Calif. Official Bans Some Voting Machines [Calls for Criminal Investigation of Diebold]

Associated Press ^ | May 1, 2004 | Jim Wasserman

[AntiGuv]

SACRAMENTO, Calif. - The state's top elections official called for a criminal investigation of Diebold Election Systems Inc. as he banned use of the company's newest model touchscreen voting machine, citing concerns about its security and reliability.

Friday's ban will force up to 2 million voters in four counties, including San Diego, to use paper ballots in November, marking their choices in ovals read by optical scanners.

Secretary of State Kevin Shelley asked the attorney general's office to investigate allegations of fraud, saying Diebold had lied to state officials. A spokesman for Attorney General Bill Lockyer said prosecutors would review Shelley's claims.

Diebold issued a statement saying it was confident in its systems and planned to work with election officials in California and throughout the nation to run a smooth election this fall.

The ban immediately affects more than 14,000 AccuVote-TSx machines made by Diebold, the leading touchscreen provider. Many were used for the first time in the March primaries and suffered failures.

In 10 other counties, Shelley decertified touchscreen machines but set 23 conditions under which they still could be used. That order involved 4,000 older machines from Diebold and 24,000 from its three rivals.

The decision follows the recommendations of a state advisory panel, which conducted hearings earlier this month.

Made just six months before a presidential election, the decision reflects growing concern about paperless electronic voting.

A number of failures involving touchscreen machines in Georgia, Maryland and California have spurred serious questioning of the technology. As currently configured, the machines lack paper records, making recounts impossible.

"I anticipate his decision will have an immediate and widespread impact," said Kim Alexander, president of the California Voter Foundation and a frequent critic of the machines. "California is turning away from e-voting equipment, and other states are sure to follow."

Activists have been demanding paper printouts — required in California by 2006 — to guard against fraud, hacking and malfunction.

Diebold has been a frequent target of such groups, though most California county election officials say that problems have been overstated and that voters like the touchscreen systems first installed four years ago.

At least 50 million voters nationally were expected to use the ATM-like machines from Diebold and other companies in November.

California counties with 6.5 million registered voters have been at the forefront of touchscreen voting, installing more than 40 percent of the more than 100,000 machines believed to be in use nationally.

A state investigation released this month said Diebold jeopardized the outcome of the March election in California with computer glitches, last-minute changes to its systems and installations of uncertified software in its machines in 17 counties.

It specifically cited San Diego County, where 573 of 1,611 polling places failed to open on time because low battery power caused machines to malfunction.

Registrars in counties that made the switch to paperless voting said Shelley's decision to return to paper ballots would result in chaos.

"There just isn't time to bring this system up before November," Kern County Registrar Ann Barnett said. "It's absurd."

Diebold officials, in a 28-page report rebutting many of the accusations about its performance, said the company had been singled out unfairly for problems with electronic voting and maintained its machines are safe, secure and demonstrated 100 percent accuracy in the March election.

The company, a subsidiary of automatic teller machine maker Diebold, Inc., acknowledged it had "alienated" the secretary of state's office and promised to redouble efforts to improve relations with counties and the state.

[patton]

hmmmm...good point. I could see that happening.

[FreeAtlanta]

As the results come in, they should be burned to a local permenant optical disk for verifying the records and the results should be transmitted through ssl to a central state database that is mirrored and insert only. I don't see what the big deal is in making this system hacker proof, secure and highly auditable. I think it could be made much more reliable than having a bunch of punch cards or optical cards that can be manufactured and stored in democrat warehouses, imo.

[randog]

...the company had been singled out unfairly for problems with electronic voting and maintained its machines are safe, secure and demonstrated 100 percent accuracy in the March election.

How do you prove 100% accuracy on a voting system that has no mechanism for verifying accuracy? I've always been a vocal advocate for paper receipts on electronic voting machines because it provides such a verification mechanism.

[Shermy]

Ping.

[Carry_Okie]

I think it could be made much more reliable than having a bunch of punch cards or optical cards that can be manufactured and stored in democrat warehouses, imo.

So that they can just switch optical disks? LOL!

That's why the paper trail for chain of custody on the ballots has to be required. It's also why observers at the polls should have access to the tallies to report them in a parallel count. It's a lot easier to catch somebody trucking in boxes than it is to detect a hacker.

I don't give a damn if the count takes a few hours longer.

[Lael]

New flashy technology doesn't always mean better

Actually, the Software is where the Problems are likely to be.

Take New Mexico in 2000. In Albuquerque, the Presidential line was NOT counted for Bush-Cheney if the Ballot was cast Straight Republican. If the ticket was split, it did.

Thus, so-called Broken Glass Republicans were disenfranchised as to the Presidency.

NO such "glitch" occurred for Yellow Dog Democrats!

Yet no one went to Jail for rigging the Software!!

Luckily, the problem was caught and corrected [paper trail].

Electronic voting is a SCAM!!!

[Lael]

BTW, New Mexico went for Gore by just 385 votes!!

[Theo]

It's a long article, but I didn't see any mention of what the alleged fraud was.

Is the journalist who penned this piece intentionally not providing the most basic of facts, so that people won't understand why this type of voting machine should be banned? Is the unskilled journalist (or editor) intentionally trying to make it a "he said/she said" rather than providing information so that I can make up my mind myself? Am I missing the obvious?

FWIW, I'm against electronic voting. I'm a software developer. Enough said.

[null and void]

Thank God!

[null and void]

Yep, we use punchcards here, (Virginia Beach,VA), I've yet to see a chad of any sort. It's simple, quick and easy.

The only way to get dimpled, dangling and preggers chads is to hold a stack of ballots, place a pen on the vote you wish to multiply and pull the stack up. If the stack is too thick, not all the chads will break loose.

In other words - EVERY DANGLING CHAD IS CLEAR EVEDENCE OF ATTEMPTED FRAUD!

[Political Junkie Too]

I'll give Kevin Shelley credit for doing this. I expected him, as a Democrat, to try to push the touch-screen machines through in order to facilitate fraud. I'm glad to see that he's bucking my expectations and standing firm on this.

-PJ

[freeangel]

There is no foolproof system for an idiot that cannot follow directions. I rather liked the punchcard system myself, but apparently there were enough dummies that couldn't figure out the easy way. There will be ongoing controversy about any machine.

[null and void]

Oddly enough, the Diebold software has provisions for "negative votes"...

[Petronski]

Simple, quick, easy, leaves two paper records - one in the machine, one to the customer.

Printed receipts enable vote-buying schemes: Bring you John F'n Kerry receipt down to the AFL-CIO hall for a promotion or vacation day or cash bribe. Don't think it wouldn't be happen.

Optical scan paper ballots.

[novalogic]

"Why in heck don't we just use the ATM's?"

Actually Diebold makes ATM's as well as the voting machines in question. Why they didn't use the same type setup(without the cameras of course) is beyond me. It could print out a receipt that you could double-check and then put in the old style boxes in case a manual recount is needed.

[null and void]

You tell me.

[eno_]

They can do better than that: each ballot can have an electronic signature. That signature (a number) can be printed on your paper reciept. Votes and paper reciepts can be inconrovertably linked.

[gemoftheocean]

absolutely right. ANYONE who has ever made a computer program can tell you how simple it would be to spit out a paper record that "looks good", but in fact after it issues that paper record can easily change every 10th vote or so. [They wouldn't make it "too" obvious....] Chikd's play. And of course, since all the damn programmers are now in India, it shouldn't be too hard to wave a little Al-Qa'eda money in front of a few of them.