Posted on 01/07/2004 2:58:42 PM PST by quidnunc
2003 was a big year for Civil War movies. Gods and Generals, based on Jeff Shaara's novel of the same name hit theaters in the spring. Gods and Generals was a paean to the Old Confederacy, reflecting the "Lost Cause" interpretation of the war. This school of Civil War historiography received its name from an 1867 book by Edward A. Pollard, who wrote that defeat on the battlefield left the south with nothing but "the war of ideas."
I know from the Lost Cause school of the Civil War. I grew up in a Lost Cause household. I took it for gospel truth that the Civil War was a noble enterprise undertaken in defense of southern rights, not slavery, that accordingly the Confederates were the legitimate heirs of the American Revolutionaries and the spirit of '76, and that resistance to the Lincoln government was no different than the Revolutionary generation's resistance to the depredations of George III. The Lost Cause school was neatly summarized in an 1893 speech by a former Confederate officer, Col. Richard Henry Lee: "As a Confederate soldier and as a Virginian, I deny the charge [that the Confederates were rebels] and denounce it as a calumny. We were not rebels, we did not fight to perpetuate human slavery, but for our rights and privileges under a government established over us by our fathers and in defense of our homes."
Cold Mountain, based on Charles Frazier's historical novel, was released on Christmas Day. It too is about the Civil War but Cold Mountain is a far cry from Gods and Generals. This is the "other war," one in which war has lost its nobility and those on the Confederate home front are in as much danger from other southerners as they are from Yankee marauders. Indeed, Cold Mountain can be viewed as the anti-Gods and Generals.
-snip-
(Excerpt) Read more at nationalreview.com ...
How free can you expect a country to be when a foreign invading army is maneuvering about freely on your land, laying waste to your resources, while at the same time your coastal ports are being blockaded? Turn the tables and the conclusion would be the opposite.
Then you obviously don't know your ass from your elbow when it comes to history. You seem to forget that Major William Clarke Quantrill, "Bloody" Bill Anderson, Jesse James, Frank James, Cole Younger, Bob Younger were serious players for the Confederacy in Missouri and Kansas. These men held ranks and were recognised as partisans by the Confederacy. Kansas also had its Redlegs who fought for the North. Not to mention the fact that it was because of Yankee industrialist's unscrupulous dealings (something to do with the Railroad) in the Border States, that was considered the last straw in a long chain of Northern abuses of power culminating in the secession of the Southern States. The border states counted a lot!
Now as to the crux of the article, the film is an anti-war flick pure and simple. Just like "All Quiet on the Western Front". As for the way it is trying to portray Southerners wanting it to end, perhaps its accurate, but just as any Yankees deserted and were pillaging in the northern states. To sum it all up very succinctly the Roman general Vegetius once said "War is always glorious to those who are strangers to it." But what it doesn't mean is that although some Southern men were tired of the war, that they didn't do their duty, and acquit themselves honorably on the field of battle.
Lincoln started the war by dispatching the fleet to Charleston with orders to fight their way in. The confederates simply preempted its arrival.
Many Southeners were anti war -but much more were pro war and joined the North to make war on the South.
We did not simply give up the bases in the Philippines. We gave up the Philippines themselves, which would mean that specks were indeed given away.
Lincoln did not want a nation half slave and half free. Neither did he want a nation half white and half black. Lincoln didn't want free blacks in the territories either.
I HAVE A WHITE DREAM
by Abraham Lincoln
Lincoln said he was in favor of the new territories "being in such a condition that white men may find a home."
Lincoln, Alton, Illinois, 10/15/1862
Lincoln's dream did not contain Indians or even Mexicans who he referred to as "mongrels."
Lincoln, CW 3:234-5
"Resolved, That the elective franchise should be kept pure from contamination by the admission of colored votes."
That got Lincoln's vote, January 5, 1836.
"in our greedy chase to make profit of the Negro, let us beware, lest we 'cancel and tear to pieces' even the white man's charter of freedom"
Lincoln, CW 2:276
Translation for the intellectually challenged:
Lincoln's White Man's Charter of Freedom = The Declaration of Independence
Lincoln wanted the territories to be "the happy home of teeming millions of free, white prosperous people, and no slave among them"
Lincoln, 1854, CW 2:249
The territories "should be kept open for the homes of free white people"
Lincoln, 1856, CW 2:363
"We want them [the territories] for the homes of free white people."
Lincoln, CW 3:311
If slavery was allowed to spread to the territories, he said "Negro equality will be abundant, as every White laborer will have occasion to regret when he is elbowed from his plow or his anvil by slave n-----s"
Lincoln, CW 3:78 [Lincoln uses the N-word without elision]
"Is it not rather our duty to make labor more respectable by preventing all black competition, especially in the territories?"
Lincoln, CW 3:79
The orders were sent with the warships, not the tugboats. Lincoln heavily armed his expedition for a reason and that was to exert military force as he had been planning since at least the previous December - a time at which he was not even president.
with orders to supply the garrison at Ft. Sumter without violence, if possible, but under the force of arms, if need be.
The order was to attempt entry into the harbor and, if entry was not permitted, to use force to do so. Lincoln sent this order fully knowing that the denial of entry for yankee warships was a certainty. Thus the provision of force in his order was fully intended to be acted upon.
The intention to supply the Ft. Sumter garrison with provisions was made clear to the rebels in South Carolina well in advance.
The week prior Lincoln sent a two line message to the governor of South Carolina announcing (a) that he intended to resupply and (b) he would not use force if this resupply was permitted. The message contained no specifics, nor did it state that a denial of entry would be met with opening fire as his orders to the ships did. Confederate intelligence in the north discovered in advance that his resupply mission was to be conducted by warships and got word to Charleston.
Looking back on it, Lincoln had only two choices, surrender Fort Sumter, or hold it. Maintaining the status quo was not an act of war. Capturing the fort was an act of war.
That is a severe oversimplification of his options. Lincoln indisputably had a third choice he could make - negotiate the continuation of non-military provisions to the garrison by way of Charleston as had been occurring for several months prior. The fact that Lincoln consciously and repeatedly refused to even come to the table for negotiations with the confederates prevented this otherwise possible option. It should be further noted that prior to December 26, 1860 Fort Sumter was a mothballed fort without a garrison. That is the day that Robert Anderson, acting without order from the war department, abandoned Fort Moultrie and took up garrison in Sumter.
Ironically, while these events transpired, cooler heads were considering compromises that might maintain the Union, e.g., the Crittenden Compromise, or something similar. Tennessee and Virginia both delayed secession, hoping that a compromise could be worked out.
That they did. Unfortunately Lincoln did everything in his power to kill every compromise effort save one, the Corwin amendment to protect slavery that he helped to author. He virtually ignored the efforts of the Virginia-led Washington Peace Convention despite the fact that it was chaired by former president Tyler and had the ear of the Virginia governor. With the deep south, he adamantly refused to even so much as meet with three separate negotiation teams sent to discuss, offer payment for, and hopefully resolve matters such as the forts. He refused the efforts of two sitting U.S. senators (one from Virginia which had not seceded and the other from Texas, which had seceded though its delegation remained in Congress in case of emergency action being there), and a sitting supreme court justice to serve as intermediaries between administration and the CSA. Even Jefferson Davis, who had actively negotiated with the Buchanan administration prior to his own state's secession, sent the mayor of Mobile, Alabama to attempt a strictly informal meeting with Lincoln. The mayor spent several weeks in Washington trying to meet, only to return to Montgomery with a simple message for Davis: Lincoln refused to even acknowledge that I exist.
By ordering the shelling of Fort Sumter, rather than acceding to its peaceful provisioning, Davis unnecessarily started an armed insurrection.
Don't be silly. Davis waited to the last opportunity before Lincoln's ships arrived. He had Beauregard open fire only when their arrival was imminent and a preemptive measure rendered necessary. In fact, the Harriet Lane arrived off of Charleston some 5 or 6 hours before the shelling and immediately fired upon a civilian vessel, the Nashville, as it attempted to enter the port for the reason that it did not have a US flag. War was imminent and its causal event was that fleet's arrival.
"Using claims going back to La Salle and the Cruzat Charter of 1712, the United States began by claiming Texas to the Rio Grande River. Spain reacted by reopening its settlement at Los Adaes, east of the Sabine River. Tension between the two countries was escalating. Realizing La Salle's claims of the extent of French territory were not supported by recent history, and that there was a history of Spanish settlements in east Texas, the United States claimed the border to be the Sabine River. Spain said no; it was farther east." [From: Louisiana Purchase]
Lincoln dispatched two unarmed tugboats, the Uncle Ben and the Yankee, supported by three armed vessels, the Harriet Lane, the Pawnee, and the Powhatan, with orders to supply the garrison at Ft. Sumter without violence, if possible, but under the force of arms, if need be.The intention to supply the Ft. Sumter garrison with provisions was made clear to the rebels in South Carolina well in advance.
That is what was said publicly. Lincoln simply lied -- to the public, and later to Congress.
In his special message of July 4, 1861 to Congress, seeking to justify his illegal actions and to obtain Congressional forgiveness, Lincoln lied repeatedly. He gave false information and he withheld information. His lies and omissions were relevant and material. Below is one documented example of a Lincoln Lie.
The first return news from the order was received just one week before the fall of Fort Sumter. The news itself was, that the officer commanding the Sabine, to which vessel the troops had been transferred from the Brooklyn, acting upon some quasi armistice of the late administration, (and of the existence of which, the present administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had only too vague and uncertain rumors, to fix attention) had refused to land the troops.
Lincoln told Congress the administration only had uncertain rumors of some quasi armistice. Let us review some official records.
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, p. 355-6
WASHINGTON, January 29, 1861.
TO JAMES GLYNN, commanding the Macedonian; Captain W. S. WALKER, commanding the Brooklyn, and other naval officers in command; and Lieutenant ADAM J. SLEMMER, First Regiment Artillery, U. S. Army, commanding Fort Pickens, Pensacola, Fla.:
In consequence of the assurance received from Mr. Mallory in a telegram of yesterday to Messrs. Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, with a request it should be laid before the President, that Fort Pickens would not be assaulted, and an offer of such an assurance to the same effect from Colonel Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile collision, upon receiving satisfactory assurances from Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase that Fort Pickens will not be attacked, you are instructed not to land the company on board the Brooklyn unless said fort shall be attacked or preparations shall be made for its attack. The provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you will land. The Brooklyn and other vessels of war on the station will remain, and you will exercise the utmost vigilance and be prepared at a moment's warning to land the company at Fort Pickens, and you and they will instantly repel an attack on the fort.
The President yesterday sent a special message to Congress commending the Virginia resolutions of compromise. The commissioners of different States are to meet here on Monday, the 4th February, and it is important that during their session a collision of arms should be avoided, unless an attack should be made or there should be preparation for such an attack. In either event the Brooklyn and the other vessels will act promptly.
Your right, and that of the other officers in command at Pensacola, freely to communicate with the Government by special messenger, and its right in the same manner to communicate with yourself and them, will remain intact as the basis on which the present instruction is given.
J. HOLT,
Secretary of War.
ISAAC TOUCEY,
Secretary of the Navy.
O.R. Series 1, Vol 1, Part 1, page 357-8
PENSACOLA HARBOR, FLA., February 7, 1861.
Colonel L. THOMAS, Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Army:
SIR: I have the honor to report that I arrived on this station yesterday in the U. S. steamer Brooklyn, with Company A, First Artillery. I met orders here which prevent the landing of my company or the reenforcement of the garrison of Fort Pickens at present. Yesterday I landed at Fort Pickens, assumed command of the forces on the station, inspected the defenses, and had a consultation with Lieutenant Sleemer. I am compelled to remain on board the Brooklyn for the present, and can, of course, only give general instructions to Lieutenant Slemmer. I am sorry to inform the Department that I found Fort Pickens in a very inefficient state of defense. At the time Lieutenant Slemmer removed his command to Fort Pickens there were only forty guns mounted in the fort. At present there are fifty-four in position. The accompanying sketch indicates the position and class of guns now in position; total, fifty-four of all kinds.
Lieutenant Slemmer has with him only forty-six enlisted men for duty, and thirty ordinary seamen from the yard at this station, and the latter are entirely untrained, insubordinate, and of but little use in case of attack. There are fifty-seven embrasures that are unprovided with cannon, and are only about seven feet from the bottom of the ditch, and at present but few of them have only the common wooden shutter, presenting only a slight obstacle to an enemy. There are only very imperfect means of barricading them. Such as they are, however, I have given orders to be immediately employed.
Lieutenant Slemmer has been obliged to employ his command in getting guns into position and in barricading the embrasures. He is obliged to keep one-half of his men under arms every night, and they are nearly all exhausted with fatigue. The guns and carriages and implements are all old, and nearly unserviceable. I have made a requisition direct on the Department for the necessary supply of guns, carriages, and ammunition. The supply of this last is very inadequate. There is no ammunition for the columbiads, no cartridge bags for them, nor flannel to make any. In fact, had it been the intention of the government to place the fort in the state to render its defense impossible, it could not have been done more efficiently that it has been done. The post is without any medical officer, and if it is intended to defend it there should be an Engineer officer sent at once to the station. I trust that the Department will immediately order that the supplies requested be sent. There are no bunks either for the hospital or for the troops, and but little bedding for the sick. I request a supply may be sent. There are plenty of provisions for the present, although I should like some desiccated vegetables and supplies for the officers. I would mention that all of the troops will be compelled to live in open casemages, and many of them will soon be on the sick-list.
The seceders have a considerable force in and about Pensacola; what number I am unable to say positively, but they are estimated at about 1,700 men. They are disorderly, and very unwilling to be controlled. Their leaders, from what I can learn, I believe are sincere in their intention to observe the armistice, but their ability to control the men under their command is very doubtful. They are engaged in erecting batteries, are making sand bags, &c. They have plenty of means of transportation their troops to Saint Rosa Island, and can attack the fort on all sides at once. At present there is not one trained man to a gun within the fort. Should the enemy decide to attack, it is exceedingly probable that he might succeed in penetrating into the fort before my company could be landed or any succor could arrive from the fleet. I should therefore urge upon the Department the necessity of the fleet taking up a position such as to prevent the landing of any forces within one and a half miles of the fort; this would give time to provide for the defense of the work and the landing of the troops from the fleet; otherwise we may have the mortification and disgrace of seeing the fort taken by a body of untrained troops under our very noses.
Should the armistice be broken, my company, all the marines, and as many sailors as may raise the garrison to four hundred men should be immediately landed. All of the advantages of the present armistice are entirely on the side of the seceders. I would therefore urge upon the Department the necessity of immediately re-enforcing the garrison. The two additional companies ordered to Forts Taylor and Jefferson are not immediately required for the defense of those works. In fact, in their present state, and with the forces now in them, they would be stronger than Fort Pickens will be when garrisoned with four hundred men. Captain Meigs kindly offered his services, if necessary, to assist in the defense of this place, and I request the Department that he may be ordered to repair to this place.
Lieutenant Slemmer has done all that it has been possible to do with the small force under his command. His resolution to defend his post at all hazards evinces the highest moral courage on his part, but at the same time I must state that with any amount of vigor on the part of the assaulters his defense would have been hopeless. His resolution has probably been the means of preserving Fort Pickens from the seceders.
Yours, &c.,
I. VOGDES,
Captain, First Artillery.
P. S.-I must not be understood as recommending any violation of the existing armistice, but the collection of an amount of troops on the station as may be necessary for the defense should anything occur to rupture the present armistice.
FORT PICKENS, FLA., February --, 1861.
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, Page 440-1
Message of the President of the United States, in answer to a resolution of the Senate requesting information concerning the quasi armistice alluded to in his message of the 4th instant.
JULY 31, 1861.- Read, ordered to lie on the table and be printed.
To the Senate of the United States:
In answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 19th instant, requesting information concerning the quasi armistice alluded to in my message of the 4th instant, I transmit a report from the Secretary of War.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
JULY 30, 1861.
NAVY DEPARTMENT,
July 29, 1861.
The Secretary of the Navy, to whom was referred the resolution of the Senate of the 19th instant, requesting the President of the United States to "communicate to the Senate (if not incompatible with the public interest) the character of the quasi armistice to which he refers in his message of the 4th instant, be reason of which the commander of the frigate Sabine refused to transfer the United States troops into Fort Pickens in obedience to his orders; by whom and when such armistice was entered into; and if any, and what, action has been taken by the Government in view of the disobedience of the order of the President aforesaid," has the honor to report that it is believed the communication of the information called for would not, at this time, comport with the public interest.
Respectfully submitted.
GIDEON WELLES.
The PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
[Lincoln] As had been intended, in this contingency, it was also resolved to notify the Governor of South Carolina, that he might except an attempt would be made to provision the Fort; and that, if the attempt should not be resisted, there would be no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition, without further notice....
Once again, Lincoln simply lied. The day after Congress adjourned, Lincoln began to issue orders, not to resupply Sumter and Pickens, but specifically to reinforce. Lincoln lied to the governor of South Carolina and he lied to Congress.
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, page 286
MONTGOMERY, ALA., April 3, 1861 - 10 p. m.
General BEAUREGARD:
Minnesota ordered to sea, supposed to be for mouth of Mississippi; Powhatan to sail next week; Pawnee ordered to sea on Saturday. Three companies artillery (one of sappers and miners) ordered to New York; probably for the South. Be on lookout.
L. P. WALKER.
March 29, 1861
To the Secretary of the Navy
I desire that an expedition, to move by sea be go ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according to memorandum attached: and that you co-operate with the Secretary of War for that object.
Signed: Abraham Lincoln
The memorandum attached called for:
From the Navy, three ships of war, the Pocahontas, the Pawnee and the Harriet Lane; and 300 seamen, and one month's stores.
From the War Department, 200 men, ready to leave garrison; and one year's stores.
April 1, 1861 by General Scott
April 2, 1861 approved by Abraham Lincoln
To: Brevet Colonel Harvey Brown, U.S. Army
You have been designated to take command of an expedition to reinforce and hold Fort Pickens in the harbor of Pensacola. You will proceed to New York where steam transportation for four companies will be engaged; -- and putting on board such supplies as you can ship without delay proceed at once to your destination. The object and destination of this expedition will be communicated to no one to whom it is not already known. Signed: Winfield Scott
Signed approved: Abraham Lincoln
April 4, 1861
To: Lieut. Col. H.L. Scott, Aide de Camp
This will be handed to you by Captain G.V. Fox, an ex-officer of the Navy. He is charged by authority here, with the command of an expedition (under cover of certain ships of war) whose object is, to reinforce Fort Sumter.
To embark with Captain Fox, you will cause a detachment of recruits, say about 200, to be immediately organized at fort Columbus, with competent number of officers, arms, ammunition, and subsistence, with other necessaries needed for the augmented garrison at Fort Sumter.
Signed: Winfield Scott
April 1, 1861
To Captain H.A. Adams
Commanding Naval Forces off Pensacola
Herewith I send you a copy of an order received by me last night. You will see by it that I am directed to land my command at the earliest opportunity. I have therefore to request that you will place at my disposal such boats and other means as will enable me to carry into effect the enclosed order.
Signed: I. Vogdes, Capt. 1st Artly. Comdg.
Captain Adams REFUSED TO OBEY THE ORDER and reported to the Secretary of the Navy as follows:
It would be considered not only a declaration but an act of war; and would be resisted to the utmost.
Both sides are faithfully observing the agreement (armistice) entered into by the United States Government and Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase, which binds us not to reinforce Fort Pickens unless it shall be attacked or threatened. It binds them not to attack it unless we should attempt to reinforce it.
The Secretary of the Navy issued a CLASSIFIED response to Capt. Adams:
April 6, 1861
Your dispatch of April 1st is received. The Department regrets that you did not comply with the request of Capt. Vogdes. You will immediately on the first favorable opportunity after receipt of this order, afford every facility to Capt. Vogdes to enable him to land the troops under his command, it being the wish and intention of the Navy Department to co-operate with the War Department, in that object.
Signed: Gideon Welles, Secty. of the Navy
April 11, 1861 (USS Supply, official ship's log)
"April 11th at 9 P.M. the Brooklyn got under way and stood in toward the harbor; and during the night landed troops and marines on board, to reinforce Fort Pickens."
April 1, 1861 To: Lt. D.D. Porter, USN
You will proceed to New York and with least possible delay assume command of any steamer available.
Proceed to Pensacola Harbor, and, at any cost or risk, prevent any expedition from the main land reaching Fort Pickens, or Santa Rosa.
You will exhibit this order to any Naval Officer at Pensacola, if you deem it necessary, after you have established yourself within the harbor.
This order, its object, and your destination will be communicated to no person whatever, until you reach the harbor of Pensacola.
Signed: Abraham Lincoln
Recommended signed: Wm. H. Seward
April 1, 1861
Telegram
To: Commandant, Brooklyn Navy Yard
Fit out Powhatan to go to sea at the earliest possible moment, under sealed orders. Orders by confidential messenger go forward tomorrow.
Signed: Abraham Lincoln
April 1, 1861
To: Commandant, Brooklyn Navy Yard
You will fit out the Powhatan without delay. Lieutenant Porter will relieve Captain Mercer in command of her. She is bound on secret service; and you will under no circumstances communicate to the Navy Department the fact that she is fitting out.
Signed: Abraham Lincoln
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, page 291
APRIL 8, 1861.
"I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and that if such attempt be not resisted no effort to throw in men, arms, or ammunition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort."
The above was communicated to us on the evening of April 8 by Robert S. Chew, esq., of the State Department in Washington, and Captain Talbot stated that it was from the President of the United States, as did Mr. Chew, and was delivered to him on the 6th instant at Washington, and this was read in their presence and admitted.
F. W. PICKENS.
G. T. BEAUREGARD.
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, page 292
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Headquarters, April 9, 1861.
To the PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES:
MY DEAR SIR: I send by the bearer important dispatches to the Secretary of War, and beg to call your immediate attention to them. The bearer is Colonel Hayne, an aide of mine, and will return immediately to me. If you have anything particular to General Beauregard or myself, you can trust it to him, and he will bring it back immediately. Since I inclosed the dispatch to the Secretary of War Major Anderson has written a polite note to General Beauregard, requesting that the letters taken from the mail might be returned, as he had been notified that his mails would be stopped entirely. The general returned for answer that the private letters had been sent to their destination, but the official letters were sent to the Confederate Government, because rumors, well established, indicated that Mr. Fox had violated his faith to me in visiting the fort, under the guarantee of Captain Hartstene, who went with him. The pledge was that he visited Major Anderson by authority, for pacific purposes entirely. You see that the present scheme for supplying the fort is Mr. Fox's. It is thought that the attempt will be made to-night, and we have doubled our steamboats on the harbor and bar.
Since I wrote to the War Department we have increased the forces on Morris Island to two thousand one hundred men, and ten companies of fine men arrive to-night, in the next train, of eight hundred men, and two more regiments arrive to-morrow. We hope to have about six thousand men there on the harbor batteries and posts. I trust we are ready, and if they come we will give them a cordial reception, such as will ring through this country, I think. I hope we are not mistaken; but, at any rate, we will try and do our duty.
With great esteem, yours, very truly,
F. W. PICKENS.
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, page 292
O.R. Series 1, Vol. 1, Part 1, page 293
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Headquarters, April 9, 1861.
Honorable Mr. WALKER, Secretary of War:
SIR: At the request of General Beauregard I inclose the within. I took possession of the mails this morning from Sumter, and retained the packages marked "official." These are all sent you. The private letters are all sent, as directed, to their owners. I did this because I consider a state of war is now inaugurated by the authorities at Washington, and all information of a public nature was necessary to us. The mails and all intercourse of any kind with Sumter are now forbidden, and I immediately refused Captain Talbot any interview with Major Anderson, and also his request to be restored to his command in the fort. I called in General Beauregard, and made Captain Talbot and Mr. Chew repeat in his presence what they had said and what the former desired as to Sumter, and General Beauregard entirely and immediately concurred.
You will see by these letters of Major Anderson how it is intended to supply the fort; but by God's providence we will, I trust, be prepared for them; and if they approach with war vessels also, I think you will hear of as bloody a fight as ever occurred. We now have three thousand seven hundred men at the different posts and batteries, and will have by to-morrow three thousand more, which I have called down. From my calculation, I think they will have about two thousand six hundred, and will attempt to land in launch-boats with 24 and 12 pounders, and it will probably be on the lower end of Morris Island, next the light-house. If so, we will have a fine rifle regiment to give them a cordial welcome from behind sand hills (that are natural fortifications), and two Dahlgren guns will be right on them, besides four 24-pounders in battery. I have four hundred fine Enfield rifles that have been practiced at nine hundred yards, and on that island, altogether, we have now one thousand nine hundred and fifty men, and are increasing it to-day.
There has just arrived on the bar a fine rifled cannon from Liverpool, of the latest maker (Blakely gun), an improvement upon Armstrong, of steel rolls or coils, with an elevation of seven and one-half degrees to a mile. It throws a shell or twelve-pound shot with the accuracy of a dueling-pistol, and only one and one-half pounds of powder. Such, they write me, is this gun, and I hope to have it in position to-night. We expect the attack about 6 o'clock in the morning, on account of the tide.
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