Simkanin guilty of 29 counts of tax violations

Repeal the 16th Amendment

"Repeal the 16th Amendment"

As mentioned earlier, that might help you if you are a landlord. Then you could argue that the Pollock decision said you didn't have to pay income taxes on the rent you collect.

Otherwise, there wouldn't be much of a difference.

The vitriol that this topic elicits is indicative of three things:

1. That the answer to this question has yet to be effectively and finally adressed.
2. That some here on FR are either IRS agents or apologists therefor.
3. That some here on FR are active or retired judges who balk at having their Monarchy questioned and exposed.

If such law existed in our Federal Tax Code, it would be the simplest thing for all you IRS and Rogue Court apologists to just cite it, chapter and verse.

The fact that you cannot is more telling than all of your wasted vitriol. p> ;-/

Where does it say the government can make an employer a defacto IRS agent by forcing them to withhold income taxes?

Constitution for the United States of America:

Article VI: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

Article I Section 8: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises,
to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States;
but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; "

Article I Section 8: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

James Madison, Federalist #39:

"The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character;"

James Madison, Federalist #45:

"The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the most important; and yet the present [Continental] sic Congress have as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare, as the future [Constitutional] Congress will have to require them of individual citizens;

I'm with you on this. The next time I have to go into court over a speeding ticket I'm going to make the court prove that there are laws against speeding, that they are Constitutional, that they are posted, that the cop caught me, that the cop exists, that cars exist, that I exist.
-hon-

Absurd argument. -- Both defense & prosecution have time limits on arguments.

What they plead in their alloted time before the jury should not be limited, -- according to our constitution..

Get real, hon-ey.

"The vitriol that this topic elicits is indicative of three things:"

I agree. They are

1) People don't like paying taxes.

2) Some people are too lazy or stupid to look up the laws and therefore believe the snake oil salesmen who claim that there aren't any laws that require it. There are.

3) There is a tendency on the part of some here when confronted with the facts to try to discredit those who point them out by calling them government plants or IRS goons.

Actually, the IRS makes a lot of money in penalties from people who think they can beat the system. Why would IRS agents cut into their revenue source by trying to explain the error of their ways?

"Both defense & prosecution have time limits on arguments."

LOL! You missed the OJ trial, I assume.

Of course in actuality there are no such thing as time limits in trials. Not on this planet. Maybe where you come from.

There are relevancy limits, however. Demanding proof that the law exists is irrelevant.

If the law didn't exist, there wouldn't have been grounds for an indictment and the case wouldn't have been brought to trial.

Hylton v. United States(1796), 3 U.S. 171

"A general power is given to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, of every kind or nature, without any restraint, except only on exports; but two rules are prescribed for their government, namely, uniformity and apportionment: Three kinds of taxes, to wit, duties, imposts, and excises by the first rule, and capitation, or other direct taxes, by the second rule. "

"the present Constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases specified: And this is the leading distinction between the articles of Confederation and the present Constitution."

"Uniformity is an instant operation on individuals, without the intervention of assessments, or any regard to states,"

"[T]he DIRECT TAXES contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, A CAPITATION OR POLL TAX, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND."

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)

"The power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which the Government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the Government itself. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation."

LICENSE TAX CASES, 72 U.S. 462 (1866)

"It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception, and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion."

PACIFIC INS. CO. v. SOULE, 74 U.S. 433 (1868),7 Wall. 433

"Congress may prescribe the basis, fix the rates, and require payment as it may deem proper. Within the limits of the Constitution it is supreme in its action. No power of supervision or control is lodged in either of the other departments of the government."

Lane Co. v. Oregon (1868), 74 U.S. [7 Wall.] 71:

[T]he people, through the constitution of the United States, 'established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the states.' In no other way can the supremacy of that constitution be maintained. It creates a government in fact as well as in name, because its constitution is the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding;' and its authority is enforced by its power to regulate and govern the conduct of individuals, even where its prohibitions are laid only upon the states themselves.

United States v. Cruikshank(1876), 92 U.S. 542:

"The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to two governments: one State, and the other National. ..."

Springer v. United States(1880), 102 U.S. 586

"The central and controlling question in this case is whether the tax which was levied on the income, gains, and profits of the plaintiff in error, as set forth in the record, and by pretended virtue of the acts of Congress and parts of acts therein mentioned, is a direct tax."

"Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty."

"[W]henever the government has imposed a tax which it recognized as a direct tax, it has never been applied to any objects but real estate and slaves."

"If the laws here in question involved any wrong or unnecessary harshness, it was for Congress, or the people who make congresses, to see that the evil was corrected.
The remedy does not lie with the judicial branch of the government."

POINDEXTER v. GREENHOW, 114 U.S. 270 (1885)

It was said by Chief Justice CHASE, speaking for the whole court in Lane Co. v. Oregon (1868), 74 U.S. [7 Wall.] 71, 76, that the people, through the constitution of the United States, 'established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the states.' In no other way can the supremacy of that constitution be maintained. It creates a government in fact as well as in name, because its constitution is the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding;' and its authority is enforced by its power to regulate and govern the conduct of individuals, even where its prohibitions are laid only upon the states themselves.

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895)

"The people of the United States constitute one nation, under one government, and this government, within the scope of the powers with which it is invested, is supreme."

"Without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States. Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The people, through that instrument[the Constitution], established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States."

POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST CO., 158 U.S. 601 (1895):

"We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such."

"If that[rents from land] be stricken out, and also the income from all invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds, it is obvious that by a r the largest part of the anticipated revenue would be eliminated, and this would leave the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or vocations; and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain, in substance, a tax on occupations and labor. We cannot believe that such was the intention of congress."

"We do not mean to say that an act laying by apportionment a direct tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof, might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments, and vocations. "

Our conclusions may therefore be summed up as follows:
First. We adhere to the opinion already announced,-that, taxes on real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the rents or income of real estate are equally direct taxes.
Second. We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes.
Third. The tax imposed by sections 27 to 37, inclusive, of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income of real estate, and of personal property, being a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution, and therefore unconstitutional and void, because not apportioned according to representation, all those sections, constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are necessarily invalid.
Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting.

16. The injustice of the conclusion points to the error of adopting it. It takes invested wealth, and reads it into the constitution as a favored and protected class of property, which cannot be taxed without apportionment, while it leaves the occupation of the minister, the doctor, the professor, the lawyer, the inventor, the author, the merchant, the mechanic, and all other forms of industry upon which the prosperity of a people must depend, subject to taxation without that condition.

KNOWLTON v. MOORE, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)

" It is true that in the income tax cases the theory of certain economists by which direct and indirect taxes are classified with reference to the ability to shift the same was adverted to. But this disputable theory was not the basis of the conclusion of the court. "
"The constitutional meaning of the word direct was the matter decided. Considering that the constitutional rule of apportionment had its origin in the purpose to prevent taxes on persons solely because of their general ownership of property from being levied by any other rule than that of apportionment, two things were decided by the court: First, that no sound distinction existed between a tax levied on a person solely because of his general ownership of real property, and the same tax imposed solely because of his general ownership of personal property. Secondly, that the tax on the income derived from such property, real or personal, was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property from which said income was derived, and hence must be apportioned." These conclusions, however, lend no support to the contention that it was decided that duties, imposts and excises which are not the essential equivalent of a tax on property generally, real or personal, solely because of its ownership, must be converted into direct taxes, because it is conceived that it would be demonstrated by a close analysis that they could not be shifted from the person upon whom they first fall. The proposition now relied upon was considered and refuted in Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 , 43 L. ed. 786, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522, where the court said ( p. 515, L. ed. p. 791, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 525):

'The commands of the Constitution in this, as in all other respects, must be obeyed; direct taxes must be apportioned, while indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United [178 U.S. 41, 83] States. But while yielding implicit obedience to these constitutional requirements, it is no part of the duty of this court to lessen, impede, or obstruct the exercise of the taxing power by merely abstruse and subtle distinctions as to the particular nature of a specified tax, where such distinction rests more upon the differing theories of political economists than upon the practical nature of the tax itself.

'In deciding upon the validity of a tax with reference to these requirements, no microscopic examination as to the purely economical or theoretical nature of the tax should be indulged in for the purpose of placing it in a category which would invalidate the tax. As a mere abstract, scientific, or economical problem, a particular tax might possibly be regarded as a direct tax, when as a practical matter pertaining to the actual operation of the tax it might quite plainly appear to be indirect. Under such circumstances, and while varying and disputable theories might be indulged as to the real nature of the tax, a court would not be justified, for the purpose of invalidating the tax, in placing it in a class different from that to which its practical results would consign it. Taxation is eminently practical, and is, in fact, brought to every man's door, and for the purpose of deciding upon its validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results, rather than with reference to those theoretical or abstract ideas whose correctness is the subject of dispute and contradiction among those who are experts in the science of political economy.'

"Concluding, then that the tax under consideration is not direct within the meaning of the Constitution, but, on the contrary, is a duty or excise, we are brought to consider the question of uniformity. "

Champion v. Ames(1903), 186 U.S. 321

'But if what Congress does is within the limits of its power, and is simply unwise or injurious, the remedy is that suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden [21 US 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23], when [195 U.S. 27, 56] he said: 'The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments."

MCCRAY v. U S, 195 U.S. 27 (1904)

"'But if what Congress does is within the limits of its power, and is simply unwise or injurious, the remedy is that suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden [9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23], when [195 U.S. 27, 56] he said: 'The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments."

"Let us concede that if a case was presented where the abuse of the taxing power was so extreme as to be beyond the principles which we have previously stated, and where it was plain to the judicial mind that the power had been called into play, not for revenue, but solely for the purpose of destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed consistently with the principles of freedom and justice upon which the Constitution rests, that it would be the duty of the courts to say that such an arbitrary act was not merely an abuse of a delegated power, but was the exercise of an authority not conferred. "

Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.(1911), 220 U.S. 107

"This tax, it is expressly stated, is to be equivalent to 1 per centum of the entire net income over and above $5,000 received from all sources during the year, this is the measure of the tax explicitly adopted by the statute." *** In other words, the tax is imposed upon the doing of business of the character described, and the measure of the tax is to be income, with the deduction stated, received not only from property used in business, but from every source."

"The Pollock Case construed the tax there levied as direct, because it was imposed upon property simply because of its ownership."

"In the present case the tax is not payable unless there be a carrying on or doing of business in the designated capacity, and this is made the occasion for the tax, measured by the standard prescribed. The difference between the acts is not merely nominal, but rests upon substantial differences between the mere ownership of property and the actual doing of business in a certain way."

"As we have seen, the only limitation upon the authority conferred is uniformity in laying the tax, and uniformity does not require the equal application of the tax to all persons or corporations who may come within its operation, but is limited to geographical uniformity throughout the United States. This subject was fully discussed and set at rest in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747, and we can add nothing to the discussion contained in that case."

"It is therefore well settled by the decisions of this court that when the sovereign authority has exercised the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as an exercise of a franchise or privilege, it is no objection that the measure of taxation is found in the income produced in part from property which of itself considered is nontaxable.

BRUSHABER v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 U.S. 1 (1916)

"the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class [240 U.S. 1, 17] of direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary, recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such"

Stratton's Independence, LTD. v. Howbert(1913), 231 U.S. 399:

"'[I]ncome' may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, and here we have combined operations of capital and labor. As to the alleged inequality of operation between mining corporations and others, it is of course true that the revenues derived from the working of mines result to some extent in the exhaustion of the capital. But the same is true of the earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided by capital, yet such earnings are commonly dealt with in legislation as income."

Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.(1916), 240 U.S. 103:

"the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged, and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment"

COOK v. TAIT, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)

"[T]he principle was declared that the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and therefore has the power to make the benefit complete. Or, to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen."

BROMLEY v. MCCAUGHN, 280 U.S. 124,136 (1929)

"Whatever may be the precise line which sets off direct taxes from others, we need not now determine. While taxes levied upon or collected from persons because of their general ownership of property may be taken as direct, this Court has consistently held, almost from the foundation of our government, that a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned, and it is enough for present purposes that this tax is of the latter class.

It is a tax laid only upon the exercise of a single one of those powers incident to ownership, the power to give the property owned to another. . . . The persistence of this distinction and the justification for it rest upon the historic fact that taxes of this type were not understood to be direct taxes when the Constitution was adopted and, as well, upon the reluctance of this Court to enlarge by construction, limitations upon the sovereign power of taxation by Article 1, sec. 8, so vital to the maintenance of the National Government.
280 U.S. at 136; see The Federalist No. 12 (Hamilton) (distinguishing between "direct taxes" and "taxes on consumption")."

Lucas v. Earl(1930), 281 U.S. 111:

"The Revenue Act of 1918 approved February 24, 1919, c. 18, 210, 211, 212(a), 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1062, 1064, 1065, imposes a tax upon the net income of every individual including 'income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid,' 213(a). The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 233, 237, 238, in sections bearing the same numbers are similar to those of the above."

"There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them "

U.S. v. CONSTANTINE, 296 U.S. 287 (1935)

" The United States has the power to levy excises upon occupations, and to classify them for this purpose; and need look only to the fact of the exercise of the occupation or calling taxed, regardless of whether such exercise is permitted or prohibited by the laws of the United States or by those of a state. The burden of the tax may be imposed alike on the just and the unjust."

Charles C. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis (1937), 301 U.S. 548:

The tax, which is described in the statute as an excise, is laid with uniformity throughout the United States as a duty, an impost, or an excise upon the relation of employment.

"But natural rights, so called, are as much subject to taxation as rights of lesser importance. An excise is not limited to vocations or activities that may be prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the outcome of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities pursued as of common right."

Employment is a business relation, if not itself a business. It is a relation without which business could seldom be carried on effectively. The power to tax the activities and relations that constitute a calling considered as a unit is the power to tax any of them. The whole includes the parts. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 267 , 268 S., 53 S.Ct. 345, 349, 350, 87 A.L.R. 1191

House Congressional Record, March 27, 1943, pg. 2580:

"The income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such. It is an excise tax with respect to certain activities and privileges (the type 3 and 4 taxes) which is measured by reference to the income which they produce. The income is not the subject of the tax; it is the basis for determining the amount of tax."

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955).

"Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature."

United States v. Melton, No. 94-5535 (4th Cir. 1996)
ARGUED: Lowell Harrison Becraft, Jr.[one of Schulz & Co. legal beagles], Huntsville, Alabama, for Appellants.

The jury heard not only the United States's evidence against the Meltons, but also the brothers' defense that they believed they were not "persons liable" for federal income tax. The jury rejected the excuse, however, and convicted them on nearly all counts.

[Subtitle A] "Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a federal tax on the taxable income of every individual.
26 U.S.C. s 1."

[Subtitle A] "Section 63 defines "taxable income" as gross income minus allowable deductions."
26 U.S.C. s 63.

[Subtitle A] Section 61 states that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived," including compensation for services.
26 U.S.C. s 61.

[Subtitle F] Sections 6001 and 6011 provide that a person must keep records and file a tax return for any tax for which he is liable.
26 U.S.C. ss 6001
26 U.S.C. ss 6011.

Finally, section 6012 provides that every individual having gross income that equals or exceeds the exemption amount in a taxable year shall file an income tax return.
26 U.S.C. s 6012.

The duty to pay federal income taxes therefore is "manifest on the face of the statutes, without any resort to IRS rules, forms or regulations." United States v. Bowers, 920 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir.1990). The rarely recognized proposition that, "where the law is vague or highly debatable, a defendant--actually or imputedly--lacks the requisite intent to violate it," Mallas, 762 F.2d at 363 (quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir.1974)), simply does not apply here.
Each Melton brother had gross income in excess of the amount requiring the filing of a return in each of the years at issue. Therefore, each was a "person liable."

26 USC 7805(a) Rules and regulations
(a) Authorization - … the Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title [Title 26]…" [26 USC § 7805]

Thus under amplifying Treasury regulations for 26 USC 1, 26 CFR 1.1-1(a),(b)

Sec. 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals.

(a) General rule. (1) Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States and, to the extent provided by section 871(b) or 877(b), on the income of a nonresident alien individual.
(b) Citizens or residents of the United States liable to tax. In general, all citizens of the United States, wherever resident, and all resident alien individuals are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code whether the income is received from sources within or without the United States.

And in Regard to 26 USC 861

TITLE 26 - INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Subtitle A - Income Taxes
CHAPTER 1 - NORMAL TAXES AND SURTAXES
Subchapter N - Tax Based on Income From Sources Within or Without
the United States
PART I - SOURCE RULES AND OTHER GENERAL RULES RELATING TO FOREIGN INCOME
Sec. 861. Income from sources within the United States
(a) Gross income from sources(activities) within United States
The following items of gross income shall be treated as
income from sources(activities) within the United States:

(3) Personal services
Compensation for labor or personal services performed in the United States;
EXCEPT that compensation for labor or services
performed in the United States shall not be deemed to be income
from sources within the United States if -

(A) the labor or services are performed by a nonresident
alien individual temporarily present in the United States for a
period or periods not exceeding a total of 90 days during the
taxable year,
(B) such compensation does not exceed $3,000 in the
aggregate, and
(C) the compensation is for labor or services performed as an
employee of or under a contract with

(i) a nonresident alien, foreign partnership, or foreign
corporation, not engaged in trade or business within the
United States, or
(ii) an individual who is a citizen or resident of the
United States, a domestic partnership, or a domestic
corporation, if such labor or services are performed for an office or place of business maintained in a foreign country
or in a possession of the United States by such individual,
partnership, or corporation.
In addition, except for purposes of sections 79 and 105 and
subchapter D, compensation for labor or services performed in the
United States shall not be deemed to be income from sources
within the United States if the labor or services are performed
by a nonresident alien individual in connection with the
individual's temporary presence in the United States as a regular
member of the crew of a foreign vessel engaged in transportation
between the United States and a foreign country or a possession
of the United States.

In Summary, if you are a United States citizen, and receive compensation for labor or services in the United States you are subject to income taxes.

compensation = item of income
in exchange for = activity
service = source.

A tax levied as an excise or duty on an activity of commerce.

A LAW DICTIONARY
by John Bouvier, Revised Sixth Edition, 1856:
WAGES, contract. A compensation given to a hired person for his or her services.

KNOWLTON v. MOORE, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)

'indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an event or an exchange.'

BROMLEY v. MCCAUGHN, 280 U.S. 124 (1929)

While taxes levied upon or collected from persons because of their general ownership of property may be taken to be direct, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Turst Co., 157 U.S. 429 , 15 S. Ct. 673; Id., 158 U.S. 601 , 15 S. Ct. 912, this court has consistently held, almost from the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership, is an excise which neet not be apportioned

Tyler v. U.S. 281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930)

An indirect tax is a tax laid upon the happening of an event,as distinguished from its tangible fruits.

BULL v. UNITED STATES 295 U.S. 247 (1935)

", the usual procedure for the recovery of debts is reversed in the field of taxation. Payment precedes defense, and the burden of proof, normally on the claimant, is shifted to the taxpayer. The assessment supersedes the pleading, proof, and judgment necessary in an action at law, and has the force of such a judgment. The ordinary defendant stands in judgment only after a hearing. The taxpayer often is afforded his hearing after judgment and after payment, and his only redress for unjust administrative action is the right to claim restitution. But these reversals of the normal process of collecting a claim cannot obscure the fact that after all what is being accomplished is the recovery of a just debt owed the sovereign."

House Congressional Record, March 27, 1943, pg. 2580:

"The income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such. It is an excise tax with respect to certain activities and privileges (the type 3 and 4 taxes) which is measured by reference to the income which they produce. The income is not the subject of the tax; it is the basis for determining the amount of tax."

Implied contract:

GUARDIAN TRUST & DEPOSIT CO. v. FISHER, 200 U.S. 57 (1906)

An individual may be [200 U.S. 57, 69] under no obligation to do a particular thing, and his failure to act creates no liability; but if he voluntarily attempts to act and do the particular thing, he comes under an implied obligation in respect to the manner in which he does it. A surgeon, for instance, may be under no obligation, in the absence of contract, to assume the treatment of an injured person, but if he does undertake such treatment, he assumes likewise the duty of reasonable care in such treatment. The owner of a lot is not bound to build a house or store thereon, but if he does so he comes under an implied obligation to use reasonable care in the work to prevent injury therefrom to others. Holmes, Common Law, p. 278

Judges Taxed -- The Supreme Court's reasoning:

O'MALLEY v. WOODROUGH, 307 U.S. 277 (1939)

"the question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power in providing that United States judges [307 U.S. 277, 282] appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the incidences of taxation to which everyone else within the defined classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to the income of a federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of Article III, 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of judges who took office after Congress had thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article III, 1.9 To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering.

Witholding not a tax:

BARAL v. UNITED STATES, 172 F. 3d 918; affirmed SCOTUS 98-1667 (Feb 22, 2000)

"Contrary to Baral's claim, the withholding tax and estimated tax are not taxes in their own right (separate from the income tax), that are converted into income tax only on the income tax return. Rather, they are methods for collecting income taxes."

"there are some here who... when confronted with the facts... try to discredit those who point them out"

Nobody here, including you, newbie... has pointed out any "fact" so far in this thread, other than the fact that nobody can cite the alleged verbiage of the "law" in question.

The "fact" (chapter and verse of the Tax Code which makes withholding mandatory) has not been pointed out by anyone here, or elsewhere, because it doesn't exist.

Anyone who eventually does fabricate such chapter and verse as though it existed in the Tax Code will indeed be discredited. I assure you of that.

Which one are you going to vote for, Dean or Clark?

;-/

Gargantua:

"The vitriol that this topic elicits is indicative of three things:"

_______________________________________

I agree. They are:

1) People don't like paying taxes. - [Under 'regulations' dreamed up by idiots.]

2) Some people are too lazy or stupid to look up the constitutional basis for laws and therefore believe the snake oil salesmen who claim that any regulation is "the law".

3) There is a tendency on the part of some here when confronted with the facts to try to discredit those who point them out by claiming they are being called "government plants or IRS goons".. Not true.
-- They are simply misguided statists, who believe big brothers agit-prop.

I was hoping you'd show up.

You boys see #148. Better bring your lunch.

TITLE 26 > Subtitle C > CHAPTER 24 > Sec. 3402. Prev | Next
Sec. 3402. - Income tax collected at source

(a) Requirement of withholding

(1) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section, every employer making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax determined in accordance with tables or computational procedures prescribed by the Secretary. Any tables or procedures prescribed under this paragraph shall -

(A)

apply with respect to the amount of wages paid during such periods as the Secretary may prescribe, and

(B)

be in such form, and provide for such amounts to be deducted and withheld, as the Secretary determines to be most appropriate to carry out the purposes of this chapter and to reflect the provisions of chapter 1 applicable to such periods.

(2) Amount of wages

For purposes of applying tables or procedures prescribed under paragraph (1), the term ''the amount of wages'' means the amount by which the wages exceed the number of withholding exemptions claimed multiplied by the amount of one such exemption. The amount of each withholding exemption shall be equal to the amount of one personal exemption provided in section 151(b), prorated to the payroll period. The maximum number of withholding exemptions permitted shall be calculated in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary under this section, taking into account any reduction in withholding to which an employee is entitled under this section.

(b) Percentage method of withholding

(1)

If wages are paid with respect to a period which is not a payroll period, the withholding exemption allowable with respect to each payment of such wages shall be the exemption allowed for a miscellaneous payroll period containing a number of days (including Sundays and holidays) equal to the number of days in the period with respect to which such wages are paid.

(2)

In any case in which wages are paid by an employer without regard to any payroll period or other period, the withholding exemption allowable with respect to each payment of such wages shall be the exemption allowed for a miscellaneous payroll period containing a number of days equal to the number of days (including Sundays and holidays) which have elapsed since the date of the last payment of such wages by such employer during the calendar year, or the date of commencement of employment with such employer during such year, or January 1 of such year, whichever is the later.

(3)

In any case in which the period, or the time described in paragraph (2), in respect of any wages is less than one week, the Secretary, under regulations prescribed by him, may authorize an employer to compute the tax to be deducted and withheld as if the aggregate of the wages paid to the employee during the calendar week were paid for a weekly payroll period.

(4)

In determining the amount to be deducted and withheld under this subsection, the wages may, at the election of the employer, be computed to the nearest dollar.

(c) Wage bracket withholding

(1)

At the election of the employer with respect to any employee, the employer shall deduct and withhold upon the wages paid to such employee a tax (in lieu of the tax required to be deducted and withheld under subsection (a)) determined in accordance with tables prescribed by the Secretary in accordance with paragraph (6).

(2)

If wages are paid with respect to a period which is not a payroll period, the amount to be deducted and withheld shall be that applicable in the case of a miscellaneous payroll period containing a number of days (including Sundays and holidays) equal to the number of days in the period with respect to which such wages are paid.

(3)

In any case in which wages are paid by an employer without regard to any payroll period or other period, the amount to be deducted and withheld shall be that applicable in the case of a miscellaneous payroll period containing a number of days equal to the number of days (including Sundays and holidays) which have elapsed since the date of the last payment of such wages by such employer during the calendar year, or the date of commencement of employment with such employer during such year, or January 1 of such year, whichever is the later.

(4)

In any case in which the period, or the time described in paragraph (3), in respect of any wages is less than one week, the Secretary, under regulations prescribed by him, may authorize an employer to determine the amount to be deducted and withheld under the tables applicable in the case of a weekly payroll period, in which case the aggregate of the wages paid to the employee during the calendar week shall be considered the weekly wages.

(5)

If the wages exceed the highest wage bracket, in determining the amount to be deducted and withheld under this subsection, the wages may, at the election of the employer, be computed to the nearest dollar.

(6)

In the case of wages paid after December 31, 1969, the amount deducted and withheld under paragraph (1) shall be determined in accordance with tables prescribed by the Secretary. In the tables so prescribed, the amounts set forth as amounts of wages and amounts of income tax to be deducted and withheld shall be computed on the basis of the table for an annual payroll period prescribed pursuant to subsection (a).

(d) Tax paid by recipient

If the employer, in violation of the provisions of this chapter, fails to deduct and withhold the tax under this chapter, and thereafter the tax against which such tax may be credited is paid, the tax so required to be deducted and withheld shall not be collected from the employer; but this subsection shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for any penalties or additions to the tax otherwise applicable in respect of such failure to deduct and withhold.

(e) Included and excluded wages

If the remuneration paid by an employer to an employee for services performed during one-half or more of any payroll period of not more than 31 consecutive days constitutes wages, all the remuneration paid by such employer to such employee for such period shall be deemed to be wages; but if the remuneration paid by an employer to an employee for services performed during more than one-half of any such payroll period does not constitute wages, then none of the remuneration paid by such employer to such employee for such period shall be deemed to be wages.

(f) Withholding exemptions

(1) In general

An employee receiving wages shall on any day be entitled to the following withholding exemptions:

(A)

an exemption for himself unless he is an individual described in section 151(d)(2);

(B)

if the employee is married, any exemption to which his spouse is entitled, or would be entitled if such spouse were an employee receiving wages, under subparagraph (A) or (D), but only if such spouse does not have in effect a withholding exemption certificate claiming such exemption;

(C)

an exemption for each individual with respect to whom, on the basis of facts existing at the beginning of such day, there may reasonably be expected to be allowable an exemption under section 151(c) for the taxable year under subtitle A in respect of which amounts deducted and withheld under this chapter in the calendar year in which such day falls are allowed as a credit;

(D)

any allowance to which he is entitled under subsection (m), but only if his spouse does not have in effect a withholding exemption certificate claiming such allowance; and

(E)

a standard deduction allowance which shall be an amount equal to one exemption (or more than one exemption if so prescribed by the Secretary) unless

(i)

he is married (as determined under section 7703) and his spouse is an employee receiving wages subject to withholding or

(ii)

he has withholding exemption certificates in effect with respect to more than one employer.

For purposes of this title, any standard deduction allowance under subparagraph (E) shall be treated as if it were denominated a withholding exemption.

(2) Exemption certificates

(A) On commencement of employment

On or before the date of the commencement of employment with an employer, the employee shall furnish the employer with a signed withholding exemption certificate relating to the number of withholding exemptions which he claims, which shall in no event exceed the number to which he is entitled.

(B) Change of status

If, on any day during the calendar year, the number of withholding exemptions to which the employee is entitled is less than the number of withholding exemptions claimed by the employee on the withholding exemption certificate then in effect with respect to him, the employee shall within 10 days thereafter furnish the employer with a new withholding exemption certificate relating to the number of withholding exemptions which the employee then claims, which shall in no event exceed the number to which he is entitled on such day. If, on any day during the calendar year, the number of withholding exemptions to which the employee is entitled is greater than the number of withholding exemptions claimed, the employee may furnish the employer with a new withholding exemption certificate relating to the number of withholding exemptions which the employee then claims, which shall in no event exceed the number to which he is entitled on such day.

(C) Change of status which affects next calendar year

If on any day during the calendar year the number of withholding exemptions to which the employee will be, or may reasonably be expected to be, entitled at the beginning of his next taxable year under subtitle A is different from the number to which the employee is entitled on such day, the employee shall, in such cases and at such times as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe, furnish the employer with a withholding exemption certificate relating to the number of withholding exemptions which he claims with respect to such next taxable year, which shall in no event exceed the number to which he will be, or may reasonably be expected to be, so entitled.

(3) When certificate takes effect

(A) First certificate furnished

A withholding exemption certificate furnished the employer in cases in which no previous such certificate is in effect shall take effect as of the beginning of the first payroll period ending, or the first payment of wages made without regard to a payroll period, on or after the date on which such certificate is so furnished.

(B) Furnished to take place of existing certificate

(i) In general

Except as provided in clauses (ii) and (iii), a withholding exemption certificate furnished to the employer in cases in which a previous such certificate is in effect shall take effect as of the beginning of the 1st payroll period ending (or the 1st payment of wages made without regard to a payroll period) on or after the 30th day after the day on which such certificate is so furnished.

(ii) Employer may elect earlier effective date

At the election of the employer, a certificate described in clause (i) may be made effective beginning with any payment of wages made on or after the day on which the certificate is so furnished and before the 30th day referred to in clause (i).

(iii) Change of status which affects next year

Any certificate furnished pursuant to paragraph (2)(C) shall not take effect, and may not be made effective, with respect to any payment of wages made in the calendar year in which the certificate is furnished.

(4) Period during which certificate remains in effect

A withholding exemption certificate which takes effect under this subsection, or which on December 31, 1954, was in effect under the corresponding subsection of prior law, shall continue in effect with respect to the employer until another such certificate takes effect under this subsection.

(5) Form and contents of certificate

Withholding exemption certificates shall be in such form and contain such information as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe.

(6) Exemption of certain nonresident aliens

Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), a nonresident alien individual (other than an individual described in section 3401(a)(6)(A) or (B)) shall be entitled to only one withholding exemption.

(7) Exemption where certificate with another employer is in effect

If a withholding exemption certificate is in effect with respect to one employer, an employee shall not be entitled under a certificate in effect with any other employer to any withholding exemption which he has claimed under such first certificate.

(g) Overlapping pay periods, and payment by agent or fiduciary

If a payment of wages is made to an employee by an employer -

(1)

with respect to a payroll period or other period, any part of which is included in a payroll period or other period with respect to which wages are also paid to such employee by such employer, or

(2)

without regard to any payroll period or other period, but on or prior to the expiration of a payroll period or other period with respect to which wages are also paid to such employee by such employer, or

(3)

with respect to a period beginning in one and ending in another calendar year, or

(4)

through an agent, fiduciary, or other person who also has the control, receipt, custody, or disposal of, or pays, the wages payable by another employer to such employee,

the manner of withholding and the amount to be deducted and withheld under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary under which the withholding exemption allowed to the employee in any calendar year shall approximate the withholding exemption allowable with respect to an annual payroll period.

(h) Alternative methods of computing amount to be withheld

The Secretary may, under regulations prescribed by him, authorize -

(1) Withholding on basis of average wages

An employer -

(A)

to estimate the wages which will be paid to any employee in any quarter of the calendar year,

(B)

to determine the amount to be deducted and withheld upon each payment of wages to such employee during such quarter as if the appropriate average of the wages so estimated constituted the actual wages paid, and

(C)

to deduct and withhold upon any payment of wages to such employee during such quarter (and, in the case of tips referred to in subsection (k), within 30 days thereafter) such amount as may be necessary to adjust the amount actually deducted and withheld upon the wages of such employee during such quarter to the amount required to be deducted and withheld during such quarter without regard to this subsection.

(2) Withholding on basis of annualized wages

An employer to determine the amount of tax to be deducted and withheld upon a payment of wages to an employee for a payroll period by -

(A)

multiplying the amount of an employee's wages for a payroll period by the number of such payroll periods in the calendar year,

(B)

determining the amount of tax which would be required to be deducted and withheld upon the amount determined under subparagraph (A) if such amount constituted the actual wages for the calendar year and the payroll period of the employee were an annual payroll period, and

(C)

dividing the amount of tax determined under subparagraph (B) by the number of payroll periods (described in subparagraph (A)) in the calendar year.

(3) Withholding on basis of cumulative wages

An employer, in the case of any employee who requests to have the amount of tax to be withheld from his wages computed on the basis of his cumulative wages, to -

(A)

add the amount of the wages to be paid to the employee for the payroll period to the total amount of wages paid by the employer to the employee during the calendar year,

(B)

divide the aggregate amount of wages computed under subparagraph (A) by the number of payroll periods to which such aggregate amount of wages relates,

(C)

compute the total amount of tax that would have been required to be deducted and withheld under subsection (a) if the average amount of wages (as computed under subparagraph (B)) had been paid to the employee for the number of payroll periods to which the aggregate amount of wages (computed under subparagraph (A)) relates,

(D)

determine the excess, if any, of the amount of tax computed under subparagraph (C) over the total amount of tax deducted and withheld by the employer from wages paid to the employee during the calendar year, and

(E)

deduct and withhold upon the payment of wages (referred to in subparagraph (A)) to the employee an amount equal to the excess (if any) computed under subparagraph (D).

(4) Other methods

An employer to determine the amount of tax to be deducted and withheld upon the wages paid to an employee by any other method which will require the employer to deduct and withhold upon such wages substantially the same amount as would be required to be deducted and withheld by applying subsection (a) or (c), either with respect to a payroll period or with respect to the entire taxable year.

(i) Changes in withholding

(1) In general

The Secretary may by regulations provide for increases in the amount of withholding otherwise required under this section in cases where the employee requests such changes.

(2) Treatment as tax

Any increased withholding under paragraph (1) shall for all purposes be considered tax required to be deducted and withheld under this chapter.

(j) Noncash remuneration to retail commission salesman

In the case of remuneration paid in any medium other than cash for services performed by an individual as a retail salesman for a person, where the service performed by such individual for such person is ordinarily performed for remuneration solely by way of cash commission an employer shall not be required to deduct or withhold any tax under this subchapter with respect to such remuneration, provided that such employer files with the Secretary such information with respect to such remuneration as the Secretary may by regulation prescribe.

(k) Tips

In the case of tips which constitute wages, subsection (a) shall be applicable only to such tips as are included in a written statement furnished to the employer pursuant to section 6053(a), and only to the extent that the tax can be deducted and withheld by the employer, at or after the time such statement is so furnished and before the close of the calendar year in which such statement is furnished, from such wages of the employee (excluding tips, but including funds turned over by the employee to the employer for the purpose of such deduction and withholding) as are under the control of the employer; and an employer who is furnished by an employee a written statement of tips (received in a calendar month) pursuant to section 6053(a) to which paragraph (16)(B) of section 3401(a) is applicable may deduct and withhold the tax with respect to such tips from any wages of the employee (excluding tips) under his control, even though at the time such statement is furnished the total amount of the tips included in statements furnished to the employer as having been received by the employee in such calendar month in the course of his employment by such employer is less than $20. Such tax shall not at any time be deducted and withheld in an amount which exceeds the aggregate of such wages and funds (including funds turned over under section 3102(c)(2) or section 3202(c)(2)) minus any tax required by section 3102(a) or section 3202(a) to be collected from such wages and funds.

(l) Determination and disclosure of marital status

(1) Determination of status by employer

For purposes of applying the tables in subsections (a) and (c) to a payment of wages, the employer shall treat the employee as a single person unless there is in effect with respect to such payment of wages a withholding exemption certificate furnished to the employer by the employee after the date of the enactment of this subsection indicating that the employee is married.

(2) Disclosure of status by employee

An employee shall be entitled to furnish the employer with a withholding exemption certificate indicating he is married only if, on the day of such furnishing, he is married (determined with the application of the rules in paragraph (3)). An employee whose marital status changes from married to single shall, at such time as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe, furnish the employer with a new withholding exemption certificate.

(3) Determination of marital status

For purposes of paragraph (2), an employee shall on any day be considered -

(A)

as not married, if

(i)

he is legally separated from his spouse under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, or

(ii)

either he or his spouse is, or on any preceding day within the calendar year was, a nonresident alien; or

(B)

as married, if

(i)

his spouse (other than a spouse referred to in subparagraph (A)) died within the portion of his taxable year which precedes such day, or

(ii)

his spouse died during one of the two taxable years immediately preceding the current taxable year and, on the basis of facts existing at the beginning of such day, the employee reasonably expects, at the close of his taxable year, to be a surviving spouse (as defined in section 2(a)).

(m) Withholding allowances

Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, an employee shall be entitled to additional withholding allowances or additional reductions in withholding under this subsection. In determining the number of additional withholding allowances or the amount of additional reductions in withholding under this subsection, the employee may take into account (to the extent and in the manner provided by such regulations) -

(1)

estimated itemized deductions allowable under chapter 1 (other than the deductions referred to in section 151 and other than the deductions required to be taken into account in determining adjusted gross income under section 62(a) (other than paragraph (10) thereof)),

(2)

estimated tax credits allowable under chapter 1, and

(3)

such additional deductions (including the additional standard deduction under section 63(c)(3) for the aged and blind) and other items as may be specified by the Secretary in regulations.

(n) Employees incurring no income tax liability

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an employer shall not be required to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter upon a payment of wages to an employee if there is in effect with respect to such payment a withholding exemption certificate (in such form and containing such other information as the Secretary may prescribe) furnished to the employer by the employee certifying that the employee -

(1)

incurred no liability for income tax imposed under subtitle A for his preceding taxable year, and

(2)

anticipates that he will incur no liability for income tax imposed under subtitle A for his current taxable year.

The Secretary shall by regulations provide for the coordination of the provisions of this subsection with the provisions of subsection (f).

(o) Extension of withholding to certain payments other than wages

(1) General rule

For purposes of this chapter (and so much of subtitle F as relates to this chapter) -

(A)

any supplemental unemployment compensation benefit paid to an individual,

(B)

any payment of an annuity to an individual, if at the time the payment is made a request that such annuity be subject to withholding under this chapter is in effect, and

(C)

any payment to an individual of sick pay which does not constitute wages (determined without regard to this subsection), if at the time the payment is made a request that such sick pay be subject to withholding under this chapter is in effect,

shall be treated as if it were a payment of wages by an employer to an employee for a payroll period.

(2) Definitions

(A) Supplemental unemployment compensation benefits

For purposes of paragraph (1), the term ''supplemental unemployment compensation benefits'' means amounts which are paid to an employee, pursuant to a plan to which the employer is a party, because of an employee's involuntary separation from employment (whether or not such separation is temporary), resulting directly from a reduction in force, the discontinuance of a plant or operation, or other similar conditions, but only to the extent such benefits are includible in the employee's gross income.

(B) Annuity

For purposes of this subsection, the term ''annuity'' means any amount paid to an individual as a pension or annuity.

(C) Sick pay

For purposes of this subsection, the term ''sick pay'' means any amount which -

(i)

is paid to an employee pursuant to a plan to which the employer is a party, and

(ii)

constitutes remuneration or a payment in lieu of remuneration for any period during which the employee is temporarily absent from work on account of sickness or personal injuries.

(3) Amount withheld from annuity payments or sick pay

If a payee makes a request that an annuity or any sick pay be subject to withholding under this chapter, the amount to be deducted and withheld under this chapter from any payment to which such request applies shall be an amount (not less than a minimum amount determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary) specified by the payee in such request. The amount deducted and withheld with respect to a payment which is greater or less than a full payment shall bear the same relation to the specified amount as such payment bears to a full payment.

(4) Request for withholding

A request that an annuity or any sick pay be subject to withholding under this chapter -

(A)

shall be made by the payee in writing to the person making the payments and shall contain the social security number of the payee,

(B)

shall specify the amount to be deducted and withheld from each full payment, and

(C)

shall take effect -

(i)

in the case of sick pay, with respect to payments made more than 7 days after the date on which such request is furnished to the payor, or

(ii)

in the case of an annuity, at such time (after the date on which such request is furnished to the payor) as the Secretary shall by regulations prescribe.

Such a request may be changed or terminated by furnishing to the person making the payments a written statement of change or termination which shall take effect in the same manner as provided in subparagraph (C). At the election of the payor, any such request (or statement of change or revocation) may take effect earlier than as provided in subparagraph (C).

(5) Special rule for sick pay paid pursuant to certain collective-bargaining agreements

In the case of any sick pay paid pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement between employee representatives and one or more employers which contains a provision specifying that this paragraph is to apply to sick pay paid pursuant to such agreement and contains a provision for determining the amount to be deducted and withheld from each payment of such sick pay -

(A)

the requirement of paragraph (1)(C) that a request for withholding be in effect shall not apply, and

(B)

except as provided in subsection (n), the amounts to be deducted and withheld under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with such agreement.

The preceding sentence shall not apply with respect to sick pay paid pursuant to any agreement to any individual unless the social security number of such individual is furnished to the payor and the payor is furnished with such information as is necessary to determine whether the payment is pursuant to the agreement and to determine the amount to be deducted and withheld.

(6) Coordination with withholding on designated distributions under section 3405

This subsection shall not apply to any amount which is a designated distribution (within the meaning of section 3405(e)(1)).

(p) Voluntary withholding agreements

(1) Certain Federal payments

(A) In general

If, at the time a specified Federal payment is made to any person, a request by such person is in effect that such payment be subject to withholding under this chapter, then for purposes of this chapter and so much of subtitle F as relates to this chapter, such payment shall be treated as if it were a payment of wages by an employer to an employee.

(B) Amount withheld

The amount to be deducted and withheld under this chapter from any payment to which any request under subparagraph (A) applies shall be an amount equal to the percentage of such payment specified in such request. Such a request shall apply to any payment only if the percentage specified is 7, 15, 28, or 31 percent or such other percentage as is permitted under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

(C) Specified Federal payments

For purposes of this paragraph, the term ''specified Federal payment'' means -

(i)

any payment of a social security benefit (as defined in section 86(d)),

(ii)

any payment referred to in the second sentence of section 451(d) which is treated as insurance proceeds,

(iii)

any amount which is includible in gross income under section 77(a), and

(iv)

any other payment made pursuant to Federal law which is specified by the Secretary for purposes of this paragraph.

(D) Requests for withholding

Rules similar to the rules that apply to annuities under subsection (o)(4) shall apply to requests under this paragraph and paragraph (2).

(2) Voluntary withholding on unemployment benefits

If, at the time a payment of unemployment compensation (as defined in section 85(b)) is made to any person, a request by such person is in effect that such payment be subject to withholding under this chapter, then for purposes of this chapter and so much of subtitle F as relates to this chapter, such payment shall be treated as if it were a payment of wages by an employer to an employee. The amount to be deducted and withheld under this chapter from any payment to which any request under this paragraph applies shall be an amount equal to 15 percent of such payment.

(3) Authority for other voluntary withholding

The Secretary is authorized by regulations to provide for withholding -

(A)

from remuneration for services performed by an employee for the employee's employer which (without regard to this paragraph) does not constitute wages, and

(B)

from any other type of payment with respect to which the Secretary finds that withholding would be appropriate under the provisions of this chapter,

if the employer and employee, or the person making and the person receiving such other type of payment, agree to such withholding. Such agreement shall be in such form and manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe. For purposes of this chapter (and so much of subtitle F as relates to this chapter), remuneration or other payments with respect to which such agreement is made shall be treated as if they were wages paid by an employer to an employee to the extent that such remuneration is paid or other payments are made during the period for which the agreement is in effect.

(q) Extension of withholding to certain gambling winnings

(1) General rule

Every person, including the Government of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentalities of the foregoing, making any payment of winnings which are subject to withholding shall deduct and withhold from such payment a tax in an amount equal to 28 percent of such payment.

(2) Exemption where tax otherwise withheld

In the case of any payment of winnings which are subject to withholding made to a nonresident alien individual or a foreign corporation, the tax imposed under paragraph (1) shall not apply to any such payment subject to tax under section 1441(a) (relating to withholding on nonresident aliens) or tax under section 1442(a) (relating to withholding on foreign corporations).

(3) Winnings which are subject to withholding

For purposes of this subsection, the term ''winnings which are subject to withholding'' means proceeds from a wager determined in accordance with the following:

(A) In general

Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), proceeds of more than $5,000 from a wagering transaction, if the amount of such proceeds is at least 300 times as large as the amount wagered.

(B) State-conducted lotteries

Proceeds of more than $5,000 from a wager placed in a lottery conducted by an agency of a State acting under authority of State law, but only if such wager is placed with the State agency conducting such lottery, or with its authorized employees or agents.

(C) Sweepstakes, wagering pools, certain parimutuel pools, jai alai, and lotteries

Proceeds of more than $5,000 from -

(i)

a wager placed in a sweepstakes, wagering pool, or lottery (other than a wager described in subparagraph (B)), or

(ii)

a wagering transaction in a parimutuel pool with respect to horse races, dog races, or jai alai if the amount of such proceeds is at least 300 times as large as the amount wagered.

(4) Rules for determining proceeds from a wager

For purposes of this subsection -

(A)

proceeds from a wager shall be determined by reducing the amount received by the amount of the wager, and

(B)

proceeds which are not money shall be taken into account at their fair market value.

(5) Exception for bingo, keno, and slot machines

The tax imposed under paragraph (1) shall not apply to winnings from a slot machine, keno, and bingo.

(6) Statement by recipient

Every person who is to receive a payment of winnings which are subject to withholding shall furnish the person making such payment a statement, made under the penalties of perjury, containing the name, address, and taxpayer identification number of the person receiving the payment and of each person entitled to any portion of such payment.

(7) Coordination with other sections

For purposes of sections 3403 and 3404 and for purposes of so much of subtitle F (except section 7205) as relates to this chapter, payments to any person of winnings which are subject to withholding shall be treated as if they were wages paid by an employer to an employee.

(r) Extension of withholding to certain taxable payments of Indian casino profits

(1) In general

Every person, including an Indian tribe, making a payment to a member of an Indian tribe from the net revenues of any class II or class III gaming activity conducted or licensed by such tribe shall deduct and withhold from such payment a tax in an amount equal to such payment's proportionate share of the annualized tax.

(2) Exception

The tax imposed by paragraph (1) shall not apply to any payment to the extent that the payment, when annualized, does not exceed an amount equal to the sum of -

(A)

the basic standard deduction (as defined in section 63(c)) for an individual to whom section 63(c)(2)(C) applies, and

(B)

the exemption amount (as defined in section 151(d)).

(3) Annualized tax

For purposes of paragraph (1), the term ''annualized tax'' means, with respect to any payment, the amount of tax which would be imposed by section 1(c) (determined without regard to any rate of tax in excess of 31 percent) on an amount of taxable income equal to the excess of -

(A)

the annualized amount of such payment, over

(B)

the amount determined under paragraph (2).

(4) Classes of gaming activities, etc.

For purposes of this subsection, terms used in paragraph (1) which are defined in section 4 of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.), as in effect on the date of the enactment of this subsection, shall have the respective meanings given such terms by such section.

(5) Annualization

Payments shall be placed on an annualized basis under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

(6) Alternate withholding procedures

At the election of an Indian tribe, the tax imposed by this subsection on any payment made by such tribe shall be determined in accordance with such tables or computational procedures as may be specified in regulations prescribed by the Secretary (in lieu of in accordance with paragraphs (2) and (3)).

(7) Coordination with other sections

For purposes of this chapter and so much of subtitle F as relates to this chapter, payments to any person which are subject to withholding under this subsection shall be treated as if they were wages paid by an employer to an employee.

(s) Exemption from withholding for any vehicle fringe benefit

(1) Employer election not to withhold

The employer may elect not to deduct and withhold any tax under this chapter with respect to any vehicle fringe benefit provided to any employee if such employee is notified by the employer of such election (at such time and in such manner as the Secretary shall by regulations prescribe). The preceding sentence shall not apply to any vehicle fringe benefit unless the amount of such benefit is included by the employer on a statement timely furnished under section 6051.

(2) Employer must furnish W-2

Any vehicle fringe benefit shall be treated as wages from which amounts are required to be deducted and withheld under this chapter for purposes of section 6051.

(3) Vehicle fringe benefit

For purposes of this subsection, the term ''vehicle fringe benefit'' means any fringe benefit -

(A)

which constitutes wages (as defined in section 3401), and

(B)

which consists of providing a highway motor vehicle for the use of the employee

You're welcome.

Well, let me ask, what if Simkanin was right? What if the witholding is a violation of the Constitution? And that "lawful tax collection" isn't so lawful after all? What if? We won't know because the judge decided the case before it was ever presented. Denying motions without even reading them is judicial arrogance. Sustaining objections not even made is judicial malprudence. Preventing the defense from even presenting a case, forget presenting it's case, is judicial abuse. Refusing to answer questions under oath because you know the judge won't bother you about it is arrogance and smacks of buyoffs. The whole thing doesn't pass the smell test. It stinks to high heaven.

In a criminal case, the judge decides what the law is and instructs the jury; the jury decides the facts.

If the judge is wrong that withholding is constitutional, the Court of Appeals can reverse the conviction. But juries don't decide constitutional questions.

BTW, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of requiring employers to withhold social security taxes from employees' paychecks back in 1937, by a vote of 8-1. They could reverse themselves, of cours (not that I think that's likely), but the issue is still not one for a jury.

None of that case law... let me repeat... NONE of that CASE LAW establishes that it is mandatory for an employer to withhold Federal taxes from his employees.

;-/

None of that case law... let me repeat... NONE of that CASE LAW establishes that it is mandatory for an employer to withhold Federal taxes from his employees.

Well, then see #152.

And, if that doesn't do it for ya, then you're galactically stupid.

Oh, and BTW. Your tag line sucks.

NONE of that CASE LAW establishes that it is mandatory for an employer to withhold Federal taxes from his employees.

I just quoted you the law requiring employers to withhold from the US code. Are you blind?

The vitriol that this topic elicits is indicative of three things:
1. That the answer to this question has yet to be effectively and finally adressed.
2. That some here on FR are either IRS agents or apologists therefor.
3. That some here on FR are active or retired judges who balk at having their Monarchy questioned and exposed.

Actually four, that the law, as stated in the complaint presented at trial, exists in the tax code, and is constitutional. Those arguing otherwise are merely being caught out blowing hot air and are raising the level of vitriol to cover there lack of knowledge on the subject.

If such law existed in our Federal Tax Code, it would be the simplest thing for all you IRS and Rogue Court apologists to just cite it, chapter and verse.

Actually the prosecutor stated the particular statute in the complaint that brought the case to court, and was open to challenge in preliminary hearing, and pre-trial motion.

However for those who do not understand where the statutes are to be found and how the Court views those statutes:

United States v. Melton, No. 94-5535 (4th Cir. 1996)
ARGUED: Lowell Harrison Becraft, Jr.[one of Schulz & Co. legal beagles], Huntsville, Alabama, for Appellants.

The jury heard not only the United States's evidence against the Meltons, but also the brothers' defense that they believed they were not "persons liable" for federal income tax. The jury rejected the excuse, however, and convicted them on nearly all counts.

[Subtitle A] "Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a federal tax on the taxable income of every individual.
26 U.S.C. s 1."

[Subtitle A] "Section 63 defines "taxable income" as gross income minus allowable deductions."
26 U.S.C. s 63.

[Subtitle A] Section 61 states that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived," including compensation for services.
26 U.S.C. s 61.

[Subtitle F] Sections 6001 and 6011 provide that a person must keep records and file a tax return for any tax for which he is liable.
26 U.S.C. ss 6001
26 U.S.C. ss 6011.

Finally, section 6012 provides that every individual having gross income that equals or exceeds the exemption amount in a taxable year shall file an income tax return.
26 U.S.C. s 6012.

The duty to pay federal income taxes therefore is "manifest on the face of the statutes, without any resort to IRS rules, forms or regulations." United States v. Bowers, 920 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir.1990). The rarely recognized proposition that, "where the law is vague or highly debatable, a defendant--actually or imputedly--lacks the requisite intent to violate it," Mallas, 762 F.2d at 363 (quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir.1974)), simply does not apply here.
Each Melton brother had gross income in excess of the amount requiring the filing of a return in each of the years at issue. Therefore, each was a "person liable."

The fact that you cannot is more telling than all of your wasted vitriol.

Hmmm! the only "wasted vitriol" seems to be coming from those in denial of reality here.

"Both defense & prosecution have time limits on arguments."

LOL! You missed the OJ trial, I assume.

Is it still going on? If not, it stands to reason there were time limits.

Of course in actuality there are no such thing as time limits in trials. Not on this planet. Maybe where you come from.

The judge sets such limits, subject to review.

There are relevancy limits, however. Demanding proof that the law exists is irrelevant.

Maybe where you come from. -- We have a US Constitution to honor, and it is relevant to argue that point before the jury, within time limits.

If the law didn't exist, there wouldn't have been grounds for an indictment and the case wouldn't have been brought to trial.

So you claim. I claim the right to present my case before an informed & impartial jury, as per the 6/7th amendments..

Why do you oppose this freedom?

"The "fact" (chapter and verse of the Tax Code which makes withholding mandatory) has not been pointed out by anyone here, or elsewhere, because it doesn't exist.

Anyone who eventually does fabricate such chapter and verse as though it existed in the Tax Code will indeed be discredited. I assure you of that."

I'm waiting to be discredited.