Replies

Hylton v. United States(1796), 3 U.S. 171

"A general power is given to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, of every kind or nature, without any restraint, except only on exports; but two rules are prescribed for their government, namely, uniformity and apportionment: Three kinds of taxes, to wit, duties, imposts, and excises by the first rule, and capitation, or other direct taxes, by the second rule. "

"the present Constitution was particularly intended to affect individuals, and not states, except in particular cases specified: And this is the leading distinction between the articles of Confederation and the present Constitution."

"Uniformity is an instant operation on individuals, without the intervention of assessments, or any regard to states,"

"[T]he DIRECT TAXES contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, A CAPITATION OR POLL TAX, simply, without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on LAND."

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)

"The power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which the Government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this power is found in the structure of the Government itself. In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation."

LICENSE TAX CASES, 72 U.S. 462 (1866)

"It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception, and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion."

PACIFIC INS. CO. v. SOULE, 74 U.S. 433 (1868),7 Wall. 433

"Congress may prescribe the basis, fix the rates, and require payment as it may deem proper. Within the limits of the Constitution it is supreme in its action. No power of supervision or control is lodged in either of the other departments of the government."

Lane Co. v. Oregon (1868), 74 U.S. [7 Wall.] 71:

[T]he people, through the constitution of the United States, 'established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the states.' In no other way can the supremacy of that constitution be maintained. It creates a government in fact as well as in name, because its constitution is the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding;' and its authority is enforced by its power to regulate and govern the conduct of individuals, even where its prohibitions are laid only upon the states themselves.

United States v. Cruikshank(1876), 92 U.S. 542:

"The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to two governments: one State, and the other National. ..."

Springer v. United States(1880), 102 U.S. 586

"The central and controlling question in this case is whether the tax which was levied on the income, gains, and profits of the plaintiff in error, as set forth in the record, and by pretended virtue of the acts of Congress and parts of acts therein mentioned, is a direct tax."

"Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that instrument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty."

"[W]henever the government has imposed a tax which it recognized as a direct tax, it has never been applied to any objects but real estate and slaves."

"If the laws here in question involved any wrong or unnecessary harshness, it was for Congress, or the people who make congresses, to see that the evil was corrected.
The remedy does not lie with the judicial branch of the government."

POINDEXTER v. GREENHOW, 114 U.S. 270 (1885)

It was said by Chief Justice CHASE, speaking for the whole court in Lane Co. v. Oregon (1868), 74 U.S. [7 Wall.] 71, 76, that the people, through the constitution of the United States, 'established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the states.' In no other way can the supremacy of that constitution be maintained. It creates a government in fact as well as in name, because its constitution is the supreme law of the land, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding;' and its authority is enforced by its power to regulate and govern the conduct of individuals, even where its prohibitions are laid only upon the states themselves.

Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429 (1895)

"The people of the United States constitute one nation, under one government, and this government, within the scope of the powers with which it is invested, is supreme."

"Without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States. Both the States and the United States existed before the Constitution. The people, through that instrument[the Constitution], established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States."

POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN & TRUST CO., 158 U.S. 601 (1895):

"We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income derived from real estate, and from invested personal property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments has assumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such."

"If that[rents from land] be stricken out, and also the income from all invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds, it is obvious that by a r the largest part of the anticipated revenue would be eliminated, and this would leave the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employments, or vocations; and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain, in substance, a tax on occupations and labor. We cannot believe that such was the intention of congress."

"We do not mean to say that an act laying by apportionment a direct tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof, might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments, and vocations. "

Our conclusions may therefore be summed up as follows:
First. We adhere to the opinion already announced,-that, taxes on real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the rents or income of real estate are equally direct taxes.
Second. We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes.
Third. The tax imposed by sections 27 to 37, inclusive, of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income of real estate, and of personal property, being a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution, and therefore unconstitutional and void, because not apportioned according to representation, all those sections, constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are necessarily invalid.
Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting.

16. The injustice of the conclusion points to the error of adopting it. It takes invested wealth, and reads it into the constitution as a favored and protected class of property, which cannot be taxed without apportionment, while it leaves the occupation of the minister, the doctor, the professor, the lawyer, the inventor, the author, the merchant, the mechanic, and all other forms of industry upon which the prosperity of a people must depend, subject to taxation without that condition.

KNOWLTON v. MOORE, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)

" It is true that in the income tax cases the theory of certain economists by which direct and indirect taxes are classified with reference to the ability to shift the same was adverted to. But this disputable theory was not the basis of the conclusion of the court. "
"The constitutional meaning of the word direct was the matter decided. Considering that the constitutional rule of apportionment had its origin in the purpose to prevent taxes on persons solely because of their general ownership of property from being levied by any other rule than that of apportionment, two things were decided by the court: First, that no sound distinction existed between a tax levied on a person solely because of his general ownership of real property, and the same tax imposed solely because of his general ownership of personal property. Secondly, that the tax on the income derived from such property, real or personal, was the legal equivalent of a direct tax on the property from which said income was derived, and hence must be apportioned." These conclusions, however, lend no support to the contention that it was decided that duties, imposts and excises which are not the essential equivalent of a tax on property generally, real or personal, solely because of its ownership, must be converted into direct taxes, because it is conceived that it would be demonstrated by a close analysis that they could not be shifted from the person upon whom they first fall. The proposition now relied upon was considered and refuted in Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 , 43 L. ed. 786, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522, where the court said ( p. 515, L. ed. p. 791, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 525):

'The commands of the Constitution in this, as in all other respects, must be obeyed; direct taxes must be apportioned, while indirect taxes must be uniform throughout the United [178 U.S. 41, 83] States. But while yielding implicit obedience to these constitutional requirements, it is no part of the duty of this court to lessen, impede, or obstruct the exercise of the taxing power by merely abstruse and subtle distinctions as to the particular nature of a specified tax, where such distinction rests more upon the differing theories of political economists than upon the practical nature of the tax itself.

'In deciding upon the validity of a tax with reference to these requirements, no microscopic examination as to the purely economical or theoretical nature of the tax should be indulged in for the purpose of placing it in a category which would invalidate the tax. As a mere abstract, scientific, or economical problem, a particular tax might possibly be regarded as a direct tax, when as a practical matter pertaining to the actual operation of the tax it might quite plainly appear to be indirect. Under such circumstances, and while varying and disputable theories might be indulged as to the real nature of the tax, a court would not be justified, for the purpose of invalidating the tax, in placing it in a class different from that to which its practical results would consign it. Taxation is eminently practical, and is, in fact, brought to every man's door, and for the purpose of deciding upon its validity a tax should be regarded in its actual, practical results, rather than with reference to those theoretical or abstract ideas whose correctness is the subject of dispute and contradiction among those who are experts in the science of political economy.'

"Concluding, then that the tax under consideration is not direct within the meaning of the Constitution, but, on the contrary, is a duty or excise, we are brought to consider the question of uniformity. "

Champion v. Ames(1903), 186 U.S. 321

'But if what Congress does is within the limits of its power, and is simply unwise or injurious, the remedy is that suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden [21 US 1, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23], when [195 U.S. 27, 56] he said: 'The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments."

MCCRAY v. U S, 195 U.S. 27 (1904)

"'But if what Congress does is within the limits of its power, and is simply unwise or injurious, the remedy is that suggested by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden [9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23], when [195 U.S. 27, 56] he said: 'The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments."

"Let us concede that if a case was presented where the abuse of the taxing power was so extreme as to be beyond the principles which we have previously stated, and where it was plain to the judicial mind that the power had been called into play, not for revenue, but solely for the purpose of destroying rights which could not be rightfully destroyed consistently with the principles of freedom and justice upon which the Constitution rests, that it would be the duty of the courts to say that such an arbitrary act was not merely an abuse of a delegated power, but was the exercise of an authority not conferred. "

Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.(1911), 220 U.S. 107

"This tax, it is expressly stated, is to be equivalent to 1 per centum of the entire net income over and above $5,000 received from all sources during the year, this is the measure of the tax explicitly adopted by the statute." *** In other words, the tax is imposed upon the doing of business of the character described, and the measure of the tax is to be income, with the deduction stated, received not only from property used in business, but from every source."

"The Pollock Case construed the tax there levied as direct, because it was imposed upon property simply because of its ownership."

"In the present case the tax is not payable unless there be a carrying on or doing of business in the designated capacity, and this is made the occasion for the tax, measured by the standard prescribed. The difference between the acts is not merely nominal, but rests upon substantial differences between the mere ownership of property and the actual doing of business in a certain way."

"As we have seen, the only limitation upon the authority conferred is uniformity in laying the tax, and uniformity does not require the equal application of the tax to all persons or corporations who may come within its operation, but is limited to geographical uniformity throughout the United States. This subject was fully discussed and set at rest in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747, and we can add nothing to the discussion contained in that case."

"It is therefore well settled by the decisions of this court that when the sovereign authority has exercised the right to tax a legitimate subject of taxation as an exercise of a franchise or privilege, it is no objection that the measure of taxation is found in the income produced in part from property which of itself considered is nontaxable.

BRUSHABER v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO., 240 U.S. 1 (1916)

"the conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class [240 U.S. 1, 17] of direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary, recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such"

Stratton's Independence, LTD. v. Howbert(1913), 231 U.S. 399:

"'[I]ncome' may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined, and here we have combined operations of capital and labor. As to the alleged inequality of operation between mining corporations and others, it is of course true that the revenues derived from the working of mines result to some extent in the exhaustion of the capital. But the same is true of the earnings of the human brain and hand when unaided by capital, yet such earnings are commonly dealt with in legislation as income."

Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.(1916), 240 U.S. 103:

"the provisions of the 16th Amendment conferred no new power of taxation, but simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently belonged, and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject to apportionment"

COOK v. TAIT, 265 U.S. 47 (1924)

"[T]he principle was declared that the government, by its very nature, benefits the citizen and his property wherever found, and therefore has the power to make the benefit complete. Or, to express it another way, the basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States, nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen, that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen."

BROMLEY v. MCCAUGHN, 280 U.S. 124,136 (1929)

"Whatever may be the precise line which sets off direct taxes from others, we need not now determine. While taxes levied upon or collected from persons because of their general ownership of property may be taken as direct, this Court has consistently held, almost from the foundation of our government, that a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership, is an excise which need not be apportioned, and it is enough for present purposes that this tax is of the latter class.

It is a tax laid only upon the exercise of a single one of those powers incident to ownership, the power to give the property owned to another. . . . The persistence of this distinction and the justification for it rest upon the historic fact that taxes of this type were not understood to be direct taxes when the Constitution was adopted and, as well, upon the reluctance of this Court to enlarge by construction, limitations upon the sovereign power of taxation by Article 1, sec. 8, so vital to the maintenance of the National Government.
280 U.S. at 136; see The Federalist No. 12 (Hamilton) (distinguishing between "direct taxes" and "taxes on consumption")."

Lucas v. Earl(1930), 281 U.S. 111:

"The Revenue Act of 1918 approved February 24, 1919, c. 18, 210, 211, 212(a), 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1062, 1064, 1065, imposes a tax upon the net income of every individual including 'income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service ... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid,' 213(a). The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 233, 237, 238, in sections bearing the same numbers are similar to those of the above."

"There is no doubt that the statute could tax salaries to those who earned them "

U.S. v. CONSTANTINE, 296 U.S. 287 (1935)

" The United States has the power to levy excises upon occupations, and to classify them for this purpose; and need look only to the fact of the exercise of the occupation or calling taxed, regardless of whether such exercise is permitted or prohibited by the laws of the United States or by those of a state. The burden of the tax may be imposed alike on the just and the unjust."

Charles C. Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis (1937), 301 U.S. 548:

The tax, which is described in the statute as an excise, is laid with uniformity throughout the United States as a duty, an impost, or an excise upon the relation of employment.

"But natural rights, so called, are as much subject to taxation as rights of lesser importance. An excise is not limited to vocations or activities that may be prohibited altogether. It is not limited to those that are the outcome of a franchise. It extends to vocations or activities pursued as of common right."

Employment is a business relation, if not itself a business. It is a relation without which business could seldom be carried on effectively. The power to tax the activities and relations that constitute a calling considered as a unit is the power to tax any of them. The whole includes the parts. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 267 , 268 S., 53 S.Ct. 345, 349, 350, 87 A.L.R. 1191

House Congressional Record, March 27, 1943, pg. 2580:

"The income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such. It is an excise tax with respect to certain activities and privileges (the type 3 and 4 taxes) which is measured by reference to the income which they produce. The income is not the subject of the tax; it is the basis for determining the amount of tax."

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955).

"Congress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their nature."

United States v. Melton, No. 94-5535 (4th Cir. 1996)
ARGUED: Lowell Harrison Becraft, Jr.[one of Schulz & Co. legal beagles], Huntsville, Alabama, for Appellants.

The jury heard not only the United States's evidence against the Meltons, but also the brothers' defense that they believed they were not "persons liable" for federal income tax. The jury rejected the excuse, however, and convicted them on nearly all counts.

[Subtitle A] "Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a federal tax on the taxable income of every individual.
26 U.S.C. s 1."

[Subtitle A] "Section 63 defines "taxable income" as gross income minus allowable deductions."
26 U.S.C. s 63.

[Subtitle A] Section 61 states that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived," including compensation for services.
26 U.S.C. s 61.

[Subtitle F] Sections 6001 and 6011 provide that a person must keep records and file a tax return for any tax for which he is liable.
26 U.S.C. ss 6001
26 U.S.C. ss 6011.

Finally, section 6012 provides that every individual having gross income that equals or exceeds the exemption amount in a taxable year shall file an income tax return.
26 U.S.C. s 6012.

The duty to pay federal income taxes therefore is "manifest on the face of the statutes, without any resort to IRS rules, forms or regulations." United States v. Bowers, 920 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir.1990). The rarely recognized proposition that, "where the law is vague or highly debatable, a defendant--actually or imputedly--lacks the requisite intent to violate it," Mallas, 762 F.2d at 363 (quoting United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir.1974)), simply does not apply here.
Each Melton brother had gross income in excess of the amount requiring the filing of a return in each of the years at issue. Therefore, each was a "person liable."

26 USC 7805(a) Rules and regulations
(a) Authorization - … the Secretary [of the Treasury] shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title [Title 26]…" [26 USC § 7805]

Thus under amplifying Treasury regulations for 26 USC 1, 26 CFR 1.1-1(a),(b)

Sec. 1.1-1 Income tax on individuals.

(a) General rule. (1) Section 1 of the Code imposes an income tax on the income of every individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States and, to the extent provided by section 871(b) or 877(b), on the income of a nonresident alien individual.
(b) Citizens or residents of the United States liable to tax. In general, all citizens of the United States, wherever resident, and all resident alien individuals are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code whether the income is received from sources within or without the United States.

And in Regard to 26 USC 861

TITLE 26 - INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Subtitle A - Income Taxes
CHAPTER 1 - NORMAL TAXES AND SURTAXES
Subchapter N - Tax Based on Income From Sources Within or Without
the United States
PART I - SOURCE RULES AND OTHER GENERAL RULES RELATING TO FOREIGN INCOME
Sec. 861. Income from sources within the United States
(a) Gross income from sources(activities) within United States
The following items of gross income shall be treated as
income from sources(activities) within the United States:

(3) Personal services
Compensation for labor or personal services performed in the United States;
EXCEPT that compensation for labor or services
performed in the United States shall not be deemed to be income
from sources within the United States if -

(A) the labor or services are performed by a nonresident
alien individual temporarily present in the United States for a
period or periods not exceeding a total of 90 days during the
taxable year,
(B) such compensation does not exceed $3,000 in the
aggregate, and
(C) the compensation is for labor or services performed as an
employee of or under a contract with

(i) a nonresident alien, foreign partnership, or foreign
corporation, not engaged in trade or business within the
United States, or
(ii) an individual who is a citizen or resident of the
United States, a domestic partnership, or a domestic
corporation, if such labor or services are performed for an office or place of business maintained in a foreign country
or in a possession of the United States by such individual,
partnership, or corporation.
In addition, except for purposes of sections 79 and 105 and
subchapter D, compensation for labor or services performed in the
United States shall not be deemed to be income from sources
within the United States if the labor or services are performed
by a nonresident alien individual in connection with the
individual's temporary presence in the United States as a regular
member of the crew of a foreign vessel engaged in transportation
between the United States and a foreign country or a possession
of the United States.

In Summary, if you are a United States citizen, and receive compensation for labor or services in the United States you are subject to income taxes.

compensation = item of income
in exchange for = activity
service = source.

A tax levied as an excise or duty on an activity of commerce.

A LAW DICTIONARY
by John Bouvier, Revised Sixth Edition, 1856:
WAGES, contract. A compensation given to a hired person for his or her services.

KNOWLTON v. MOORE, 178 U.S. 41 (1900)

'indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an event or an exchange.'

BROMLEY v. MCCAUGHN, 280 U.S. 124 (1929)

While taxes levied upon or collected from persons because of their general ownership of property may be taken to be direct, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Turst Co., 157 U.S. 429 , 15 S. Ct. 673; Id., 158 U.S. 601 , 15 S. Ct. 912, this court has consistently held, almost from the foundation of the government, that a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership, is an excise which neet not be apportioned

Tyler v. U.S. 281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930)

An indirect tax is a tax laid upon the happening of an event,as distinguished from its tangible fruits.

BULL v. UNITED STATES 295 U.S. 247 (1935)

", the usual procedure for the recovery of debts is reversed in the field of taxation. Payment precedes defense, and the burden of proof, normally on the claimant, is shifted to the taxpayer. The assessment supersedes the pleading, proof, and judgment necessary in an action at law, and has the force of such a judgment. The ordinary defendant stands in judgment only after a hearing. The taxpayer often is afforded his hearing after judgment and after payment, and his only redress for unjust administrative action is the right to claim restitution. But these reversals of the normal process of collecting a claim cannot obscure the fact that after all what is being accomplished is the recovery of a just debt owed the sovereign."

House Congressional Record, March 27, 1943, pg. 2580:

"The income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such. It is an excise tax with respect to certain activities and privileges (the type 3 and 4 taxes) which is measured by reference to the income which they produce. The income is not the subject of the tax; it is the basis for determining the amount of tax."

Implied contract:

GUARDIAN TRUST & DEPOSIT CO. v. FISHER, 200 U.S. 57 (1906)

An individual may be [200 U.S. 57, 69] under no obligation to do a particular thing, and his failure to act creates no liability; but if he voluntarily attempts to act and do the particular thing, he comes under an implied obligation in respect to the manner in which he does it. A surgeon, for instance, may be under no obligation, in the absence of contract, to assume the treatment of an injured person, but if he does undertake such treatment, he assumes likewise the duty of reasonable care in such treatment. The owner of a lot is not bound to build a house or store thereon, but if he does so he comes under an implied obligation to use reasonable care in the work to prevent injury therefrom to others. Holmes, Common Law, p. 278

Judges Taxed -- The Supreme Court's reasoning:

O'MALLEY v. WOODROUGH, 307 U.S. 277 (1939)

"the question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power in providing that United States judges [307 U.S. 277, 282] appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the incidences of taxation to which everyone else within the defined classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to the income of a federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of Article III, 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of judges who took office after Congress had thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article III, 1.9 To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering.

Witholding not a tax:

BARAL v. UNITED STATES, 172 F. 3d 918; affirmed SCOTUS 98-1667 (Feb 22, 2000)

"Contrary to Baral's claim, the withholding tax and estimated tax are not taxes in their own right (separate from the income tax), that are converted into income tax only on the income tax return. Rather, they are methods for collecting income taxes."