Rumsfeld’s War, Powell’s Occupation

The latest post-hoc conventional wisdom on Iraq is that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld won the war but lost the occupation.

There are two problems with this analysis (which comes, most forcefully, from The Weekly Standard).

Second, although it's painfully obvious that much is wrong with this occupation, it's simple-minded to assume that more troops will fix it.

More troops may be needed now, but more of the same will not do the job. Something different is needed — and was, right from the start.

Rumsfeld wanted to put an Iraqi face on everything at the outset — not just on the occupation of Iraq, but on its liberation too. That would have made a world of difference.

Rumsfeld's plan was to train and equip — and then transport to Iraq — some 10,000 Shia and Sunni freedom fighters led by Shia exile leader Ahmed Chalabi and his cohorts in the INC, the multi-ethnic anti-Saddam coalition he created.

There, they would have joined with thousands of experienced Kurdish freedom fighters, ably led, politically and militarily, by Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani.

Working with our special forces, this trio would have sprung into action at the start of the war, striking from the north, helping to drive Baathist thugs from power, and joining Coalition forces in the liberation of Baghdad.

That would have put a proud, victorious, multi-ethnic Iraqi face on the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and it would have given enormous prestige to three stubbornly independent and unashamedly pro-American Iraqi freedom fighters: Chalabi, Talabani, and Barzani.

Jay Garner, the retired American general Rumsfeld chose to head the civilian administration of the new Iraq, planned to capitalize on that prestige immediately by appointing all three, along with six others, to head up Iraq's new transitional government.

He planned to cede power to them in a matter of weeks — not months or years — and was confident that they would work with him, not against him, because two of them already had.

General Garner, after all, is the man who headed the successful humanitarian rescue mission that saved the Kurds in the disastrous aftermath of Gulf War I, after the State Department-CIA crowd and like thinkers in the first Bush administration betrayed them.

Kurds are not a small minority — and they remember. The hero's welcome they gave General Garner when he returned to Iraq last April made that crystal clear.

Finally, Secretary Rumsfeld wanted to cut way down on the infiltration of Syrian and Iranian agents and their foreign terrorist recruits, not just by trying to catch them at the border — a losing game, given the length of those borders — but by pursuing them across the border into Syria to strike hard at both the terrorists and their Syrian sponsors, a move that would have forced Iran as well as Syria to reconsider the price of trying to sabotage the reconstruction of Iraq.

None of this happened, however, because State and CIA fought against Rumsfeld's plans every step of the way.

Instead of bringing a liberating Shia and Sunni force of 10,000 to Iraq, the Pentagon was only allowed to fly in a few hundred INC men.

General Garner was unceremoniously dumped after only three weeks on the job, and permission for our military to pursue infiltrators across the border into Syria was denied.

General Garner was replaced by L. Paul Bremer, a State Department man who kept most of the power in his own hands and diluted what little power Chalabi, Talabani, and Barzani had by appointing not six but 22 other Iraqis to share power with them.

This resulted in a rapidly rotating 25-man queen-for-a-day-type leadership that turned the Iraqi Governing Council into a faceless mass, leaving Bremer's face as the only one most Iraqis saw.

By including fence-sitters and hostile elements as well as American friends in his big, unwieldy IGC and giving them all equal weight, Bremer hoped to display a kind of inclusive, above-it-all neutrality that would win over hostile segments of Iraqi society and convince them that a fully representative Iraqi democracy would emerge.

Many saw a foreign occupation of potentially endless length, led by the sort of Americans who can't be trusted to back up their friends or punish their enemies.

Iraqis saw, too, that Syria and Iran had no and were busily entrenching their agents and terrorist recruits into Iraqi society to organize, fund, and equip Sunni bitter-enders like those now terrorizing Fallujah and Shiite thugs like Moqtada al Sadr, the man who is holding hostage the holy city of Najaf.

Despite all the crippling disadvantages it labored under, Bremer's IGC managed to do some genuine good by writing a worthy constitution, but the inability of this group to govern-period, let alone in time for the promised June 30 handover — finally became so clear that Bremer and his backers at State and the CIA were forced to recognize it.

Their last minute "solution" is to dump the Governing Council altogether, and give U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan's special envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, the power to appoint a new interim government.

The hope is that U.N. sponsorship will do two big things: 1) give the Brahimi government greater legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people; and 2) convince former allies to join us and reinforce our troops in Iraq in some significant way.

Putting a U.N. stamp on an Iraqi government will delegitimize it in the eyes of most Iraqis and do great damage to those who are actively striving to create a freer, more progressive Middle East.

Iraqis may distrust us, but they have good reason to despise the U.N., and they do.

For 30 years, the U.N. ignored their torments and embraced their tormentor, focusing obsessively on a handful of Palestinians instead.

Then, when Saddam's misrule reduced them to begging for food and medicine, they saw U.N. fat cats rip off the Oil-for-Food Program money that was supposed to save them.

The U.N. as a whole is bad; Lakhdar Brahimi is worse. A long-time Algerian and Arab League diplomat, he is the very embodiment of all the destructive old policies foisted on the U.N. by unreformed Arab tyrants, and he lost no time in making that plain.

In his first press conferences, he emphasized three points: Chalabi, Talabani, and Barzani will have no place in a government he appoints; he will condemn American military action to restore order in Iraq; and he will be an energetic promoter of the old Arab excuses — Israel's "poison in the region," he announced, is the reason it's so hard to create a viable Iraqi interim government.

Men like Chalabi, Talabani, and Barzani have nothing but contempt for Mr. Brahimi, the U.N., and old Europe.

They know perfectly well who their real enemies are, and they understand that only decisive military action against them can create the kind of order that is a necessary precondition for freedom and democracy.

They see, as our State Department Arabists do not, that we will never be loved, in Iraq or anywhere else in the Middle East, until we are respected, and that the month we have wasted negotiating with the butchers of Fallujah has earned us only contempt, frightening our friends and encouraging our mortal enemies.

The damage Brahimi will do to the hope of a new day in Iraq and in the Middle East is so profound that it would not be worth it even if empowering him would bring in a division of French troops to reinforce ours in Iraq.

Behind all the bluster and moral preening, the plain truth is that the French have starved their military to feed their bloated, top-heavy welfare state for decades.

They couldn't send a division like the one the Brits sent, even if they wanted to (they don't).

Belgium doesn't want to help us either, nor Spain, nor Russia, because these countries are not interested in fighting to create a new Middle East.

They're fighting to make the most advantageous deals they can with the old Middle East, seeking to gain advantages at our expense, and at the expense of the oppressed in Iraq, Iran, and every other Middle Eastern country where people are struggling to throw off the shackles of Islamofascist oppression.

It is not yet too late for us to recognize these facts and act on them by dismissing Brahimi, putting Secretary Rumsfeld and our Iraqi friends fully in charge at last, and unleashing our Marines to make an example of Fallujah.

And when al Jazeera screams "massacre," instead of cringing and apologizing, we need to stand tall and proud and tell the world: Lynch mobs like the one that slaughtered four Americans will not be tolerated.

Order will restored, and Iraqis who side with us will be protected and rewarded.

Rows dog general waiting to take over

Bush's man to pick up pieces after war

Matthew Engel in Washington

Wednesday April 2, 2003

The Guardian

It is probably most accurate to call him Iraq's president-elect. The moment Saddam Hussein falls, Jay Garner will take over, with the kind of sweeping power over the whole of Iraq that even President Saddam has been unable to exercise for the past few years.

When the name Garner was announced as the US's intended interim ruler six weeks ago, it seemed relatively uncontroversial. After all, it was clear someone would have to do the job. Here was a retired general, highly regarded in the services and with a track record of involvement in humanitarian work in the region, being dragged reluctantly from rebuilding the boat deck at his Florida home the moment his country called.

But as the weeks have gone by, the choice looks to be yet another misjudgment from a Pentagon leadership that has misjudged rather a lot.

At present, General Garner is sitting in Kuwait, saying nothing in public, waiting for the US military to declare at least some areas sufficiently pacific for his team to start work. For the past fortnight the Iraqi interim authority has had the formal sanction of the Bush administration. But its plans remain mysterious: the New York Times called Gen Garner's operation "obsessively secret".

Meanwhile, arguments swirl around him - between those ancient Washington adversaries, the state and defence departments, and between the US and the UN. There is no argument among Arab opinion formers, who with rare unanimity have been condemning his appointment as another sign of American contempt for Iraqi feelings.

Among those who actually know him, no one seems to have a bad word for Jay Gar ner. Now 64, he retired six years ago as a three-star general, having made his reputation most spectacularly after the 1991 Gulf war when he was in charge of the Kurdish areas in the north, and won the confidence of the thousands of Kurds who had fled into the mountains to escape President Saddam's forces.

Former colleagues recall him as a brave decision-maker ("He wouldn't dodge bullets, he'd bite them," in the words of General Thomas McInerney) and a humane, informal ("Call me Jay") and humorous man. His Florida neighbours like him too. "Real casual, very humble," said one of them, Renee Keene.

But three facts have come to haunt his mission before it even starts. One is the general's work since retiring from the army as president of defence contractor SY Coleman, now part of a communications-led outfit called L3. An L3 spokesman insisted that Gen Garner's firm does not make military hardware but specialises in the guidance systems. In other words, he is the man who has been trying to make sure the weapons hit the targets rather than the surrounding civilians. This may be true, but this might require an over-subtle explanation in the Baghdad souks if Iraqis start to believe they are being ruled by a man who was just trying to kill them.

The second problem concerns his links with Israel. In October 2000 Gen Garner went on what seems to have been a routine 10-day freebie to Israel, organised by the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, an organisation striving "to inform the American defence and foreign affairs community about the important role Israel can and does play in bolstering democratic interests in the Mediterranean and the Middle East". Afterwards, the general signed a declaration of support for Israeli policy, at a time when the latest outbreak of Palestinian unrest was just under way.

Commentators across the Arab world, always on the lookout for slights, are aghast at the insensitivity involved in his appointment. "It sends completely the wrong signal," said Ibrahim Hooper of the Washington-based Council on American-Islamic Relations.

"From the perspective of the Muslim and Arab world, it is inappropriate to have someone who has exhibited strong pro-Israel sentiments as the veritable ruler of Iraq. It will be seen as confirming the sense that it is not a war of lib eration but a war to promote the state of Israel."

In Washington a diplomatic battle has broken out about whether relief for Iraq should be controlled by Colin Powell's state department or the Pentagon. Mr Powell's allies regard Gen Garner, appointed by the defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, and reporting to the wartime commander Tommy Franks, as someone whose motives will inevitably be regarded as tainted in postwar Iraq.

Umm, Bremmer was not Powell's guy:

1. Fred Barnes: The Essential Bremer The Weekly Standard ^ | April 12 / April 19, 2004 | Fred Barnes

Posted on 04/04/2004 2:53:56 PM PDT by RWR8189

What the American administrator in Iraq has accomplished.

Baghdad IN THE BEGINNING, no American funds were to be used for the reconstruction of Iraq. It would be paid for, gradually, out of Iraqi oil revenues. Two months after Saddam Hussein was toppled, the American administrator for Iraq, Paul Bremer, concluded the oil plan wouldn't work. He asked for $5 billion to $7 billion to rebuild Iraq's crumbling and looted infrastructure. The White House was shocked and said this was too much. Take another look at what's needed, Bremer was told. He did and came back with a request for $22 billion. Bremer had a strong ally on his side, President Bush. So the White House swallowed hard and cut the request to $20 billion. Congress trimmed it to $18.4 billion. The reconstruction money begins flowing into Iraq this spring, with the promise of one million to two million new jobs for Iraqis and a jump-started economy.

That episode demonstrates Bremer's clout. More than anyone in Washington, including Bush or Pentagon officials, he shapes policy in Iraq. And it is an ambitious policy--the creation, in Bremer's phrase, of a "new Iraq." The president's confidence seems to have emboldened Bremer. Ask about Bush and Bremer and every White House aide gives the same answer: "The president likes Bremer." On reconstruction funding, Bremer insisted that none of it be a loan saddling a democratic Iraqi government with more debt. The White House was persuaded, fought against a loan, and won. Bremer, 62, usually gets what he wants from Washington.

But there are limits to getting what he wants from Iraqis. A year after Saddam was ousted, Bremer follows a simple game plan: strategic clarity, tactical flexibility. The prize in this game is a free and democratic Iraq at peace at home and with its neighbors. Exactly how Iraq arrives there is less important than getting there in a timely fashion without jeopardizing the goal itself. Bremer has retreated when necessary. He backed down from demanding Iraqis draft a permanent constitution before the Coalition Provisional Authority, which he heads, hands over sovereignty. But he refused pleas to keep the Iraqi army intact and use it as a police and security force. Despite terrorist attacks, Bremer has no regrets about that decision.

One measure of Bremer's extraordinary success is that his selection has numerous fathers. State Department officials claim he was their pick. In truth, Bremer's name was suggested to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld by his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz. Rumsfeld sold it to Bush, who didn't know Bremer, and to others in the administration. Bremer was a well-known terrorism expert who'd worked for Henry Kissinger both in government and as a director of Kissinger Associates. What wasn't known was Bremer's political skill. He has the ideal qualities. He's relentlessly cheerful and upbeat, but serious and tough at the same time. The best way to judge Bremer is to look at his most significant decisions. Here are a half-dozen of them: * DE-BAATHIFICATION. This was a no-brainer. Barred from serving in the new government was anyone in the top three layers of the Baath party or the top four layers of a ministry in Saddam's regime, roughly 1.5 million Iraqis. In Iraq, this has been Bremer's most popular decision. The Baathists were Stalinists responsible for the disappearance of well over one million of their fellow Iraqis. Now Iraq has "an Adenauer problem." In postwar Germany, Konrad Adenauer quickly emerged as a national leader. No strong leader has stepped forward in Iraq. Exiles like Ahmad Chalabi have no political base. Unlike Afghanistan, Iraq had no king or Hamid Karzai to tap for leadership. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the Shia leader, has political influence but doesn't want direct political power. * DISBANDING SADDAM'S ARMY. This was Bremer's most controversial decision. Despite an $80 to $120 monthly stipend depending on their rank, some former soldiers joined what the press euphemistically calls the "insurgency" against the United States. But Bremer was right to dismiss them. For one thing, the army had spontaneously dispersed in the face of the American invasion. To reconstitute it, the officers, many of them Sunnis aligned with Saddam, would have had to be called back. Besides, this was the army that had brutally oppressed the majority Shia and the minority Kurds, who would have rebelled against its return. Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani told Bremer disbanding the army was as important as the capture of Saddam. Indeed it was. * THE NOVEMBER 15 AGREEMENT. This is the best example of Bremer's tactical flexibility. He dropped his plan for provincial caucuses to elect an interim government that would write a permanent constitution, to be followed by the turnover of sovereignty and a democratic election. Bremer yielded to political reality. Both Sistani and the appointed Iraqi Governing Council wanted sovereignty sooner. Bremer traveled to Washington and met one-on-one with the president before approving a new plan with transfer of sovereignty on June 30. The election of a new government will be held sometime before next January 31. Iraqis may not be ready to rush to democracy. Certainly Falluja isn't. But Bremer and Bush believe delay could be worse. * SAYING NO TO PRIVATIZATION. This may be Bremer's worst (though understandable) decision. The privatization of Iraq's oil industry was always off the table, if only for fear that Washington would be accused of going to war for oil. Bremer believes, however, that oil production could be doubled if the new Iraqi government seeks help from private companies. Also for political reasons, dollarizing the currency was rejected in favor of issuing a new currency without Saddam's picture on the bills. And to avoid worsening unemployment, the 200 or so nationalized enterprises with 500,000 employees haven't been cut loose. Nor have the massive subsidies for gasoline, food, and energy been eliminated. Bremer intends to trim the subsidies by June 30, when he leaves. But privatization has essentially been left to the government elected next year. So the prospects for full privatization are uncertain. * THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION. This was a political breakthrough engineered by Bremer. He stood firm on minority rights and no Islamic law while overseeing the drafting of the constitution. When Sistani complained and five of the 25 members of the Iraqi Governing Council balked, Bremer left it to the council to reach agreement. They finally did. Sistani, by the way, doesn't meet with Bremer or other coalition officials. But Bremer has effectively communicated with him since last May through intermediaries. On the constitution, it was Sistani who backed down. * THE UNITED NATIONS. Bush and Bremer favor a U.N. role in Iraq for the specific purposes of organizing the election and giving the new government legitimacy. But Sistani and other Shia opposed a U.N. role after U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi concluded a few months ago that a quickie election was impossible. Bremer wanted Brahimi to return and help establish an election process. Security Council approval would bestow legitimacy. Robert Blackwill, a senior National Security Council official at the White House, was dispatched to backstop Bremer, but it was Bremer who persuaded the governing council and Sistani to go along. His cleverest argument was that Iraq would need the U.N. later. Barring it now would put U.N. aid to independent Iraq at risk. No American official of recent vintage has taken on a task on the scale of Bremer's. It amounts to the creation not just of a government and an economy but of a country. Douglas MacArthur had seven years to achieve in Japan what Bremer is trying to do in less than 15 months. Rich Galen, an American press officer in Baghdad, calls it "MacArthur on steroids." Bremer has won the support of many but not all Iraqis. When an Iraqi journalist told him he was loved by Iraqis, Bremer responded, "Except for those who want to kill me." He's regarded by security officials as more threatened by assassins than even Bush. That hasn't impeded him or the impressive staff of volunteers who've joined him in Iraq. They are rushing to put in place before they leave on June 30 as many elements of a democracy--a securities and exchange commission, a stock market, a public broadcasting system--as they can. Then the future of Iraq will be left to Iraqis. For all the obstacles, I think democracy will prevail. If it does, Bremer will rightly be deemed the father of free Iraq.

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