Posted on 07/22/2004 1:34:39 PM PDT by tang-soo
I've posted this top a few other threads. Please ignore if you've seen it before ...
I called our local Clear Channel station the night after this story broke and spoke for about 10 minutes describing the procedures used to handle classified information. The following is a basic description of what I said ...
1) A person who wishes to review classified information at a given facility must have his/her clearance on file with the security office that has legal custody of the information.
2) Once they arrive to the facility, they must show their credentials to identify themselves, sign into the facility - maybe issued a badge indicating their clearance and access and escorted to the room where the material will be reviewed.
3) A quick sidebar on program access and document marking. The term "Access" refers to the concept of "Need to Know". The fact you have a clearance that matches the level required to have access to the material does not establish your "need to know". It must be determined by someone like a program manager or security personnel that your job function requires access to certain information. If you are granted access, you may be required to go through another level of investigation. Some levels of access (at least the ones I was exposed to) are known as "Special Need to Know" or SNTK (pronounced Snick) and "Special Access Required" or SAR. Programs with these designations require special prominent markings on each page of a classified document along with the classification level. Believe it or not, after all the markings (top and bottom) there usually is enough room for the content of the page.
4) I should also mention that each paragraph of the document starts with a designation indicating the classification level of that paragraph. This would look like (U), (C), (S), (S/SAR), (S/SNTK), (TS) or (TS/SAR). Every page is marked top and bottom based upon the highest level of any paragraph on that page. ie. it's possible to have an unclassified page in a top secret document. And as you might think, the overall classification of the document is classified at the highest level of any single page.
5) This next point is especially important in light of the current investigation. Every page is marked "Page x of y Pages". For example page 13 of a 32 page document would be clearly marked in the banner section of the page "Page 13 of 32 Pages". This is done for obvious reasons - if any page is missing, it can be accounted for. The page count is also part of the document's registration in the security catalog.
6) Once in the room, the container (probably a safe i.e. a very heavy duty file cabinet with heavy combination locks with different combinations on each drawer) is opened. This process should be logged by security personnel.
7) The documents are taken from the container. All classified documents are stamped (each page) with items such as a control number, date of creation, level of clearance (top and bottom), program name indicating what access is required and eventual dispensation (i.e. when the material is designated to destruction if applicable).
8) If the documents are classified "top secret", each document has a log on the cover sheet. EACH time a person has access to this information, they must sign and date it.
9) The material is not to be removed (ie stuffed in underwear, socks ... etc) without approval of security personnel. If this takes place, the transfer is documented on both ends of the transaction. If the material is top secret or above, it requires at least two cleared people as an escort.
10) If you travel overnight, the material is not to be kept in your hotel/motel room but instead must be taken to an approved facility. Arrangements are usually made in advance. Security people do not like suprise visits. They like to make them but not receive them.
11) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.
12) This material is frequently audited by internal security agents and is subject to "suprise" audits conducted by military, FBI or other external security personnel.
13) People given access to this type of information are briefed and attend classes on how to handle this material - ie. no excuses for "honest mistakes".
14) As the NSA for the Clinton administration, I imagine Berger was personally responsible that this protocol was designed, implemented and enforced by his staff - at least in an appropriately managed administration. This would apply to government employees, officials, military personnel and civilians under contract and extended clearances issued by the DoD, DoE or other intel operations.
15) As such, ANYBODY who has worked in this environment and heard Mr. Berger's comments yesterday about being "sloppy" and "an honest mistake" knows beyond any doubt that he was not only lying, but this was a premeditated act.
16) I left the aerospace business(as an engineer) in 1993 so these comments are based upon the security world of that time. Only Lord knows how the Clinton administration changed things during his 8 years.
That summarizes what I mentioned to Steve Cannon of WTVN 610 AM (Columbus, Oh) the night after the story broke.
I should have added another issue that may pertain to the current case. The concept of "Working papers". This would be scratch material that is never intended to end up in a document being prepared. For example, preliminary drafts, graphics with various scales, handdrawn sketches, ... etc. Usually, this kind of material is kept in a folder or envelope which is marked as a regular document would be. This folder falls under the same criteria as a regular document ie locking up when not being used ... etc. Usually, this material is collected on a regular basis when the work is finished and tossed into a "burn barrel". The burn barrel is emptied periodically by cleared personnel and either burned or processed through an approved shredder (ends up as dust).
The latest word I have heard is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material.
So the question comes to mind, why would anybody do such a thing under conditions where he knew he stood a huge chance of being caught? The mission must have been extraordinary for such a risk. The presumption is that he wanted to alter or remove and destroy material that implicated either himself, or quite possibly Mr. Clinton. The fact that some of the material is "lost" implies that regardless of the consequences, the mission has been accomplished with his current situation collateral damage.
Webb Hubbell's infamous quote "I guess I'll have to roll over again for Hillary" comes to mind. Another example of the Clinton whirlwind leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.
bttt
bttt
Including their removal, loss and destruction? Bill Clinton has the authority to order that?
No. By statute, the President can grant or deny access to classified materials (and 5 other categories of materials) for 12 years.
Thanks for the clarification, angkor. There could be some thorny legal issues here that may at least partly explain the apparent stand-off between Berger and the DOJ.
As I've alluded to before, I am very impressed by your summary. One item that I would like you to add, when you get a chance to update it:
There are many, many people who have had "Confidential" or "Secret" clearances, or even marginal "Top Secret" access. Those people are likely to under a delusion that this "Code Word" - Highest sensitivity - material is handled in a similar manner. Nothing could be further from the truth.
This stuff is handled with far more care than the lower clearance material, and even the archivists (or investigators of criminal behavior with respect to it) are under severe restrictions when they have to handle it in any way because they do not have the clearances and "need-to-know" to be allowed to view it.
There is no way - I mean NO WAY - for this material to be inadvertently carried off and subsequently lost or disposed of.
.
I am dead certain that the Demodogs leaked this.
Berger was expected to be Sec.State or some other top level appointment. Can you imagine the clamor if this story was broken a week or so after Kerry "pre-announces" his "team" - or in another way flags what his Cabinet would be? We had a very good idea of who was in Bush's Cabinet well before the election. They NYSlimes even said "there's a chance this will hurt Berger's chances to be Sec.State", so they knew Berger was in line. Really, what type of damage would having this come out a mere 2-4 weeks before Nov.2 cause? Berger apparently saw fit to hide this story from Kerry!
Demodogs leaked this... pure and simple.
--
I sure wish somebody with a little more recent experience with super-high level security procedures would verify what tang-soo has posted here.
His experience is about 10 years old, and mine is even older.
Anybody verifying, updating, and adding to his post would be very appreciated.
.
bump
bttt
Thanks for this informative post!
A most enlightening post. Michael Savage made mention of the "Code Word Access" and how secrete that level is. This Berger thing simply does not pass the smell test in any shape or form...Berger committed a crime and I suspect he did not do this for himself – shades of Ron Brown.
I know that even "honest mistakes" where procedures were improperly followed, but which resulted in no actual compromise of the data results in severe punishment for people in the military: Reduction of rank, loss of multiple months pay, and confinement to quarters - in addition to possible revokation of security clearances.
That's just for mishandling or misrecording. Anything even remotely like what is described would result in jail-time.
Generally Presidents and certain other positions like CIA Directors retain their clearances after leaving office - assuming a sort of "emeritus" status.
O.K. apparently there is a mechanism that makes it look like they still have clearances. See the Order likned above.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.