Posted on 03/07/2004 9:59:25 AM PST by goodnesswins
Saturday, March 06, 2004 - 12:00 A.M.
Dan Thies / NEXT team Muted vote: Flawed Electoral College system ignores the will of the majority
More than 200 years ago, the free and democratic society envisioned by the framers of the United States Constitution began with one important step: giving citizens the power to determine the course of their government with the right to vote.
While this privilege was at first only extended to white male land-owners, over time, society grew and the Constitution evolved, ultimately embracing voting rights for all adult citizens.
We seem to have now reached a point where everyone has a voice in our political process. This may be true, but far too often, the voice of the majority has fallen upon deaf ears.
For too long, politics in America has been trapped in an electoral process that has failed to reflect the whim of the voting majority. Our voice has been drowned out by the tyrannically dominant two-party system, coupled with the method by which our president is chosen, the Electoral College.
The current two-party system that co-opts our political process has muted the voice of average voters by limiting their choice. This system cannot truly represent the will of a vast population with political leanings as diverse as its citizenry.
In this system, third-party candidates rarely amount to anything more than token opposition, and are often viewed as a nuisance to the established major-party candidates.
The recent announcement by Independent Ralph Nader that he will once again make a bid for the White House has outraged Democrats and left-leaning independents alike. What they fear is a repeat of the so-called "spoiler" effect created by Nader's candidacy in 2000, which is largely blamed for Al Gore's loss in that election.
It's true, the 2.7 percent of the popular vote garnered by Nader in 2000 would have been enough to hand Gore a clear victory. But it isn't fair to claim that Nader "stole" those votes from Gore. Such an assertion assumes that those votes were Gore's to begin with. In this democracy, every vote is up for grabs, and the people are free to vote for whomever they please.
It is fair, however, to assume that most of Nader's supporters would rather have seen Gore elected than George W. Bush. In a fairer sense, what truly cost Gore the presidency was his loss in the Electoral College.
Originally designed to amplify the importance of smaller states in national elections, the constitutionally prescribed Electoral College is innately flawed. Instead of reflecting the will of individual voters, ballots are funneled into a statewide, winner-takes-all pool of electoral votes. These votes are then cast by that state's chosen electors.
That it's possible for a candidate to lose the popular vote, but still win the election is this system's major defect.
It was this very defect that enabled Bush to become the fourth U.S. president to ascend to his position despite losing the popular vote in an election.
Many will argue that Bush's presidency is no less legitimate than that of any past president who won both the popular and electoral vote, but was unable to garner a true mandate of 50-plus percent. The argument that more people voted against him than for him could be applied to any of his opponents in 2000.
While there is some merit to this claim, the fact still remains that a candidate named Al Gore received more votes than Bush did.
Given the 2000 election debacle, it's a mystery there hasn't been a major public movement for change in the system. This country's electoral process has serious flaws, but there are solutions, too.
One major step would be a constitutional amendment dismantling the Electoral College and moving to a system of direct voting for our president. While this overhaul could ultimately take years, it would ensure that the true winner in every election is the candidate with the most votes.
A more immediate step would be for the states to adopt and implement a system of instant runoff voting. This is a process whereby instead of choosing only one candidate, voters can rank candidates in order of preference. In the event of a three-or-more-way contest, in which no contender wins a clear majority, an instant runoff will occur. The runoff will serve to determine the ultimate preference of the voters, who will then emerge as the victor.
This system — used in national elections in Britain, Ireland and Australia, and being experimented with in San Francisco and Vermont — would make presidential races much more welcoming to third-party candidates, and is a far more accurate gauge of voter's will than our current system.
We're facing another tight, three-way contest this election year. Now is the time to take a hard look at our electoral process, and consider a sweeping reform. We deserve a process that will bring us that much closer to the truly democratic society we've been striving for over the past 200 years.
Daniel Thies lives in Seattle.
E-mail: NEXT@seattletimes.com
That it's possible for a candidate to lose the popular vote, but still win the election is this system's major defect.
But if you look at the county by county map, it quickly becomes obvious that the will of the nation is better served by the Electoral College. I'm amazed at the foresight of our founding fathers sometimes.
Many will argue that Bush's presidency is no less legitimate than that of any past president who won both the popular and electoral vote, but was unable to garner a true mandate of 50-plus percent. The argument that more people voted against him than for him could be applied to any of his opponents in 2000.
How'd Bill Clinton do in 92 and 96???? Oh yeah.... same thing!
Really! This is the same people who sue, claiming that minorites are disinfranchised by a punch card ballot because it's too hard for them to figure out (that sounds like a racist statement to me... but I guess it's okay when Rats say it). Yet, they say in the next breath that they can figure out a system of ranking candidates? Which is it?
No, it's the beauty of the design. It maintains the fabric of a representaive republic, which is what we have.
He'd really hate it if we went back to nominating senators per the original document. That forced local politics to be important, anyway thats a discussion for another thread.
In other states, such as the largest one, Virignia (with one third of the nation's population), the requirement was the value of the property; it did not have to be land. According to the census of 1790, about 5,000 free blacks lived there, and a significant number of them owned enough property to be allowed to vote. The property they owned in many cases was slaves. (A little-known fact is that the first person to own a slave, by court order, in America was a free black man in the Johnstown colony.)
Then, of course, there is the ignorance of the writer as to why we have the Electoral College in the first place. It is an outgrowth of the "grand compromise" between the large states and the small ones, resulting in the establishment of the Senate and the House, on whose membership the College is based.
The writer is also ignorant of the fact that over 1,000 proposed amendments introduced in Congress over the centuries which would have changed the manner of election or the terms of Presidents. Only one of those, the 22nd Amendment limiting Presidents to two terms, has passed.
Other than its pervasive ignorance of historical facts, this is an interesting article.
Congressman Billybob
| The United States of America is NOT a democracy. |
|---|
In other states, such as the largest one, Virignia (with one third of the nation's population), the requirement was the value of the property; it did not have to be land. According to the census of 1790, about 5,000 free blacks lived there, and a significant number of them owned enough property to be allowed to vote. The property they owned in many cases was slaves. (A little-known fact is that the first person to own a slave, by court order, in America was a free black man in the Johnstown colony.)
Then, of course, there is the ignorance of the writer as to why we have the Electoral College in the first place. It is an outgrowth of the "grand compromise" between the large states and the small ones, resulting in the establishment of the Senate and the House, on whose membership the College is based.
The writer is also ignorant of the fact that over 1,000 proposed amendments introduced in Congress over the centuries which would have changed the manner of election or the terms of Presidents. Only one of those, the 22nd Amendment limiting Presidents to two terms, has passed.
Other than its pervasive ignorance of historical facts, this is an interesting article.
Congressman Billybob
The framers of the Constitution considered the election of the president and vice-president to be a major issue, and most were apprehensive about the obvious options. Election of the president by Congress would upset the balance of power between the executive and the legislative branches, while election by the people might not put the best person in the office. Many believed that Americans were too spread out and thus unable to be adequately informed to make such an important decision.
On the Electoral College; On Reeligibility of the President
By an anonymous writer "REPUBLICUS," appearing in The Kentucky Gazette on March 1, 1788.
. . I go now to Art. 2, Sec. 1, which vest the supreme continental executive power in a president-in order to the choice of whom, the legislative body of each state is empowered to point out to their constituents some mode of choice, or (to save trouble) may choose themselves, a certain number of electors, who shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot, for two persons, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. Or in other words, they shall vote for two, one or both of whom they know nothing of. An extraordinary refinement this, on the plain simple business of election; and of which the grand convention have certainly the honor of being the first inventors; and that for an officer too, of so much importance as a president - invested with legislative and executive powers; who is to be commander in chief of the army, navy, militia, etc.; grant reprieves and pardons; have a temporary negative on all bills and resolves; convene and adjourn both houses of congress; be supreme conservator of laws; commission all officers; make treaties; and who is to continue four years, and is only removable on conviction of treason or bribery, and triable only by the senate, who are to be his own council, whose interest in every instance runs parallel with his own, and who are neither the officers of the people, nor accountable to them.
Is it then become necessary, that a free people should first resign their right of suffrage into other hands besides their own, and then, secondly, that they to whom they resign it should be compelled to choose men, whose persons, characters, manners, or principles they know nothing of? And, after all (excepting some such change as is not likely to happen twice in the same century) to intrust Congress with the final decision at last? Is it necessary, is it rational, that the sacred rights of mankind should thus dwindle down to Electors of electors, and those again electors of other electors? This seems to be degrading them even below the prophetical curse denounced by the good old patriarch, on the offspring of his degenerate son: "servant of servants". . .
Again I would ask (considering how prone mankind are to engross power, and then to abuse it) is it not probable, at least possible, that the president who is to be vested with all this demiomnipotence - who is not chosen by the community; and who consequently, as to them, is irresponsible and independent-that he, I say, by a few artful and dependent emissaries in Congress, may not only perpetuate his own personal administration, but also make it hereditary? By the same means, he may render his suspensive power over the laws as operative and permanent as that of G. the 3d over the acts of the British parliament; and under the modest title of president, may exercise the combined authority of legislation and execution, in a latitude yet unthought of. Upon his being invested with those powers a second or third time, he may acquire such enormous influence-as, added to his uncontrollable power over the army, navy, and militia; together with his private interest in the officers of all these different departments, who are all to be appointed by himself, and so his creatures, in the true political sense of the word; and more especially when added to all this, he has the power of forming treaties and alliances, and calling them to his assistance-that he may, I say, under all these advantages and almost irresistible temptations, on some pretended pique, haughtily and contemptuously, turn our poor lower house (the only shadow of liberty we shall have left) out of doors, and give us law at the bayonet's point. Or, may not the senate, who are nearly in the same situation, with respect to the people, from similar motives and by similar means, erect themselves easily into an oligarchy, towards which they have already attempted so large a stride? To one of which channels, or rather to a confluence of both, we seem to be fast gliding away; and the moment we arrive at it-farewell liberty. . . .
To conclude, I can think of but one source of right to government, or any branch of it-and that is THE PEOPLE. They, and only they, have a right to determine whether they will make laws, or execute them, or do both in a collective body, or by a delegated authority. Delegation is a positive actual investiture. Therefore if any people are subjected to an authority which they have not thus actually chosen-even though they may have tamely submitted to it-yet it is not their legitimate government. They are wholly passive, and as far as they are so, are in a state of slavery. Thank heaven we are not yet arrived at that state. And while we continue to have sense enough to discover and detect, and virtue en(>ugh to detest and oppose every attempt, either of force or fraud, either from without or within, to bring us into it, we never will.
Let us therefore continue united in the cause of rational liberty. Let unity and liberty be our mark as well as our motto. For only such an union can secure our freedom; and division will inevitably destroy it. Thus a mountain of sand may peace meal [sic] be removed by the feeble hands of a child; but if consolidated into a rock, it mocks the united efforts of mankind, and can only fall in a general wreck of nature.
REPUBLICUS
The Mode of Electing the President
From the New York Packet
Friday, March 14, 1788.
Author: Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State of New York:
THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to admit that the election of the President is pretty well guarded. I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the union of which was to be wished for.
It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigations.
It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government as the President of the United States. But the precautions which have been so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements, than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people, than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.
Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption. These most deadly adversaries of republican government might naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a nature to mislead them from their duty.
Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.
All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such State in the national government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of the poet who says: ``For forms of government let fools contest That which is best administered is best,'' yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties of the President.
PUBLIUS.
Alexander Hamilton drafted the compromise that was to be included in the Constitution. Under this system, when a citizen voted in the presidential election, he was actually casting a vote to choose a presidential elector. In theory, a citizen's vote is cast the same way today. Hamilton's plan included eight major points.
1. Each state would be allocated a number of electors equal to the sum of its senators and members of the House of Representatives.
2. State legislatures would decide the methods for choosing electors in their respective states.
3. Electors would meet in their own states, each casting two votes on one ballot, each vote for a different candidate for president.
4. The president of the Senate would open and count the electoral votes before a joint session of Congress.
5. The candidate who received the largest number of electoral votes, which was also the majority of the Electoral College, would become president.
6. The candidate who received the second largest number of votes would become vice-president.
7. In the case of a tie between candidates that also constituted a majority of the electoral votes, the House would choose the president from among them. If no person had a majority of the electoral votes, then the House would choose the president from among the five highest candidates on the list. Voting would be by state; a majority of the states would be needed for a choice to be made.
8. The vice-president would always be the person having the largest number of votes after the president. In the case of a tie between two or more, the Senate would choose from them.
The original Electoral College plan worked successfully for the two times that George Washington was elected president. However, a major flaw became apparent after the election of 1796. According to the Constitution each elector cast only one ballot with two names on it. John Adams, a Federalist, received the largest number of votes. Thomas Jefferson, the Democratic Republican, lost to Adams by three votes and became vice-president. The framers were not in favor of political parties and had made no mention of them in the Constitution. Yet here were a president and vice-president from different parties, and Adams and Jefferson were strongly opposed on many major issues including states' rights, the power and size of the national government, and tariffs. The outcome of the election of 1796 would influence the way electors would be chosen as well as how they would vote in future elections.
In the election of 1800 John Adams, the incumbent, again faced Thomas Jefferson. This time the Democratic Republican electors were urged to vote the party ticket, that is, Thomas Jefferson for president and Aaron Burr for vice-president. Seventy-three electors did just that, resulting in a tie for president between Jefferson and Burr. Under the Constitution, the vote moved to the House where Federalists desiring to embarrass Jefferson voted for Burr, forcing the ballot 35 times over six days. Finally, Alexander Hamilton reluctantly supported Jefferson and the tie was broken.
The election of 1800 had several lasting effects on the Electoral College system. It was the first time that a two-candidate ticket was promoted by a party, as well as the beginning of the practice of nominating electors who pledged to automatically vote the party ticket. This new development was directly opposed to the framers' original version of the electors as "free agents'" or informed, respectable, independent citizens from each state. By 1804, the 12th Amendment was passed, making up for the weakness in the original Clause 3. Never again would such a tie be possible, as separate ballots would now be cast for president and vice-president.
The Election of 1824 and the featured document, The Tally of the 1824 Electoral College Vote bring to light two important points about the electoral system, one of them constitutional and the other borne of the political party system. The election of 1824 had several candidates as serious contenders. The official Republican candidate, William H. Crawford of Georgia, was nominated by a caucus, a private meeting of party leaders, but he lacked the backing of much of the party. Challenging Crawford and bucking the caucus nominating method, were Republicans Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, Henry Clay of Kentucky, and John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts. Nomination by the caucus had been under fire for years as being undemocratic, and the issue reached its peak by 1824. (Today most states use direct primaries to nominate candidates while a small number still use nominating conventions.)
With so many candidates in the election of 1824, it's not surprising that no candidate received a majority of votes in the Electoral College. Andrew Jackson had a plurality of both the popular vote (40.3%) and the Electoral College vote, but he did not hold the constitutional requirement of a majority of the electoral votes. For the first time, the presidential election vote proceeded to the House of Representatives. There, John Quincy Adams was chosen primarily because Henry Clay, never a Jackson supporter, placed his support behind Adams. Jackson was outraged after Adams appointed Clay secretary of state, and he proclaimed it a "corrupt bargain." While he was never able to prove any actual bribery or corruption occurred, the accusation endured and influenced the next election, as well as Clay's political career.
Today most Americans perceive the Electoral College as a formality necessitated by the Constitution. Electors meet in their states on the Monday after the second Wednesday in December and cast their votes just as they did in 1824. The votes are sealed and sent by registered mail to Washington, D.C., where they are opened and counted before a joint session of Congress when they convene in January. In recent history rarely has an elector failed to vote automatically for the candidate winning his or her state's popular votes. In 1976 a Republican elector in Washington voted for Ronald Reagan instead of Gerald Ford, the Republican Party's candidate. In 1972, a Republican from Virginia voted for the Libertarian candidate rather than the Republican, Richard Nixon.
There are critics today who point to several remaining flaws in the Electoral College system. The most obvious of these is the risk that the popular vote winner will not receive the majority of votes in the Electoral College. The winner-take-all feature of the system makes this a possibility, yet it has happened only three times in our history: 1824, 1876, and 1888. Another point of criticism is that the electoral vote distribution is not proportional to the popular vote distribution because of the automatic two votes per state provision. If you contrast the number of electoral votes per person in California and Alaska, this point is clear. "Faithless electors," as described earlier in the 1972 and 1976 examples, are also a flaw according to opponents. Yet never has a broken pledge affected the outcome of an election. Finally, critics highlight as unfair the provisions calling for choice by the House or the Senate in the case of a tie or lack of majority. Voting by state gives small states the same weight as large states, and if a state's representatives were divided, its vote could be relinquished. Additionally, a strong third party candidate could make it difficult for any candidate to earn a majority.
Different opponents and critics of the present system have developed various alternatives over the years. Twice in recent history, in 1969 and 1979, constitutional amendments have been introduced to Congress but failed to pass. Proposals range from a district plan similar to the way members of Congress are chosen to a proportional plan where the candidates get the same proportion of the electoral votes as they do the popular vote in each state. Some have even proposed doing away with the Electoral College and moving to direct popular election.
Proponents of the Electoral College claim first that critics exaggerate the risks in our present system, pointing to the very small number of occasions where their concerns have come to fruition. Only two elections in our history ever were decided in the House and none since 1825. Also, the loser of the popular vote has been elected only three times, and that has not happened in more than 100 years. They would add that the present Electoral College is a tried and true system, and we would be foolish to risk experimenting with a new one. Finally, the system is efficient, it identifies a winner quickly, and it avoids recounts.
The Federal Register's Electoral College web page is an additional resource for more detailed information regarding the functions of the Electoral College and presidential election statistics from 1789 through 1992.
Bibliography
League of Women Voters. Choosing the President: A Citizen's Guide to the Electoral Process . New York: Lyons & Burford, 1992.
McClenaghan, W. A. Magruder's American Government . Needham, MA: Prentice Hall School Group, 1997.
Pessen, E. Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics . Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1978.
Viola, H. J. Why We Remember United States History . Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1998.
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