Violence Finally Forced US To Follow Path Suggested By Britain Last Year

A month before the war in Iraq, hundreds of American officials secretly gathered in a Washington auditorium for a "rock drill" - the US military term for a meeting to plan scenarios - to decide how Iraq would be run after the downfall of Saddam Hussein.

It included a small band of British officials who had been drawing up options for an international administration in Iraq lasting up to two years, based on previous experiences in Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo.

But at the rock drill, presided over by Jay Garner, the retired US general who would become the first American governor of Iraq, the British delegation realised that America had very different ideas for Iraq.

"There was going to be no United Nations involvement. This would be run by the occupation forces," recalled one participant. "We were horrified but beguiled. Garner wanted to do the right thing for the Iraqi people.

"We asked, 'What about international legitimacy?' The answer was, 'Legitimacy arises from the act of removing Saddam Hussein.' "

The military operation that toppled the Ba'athist regime may be admired for its swiftness but it was apparent almost from the day that Saddam's statue was toppled in Baghdad that the allies' plans for the post-war era were going badly wrong.

The coalition failed to stop the country being looted, and failed to stop the lawlessness turning into a fully-fledged armed uprising against the occupation. The allies prevaricated over how and when to hand power to an Iraqi government.

It was not just a question of America's confidence - even hubris - over its ability to go it alone without international support.

Gen Garner had drawn up his plans to deal with the wrong scenario. Based on the experience of the 1991 war against Iraq, he prepared for the mass movement of refugees displaced by war - not mass looting or the wholesale collapse of government. Unlike the military commanders, who had refined their plans for a year, Gen Garner had only weeks to prepare.

Part of the explanation lies in the Pentagon's desire not to undermine its case for war by highlighting the difficulties of running Iraq after Saddam was removed.

America believed, or convinced itself, that it would inherit a working bureaucracy, and that the Iraqi armed forces would defect to its side. A critical problem was the chronic feuding within Washington, which hampered almost every decision.

US officials say the Pentagon banned Gen Garner from enlisting Thomas Warrick, a State Department official who had worked for more than a year on the "Future of Iraq project" - in which groups of exiles drew up detailed reports on a host of issues ranging from creating a new justice system to economic reform.

Gen Garner planned to hand power to an exile-led provisional government in June last year. But he was abruptly replaced by President George W Bush because of the chaos in Baghdad, and within Gen Garner's own staff.

Within days of his arrival, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution recognising America and Britain as "occupying powers".

Inspired by the example of America's occupation of Germany and Japan, one of Mr Bremer's first and most controversial decisions was formally to disband all Saddam-era security forces, and to ban tens of thousands of the most senior Ba'ath party members from government jobs.

It was the Iraqi equivalent of "de-Nazification". But in Iraq it created a large pool of disaffected and armed Iraqis - especially Sunnis.

The British were aghast, but Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Tony Blair's special envoy to Baghdad, makes no secret that Britain was the "junior partner".

Having resisted the idea of handing power to Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi National Congress leader whom they distrusted, the British now worried about the occupation lasting too long.

They sought to internationalise the occupation by the back door, encouraging the UN to put in an envoy, Sergio Viera de Mello, who would work his way into an informal position of influence. But on Aug 19 last year a lorry bomb destroyed the UN headquarters, killing 22 people, including the special envoy.

"It was a complete disaster," said one British official. "That is when we realised we had a serious insurgency on our hands."

Mr Bremer drew up a seven-point plan to create a new government, including the establishment of a 25-member "governing council" to advise the coalition and appoint ministers.

The key step was for Iraqis to write a new constitution, which would then be ratified by popular vote. This would serve as the basis for general elections to choose a fully-functioning government.

He told Congress that an appointed government would not have enough legitimacy, declaring: "Short-cutting the process would be dangerous."

But by November, as bombings and shootings intensified, Mr Bremer took a short-cut to Iraqi sovereignty. He announced that the coalition would hand power to an interim government by June 30, rather than wait for a constitution to be written. This would have been a lengthy process given Shi'a demands that those who drafted the document should be elected.

But the new plan for the government to be chosen by a series of regional "caucuses" still faced Shi'a resistance, led by Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who insisted on elections to consolidate the power of the Shi'a majority.

Lakhdar Brahimi, the new UN envoy, was sent to Baghdad to answer Ayatollah Sistani's "exam question": can elections be held before June 30?

Mr Brahimi's answer was "No". He proposed that the handover took place as scheduled but that elections be brought forward to January 2005.

The interim government would last only seven months, and agree not to take long-term decisions about Iraq's "destiny". After the elections a "transitional" government would draft a constitution. Elections for a permanent government would be held by the end of 2005.

This was similar to Mr Brahimi's earlier UN plan for a succession of governments in Afghanistan whereby each administration would gain ever-greater legitimacy.

But in contrast with Afghanistan there was no obvious Iraqi equivalent of Hamid Karzai. The only policy was "ABC": "Anyone But Chalabi".

Mr Brahimi spent weeks in Baghdad on a political talent-spotting mission before giving his support to Iyad Allawi as prime minister and Ghazi al-Yawar as president.

The result was widely welcomed, and enshrined in a UN Security Council resolution. But among some British officials there was a feeling of frustration over a year of wasted opportunities.

One said: "We might have had an interim government a year ago if they had listened to us and brought the UN in from the start."

This makes it seem like no UN involvement was entirely our idea. But the UN was there, and scooted away, after one bombing. Subsequently they made it clear that they would NOT come back "unless the security situation improved". So speaking as if "UN involvement" was there on the table for the US to simply refuse, is highly dishonest.

You want someone to blame for no UN involvement, why not go complain to Mssrs. Chirac and Annan.

"We asked, 'What about international legitimacy?' The answer was, 'Legitimacy arises from the act of removing Saddam Hussein.' "

That's swell and everything that the Brits were concerned about "international legitimacy" whatever that is. But let's say that we had done it the British way. And BOOM we got it, we got "international legitimacy".

How exactly would that have reduced the insurgency and attack frequency? In explicit terms now. How?

This criticism does seem to be valid and accords with much else that I have read.

America believed, or convinced itself, that it would inherit a working bureaucracy, and that the Iraqi armed forces would defect to its side.

Hm. I wonder who the author means by "America". I certainly never believed or convinced myself that. If you had asked me to make predictions on this subject in February of 2003 I'd have said (1) the bureaucracy will collapse and (2) much of the armed forces will go home. I'd have gotten a lot else totally wrong, mind you :-) (i.e. they'd use WMD against us) but not those two things.

Interesting. And Warrick's advice (not described) would have led to an improvement because...?

Ah. What might have been. Yes, good thing Bush replaced Garner, to stave off all the chaos.

Paul Bremer, a former diplomat with links to the Republican party, was brought in as a political heavyweight. Mr Bremer took all power into his own hands, ruling that the exiles were "not representative of the Iraqi people". Within days of his arrival, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution recognising America and Britain as "occupying powers".

Weird sequence of events here. So the UNSC started purring once Bremer got in there and Garner got out.

The difference seems to be that Garner was going to stick with the exile government. These UN types really have it in for those exiles, don't they?

Still haven't made up my mind what to think about that decision. Doesn't help that administration critics were criticizing Bush for keeping Baathists around and then (later) criticizing him for disbanding them....

Having resisted the idea of handing power to Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi National Congress leader whom they distrusted, the British now worried about the occupation lasting too long.

Thanks a lot Brits. So you resist handing power quickly to the INC, then you gripe that the occupation "lasts too long". Well, who do you have to blame? This anti-Chalabi sentiment is really strong.

One said: "We might have had an interim government a year ago if they had listened to us and brought the UN in from the start."

Or if they hadn't resisted Chalabi.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.