Posted on 07/26/2004 5:40:46 AM PDT by OESY
WASHINGTON, July 23 - In May 1998, George J. Tenet, then director of central intelligence, scrapped a heavily rehearsed raid to kidnap Osama bin Laden from his compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, according to the report by the Sept. 11 commission.
Under the plan, developed from satellite photographs and on-the-ground intelligence, Afghan operatives would execute a daring kidnapping and later hand over Mr. bin Laden, the leader of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, to the Central Intelligence Agency.
"No capture plan before 9/11 ever again attained the same level of detail and preparation," the report said. "Working-level C.I.A. officers were disappointed."
The tale of the canceled raid, as described in the commission's report, tells of senior C.I.A. and national security officials balancing the operation's potential rewards against concerns about jeopardizing the lives of operatives and the repercussions that would follow if the gambit failed. Ultimately, senior C.I.A. officials decided the plan was too dangerous, according to the report.
Aspects of the raid have been described in books by Richard A. Clarke, the former counterterrorism chief, and Steve Coll, a journalist with The Washington Post. The commission's report provides a detailed account of deliberations involving the Clinton White House, the C.I.A. and the Pentagon.
The agency's counterterrorist center conceived of the nighttime raid on Mr. bin Laden's compound after Afghan tribal leaders described to agency officials a failed roadside ambush they had tried.
The bin Laden compound, known as Tarnak Farms, contained about 80 concrete or mud-brick buildings surrounded by a 10-foot wall on a vast stretch of isolated and treeless desert near the Kandahar airport.
C.I.A. officers mapped the site, identifying houses that belonged to Mr. bin Laden's wives and the one where he would be most likely to sleep.
Working with the tribal leaders, the agency drew up plans for a raid and ran two complete rehearsals in the fall of 1997, the report said.
Planners at the agency were ready to seek White House approval by early 1998. Mr. Tenet walked the national security adviser, Samuel R. Berger, through the operation on Feb. 13 and in a paper titled "Next Steps Against Usama bin Ladin."
Guards at the compound would be subdued by a group of Afghan operatives, who would enter Tarnak Farms to stealthily grab Mr. bin Laden, the report said. Taking him to a site in the desert outside Kandahar, the tribal leaders would turn Mr. bin Laden over to a second group of tribal leaders, and they would take him to a desert landing zone for a handoff to the C.I.A. From there, the agency was to fly Mr. bin Laden to New York, an Arab capital, or wherever he was to be arraigned.
The briefing papers presented to Mr. Berger acknowledged several risks, including the possibility that people would be killed during the raid and that Mr. bin Laden's supporters in Afghanistan might retaliate by kidnapping American citizens in Kandahar.
The briefing papers also highlighted other options for C.I.A. action against Mr. bin Laden, including paramilitary or sabotage attacks in Kandahar and Sudan as well as providing intelligence support for military strikes.
Each plan had shortcomings, but so did inaction, the briefing papers said.
"Sooner or later," the papers said, "bin Laden will attack United States interests, perhaps using W.M.D."
Mr. Clarke told the agency to carry on with planning and begin drafting the legal documents necessary for covert action.
In March 1998, planners conducted a third rehearsal and briefed Mr. Clarke on the outcome. In a note to Mr. Berger on March 7, Mr. Clarke described the operation as "somewhat embryonic" and the C.I.A. as "months away from doing anything."
The chief of the bin Laden unit at the agency thought the plan was "the perfect operation." The required infrastructure was minimal, and the plan had been modified to keep Mr. bin Laden in hiding for up to a month before handing him over to the United States, thus enhancing the chances of keeping American involvement hidden.
The C.I.A. field officer in charge, Gary Schroen, called the tribal leaders' abilities "professional and detailed," according to the report. Mr. Schroen said the plan was "about as good as it can be," meaning a 40 percent chance of capturing or killing Mr. bin Laden. Yet even the best planning, he added, would not prevent that point when "we step back and keep our fingers crossed."
Military officers reviewed the capture plan and, the bin Laden station chief said, "found no showstoppers."
There were, however, concerns, according to the report. The commander of Delta Force, the elite military unit, felt "uncomfortable" leaving Mr. bin Laden a captive of the tribal leaders for so long, while the commander of joint special operations forces, Lt. Gen. Michael Canavan, feared for the safety of the tribal leaders within Tarnak Farms.
At that point, however, Mr. Berger worried about what would be done with Mr. bin Laden if he was captured. The hard evidence against Mr. bin Laden that would lead to any conviction was still skimpy, Mr. Berger said, and there was a danger of bringing him back to the United States only to see him acquitted.
A May 18 review of draft documents legally authorizing the capture operation prompted discussion among agency managers about what might happen if something were to go wrong on the ground.
James Pavitt, the assistant head of the directorate of operations, worried that the operation had "a slight flavor of a plan for an assassination," the commission's report said. Despite Mr. Pavitt's misgivings, the agency cleared the draft memorandum and sent it to the National Security Council.
Counterterrorist center officers briefing Attorney General Janet Reno and the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Louis J. Freeh, declared that the operation had a 30 percent chance of success. In a separate briefing, the chief of the counterterrorist center warned that someone would surely be killed in the operation.
From May 20 to 24, the C.I.A. ran another rehearsal with F.B.I. participation that was spread over three time zones and even brought in personnel from the region. A post-rehearsal briefing gave the date of the raid as June 23, with Mr. bin Laden coming out of Afghanistan no later than July 23.
On May 29, however, the bin Laden unit chief cabled his field operatives to "stand down on the operation for the time being." Cabinet-level officials, the unit chief wrote, thought the risk of civilian casualties too high.
While many senior officials, including Mr. Clarke and Mr. Berger, had raised concerns about the plan, Mr. Tenet told the commission he had made the decision based on the recommendation of his chief operations officers.
"He alone had decided to 'turn off' the operation," the commission report said of Mr. Tenet.
The window for action quickly became smaller.
"The tribals' reported readiness to act diminished," the report said. "And bin Laden's security precautions and defenses became more elaborate and formidable."
Puleeeeez....They could have just picked up the platter that was handed to them. They treated it like a hot potato and thousands died and were injured on 9-11.
IMHO I do not believe that the Pentagon was a target, particularly because they hit that reinforced side of it. It was two for the Capital....just like NY if one considers the towers as a single target. It meant doubling up the fuel, heat and prolongation of the destruction. Many other building would have been destroyed in DC, just like NY.
WOW ... with all of the 9-11 widows yelling out for the commissioners to " Talk about the RADIOS !! " and gasping over the title " Bin Laden determined to strike in the US " ... will they come out with a news conference on this newly released item here ???
( Same women that had the Anti-Bush talking points on the interviews with the press not too long ago )
And this, in a nutshell, is why democrats can never be trusted with national security.
Kill the bastard.
Sockgate continues to develop.
I am reading the 9/11 report and so far have read about 200 pages. All I can say is that Clinton does not look as bad as I had thought, but Berger, Reno, Albright, Tenet, seem to deserve a lot of blame. Clinton was ill served and did seem to want to get the guy. I can't stand Clinton, I despise the man, but the report is clear who sacked the plans to get OBL. It is scary to even imagine that these people would ever be in a position of pwer again.
Ditto
All Clinton had to say was "do it". Don't forget, he himself said he was obsessed with Usama and terrorism was his highest priority. He did nothing! It's what worked for him. The economy was rolling (because of us not him) and everything was quiet....so quiet that you couldn't hear a thing in the Oval office. It's just the way he wanted it.
Lawyers don't win fight wars.
If they were planning on getting that close, why not just kill him. I really don't want these scum to get show trials with Geragos leading the defense.
Clinton's admistration wound up taking the blame for September 11th. The same people that are now advising Kerry.
Let's think about that one...
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