Lando 
Posted on 05/01/2004 5:53:31 AM PDT by Lando Lincoln
Some have suggested that I believe the United States to be perfect. This is, in fact, far from the truth. The Untied States has made serious mistakes in its history: it’s just that the real mistakes are not the ones commonly identified by America’s opponents. The problem is not that America is too aggressive, too bullying, or too imperialistic: but that it is insufficiently all of those things. Mistakes by American leaders are, to a great degree, responsible for creating the world in which we live. It’s just that the mistakes are not the ones we commonly identify.
I’m going to restrict myself to the years since the middle of the 20th Century, since the mistakes made during the end of the Second World War in Europe (and in the immediate aftermath of the war) are already widely recognized. But there are some that are not.
The first mistake of which I wish to speak occurred in early 1951. This error was made, as the worst typically are made, by men with the best of intentions. In the fall of 1950, as the United Nations forces approached the Yalu River which separates North Korea from China, the Chinese Communists had intervened in the Korean War, launching a massive offensive using hundreds of thousands of troops. Thus was the conflict, in which North Korea had been almost totally defeated, transformed into what the Supreme Allied Commander, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, deemed an, “entirely new war.”
The Allied forces were hurled back by human waves of crazed Chinese communists. The UN forces often fought gallantly (in the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir the 1st Marine Division, in one of the epic battles of history, shattered ten Chinese divisions) but they were forced to retreat even from the South Korean capital of Seoul.
Eventually, under the command of General Matthew Ridgeway, American forces managed to advance once more to the north (recapturing Seoul in the process) but the war rapidly became one of static attrition. One major reason for this was that the Chinese were allowed the unimpeded use of their home territory from which they were able to bring both supplies and reinforcements. Fearing that any attack on China proper would bring Soviet intervention, Truman refused to allow any attacks on Chinese soil.
To win the war, General MacArthur declared, he would require the freedom to launch a naval blockade of the Chinese coast, to use the 500,000 Chinese Nationalist troops on Taiwan, and to launch air strikes into China itself. Such strikes would have included the use of nuclear weapons which were, according to one proposal, to be dropped on the fifty largest Chinese cities.
President Truman refused to authorize any of these steps. Despite the large disparity between the American and Soviet nuclear arsenals at the time (while the United States had hundreds of bombs and modern delivery systems, the Russians had only a handful of weapons and obsolete B-29 knock-offs with which to deliver them against the Continental United States). Instead, he proposed to negotiate a peace with the Chinese and North Koreans. When General MacArthur (in an admitted act of insubordination) sabotaged these moves, he fired him.
The result of all of this was that the Korean War degenerated into a stalemate and lasted for another two years before both sides accepted what was, in essence, a cease-fire in place. The aggressor was not punished, nor was Communist China. Worse still, the war created the modern precedent for the waging of a “limited war” by the United States with the full might of the US armed forces held by for political reasons. Even more dangerous (in the long term) a golden opportunity to destroy Red China was lost. The stalemate in Korea can be viewed as the direct antecedent of defeat in Vietnam.
Imagine if Truman had followed MacArthur’s advice! Given the actual state of the Soviet Union at that time, it strikes me as doubtful that they would have actually gone to war with the United States over the issue. Stalin was many things- he was not stupid. He authorized the North Korean attack only because he felt it could be successful. He was not going to risk the Soviet Union for the sake of either the Koreans or the Chinese. Even if he did, given the nuclear balance at the time, he’d have been destroyed (with a low cost in American lives) and the Cold War would have ended forty years ahead of time. As for the Chinese, while I don’t deny that their losses would have been extreme: but that’s what the Chinese deserved for intervening in Korea. To those with greater concern with the actual toll in Chinese lives, I point out that even a nuclear attack that destroyed fifty Chinese cities with 1951 weapons would have probably killed fewer people than the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.
What concerns us more today is that such an outcome in Korea would have continued the Second World War precedent: total victory in war. In such a world there would have been no Vietnam, no aborted Gulf War. Had a Vietnam War come, it would have ended sometime not too long after the fall of Hanoi and the nuclear destruction of key points along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The alternate Gulf War would have ended in Baghdad. Of course, I doubt that in a world where the United States behaved such a way, Saddam Hussein would have ever invaded Kuwait.
The second error came in 1956, when the United States used its diplomatic influence to end the joint Franco-British attack against Egypt during the Suez Crisis. The foolish denunciation of the invasion by President Eisenhower (which, because it set off a run on the British Pound and the United States refused to provide loans until the British and French withdrew, forced an end to the assault) greatly damaged both French and British credibility and rapidly led to the diminishment of British influence in the Middle East.
In the Summer of 1956 Egyptian President Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal (which was owned by the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company) in response to a refusal by the West to provide loans for the construction of the Aswan Dam. In response, the British and French developed a covert plot in collusion with Israel.
The Israelis would invade Egypt and seize one side of the Canal. Then, on the pretext of an intervention to “save” the endangered canal, British and French forces would strike into Egypt. Additionally, the British had by this time resolved to overthrow Nasser (who would soon turn his country into a Soviet proxy).
Once more the error which occurred came from the heart. Where President Truman had made his in the pursuit of peace (where intensified but victorious war was the better alternative) Eisenhower made his in defense of the principle of national self-determination (and in opposition to what he and his advisors saw as a neo-colonialist adventure which would drive the Arab world into the Soviet sphere). The ultimate consequences, however, were equally disastrous.
Without American support, the invasion was impossible and so the British withdrew, thereby forcing the French to withdraw as well. British credibility in the region was destroyed and they soon withdrew all forces from East of Suez. Eisenhower’s main fear (that Egypt would become a Soviet client) was realized anyways.
Imagine the consequences had the invasion been allowed to proceed. With Nasser gone, the British would presumably have proceeded to install some sort of puppet regime. Such a move would have aborted the 1967 war (and therefore the 1973) and therefore would probably have avoided many of the more disastrous consequences of those occasions.
The principal flaw in American power is aversion to the use of that power for coercion- not the overuse of it. Either American power is not sufficiently used (as in the case of Korea) or it is used to restrain well-meaning allies. This is as silly as it is dangerous.
For our world to be bettered this must become the age of American Empire. This will mean the use of force. It will mean the necessary subjugation and domination of peoples. It will mean death. But it will all be worth it in the end.
America will make mistakes in the future just as it has in the past. What is most notable about these errors, as grave as they are, is that they are all ultimately recoverable and redeemable.
Lando
If I am not mistaken it was Winston Churchill who observed that Americans can always be counted on to do the right thing, but only after they have exhausted all other alternatives.
Doing the right thing is not an easy decision to take
("One ought never to turn one's back on a threatened danger and try to run away from it. If you do that, you will double the danger. But if you meet it promptly and without flinching, you will reduce the danger by half. Never run away from anything. Never!" Winston Churchill)
when the responsibility for many is yours.
(The United States stands at the pinnacle of world power. This is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with primacy in power is joined an awe-inspiring accountability for the future." Winston Churchill)
Barry Goldwater realized it and got himself "Borked" in the process. Long before there ever was a term "Borked". A term Adam is probably ignorant of that also. Adam is probably also ignorant of the extent the Communist Manifest is being shoved down our throats and tamped down by jack boots ever since Newt Gingrich went and got himself "Borked" too.
Poor Adam seems to be a clueless, missing all the important stuff. Missing the Rooseveldt-Truman to Stalin connection I think was on purpose. Because that is the source of the problems he recounts. How could he miss the A-Bomb connection unless it was on purpose. Rooseveldt gave Stalin the A-Bomd and all of Eastern-Urp besides.. Rooseveldt LOVED Stalin, else why would have given him so much. This story has not even begun to be told yet. Ann Coulter tried to broach the subject in her book "TREASON" but did'nt even gloss this iceberg.
Mac figured out alright. He sent a message to us all by his disobedience. He was so far ahead of Truman, Harry played right into his game, by outting himself as the commie sympathizer that he was. Mac read the writing on the wall. That only a revolution could solve this mess. What he didn't know was that Most American men were wimps unless forced to get assertive. Patsy Schroeder(D-Co)(Tailhook) did observe that and did something about it. Voila!.. todays military is weaker at the top than at the bottom because of her.
Truman should have been arrested. Another 33° Mason, just like his predecessor, Roosevelt.
Stalin did not authorize the attack by North Korea-- it was a surprise to both Russia and China.
Sure Macarthur promised that he could win the war if he was allowed to attack China-- right after promising that the Chinese would never be crossing the Yalu River in the first place. When they did, he was so unprepared that he was nearly pushed off the peninsula. Truman was patient to a fault with Macarthur who flat out admitted that he was incapable of organizing a defense of Seoul without sending troops into China. Both Truman's cabinet and the JCS knew that was loopy, but Macarthur didn't get sacked until he willfully disobeyed his commanding officer's direct orders (shooting his mouth off to the press) one time too many. He was lucky to only get sacked. Fortunately, Ridgeway was more than able to clean up Macarthur's mess.
Two reasons the JCS didn't want to nuke 50 Chinese cities is (first) in April 1951 we didn't have 50 bombs, and (second) it was the Russian cities that were arming North Korea. We tried bombing railroads and highways but that kind of interdiction needed 'boots on the ground'; a lot more boots than were available at the time.
That said, 50kt on Tor Bora in 2002 might have saved us a hell of a headache.
I fought in the 1956 war. Israel in 1956 was not Israel in 2004 - we were still a very weak country. Idea of conquering Egypt at any time is idiocy.
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