Posted on 03/23/2004 4:50:24 PM PST by CobaltBlue
In the days immediately following the bombing, "senior U.S. officials" (including a few "names," like national security adviser Sandy Berger) repeatedly claimed that Al Shifa produced "no commercial products," had a "secured perimeter patrolled by the Sudanese military," "in fact makes the components for VX gas and other chemical weapons," and "had links to Osama bin Laden." No details were given about how any of this was known. Within days, though, it all began to break down: it turned out that the plant was not only commercial but had been approved by the UN Security Council to package veterinary medicines for relief shipments to Iraq. (Indeed, medical vials and pharmaceutical parcels were identifiable among the wreckage at the plant formerly known as Al Shifa.) Scores of foreigners who had toured the facility including the German and Italian ambassadors to Sudan couldn't recall any security. And the British designers of the plant testified that it hadn't been built for, and couldn't produce, chemical weapons.
Then the administration changed its tune: Al Shifa had, officials claimed, been under CIA investigation for 18 months, and the CIA had a soil sample to prove that it had been up to no good. However, the agent who spoke to the Voice said there were problems on both fronts. Since the U.S. pulled out of Khartoum in 1996 (a decision based largely on false intelligence reports by a CIA asset), the CIA has treated Sudan as a "denied area" off-limits to actual CIA officers. This led the CIA to depend on either recruiting a foreign national or one on loan from a friendly neighboring intelligence service. Egypt has no love for Sudan, and Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda all receive "non-lethal" U.S. military aid used to help the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement fight the Islamist regime in Khartoum. While declining to confirm specifics about how the sample was collected, the agent stated that the choice of operative for the mission likely did not lend itself to ensuring entirely objective results.
Immediately after the bombing, the U.S. propagated the notion that Al Shifa had vats of lethal brew ready for action. Indeed, unnamed government sources told U.S. News & World Report that this was old news: that Al Shifa "had been in the Pentagon's inventory of targets for several years," and that "one final step" before loosing the Tomahawks was running "computer models of the risk that explosions at the chemical factory would unleash a plume of poison gas across Sudan." However, when it quickly became evident that the plant was not the "clear and immediate danger" that Clinton had declared it to be, backpedaling commenced: the scientific basis for the attack was a soil sample containing EMPTA, a non-lethal VX precursor.
No more details than that, sayeth the White House, in the name of protecting intelligence "sources and methods." However, everyone from an EMPTA authority at Oxford's chemistry department to the American Chemical Society has pointed out that the presence of commercially used EMPTA proves nothing. According to a recent issue of ACS's Chemical & Engineering News, the administration's refusal to examine the results of Professor Tullius's investigation, and its contention that intelligence activities would be "jeopardized by disclosing the amount found, the analytical techniques used, or the other chemicals detected . . . [serve] only to exacerbate people's disbelief of the U.S. government's claims."
No matter. On January 22, as demonstrated in The Washington Post, the government's story underwent yet another permutation. Currently, according to White House terrorism czar Richard Clarke, the U.S. is "sure" that the Iraqis were the sinister force behind Al Shifa, producing what the Post characterized as "powdered VX-like substance at the plant that, when mixed with bleach and water, would have become fully active nerve gas." This, says Professor Tullius, strains credulity: "Bleach is often used to detoxify nerve agents," he says. "Using bleach to activate an agent makes no sense." While the Iraqi and Sudanese militaries are known to have collaborated on limited munitions projects, says investigative reporter Frank Smyth, there is nothing linking these endeavors to Al Shifa or Bin Laden. "It looks like the administration acted based on inferences drawn from pieces of intelligence they presumed were connected," he says.
(Excerpt) Read more at villagevoice.com ...
>>Clarke declined to go into detail on U.S. counterterrorism operations that he believes preempted the planned truck bombings at embassies in Africa and the Middle East. He would not say which embassies had been targeted, although U.S. officials previously disclosed that they had foiled an alleged attempt by bin Laden associates to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Uganda.
Clarke did provide new information in defense of Clinton's decision to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles at the El Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan, in retaliation for bin Laden's role in the Aug. 7 embassy bombings.
While U.S. intelligence officials disclosed shortly after the missile attack that they had obtained a soil sample from the El Shifa site that contained a precursor of VX nerve gas, Clarke said that the U.S. government is "sure" that Iraqi nerve gas experts actually produced a powdered VX-like substance at the plant that, when mixed with bleach and water, would have become fully active VX nerve gas.
Clarke said U.S. intelligence does not know how much of the substance was produced at El Shifa or what happened to it. But he said that intelligence exists linking bin Laden to El Shifa's current and past operators, the Iraqi nerve gas experts and the National Islamic Front in Sudan.
Given the evidence presented to the White House before the airstrike, Clarke said, the president "would have been derelict in his duties if he didn't blow up the facility."<<
HEADLINE: Embassy Attacks Thwarted, U.S. Says; Official Cites Gains Against Bin Laden; Clinton Seeks $10 Billion to Fight Terrorism BYLINE: Vernon Loeb, Washington Post Staff Writer January 23, 1999, Saturday, Final Edition
Priceless! BTTT!
RICHARD CLARKE National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism, National Security Council
Policy Conference at Lansdowne Conference Center October 16, 1998
First, the list of the most active state sponsors of terrorism has noticeably shifted. Ten years ago, the list consisted of only Libya, Iraq, and Syria. They are all still in the business but not on the top of my list of the most active state sponsors. The two on the top of my list presently are Iran and Afghanistan.But, from General Schoomaker as reported by the Weekly Standard:Third, terrorists are acquiring new and dangerous weapons -- weapons of mass destruction and computer weapons.
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger wrote an article for the op-ed page of today's Washington Times about that bombing, providing the clearest rationale to date for what the United States did. He asks the following questions: What if you were the president of the United States and you were told four facts based on reliable intelligence. The facts were: Usama bin Ladin had attacked the United States and blown up two of its embassies; he was seeking chemical weapons; he had invested in Sudan's military-industrial complex; and Sudan's military-industrial complex was making VX nerve gas at a chemical plant called al-Shifa? Sandy Berger asks: What would you have done? What would Congress and the American people have said to the president if the United States had not blown up the factory, knowing those four facts?
If these are new trends, what is the United States doing about it? In May, the president signed a security directive, Presidential Decision Directive 62, which is partially classified and contains three new initiatives the United States is undertaking in addition to all of the counterterrorism programs it has pursued for many years. The first program is active, ongoing, everyday disruption of terrorist groups. Whereas I cannot go into detail about what actions the United States is taking to disrupt terrorist groups, the basic philosophy behind this policy mirrors community policing belief: Get them off the streets, round them up. It has worked with friendly governments, friendly police, and friendly intelligence agencies. Long before our embassies in Africa were attacked on August 7, 1998, the United States began implementing this presidential directive. Since the embassies were attacked, we have disrupted bin Ladin terrorist groups, or cells. Where possible and appropriate, the United States will bring the terrorists back to this country and put them on trial. That statement is not an empty promise.
AS TERRORIST ATTACKS escalated in the 1990s, White House rhetoric intensified. President Clinton met each successive outrage with a vow to punish the perpetrators. After the Cole bombing in 2000, for example, he pledged to "find out who is responsible and hold them accountable." And to prove he was serious, he issued an increasingly tough series of Presidential Decision Directives. The United States would "deter and preempt...individuals who perpetrate or plan to perpetrate such acts," said Directive 39, in June 1995. Offensive measures would be used against foreign terrorists posing a threat to America, said Directive 62, in May 1998. Joint Staff contingency plans were revised to provide for offensive and preemptive options. And after al Qaeda's bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Clinton signed a secret "finding" authorizing lethal covert operations against bin Laden.Back to the speach:[snip]
These examples, among others, depict an increasingly aggressive, lethal, and preemptive counterterrorist policy. But not one of these operations--all authorized by President Clinton--was ever executed. General Schoomaker's explanation is devastating. "The presidential directives that were issued," he said, "and the subsequent findings and authorities, in my view, were done to check off boxes. The president signed things that everybody involved knew full well were never going to happen. You're checking off boxes, and have all this activity going on, but the fact is that there's very low probability of it ever coming to fruition. . . ." And he added: "The military, by the way, didn't want to touch it. There was great reluctance in the Pentagon."
The United States is engaged and busy with new policies and programs, but there are still those who do not yet understand U.S. policy on terrorism. To preempt some of the most frequently asked questions about U.S. terrorism policy -- which sometimes are statements posing as questions -- I thought I would offer the answers first.Is not terrorism, like war, just really politics by other means? Is a little bit of terrorism not, after all, a fact of life? Is not terrorism always there like death and taxes? Can we really sustain our enthusiasm and our resources against terrorism, or do we only get involved after U.S. embassies get blown up in Africa, then tend to forget about it?
Are not terrorists really a little bit smarter and more adaptive than governments and always capable of outsmarting stodgy, old, bureaucratic governments? Is not it sometimes better to give in a little to terrorism rather than being so ideological about opposing it? Finally, is it not true that just as crime does pay, terrorism really does pay?
Presidential Decision Directive 62 offers President Bill Clinton's answers to those questions. One, the United States will never accept terrorism as a legitimate means of political activity. Two, the United States will never tolerate any terrorism at any level. Three, the United States will always be energetic at rooting out terrorism. Four, the United States will adopt, adapt, adjust, and seek to stay ahead of terrorists. Five, the United States will never appease terrorism or make concessions to terrorists. Finally, as the president, the attorney general and the secretary of state said publicly, the United States will punish those who engage in terrorism no matter how long it takes, no matter how much money it costs, and no matter where they seek to hide. The terrorism policy of the Clinton administration is not just what we say. It is what we do and will continue to do every day.
So, what Richard Clarke doesn't know about terrorism, he also doesn't know about chemistry.
The good news is that Condoleezza Rice booted this twinkie downstairs, whereupon he did what twinkies do, quit.
Too much Kool-Aid with bleach.
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