The War over the War in Iraq

Tech Central Station ^ | May 10, 2004 | Keith Burgess Jackson

[quidnunc]

Why are there different views of the morality of war in Iraq? Some people support it; some don't. Those who support it don't do so (as a rule) because they think war is good in itself. They support it because it averts a greater evil or produces a greater good (or both). Most of those who oppose the war don't do so because they're extreme pacifists, opposed to violence at all costs. They oppose it because they think the cost is too high. Other means (they say) could have realized the same end(s). War should be a last resort.

Diagnosing Disagreement

In general, there are three types of disagreement: conceptual, factual, and evaluative. If I say that cloning is wrong and you say it's not, we may be using the word "cloning" in different ways. That is, we may have different conceptions of cloning. If we notice this, we can clarify the concept (define the term) and proceed with our discussion. Philosophers are adept at noticing conceptual disagreements, which is why they take pains to define their terms before arguing. When a philosopher is asked an evaluative question, such as "Is cloning wrong?" he or she is likely to reply with a question: "What do you mean by 'cloning'?" The philosopher is not being obtuse, coy, or disrespectful. He or she is ensuring that the exchange is productive rather than wasteful.

I doubt that much of the disagreement about the morality of war in Iraq is conceptual. We appear to be talking about the same act. This is not to say that the concept of war needs no clarification, for clearly it does. How does war differ from violence, for example, or terrorism, or revolution, or riot; and what sorts of war are there? Philosophers have devoted much energy to answering these questions — as they should, since war is one of the more important concepts in our conceptual scheme.

In principle, factual disagreements are the easiest of the three types to resolve. The parties should agree on a reputable source and then check it. The source can be a person with expertise (an expert) or a text prepared by an expert. Years ago, I disagreed with a friend about which position Frank Gifford played in the National Football League. I thought Gifford had been a quarterback. My friend insisted that Gifford was a running back. We recognized that we had a factual disagreement, so we agreed on a reputable source — a football encyclopedia in the university library — and checked it. My friend was right, much as it pains me to admit it. It would have been unseemly of me, having adjudged the encyclopedia authoritative, to reject what it said.

Whether evaluative disagreements are intractable depends on one's view of the nature of values. I'm an evaluative subjectivist, like David Hume (1711-1776) and J. L. Mackie (1917-1981). I deny that there are objective values. If I value individual liberty and you don't, or if I assign a higher value to individual liberty than you do, nothing further can be said or done. We simply have different values. We might inquire into why we have these different values, but it makes no sense to say that one of us is right and the other wrong. The value of individual liberty is not written into the world. This doesn't mean we can't persuade one another to change values. My high evaluation of individual liberty may contradict other values I hold, in which case I can be persuaded to alter my evaluation. Reason helps one sift through, order, clarify, and rank one's values. Two people can help each other do this. One does not have to be an evaluative objectivist to think that reason plays a role in the moral life.

-snip-

[F-117A]

Bump for later reading.

[Pietro]

"They oppose it because they think the cost is too high."

Wrong. They oppose it because they're trying to get their power back. It is that simple.

[DeaconRed]

"They oppose it because they're trying to get their power back. It is that simple."

I agree!