterize how that contact was made or what information was shared, but obviously, this does lend some credibility to the concern that there are al Qaeda operatives here in the United States that are poised to attack.
COLLINS: Well, of course. How does that information then compare with what authorities in Pakistan are saying?
ARENA: Well, a little different. The Pakistani officials go a little further. This is information that we have not confirmed with U.S. officials, but Pakistani intelligence officials at a very senior level have told CNN that, yes, there was contact made by the alleged al Qaeda computer expert, Muhammad Naeem Noor Kahn -- we've heard a lot about him lately -- that he had allegedly contacted six, what they call al Qaeda operatives here in the United States.
So they go further to define the people that are here as al Qaeda operatives and put a number on it, six. As I said, U.S. officials not confirming that part of the story, but Pakistani officials very definitely saying this is what happened.
COLLINS: But is the U.S. then saying anything about how much cooperation they're actually getting from Pakistan?
ARENA: Well, many law enforcement and government sources have said that the cooperation from Pakistan is getting increasingly better, that there has been a lot of political diplomatic pressure placed on Pakistan.
As you know, there have long been reports that many of the senior al Qaeda operatives are thought to be with -- on the Pakistan-Afghani border, so lots of problems in the tribal areas in Pakistan.
These recent arrests are happening right in the middle of the city, Heidi, so it does seem that the Pakistanis have upped the ante a bit, have gotten more aggressive. And across the board, not only in the United States, but in other countries as well, they're saying that this -- this intelligence gathering process going on in Pakistan is really proving to be very beneficial.
COLLINS: Well, it's happening right in the middle of these new terror alerts as well. So how much does this new information actually play into the recent warnings?
ARENA: Well, we're told -- and this is where it gets tricky -- we're told that it was a major factor.
(Reading between the lines here: Were the "intelligence gathering" and recent arrests a "major factor" because Kahn's name was leaked? The Pakistanis had to move quickly to make the arrests?)
We also heard today from Bush administration officials that it was not only the information in Pakistan that we all heard about, which was a surveillance of these buildings here in the United States that was done in such great detail, but that there was also another stream of intelligence coming in from human sources overseas also indicating that financial targets were being up by al Qaeda.
So you had so many different sources of intelligence coming in, but I am told that this alleged communication was high on the list of concerns.
COLLINS: So because of these concerns now, do you know whether or not the government is actually considering raising the alert level across the board all across the country?
ARENA: We haven't heard that, Heidi, and I think that the general consensus is that they've in essence done that, that the alert has been raised, the public is aware. We're also aware that homeland loosened up some funds that normally would not be available unless the country went to orange, but they've loosened up some money for some localities to use for security purposes.
So in effect many homeland observers say that it's almost as if they are at orange. I think if there were any other specific information that came in, the government would reassess. As you know, they reassess that decision every day. But right now no one is talking about going to orange on a national level.
COLLINS: All right. CNN's Kelli Arena in Washington tonight. Kelly, always happy to have your insight. Thanks again.
Let's get some expert analysis now on the information that Kelli is talking about. (Translation: "Let's see how we can make this Bush's fault.") Joining us tonight from our London bureau is John Gohel. He's the director of international security at the Asia Pacific Foundation.
Mr. Gohel, thanks to you also for being with us tonight.
As you know, about 2 1/2 years ago, U.S. forces went to Afghanistan to basically try to destroy the infrastructure of al Qaeda. Does this latest information mean it was a failure?
JOHN GOHEL, DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, ASIA PACIFIC FOUNDATION: What we have to remember, Heidi, about Operation Enduring Freedom is that it was a full frontal exercise. They went in there, totally committed to try and rout out al Qaeda.
But what happened was nobody was guarding the back door, particularly the Pakistani authorities. So all the leading al Qaeda individuals just moved the operators, their personnel and went to Pakistan, where they have stayed. And Pakistan now has become the new center for al Qaeda.
And, unfortunately, yes, there were failings made in that, and unfortunately we've not totally eliminated the total terror structure.
COLLINS: Give me a little bit more clarification on what you mean by not guarding the back door?
GOHEL: There -- there was expectation by the U.S. on the Pakistani authorities that they would pick up any al Qaeda people that were trying to flee from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
The long border was expected to be manned, properly secured, but it wasn't. Instead, thousands of al Qaeda individuals and Taliban fighters just simply walked across the border, where they made Pakistan their home.
Let's look at the fact that major key arrests in the last few couple of months -- sorry, last year, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the master planner of 9/11, he was arrested in an army compound in Rawal Pindi (ph). You had Abu Zubaydah, Taki bin al-Taj (ph), Ramzi Binalshibh, other key al Qaeda individuals, all picked up in major cities north in the border regions right in the major cities.
COLLINS: In Pakistan. Tell me then, and I don't know how you characterize this, but how much communication is there actually going on between al Qaeda abroad and then right here in the United States?
GOHEL: Well, one thing we always have to remember, Heidi, is that al Qaeda will always reserve its biggest, most spectacular attacks for U.S. interests in the U.S., as well as abroad.
And certainly, what we have to remember, that 9/11 was a declaration of war on the U.S., and we witnessed follow-up attacks elsewhere in the world.
But certainly one thing is a fact, that there are strong communications between al Qaeda cells throughout the world and particularly with those remaining cells that exist inside the United States. And they're mainly done through the Internet, through Internet chat rooms, which has become a primary source for information to spread amongst cells, because it's very easy to do that. And that is a source that the terrorists have certainly used to their advantage.
COLLINS: Because -- Sir John, do you think that -- that this new information could actually mean that someone has been given a direct order or that a terrorist cell, a sleeper cell has been activated?
GOHEL: I think because this is such a key, critical year for the U.S., a presidential year, there is a strong fear, a very realistic fear that al Qaeda and its affiliates would be planning a similar type of terrorist attack that we witnessed in Spain to proceed the presidential elections, to create maximum fear and damage and to basically derail the political process, to target the world's most powerful democracy.
And certainly because it is now we're approaching that stage, there will have to be a high level of vigilance, because certainly al Qaeda is not finished with the U.S. And we will, unfortunately, witness more attempts, more plots for them to target the U.S.
COLLINS: Sir John Gohel from the Asia Pacific Foundation, thanks so much for joining us tonight.
GOHEL: My pleasure.
(snip)