Posted on 06/14/2004 10:42:38 PM PDT by F14 Pilot
Iran is making trouble, and finessing it is a dangerous strategy.
Abu Musab al Zarkawi, born Ahmad al Khalayla in Jordan, is the current deus ex machina of the terror war against the Coalition in Iraq. He is credited with numerous assassinations — including that of an American official, Thomas Foley, in Amman — and suicide bombings, along with the spectacular but little-reported attempt to launch a chemical attack against American targets in Jordan. Secretary of State Colin Powell named him on February 3, 2003, in his speech to the United Nations. Powell reported that Zarkawi had been sighted in Baghdad, where one of his legs had been amputated due to injuries sustained in Afghanistan.
Two months earlier, I had written about Zarkawi on the basis of German and Italian intelligence documents, presented by the prosecution in court cases against members of his European network. At that time, I noted that these documents identified Iran as the base of Zarkawi's operations. Powell was making a case against Iraq, and understandably omitted the Iranian connection, but the evidence of the Iranian matrix has just been reinforced in a book by Stefan Dambruoso (and co-authored by Guido Olimpio, a well-known journalist at Corriere della Sera), one of the Italian judicial officers charged with investigating terrorist activities in Milan. The book is entitled Milan-Baghdad, and excerpts dealing with Zarkawi appear in the current edition of Panorama , the leading Italian weekly newsmagazine.
Dambruoso flatly confirms what I wrote in December 2002: "Our investigations permit us to establish that the country of the Ayatollahs is the preferred springboard for militants headed for Iraq." Dambruoso lays it out in some detail. Zarkawi had already organized groups of fighters before the liberation of Iraq, and they operate alongside the remnants of Saddam's killers. The European network is used to recruit new bodies for the jihad in Iraq, and they enter from Iran in groups of three to five, with phony passports and usually pretending to be businessmen (or, I can add, journalists). They rent or buy small apartments in Baghdad, Tikrit, and Ramadi, where they organize larger cells, and then move into the battle area. Zarkawi himself entered Iraq by this method, along with one of the leading ideologues of the jihad, Abu Masaab (a Syrian).
Dambruoso seems to believe that the relationship between Zarkawi and Osama bin Laden is ambiguous, having seen some evidence (primarily the famous letter captured by U.S. special forces late last year) that Zarkawi was unhappy about the lack of support from al Qaeda. But whatever their tactical and personal disagreements (and these can be feigned), they share a common strategy for Iraq: kill members of the Coalition and any Iraqi who cooperates, and provoke internal conflicts among the various ethnic and religious communities. That tracks with my own analysis, which is that we are dealing with several different groups, supported by the various terror masters in Tehran, Damascus, and Riadh, in a joint operation within the overall matrix of Hezbollah — which of course means Iran.
I think Iran's diabolical hand can also be seen in the evolution of the image of Zarkawi. As Dambruoso points out in his book, the figure of Zarkawi has become more glorious, and he is not only a fighter but a preacher, who, like Osama, posts sermons on jihadist blogs.
Dambruoso explicitly refers to American intelligence sources for some of this information, including the movements from Iran to Iraq. Yet as recently as Saturday, June 12, Robin Wright of the Washington Post was loyally transmitting messages from unnamed "intelligence sources" claiming that Iran was not causing trouble in Iraq, and presenting the usual disinformation about a regime said to be internally divided and strategically paralyzed.
That sort of thing makes one wonder whether anyone at the CIA takes time to read the newspapers, or whether they rely entirely on classified cables from blind men "in the field." Had they read the newspapers they would have seen the mullahs calling for a new wave of suicide terrorism against us in Iraq, and even the remarkable spectacle of a formal signup sheet for those who want to blow themselves up (it thoughtfully gives the volunteer a choice of becoming a martyr in Iraq, Israel, or elsewhere).
I suppose this doesn't constitute troublemaking, huh?
Well, how about the news from Agence France Press on June 7 that Ukrainian troops in eastern Iraq arrested "about 40 Iranians trying to enter the country illegally...with assault rifles, Kalashnikovs, hunting guns and ammunition..."
I suppose the CIA thinks the Iranians were members of a peace-loving gun club.
Well, then, how about the report from IDF Chief of Staff Yaalon to the Israeli Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on May 18, which dealt with massive arms smuggling operation from Egypt to Gaza? Yaalon said that most of the operation was "almost entirely financed by Iran and being conducted via Palestinian groups in Damascus and Hizbullah in Lebanon. He said weapons are also coming from Saudi Arabia and Africa."
We are inundated from all sides with evidence that should drive our strategy in the Middle East. The war in Iraq is part of a broader struggle, and we will not be able to succeed there unless we also defeat the terror masters who are funding, arming, training, and directing the terror war in Iraq. But instead of going after the Iranian regime by supporting a mass movement to democratize the country, our leaders tell pliant journalists that the Iranians aren't causing trouble, and the real danger comes from the possibility that Ahmad Chalabi leaked some information to the mullahs.
Did no journalist think to ask an anonymous source the obvious question: If Iran's not a problem, why are you so upset about the leak? And if Iran is a problem, why don't we have an Iran policy after four years of discussion? Is there a national-security process or not?
The Bush administration has clearly decided to try to "manage" Iraq and "finesse" Iran, hoping to muddle through until the election and then, if victorious, consider its options in the broader theater. The president and his top advisers evidently want to avoid "new adventures" between now and November.
But this is a very dangerous strategy, because it leaves the initiative, in Iraq and elsewhere, entirely in the hands of people like Zarkawi and his longtime Iranian sponsors. Indeed, it seems to me that doing nothing is an open invitation to "new adventures" in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the United States.
You don't need classified information to see this; it's right in front of our noses. Yet we refuse to see it. This is what intelligence failures are really about: denial of the most obvious facts about the world. And it's what policy failures are about as well: refusal to take the obvious steps to protect our citizens, our allies, and our national interests.
We buried Ronald Reagan. Let's hope we haven't buried American courage along with him.
Faster. Please?
Bump for the morning.
one thing we need to remember is that there are so many forces in iran. various militias and military groups and police and unofficial groups... and each of these has a different masters with different goals and religious/political stances.
many of the mullahs have semi-secret militias they personally fund - these are the guys who attacked the students in their dorms - and some of the things going on arent necesarily part of a unified insidious plan. some of the most feared (religious) military arms are controlled by mullahs and not the 'democratic' government.
finding who exactly is funding and controlling these forces may be important because it isnt necesarily something that can be simply attributed to 'iran'. there are complex currents and forces going on. i wouldnt be suprised if most of the mullahs are too busy being afraid for their own precarious positions to want to take on the usa. you may find certain elements (those driven more by hatred and ideaology) are in charge of these operations. i think you will find many mullahs are just corrupt old men who care a lot more about their own wealth and power than hating the usa.
I'm disappointed in him.
There is no reason to go into Iran. We need to take out those who are paying Iran to do their work: CHINA.
China is the head of the dragon, and terrorism will continue until they are removed from the world stage.
Not to sound simplistic, but would the globalists allow their men to take out China when it is being used by corporations to make billions of dollars in the manufacture of cheap [pun intended] goods and cheap labor?
Why...without China, American companies might have to employ those expensive Americans and that would not be fair.
If you believe that, go back to sleep, and sleep well.
Datura, I'm curious what's out there on this link.
"...one thing we need to remember is that there are so many forces in iran. various militias and military groups and police and unofficial groups... and each of these has a different masters with different goals and religious/political stances..."
Excellent point. It does appear complicated, but it's still a no-brainer far as I can tell: we can do this.
We have more information about reasons why to take out the mullahs. The moderate Arabs are not overheated and have had time to digest the righteousness of what we did in Iraq. We've had our cooling down period, and time to plan. Al qaida is in disarray and needs to stay that way. The Islamo-facists already hate our guts anyway, so it's impossible to tick them off more.
On a political level, many Americans are feeling restless. They want to see headway. Being a sitting duck is frustrating.
The Rebublican Guard of Iran can take over. They are loyal to the Shah. The people want the Shah dynasty back. And the Shah's son wants to bring a republic to Iran, unless Bush knows something we don't about him.
We should 'Kosovo' the snot out of Iran's mullah-loyal military, particularly the foreign mercenaries. We bring in special forces to coordinate. We bring in navy seals to take over strategic points. We put rangers in a strongly defendable position and build a single fortress, an Iranian base in case things unravel in Iraq, a fortress both to the Iran/Iraq border, with the best road access to Bagdhad as possible, along with a bridge and pontoon bridge fittings ready for emergencies.
The only question is: should we dominate the Iranian countryside? If we do, we lose more soldiers and save civilians? But at the same time, if we lose too many soldiers, our efforts will be mocked by the rats-- effectively mocked. I say, consider the blood on the rats' hands and keep our soldiers safe.
Tactically, I would guess this is how our opponents would fight: the mullahs will micro-manage their troops and send cannon fodder to die in hopeless gestures to retake symbolic places. Their emphasis will be on jihad-inspired courage. The military leaders will quickly lose respect for the mullahs and at some point, do things their own way. If we are lucky, that won't happen until it's time for them to surrender. If we aren't lucky, we might have a few serious battles. Either way, I believe we can win this.
One risk to consider is a desperate Iranian counter-attack into Afghanistan or Iraq.
FReegards....
What happened to the Iranian student uprising? Let them do the dirty work with enough support to keep the mullahs busy.
The Republican Guard are definately NOT loyal to the Shah. The RG was established by the Islamic "Republic" to keep tabs on the regular military forces. If there's a group loyal to someone other than the regime, it's the regular forces who were, shortly after the revolution, thoroughly purged of anyone with ties, however loose, to the Shah.
From what I understand, the regular, freedom-desiring Iranian is not so keen on the Shah II living cush in the US. They want someone from within, who's been living the hell, organizing resistance. Someone who still has the pulse of the Iranian people in his breast.
Another thing to be careful of is the strong nationalism of Iran. An invasion would not only activate the radical element, it would stoke nationalistic pride and you'd have people fighting against the US who would not dream of otherwise.
It is an extremely complicated issue.
"The danger is this: In order to make its position strong, Iran really needs to have a nuclear program. Given U.S. intelligence failures, it is very difficult to trust CIA evaluations. They may be right about Iran, but at this point, who knows? If the Iranians are really pushing ahead with a nuclear program, U.S. leaders have to assume the worst case. In the worst case, Iran is close to having a nuclear device or even a weapon. The United States could not tolerate a nuclear Iran, since that would represent a threat to fundamental American interests. It also could not be tolerated by Israel. Therefore there are two nuclear countries in whose interests it would be to take out Iran's capabilities before they become operational."
there is a lot of people in iran. frankly, without a popular revolution, i dont think we could do it without a bloodbath. iran has national service. i know guys who were in that, and they ont seem to like talking about it. i know one guy who fled the country to avoid it. if we attacked iran, chances are we are attacking young conscripted men who hate the mullahs far more than we do.
but back to the lots of people. baghdad has something like 5 or 6 million? tehran has around 11 or 12, and thats official figures. tehranis tend to say theres more, and wih the amount of afghanis who work in the building industry and besically work and live onsite, i dont find hat hard to believe. the north is blocked by an amazing mountain range and north is always uphill in tehran. im no weapons guy, but im led to believe they are much better prepared to take on the heavy modern armour than the iraqis. and remember saddam underestimated them too. he thought a country in the middle of a revolution would be easy to grab. he was clearly wrong. if you were to drive through tehran (i have) you would see a lot of army bases and a lot of soldiers in towers with guns.
also keep in mind that you have a massive amount of country to cover. youve go several moe cities in the 1-2 million range, like mashhad, esfahan, tabriz, shiraz, and several more sub 1 million ones. a city like qom is only 700,000 but it could be lot like a fallujah, as it is a hotbed of hardcore islamism. i drove through there once, and i didnt like it at all.
tehran is where you need to start. i like tehran. i guess its partly because the people there are the most westernised. they are so very close to throwing off the shackles, believe me. i wouldnt be very suprised at all if tehran became a great ally of the west within the next 2 decades.
and we dont need to start with bombs, we need to start by getting this revolution going. once thats underway, a few strategic bombs couldnt hurt, though.
good post
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