A Universal Mistake

The Autonomist ^ | 7/06/04 | Regindald Firehammer

[Hank Kerchief]

 

A Universal Mistake

One of the most important of Ayn Rand's contributions to the field of epistemology is contained in the seventh chapter of her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology entitled, "The Cognitive Role of Concepts."

In it she explains how the world we are conscious of is comprised of an infinite complexity of existents, events, and relationships and why it is not possible for us to comprehend this complexity simply by perceiving it. To understand it, we must "break it up," into manageable pieces we can identify and understand. This, Ayn Rand explains, is the role of concepts.

"The essence ... of man's incomparable cognitive power is the ability to reduce a vast amount of information to a minimal number of units—which is the task performed by his conceptual faculty." ["The Cognitive Role of Concepts," Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology," Page 63.]

The principle clearly explicated is this: the development of knowledge is essentially a process of simplification.

The Simplification of Philosophy

If there is any hope philosophy is going to be successful answering the most difficult questions, it must do so in terms of concepts that are simple, clear, and exact. With notable exceptions, the history of philosophy is the record of a relentless effort to make its concepts as complex, obscure, and incomprehensible as possible. The exceptions are the high points in the history of philosophy from which the most significant advances can all be traced.

One example of those high points is Occam's Razor, which, as Bertrand Russell observed, "swept away mountains of metaphysical lumber." Other high points of clarity and simplicity include Aristotle, Bacon, Locke, and most recently Ayn Rand.

Despite the efforts of these and other great minds dotting the landscape of philosophy's history, the field continues to labor under a load of unnecessary complexity. It is the purpose of this article, the previous one on Perception, and additional planned articles in this series, to address these points of unnecessary complexity and confusion which continue to infect the field of philosophy, and to correct them.

Superfluous Concepts

One of the most damaging concepts to ever infect philosophy is the concept of universals. Originated by Plato in his "forms," and "improved" by Aristotle as "universals," the idea has existed in some manner in every philosophy since.

It might be interesting to trace the destructive effects of this concept throughout history to observe how it has corrupted every area of philosophical enquiry, but that is not my purpose. My purpose is to eliminate the concept from philosophy completely; because it is not a concept at all. It is a pseudo-concept, impossible of meaning, which even corrupts valid concepts when mixed with them.

What are universals? That is an excellent question and there are many answers to it and they are all different. There has never been a general agreement on what universals actually are; nevertheless, every philosopher has been sure there are such things and all have felt obliged to discuss and explain them. Even Ayn Rand felt obliged to solve, "the problem of universals," which she equated with, "concepts," calling it, "philosophy's central issue." [Foreword, Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, Page 1.]

Where Did Universals Come From?

There are two different though related questions of philosophy the concept of universals attempts to answer. The first has to do with the meaning of certain words. For example, we have general concepts, like "circle", "man," and "book," but to what, exactly, do we refer by those words? We know what a circle, a man, or a book is when we see one, but when we say, "that is a circle," "that is a book," or, "that is a man," what exactly are we saying?

I think it is safe to say what we and all men have always supposed we are saying is, "that is one of those things with the qualities of a circle," or "that has the qualities of a book," or "that has the qualities of a human being," which leads directly to the second question. What are the qualities of a circle, or the qualities of a book, or the qualities of a man? And what exactly are qualities, anyway?

There are lots of circles, but almost no two are exactly alike. How can they all be circles if they are all different? How can there be "qualities of a circle," if they all have different qualities? The problem is even greater for books and men, because circles only differ in size, but the differences in books and men are practically infinite. How can they all be books, with the qualities of books, or men, with the qualities of men, if they are all different and all have different qualities?

Universals and Essence

The problem gets worse. Before we even begin to think about the answer to the first two questions, another philosophical concept pops up. That is the concept of essence.

It is easy to imagine that all circles, despite their differences, have some quality which is common to them all. We can see it. Though they are all different (in size), the common quality is what makes them all look like circles. The ancient philosophers called that common quality which made circles circles, whatever other attributes they might have, their essential quality or essence.

Essence was thought to be what makes a thing what it is, and it was assumed everything has an essence; "circleness" is the essence of circles, "bookness" is the essence of books, and "manness" is the essence of man. As we mentioned, we can more-or-less see what "circleness" might be, but what in the world would "bookness" or "manness" be?

Philosophical Sleight of Hand

Plato was the first to attempt to provide an answer to the question of what the essence of a thing, which makes it what it is rather than something else, actually is. It was obvious to the early philosophers there is something about human beings that makes them men, and not books or rhinoceroses, no matter how different they are, and there is something about books that makes them books, and not men or pickles, no matter how different they are.

Plato's "solution," was to simply to give the notion, "that which makes a thing what it is," a name. The name he chose is forms. Just giving a concept a name does not exactly answer the question of what these "forms" are, or explain how they "work". Plato might have succeeded with the trick if he had left it at that, but felt constrained to explain what forms were. Plato's explanation of forms, however, as things which existed independently, and ideally, somewhere, that when infused or impressed on existents cause them to be what they are is very confused, and obviously wrong. Aristotle saw through it right away.

Aristotle's improvement was to rid the notion of essence of its mystical independent "real" existence. According Aristotle, essences exist only as attributes of existents; but they are actual attributes and they are universals, which is where we began. By universals aristotle only means, the essence of any kind of existent is present in all existents of that kind, and it is the presence of that essence that makes the existents the kind of existents they are.

Two Solutions, Two Kinds of Qualities

Aristotle's "solution" does not really answer the question of what essence is, but it does answer the two original questions about universals. The second question was, how can two things with different qualities be the same kind of thing? Aristotle's answer to that question is there are two different kinds of qualities: essences and accidentals. Essence is that quality or property a thing has that makes it what it is; a thing must have its essence (or essential qualities) to be that thing, and having that essence, it cannot be anything else. All other qualities are accidentals, and for any existent, accidental qualities are any qualities it might have but which it does not necessarily have.

The answer to the first question of universals which was what do we mean by words like "circle", "man," and "book," follows directly. Aristotle's answer is we mean by, "circle," anything with the essential quality, "circleness," no matter what other " accidental" qualities it has, and by, "man," we mean anything with the essential quality, "manness," no matter what other " accidental" qualities they have, and by, "book," we mean anything with the essential quality, "bookness," no matter what other "accidental" qualities they have.

What is left unanswered by Aristotle is exactly what the essential qualities of, "circle," "man," and, "book," are. It is only asserted that they are universals.

Everything is a Universal

But what exactly does it mean to say something is a universal? It means that, whatever it is, it can be a quality or attribute of more than one thing. Of course this must be true if there is to be more than one of any kind of thing. Unless there is only one circle, "circleness" must be a quality of more than one thing, and unless there is only one man or only one book, manness and bookness must be qualities of more than one thing too.

This is where the concept of universals becomes very confused. It seems like it is the answer to the question, "what is essence?" but if all it means is it can be a quality or attribute of more than one thing, it means all qualities are universals, for the very same reason essences or essential qualities are universals. Unless there is only one "red" or only one "round" or only one "new" thing, "red," "round," and "new" must be qualities of more than one thing, and therefore universals.

Answers to Nothing

If universals are nothing more than qualities (any attribute, characteristic, or property), then what does the concept explain and what purpose does the concept serve?

It does not, in fact, answer any questions. It does not explain what we mean by words like circle, book, or man. Aristotle, at least provided the answer in abstract. Circle means anything with the essential quality, circle, and book means anything with the essential quality book, and man means anything with the essential quality man.

So What Is Essence?

Aristotle observed there are two kinds of qualities, essential qualities and accidentals. Though Aristotle wrongly identified what essential qualities are, his answer at least explained how things with different qualities can be existents of the same kind. What makes them existents of the same kind is they all have the same essential qualities, while their accidental qualities can be and usually are different.

Interestingly enough this solves another question as well, which is how a single thing can be the same thing over time if its qualities change. The answer is, the essential qualities do not change, only the accidental qualities change. A man starts as a baby, becomes a child and then an adult, the whole time, his knowledge is increasing; he then grows old, and may loose both physical and mental attributes in the process. Yet, the whole time it is the same "man," because the essential quality, "manness" remains the same the entire time, while all the other "accidental" qualities are changing.

Essence, for actual existents, is never a single quality, however, but a combination of all the characteristics and attributes necessary for an existent to be that existent. This is why I do not choose to use the term essence, but rather, the expression, "essential qualities," or, even better, necessary qualities.

At this point I must make two important notes to avoid confusion.

NOTE 1: Essential qualities, ontologically are different from essential qualities in the context of a definition. Ontologically, a thing is whatever all its qualities are, and as a member of a class or category, it is all the qualities necessary to that class; that is, all the qualities a thing must have to be one of the things belonging to that class. The necessary qualities also exclude any qualities with which the existent would be something else. The necessary qualities are, "all of these and only these," even if all of these are not entirely or perfectly known, and even if they are not known at all.

For purposes of a definition it is not necessary (and would be mistake) to enumerate all the necessary qualities. It is not necessary for a definition to name any of an existents actual qualities. It is only necessary for a definition to isolate the existents subsumed by the concept, which in some cases is accomplished by naming a quality or some qualities that within the scope of present knowledge, identify the things the concept subsumes, but meaning those existents with all of their qualities.

NOTE 2: The, term "accidental," for those qualities that are possible to an existent, but not necessary to it is unfortunate. I prefer the term possible for two reasons: 1. they are possible to any member of a class of existents, but for any particular existent, all the qualities of that existent are necessary, not, "accidental," and, 2. since not just any other qualities other than the necessary qualities can be true of an existent, the other qualities an existent may have, must be possible to that kind of existent. It is an existent's necessary qualities that determine what other kinds of qualities are possible to existents of that kind.

What's Wrong With Universals

If the fact a quality or attribute that can be true of more than one thing is all that is meant by a universal, there is nothing inherently wrong with that idea, but it is unnecessary. It is at least a violation of Occam's razor. Universals add nothing to our understanding of anything and can only add confusion to what is already perfectly well understood. But the concept of universals not only adds an unnecessary level of complexity to already difficult concepts, it blurs distinctions that are useful and important.

Disparate Concepts

One of the most damaging aspects of the pseudo-concept, universals, is that it conflates totally unrelated concepts, making them referents of a concept for which there is no purpose whatsoever.

A banana is a banana because it has the necessary qualities of "banananess," and a cow is a cow because she has the necessary qualities of "cowness." Everything has its necessary qualities, humans, mountains, dogs, and books, the necessary qualities of which we call humanness, mountainness, dogness, and bookness. All these necessary qualities of are called universals.

But other qualities, like redness, sharpness, heaviness, and wetness are also universals. Even abstract qualities, like oldness, importantness, goodness, and fiveness are universals.

Subsumed by the concept universals, therefore are all these: banana, cow, human dog, book, mountain, red, sharp, heavy, wet, old, important, good, and five. If it were not for the concept universals, we would never know these were in some sense, all the same kind of thing. Anyone can see, just by looking what all these have in common, NOTHING! It is a huge confusion.

There is another confusion. Since universals include all qualities (characteristics, attributes, and properties), both necessary (essential) and possible (accidental) qualities are included as universals. What is the point of a concept that confuses this most important distinction between two categories of qualities.

The only possible commonality between the things called universals is that they can be predicated of something. Well, we already have the perfectly good term, "predicates," which has none of the nonsensical implications of the pseudo-concept "universals." If that is all that is meant by "universals," it is simply superfluous.

Making Something of Nothing
or
In More Than One Place at the Same Time

No matter how clearly it is demonstrated there is no rational basis for the concept universals, the advocates of this mistaken notion persist. There are two questions always presented as necessitating the concept of universals, "how can the same thing be in more than one thing?" and, "how can it be in more than one thing at the same time?" Even if these were legitimate questions, which they are not, how the concept of universals would answer them is not explained, but, we are assured it is necessary because otherwise the questions pose some great mystery.

The always unstated (and denied if pressed) implication of these questions is qualities are something which are actually in things. I suspect these questions are really a confusion of language and could be corrected simply by pointing out qualities are not "in" things, they are "of" things. A thing's attributes are not the result of anything added to, impressed on, or infused into it, a thing's attributes are what that thing is or does.

Not Things and Not Abstractions

Qualities are not things and they are not abstractions. (There are abstract qualities, however.) Suppose we have a bunch of tin sheets, all perfectly flat. Someone comes along and, with a hammer, pounds dimples into several of the sheets. Looking at the sheets of tin we immediately notice there is something different about some of the sheets. The quality that makes those sheets different is "dimples." We may call that quality "dimpled." Obviously "dimpled" is not something added to the sheets. Its not a "something" that in any sense is in them, because nothing as been added to them at all. The dimples are an aspect or attribute of the dimpled tin sheets. But "dimpled" is also not "abstract." Dimples are real features or characteristics of some of our tin sheets.

The mistaken notion that qualities are "in" things, once it has gripped someone, seems very hard to shake. One other way this "great mystery" is sometimes expressed is, "how can there be multiple instances of the same thing in different places at the same time? How can redness, for example, be present in more than one thing like an apple, a traffic light, and an LED all at the same time?

There is nothing that can be present in multiple instances, at least not at the same time. Of course I can be present at the barbers in the morning and at the supper table in the evening, but that is not what is meant here. The idea is that there is actually "something" which is present in different things, even at the same time. If that were not what is meant, there would be no mystery?

Consider jumping beans. One of the attributes of jumping beans is that they jump. Jumping is an attribute of jumping beans. It would be absurd to say that "jumping" is in more than one jumping bean at the same time. What is in more than one jumping bean is a worm that makes them jump. It is a different worm in every jumping bean. It is the same kind of worm, however, that is in each jumping bean, but each worm is a distinct existent.

All attributes are "in" things in the same way as jumping bean worms. Just is it may be said loosely, it is the same worm in all jumping beans, but means the "same kind of worm," when we say, it is the same color (or shape or any other attribute) in things, it would be more accurate to say, it is the same kind of color, such as red, that is "in" all red things, but each instance of red is unique to that the piece of red paper.

The Physics of Qualities

While there is no general agreement about what universals are, exactly, they usually include all possible qualities and attributes. In most discussions, however, the examples given are usually attributes of physical existents. For example, roundness would be a universal because it is an attribute of apples, oranges, and other round things. But non-physical attribute are also considered universals. For example difficultness is a universal because it is an attribute of some mathematical problems, computer programs, and other difficult things. Roundness pertains to physical existents, difficulty pertains to some kinds of problems relative to achieving some objective; these are concepts, not physical existents.

For the moment, I only want to consider those concepts called universals that pertain to physical existents. By demonstrating their true nature, it becomes obvious they are not anything of which it can be said, "they are in more than one thing."

Ultimately, all physical properties can be reduced to the behavior of entities. We know this is true, for example, of the quality red. Red is not a something that is in red things, it is something red things do. What they do is cause (by reflecting it, transmitting it, or producing it) light within a specific range of wave lengths or frequencies to eminate from them. An object may be red because its surface only reflects red light or it is illuminated only by red light for it to reflect. A traffic light is red because the lens only transmits red light. An LED is red because it produces red light. Redness is not something in red things, redness is how we perceive what red things do.

This is how all the attributes of physical things can be understood. Since someone is bound to ask, I will explain this in terms of an attribute that does not seem like something an entity does, the attribute of roundness. How is roundness something a round thing does? There are two answers to this question. The first is somewhat general. Any shape is an attribute of things that maintain a shape. (A shape might be a transitional state for some things, however.) To be round it must behave in a way that allows it to be round, for example a marble, a drop of water (under the right conditions) and a smoke rings are all round. The roundness in each case is the result of the behavior of the entity, however nebulous (or smokey). It is fairly easy to see how the roundness of a smoke ring, or a drop of water falling is simply an attribute of what it does, but what about the marble. It doesn't do anything to be round, does it?

This is where the physics comes in. I do not believe philosophical problems can be solved by appeals to science, but since I do not regard universals as a legitimate philosophical concept (or any other kind of legitimate concept), an exception may be safely made in this case.

Physics tells us there is nothing static in the physical universe. Even those things that seem most solid and, "still," just beneath the surface of what we can see, they are a seething caldron of ceaseless atomic and subatomic activity, and all those attributes of solidity and "stillness" are the manifestation of that activity at the physical perceivable level. We cannot see all that activity, but in even the most solid of entities, we can feel it, in the form of heat.

A marble is round and remains round because that is the manifestation of all the behavior of the molecules, atoms, and sub-atomic particles of which it is comprised. If all the molecules suddenly bent in one direction, or all the atoms suddenly shifted to one side, or most of the subatomic particles suddenly left, the marble would, at least, have a different shape, and would probably cease to exist.

The Phoenix of Philosophy

For physical existents, those attributes and characteristics said to be "the same quality in more than one thing," are actually only actions, and the actual case is, the common attributes and characteristics are only the same actions by those existents that exhibit those qualities. This fact alone should dispense with the false notion of universals once and for all; but, there are still those abstract qualities for things which are not physical, like effectiveness (of a processes or program, for example) or beauty (of a work of art or a woman, for example). Obviously these kinds of universals are not "actions." But, it is equally obvious they are not characteristics that are in anything. In fact, neither is in the object predicated by them at all, because they are both, "evaluations," the first in relation to some objective, the second in relation to someone's values, and no matter how objectively analyzed, the object of the evaluations remains the same however it is evaluated.

The concept, "universals," is a useless and confusing concept first interjected into the body of philosophical thought by the mystic Plato. It is a synthetic concept like the phoenix or unicorn, completely devoid of objective meaning. The concept of universals must be relegated to the trash heap of junk concepts along with phlogiston, animal magnetism, and ectoplasm.

—Reginald Firehammer (7/06/04)

[D-fendr]

We have some definitional problems to overcome in order to save time in discussion.

First we'd need to define absolute values. My definition is unconditional values; inherent value, in logic: "self-evident" or axiomatic.

Does your definition differ?

Second, we'd have to define what we mean by "know." If you define it as conceptual knowledge, then, by definition, no other exists.

I, obviously, define it elsewise. We know things we cannot conceptualize. Ever had an experience you couldn't put into words? Did you still "know" it?

I maintain concepts are abstractions, less than the experience itself. "Hot" could communicate something to someone who never experienced it. However if they burned themself, they'd know "hot" much more fully.

Perhaps this reply will help clarify terms and direction for more discussion.

thank you for your reply.

[Betteboop]

LOLOLOLOLOL!!! My thought exactly!

[tet68]

They can have my phlogiston when they pry it from my cold
dead hands!

Such verbose nonsense.
Probably a student of chomsky.

[aruanan]

This is the point I got into with my atheist son-in-law Jacob over absolutes  . Jake went farther to say that they did not even exist. 

So Jake said that absolutes absolutely do not exist?

[D-fendr]

I think this portion of your post illustrates the definitional obstacle as well as providing a perfect example of our varying arguments on the topic:

If it is proved by logic and reason - it is conditional and not absolute. This a an absolute statement using logic which Therefore contradicts itself. It is just a restatement of that old stupidity: All things are relative.

If it is proved by logic and reason - it is conditional and not absolute.

Exactly, logic cannot be used to prove an absolute, only conditional truths can be proved. Absolute (non-conditional) statements, however, are very often used to begin a syllogism. For example, "It is better to be kind than cruel."

When used thus as a foundation to construct another conditional proof, this statement is deemed an axiom or "self-evident." It's key that logic cannot be used to "prove" this statement without making it conditional, i.e. no longer an absolute value.

This is due to the mechanics of the tool of logic. It cannot "see" (prove) absolutes, it must assume them to use them at all - which it does quite often to great benefit. It's an excellent tool.

The question remains: "but do absolute truths exist in reality?" It's not logical to leap from "logic cannot be used to see it" to "therefore it does not exist." This applies the same error of scientism to logic - logicism.

It is just a restatement of that old stupidity: All things are relative.

Actually, no. It is a statement that absolutes are beyond the tool of logic. As evidenced perfectly by trying on your next statement logically:

All things are relative.

Including this statement. Therefore, if this we agree with this, the truth of this statement is relative - dependent upon conditions. So, logically, under some conditions it would be also true that: All things are not relative (i.e. absolute).

Therefore, we end up with another performative contradiction:

Depending on the conditions, "All things are relative" is a true statement; and, "All things are not relative" is a true statement.

Since both cannot be true - and since logic can only be used for conditional (relative) proofs - we see logic illustrating its own limitation.

[Hank Kerchief]

Hi D-fendr,

Or am I in error in thinking she believed nothing transcending logic could be known - or even exists?

Yes, you are wrong. Ayn Rand believed in the primacy of existence. Logic is only a method and does not exist at all, except epistemologically. She did believe there was only one correct method of reason (logic) detemined by the nature of real existence and the nature of human minds. Logic comes after all that.

Regi

[Hank Kerchief]

Hi D-fendr,

Or am I in error in thinking she believed nothing transcending logic could be known - or even exists?

Yes, you are wrong. Ayn Rand believed in the primacy of existence. Logic is only a method and does not exist at all, except epistemologically. She did believe there was only one correct method of reason (logic) determined by the nature of real existence and the nature of human minds. They determine the necessity and nature of logic as the method by which the rationally conscious understand the world.

Regi

[Hank Kerchief]

Excellent refutation, LogicWings.

I especially like this: ... Rand solved by her hierarchy of conceptual development. Concepts, properly understood, completely replace the need for universals.

Except for the fact she only addressed universals as "essence" (because they also are used for qualities), the hierarchy of concepts solves both versions of this pseudo-concept.

Absolute and universal are utterly different concepts ...

Oh yes! I did not know anyone made that confusion (between universals and absolutes) until you pointed it out, thanks. I can see why it is made. In addition to its use, philosophically, for "essence" and "qualities", universal also has the connotation, "being true everywhere, always," which would mean "absolutely," that is, "without contingency". The confusion is a swapping of the two connotations. Nice catch.

Conceptual development (the concept 2) and reason (two plus two equals four) being both dependent upon mind

The concept 2 plus 2 equals four is not merely conceptual. As an abstraction it is, but all mathematical operations are methods, derived from observation. All of mathematics has its roots in counting. The concepts, two and four, are first counting symbols (cardinal numbers). The expression two plus two equals four is a shortcut method (addition) for counting. If there had never been anything to count, no mathematical concepts would be possible.

By definition, absolutes cannot be proved using reason/logic ...

In one sense this is correct, but irrelevant. If by absolutes, D-fender means, "that which is whether anyone knows what is or what its nature is or not," in that sense, the absolute cannot be proved, it is the basis of the proof of all things. It is why Ayn Rand considered existence and "axiomatic" concept. The "absolute" meaning, existence, the reality that actually is, is the very thing we must always go back to test all concepts. It is the final arbiter of all truth. D-fender's mistake is in a misunderstanding of the nature of the absolute. It does not need to be proved; it cannot be denied.

Nice job, LogicWings. Thank you.

Hank

[expat_panama]

So Jake said that absolutes absolutely do not exist?

To be fair I have to tell you that he was aware of the paradox, but he's a pragmatist and was only willing to accept a pragmatic proof.   We met with agreement only we we concluded that it was useful to notice for example, that reasonable people will independently arrive at a common realization of the value of community service (translation: love your neighbor as yourself).

He calls himself an 'atheist'-- a word that describes only what he doesn't believe, and nothing of what he does believe.  I honestly feel that with time we could have agreed on a common concept of our Creator. 

[aruanan]

He calls himself an 'atheist'-- a word that describes only what he doesn't believe, and nothing of what he does believe.  I honestly feel that with time we could have agreed on a common concept of our Creator. 

If he's going to be pragmatic, he should call himself an agnostic, describing only what he does not yet know, rather than an atheistic, which makes a blanket statement about reality that would require of him knowledge that he does not and, especially by his pragmatist philosophy, cannot have.

[expat_panama]

knowledge that he does not and, especially by his pragmatist philosophy, cannot have.

The kid's no slouch-- he's got a PhD in Physics and another degree in history.  He's also well aware of the limits of his knowledge-- but rather than call himself an agnostic (like my daughter/his wife) he points out that since he's never seen an acceptable demonstration of the usefulness of the Concept of an Infinite Being, that he's not willing to incorporate the premise into his 'tool kit'.

But things change, and since he and I were able to agree on the usefulness of a value system, I hope that some day he and I can further explore Ultimate Concepts.  I expect to pick up a lot of interesting ideas from him whether or not he learns anything from me.

[D-fendr]

If there had never been anything to count, no mathematical concepts would be possible.

Consider the outer reaches of theoretical mathematics. Or pure symbol manipulation. We can construct concepts and manipulations and truth statements with no referrent in material reality. That something is true, is ultimately a mental experience of truth.

If by absolutes, D-fender means, "that which is whether anyone knows what is or what its nature is or not,"

I'm confused by this statement. If I rephrase it I come up with "reality that does not require an observer or knower." I won't go quantum on you, but I think this is not the definition I'm using - certainly not in as used in the phrase "absolute values."

No, I really do mean, in this context, knowledge or truths which are not conditional - not relative.

in that sense, the absolute cannot be proved,

Certainly not by the means of logic/reason. To go further, we would have to have a discussion on what constitutes proof. I know some restrict proof to the realm of science and reason, likely Rand would be in this camp. This denies the value of religious method and exploration - just as scientism does with philolosphy.

it is the basis of the proof of all things.

Agreed, logic cannot get out of bed without it.

It does not need to be proved; it cannot be denied.

Certainly absolutes can be denied. People disagree on them and whether they exist at all.

thanks very much for your reply.

[D-fendr]

thanks for your reply:

Yes, you are wrong.

I really don't understand how your explanation following says that Rand did not believe that "nothing transcending logic could be known."

My understanding of Rand is that she denied the transcendent exists. I remember a discussion thread on this from a post of her work.

Perhaps it is a confusion of the term transcendent - I'm using it here for "transcending reason/logic." I believed that Rand would say this isn't transcendent, it's irrational.

Am I wrong again?

[aruanan]

The kid's no slouch-- he's got a PhD in Physics and another degree in history.  He's also well aware of the limits of his knowledge-- but rather than call himself an agnostic (like my daughter/his wife) he points out that since he's never seen an acceptable demonstration of the usefulness of the Concept of an Infinite Being, that he's not willing to incorporate the premise into his 'tool kit'.

As though the existence of anything ever depended upon a person's perceiving its "usefulness," whatever that's supposed to mean, or, much less, a "demonstration" that can be valued according to degrees of acceptability.

Both physics (and science as a whole) and history operate in very narrow fields and their practicioners too often make the mistake of assuming that their method of approaching their subjects applies to all other realms of knowledge. Some even, such as poor Carl Sagan, believe that there is nothing else to be known outside the realm open to their own methodology: "The Cosmos, all there is, was, or ever shall be." This is certainly not a proposition that has ever been demonstrated by science.

The myth: The scientist as noble, clear-eyed, dispassionate revealer of truth.

The truth is that the intellectual tool of science is designed only to make sure that one's measurements be as accurate as one's technology permits, that one's measurements use the appropriate tool for the quantity to be measured, and that one's conclusions follow logically from one's premises.

If one works very diligently, then one may be able to separate what one hopes or believes is out there from what actually is out there. That is, one may be able to systematically eliminate one's misconceptions about what is out there in the world by the practice of science and, as a result, be able to exercise control over it and then use it for one's ends. This is the power of science.

The choice of both premises and ends, though, lies outside the field of science because science is limited to reasoning and experimentation based on measurable quantities. The biggest error of the past three centuries has been the assumption that since everything that can be measured exists, nothing exists if it cannot be measured. The belief is that since measurement is but the extension of our senses by technical means, there is nothing that exists apart from that which is open, at least in principle, to our senses; ie, "seeing is believing" or, ostrich-like, "If I can't see it, it doesn't exist." Accordingly, personality, thought, love, and free will are just smiley faces we put on biochemical processes that are irrevocably part of a chain of cause and effect that we only think we control.

The funny thing is that there are some people who feel comforted in believing this who at the same time ridicule people who believe Jesus rose from the dead because of the testimony of others who witnessed it. They claim that their witness cannot be trusted because

1. something like that cannot happen,
2. it cannot happen since they've never observed it,* and
3. if it doesn't happen more than once and they haven't witnessed it themselves, then anyone else claiming to have done so must either be insane or a liar. And then they abuse the word "science" by claiming 1-3 to be scientific.

The answer to the above is, of course,

1. that the most they can say is that, given the usual nature of things, it doesn't happen, not that it cannot happen if given sufficient cause, and that if it did happen, that would be, in and of itself, evidence that the cause was outside the usual nature of things. Stating categorically that there can be no sufficient cause "because biology or physics teaches us..." is just naked arrogance trying to use science as a fig leaf;
2. that plenty of things happen that one has never witnessed or had any idea that they could happen,
3. that there are plenty of things that happen only once--the history of one's life, for instance, beginning with one's conception--that are nonetheless real.

The retort to 3, because they cannot argue with the first two, would be that 'history' or 'one's life' are not truly 'things,' but simply labels slapped arbitrarily somewhere along the chain of natural events that exist on their own without rhyme or reason and that sticking on these labels is just an attempt by weak people who lack the bravery to see things the way they really are to provide a feeling of meaning where is none--yeah, sort of like the people who use the label of "science" to claim to have the only true way of separating fact from fiction as well as the only means by which to define 'fact' and 'fiction' ?

* or observed by anyone they trust, meaning 'by anyone who believes what they believe', meaning 'if you've claimed to have witnessed this, you're no longer someone I can trust,' meaning, 'only that which I believe is true or can possibly be true,' meaning, 'I, and those like me, are the sole arbiters of truth,' meaning, 'if you don't fit in with the program, then you're an enemy,' meaning, 'if you don't accept the tenets of _____, then you're the enemy of truth and since we accept the tenets of _____ and we are human, then you are also the enemy of mankind." And how is this any different from any other form of tribalism?

[LogicWings]

My definition is unconditional values; inherent value, in logic: "self-evident" or axiomatic.

Well, from a Randian point of view there is no such thing as an “inherent value” since a value implies a valuer. What you value may not be what I value. Some people don’t even value life, which is why they commit suicide. An unconditional value is not an absolute one, this is just your definition, fine as far as it goes.

An absolute value is one that cannot be denied without negating itself. One cannot deny existence without denying ones own existence as an agent to deny existence. One cannot deny life without denying oneself as an alive being that makes that denial, (rocks cannot deny anything.) Thus I disagree with your self serving definition.

Second, we'd have to define what we mean by "know." If you define it as conceptual knowledge, then, by definition, no other exists.

I do.

I, obviously, define it elsewise. We know things we cannot conceptualize. Ever had an experience you couldn't put into words? Did you still "know" it?

Because you are born into a sea of concepts you cannot formulate such ideas without relying upon concepts to define them. If you had no concepts then an experience would only be an experience but it would not be knowledge. (Like the guy they found recently in Fiji who was raised in a chicken coop, roosting and clucking away. I can guarantee you he didn’t know when he was cold, he only experienced the sensation.) I have never had an experience that I couldn’t eventually conceptualize.

I maintain concepts are abstractions, less than the experience itself.

This is inaccurate. The concept of tree is not an abstraction, it is a concrete. An abstraction is a collection of concrete concepts subsumed under a concept that is not a concrete, (or a group of abstractions represented by yet another abstraction.) My favorite example is, “Hand me a furniture.” It sounds absurd because furniture is an abstraction. Chairs, tables, lamps, rugs and couches are concretes. A faulty understanding of concepts.

"Hot" could communicate something to someone who never experienced it. However if they burned themself, they'd know "hot" much more fully.

Actually this is not correct either. One experience does not make a concept or knowledge. It takes a minimum of two exposures to similar experiences to define a concept and therefore knowledge. The comparison of multiple exposures is a absolute requirement for knowledge and conceptual development. A little reflection will prove this true.

(you quote me quoting you) If it is proved by logic and reason - it is conditional and not absolute.

Exactly, logic cannot be used to prove an absolute, only conditional truths can be proved.

You misunderstood me, (sorry for not being clearer.) Using this statement I was restating your position and then made the point the you are making an absolute statement based upon logic, which you hold cannot be done: Thus you contradict yourself. By saying that - if it is proved by logic then it is not absolute, is in itself an absolute statement based upon logic. You refute your own premise.

I don’t care for your example: "It is better to be kind than cruel." since this is a value judgment. A better one would be, “All human beings are mortal.” Or, “All masses are subject to gravity.”

It's key that logic cannot be used to "prove" this statement without making it conditional, i.e. no longer an absolute value.

Another absolute statement that must be subject to its own limitation. If it is key that logic cannot be used to prove a statement without making it conditional, then the statement that logic cannot be used to prove a statement without making it conditional applies to this categorically absolute statement as well. Meaning it isn’t valid and logic can be used to prove a statement without making it conditional, i.e., it is absolute.

It's not logical to leap from "logic cannot be used to see it" to "therefore it does not exist."

True, Fallacy of Proving the Negative. Or, as the old saying goes, “Lack of proof isn’t proof of lack.”

It is a statement that absolutes are beyond the tool of logic.

This is an absolute statement based upon logic, (faulty though the premise is.) If true it contradicts itself.

(you quote me) All things are relative.

Including this statement. Therefore, if this we agree with this, the truth of this statement is relative - dependent upon conditions. So, logically, under some conditions it would be also true that: All things are not relative (i.e. absolute).

You just refuted your own point again. All things are not relative, therefore some things are absolute. This is a logical proof of absolutes.

Therefore, we end up with another performative contradiction:

Only for you, I disagree.

Depending on the conditions, "All things are relative" is a true statement; and, "All things are not relative" is a true statement.

If some things are absolute, as you admit “, logically, under some conditions it would be also true that: All things are not relative (i.e. absolute) ” then the statement "All things are relative" is logically invalid. It is false. It is untrue. It is self contradictory and THEREFORE, logically invalid. Or as Hugh Akston said, “Contradictions do not exist, check your premises.”

Since both cannot be true - and since logic can only be used for conditional (relative) proofs - we see logic illustrating its own limitation.

You Beg the Question that “logic can only be used for conditional (relative) proofs ” which your own arguments refute. By your own reasoning “All things are not relative” means that logic is not limited to only non absolute proofs. P>

We don’t see here a limitation of logic, but an understanding of logic.

[LogicWings]

The concept 2 plus 2 equals four is not merely conceptual. As an abstraction it is, but all mathematical operations are methods, derived from observation.

I don't want to quibble but we aren't saying anything different here. All abstractions are ultimately rooted in concretes, (counting in this case) or they are "floating abstractions" and are ultimately fallacious.

If by absolutes, D-fender means, "that which is whether anyone knows what is or what its nature is or not," in that sense, the absolute cannot be proved, it is the basis of the proof of all things.

Some absolutes like existence are axiomatic and some, like the speed of light or gravity are deductions and are, therefore, not axiomatic.

It does not need to be proved; it cannot be denied.

D-fender's statements were themselves absolute, which means they could not be conditional in any case. So one example, like the speed of light, that establishes an absolute principle through the agency of logic refutes the whole argument. That was my point.

[Hank Kerchief]

Hi LogidWings,

I did not mean for my comments to be disagreements.

For example: I don't want to quibble but we aren't saying anything different here. All abstractions are ultimately rooted in concretes, (counting in this case) or they are "floating abstractions" and are ultimately fallacious.

Yes, of course. I meant only to add to what you said, not for your sake, but D-fender's. I wanted to point out that even those things most philosophers think of as a priori are also derived from experience.

But, you have now said something I am going to quibble about.

Some absolutes like existence are axiomatic and some, like the speed of light or gravity are deductions and are, therefore, not axiomatic.

In a philosophical sense, no measured value can be absolute, because no measurement can be absolutely accurate. Mathematically, the only things that are absolute, are things that can be counted. All measurement involves a relationship (between some standard of measure and the things being measured) and there is always some level of inaccuracy in those measurements.

Gravity and the speed of light, for example, may have absolute values in some sense, be we can only be certain of what they actually are within limits (no less than this, no greater than that). As for gravity and the speed of light, they are not even universal in the sense of being, "always true, everywhere," because both seem to have some variation under very extreme conditions, and some physicists believe their values might actually change over time. In one sense, I do not like to quibble with you, because we almost always agree; in another sense, you are much more interesting to "quibble" with, because you, at least, know what you are talking about, and, even when we disagree, you know what I am talking about.

Hank

[D-fendr]

thanks for your reply. I'm going to try to break up the discussion into pieces for easier chewing.

First, we were trying to agree on a definition of an absolute value. We're still pretty far apart:

An absolute value is one that cannot be denied without negating itself.

Ignoring the syntax, I believe your definition would be evidence of a logical contradiction, yes, but, there's no "value" in this definition. If we're going to define a value as absolute it would have to be as an attribute of a value. Unless your definition is "a value that cannot be denied without negating itself [sic]," and, even then, I don't know how this performs using a value. Is "kindness" a value that cannot be denied without negating itself?

Likewise, in your example of an absolute value:

One cannot deny existence…

Existence is not a value. Not in the sense of having worth or being better than non-existence. And not even in the other other sense of value as having simple location, color, mass, size, quantity, etc. I don't see how "existence" could be used as a proper example in a definition of any kind of value.

I think you're getting at some other "absolute" perhaps.

If my use of the word "absolute" in absolute value is the problem, it's not important. Let's call them unconditional, inherent, self-evident or axiomatic if you wish.

And my point was logic cannot be used to prove (know) them. My second point was that they are required for the logical development of values/ethics, and that everyone either "knows" them, assumes them or acts as though they exist.

By saying that - if it is proved by logic then it is not absolute, is in itself an absolute statement based upon logic.

An absolute statement? Oh, I think I see the problem. Absolute as in "absolutely certain." No, that's not what I mean. I'm certainly not saying that logic cannot produce conclusions that we can be certain of. My apologies.

Again, my argument on the limits of logic is about absolute values, I'm again talking about unconditional value statements - this is where I'm pointing to the limits of logic.

If we use absolute statement to mean stated with certainty, then yes, logic can produce this, and that's what my statement about logic was - but you have to stick value after my shorthand use of "absolute" in the discussion. Better yet, I'm dropping it.

So, I'm talking about unconditional value statements, self-evident truths as used in logic

Logic can not prove unconditional value statements . It assumes them to be true, self-evident, and the conclusions reached thereafter are dependent upon the truth of this premise.

I think we can agree that values - and our knowledge of values - is extremely important. In life and in our philosophy. And this is where I'm saying Rand falls very short and those who claim logic as the limit of knowledge do as well because (again):

Logic cannot be used to prove unconditional values, only conditional ones. Any value proved by logic is conditional upon the truth of its ASSUMED premise (self-evident, etc..) which is not and cannot be proved without making it conditional upon yet another self-evident value.

Knowledge gained from this method only is conditional, relative not absolute (sorry).

Yet logic must, and we must, know some unconditional values, assume them to be true, or act as though they are true in order to function as human beings. But, about things in this key are area of knowledge, rationalism claims: they cannot be known. And, even, "they do not exist."

I think I'm being accurate here in Rand's view. Inherent is another word I used to describe unconditional values. About which you said the Randian view is "there is no such thing as an “inherent value”,"

Another word for conditional is relative. Or - if whether it's true depends upon each individual - subjective. As you put it: "a value implies a valuer. What you value may not be what I value." Here we have defined pure relative values. All values are then based upon the foundational premises of the individual.

What kind of ethics can be built upon this: Only subjective situational ethics. Randian.

If all you can know, you can know through reason, then this is where you arrive in your philosophy.

But philosophers should seek what is true not what they wish to be true. Is it true that the only values that exist are subjective and relative?

Perhaps, but again we come back to the fact that everyone - including you - either "knows" unconditional values, assumes them to be true or acts as though they are true.

This could lead us back to your definition of an absolute that "cannot be denied without negating itself."

Perhaps we are approaching a Randian proof that contradicts Rand.

{^_^}

I appreciate your reply and the discussion.

[D-fendr]

I think you are also referring here to inductive inferences, which logic says can be, at best, very probably true. We have to look to deductive arguments for the greatest possible degree of certainty using logic.

[D-fendr]

I want to be clear in what I mean by unconditional value statements. I mean they do not require a condition - a because - in order to be true. Another, often more clear, way to put it is: All other conditions being equal, A is better than not-A.

This does NOT mean that A is better than not-A in all conditions. We can imagine circumstances where A would not be better.

We can see how logic cannot prove such a statement, it must have a "because," a premise. "A is better than not-A because..."

Values could be: life is better than death, love is better than hate, kindness is better than cruelty, compassion is better than indifference.

If we take "kindness is better than cruelty" as an example. As an unconditional value statement it says: All other conditions being equal, kindness is better than cruelty.

Logic would require a premise, a condition, a "because" to arrive at this conclusion. Without it, logic is mute - there is no reason to conclude it. A logical argument could take it as a premise - and often does - and then develop other arguments and conclusions.

I emphasize it does not mean "kindness is better than cruelty" under all conditions. We can imagine conditions where it would not be better. Say a terrorist demands, "be cruel to that cat or I'll blow us up and a hundred people with us." But in this instance, all conditions would not be equal.

However, say the cat has a highly contagious disease, or for some reason it is assumed that the cat must be put down. No one is watching you, you have a variety of methods possible of equal effectiveness and speed; the only difference is some cause a great deal of suffering, some cause none. You have a choice of kindness or cruelty without any other conditions impinging on your decision.

Purely logically, it's a coin toss - there's no reason not to pick cruel, no reason not to pick kind. If you do pick one or the other based on knowledge, it can only be knowledge gained from some other means than logic.

I know this is a unusual circumstance I've drawn. It's only to illustrate clearly what I mean by unconditional value, and perhaps you can see why it's also called inherent value. If we pick kindness just because it's kind, we can say it has inherent value.

Now, of course we don't come across such choices very often, so why does this matter? The importance of unconditional values is that our other choices are derived from them. They are the basis upon which we make our value choices.

If we could only act solely on the basis of logic-proved values, we would be forever stuck in an un-ending string of logic re-iterations - with no end possible. Each time we arrive at "A is better than not-A because X is better than not-X," we must - to act solely on logic - then ask "why is X better than not-X?" Because, Y is better than not-Y… and so on.

Without an unconditional value, logical knowledge of values has nothing upon which to build, no firm ground on which to stand, no beginning and no end. If we act solely based on values known by logic, we'd never make it out of our front yard.