Posted on 01/05/2004 5:34:40 PM PST by xzins
The Air-Maneuver and Transport Concept: Can it Transform the Nature of Rapid Contingency Operations? January 2004
By Lt. Gen. H. Thomas Fields Jr., U.S. Army retired
In the year 2020 a Middle East dictator attacked and occupied an oil-rich neighboring state. Other neighboring states were intimidated and reluctant to provide basing or overflight rights to a U.S.-led coalition. The United States initially responded with long-range strike and naval aviation to achieve air superiority and destroy the enemy's integrated air defense system. The enemy countered by dispersing ground forces, including mobile gun-missile air defense artillery (ADA) systems, into urban areas. The enemy also mined seaports and airfields to prevent access by U.S. forces. Armored reserves were placed in close proximity to major ports and airfields to react to airborne or amphibious assault. There were no indications of U.S. presence in near-range intermediate staging bases although naval forces were operating over the horizon.
Early one morning, the enemy began receiving reports that elements of highly mobile Future Combat System (FCS) brigades had been delivered overnight in dispersed areas of the country and were rapidly closing on critical objectives. Additional forces were inserted from long range by C-130J aircraft as isolated airfields were overrun by the FCS units. The FCS brigades possessed long-range fire support and organic attack helicopters. The U.S. force operated with minimal reliance on ground lines of communication (GLOC) for sustainment. There was no pause in operational tempo to replenish fuel and ammunition. The U.S.-led coalition seemed to be able to strike from anywhere with little apparent infrastructure. The enemy's dispersed forces were isolated and could not react to the sudden attacks from unexpected directions. Within days the enemy force had either been destroyed, surrendered or deserted. As urban areas were occupied by U.S. forces, palletized loads of humanitarian supplies were delivered by air to restore and reconstitute vital services. The campaign was successfully concluded with minimal casualties in a matter of days. Airports and seaports of debarkation (APOD/SPOD) were cleared for commercial traffic. The United States, fighting as part of a multinational coalition, had been able to dominate a determined and well-prepared enemy with no prolonged deployment phase or large-scale commitment of forces. How was it done?
The air-maneuver and transport (AMT) concept is the enabler for the type of campaign currently envisioned by the architects of the Transformation process. It would enable surprise entry, rapid operational tempo and pulsed sustainment of the U.S. ground forces in the scenario on Page 21. The AMT is presently a concept which will lead to an advanced lift platform capable of self-deploying up to 2,100 nautical miles, operating from austere support facilities or shipboard, and then transporting FCS-equipped brigades up to 1,000 kilometers into landing zones within one to two terrain features of intended engagement areas. The AMT will combine long-range, high payload and vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capabilities to extend the dominant maneuver and focused logistics characteristics of the future force. The AMT concept has been extensively investigated as an essential capability for the future force during the annual Army Transformation war games conducted at the Army War College since 1998. These war games have shown that the AMT concept will enable the future force to overcome enemy anti-access strategies, execute joint operational maneuver from strategic distances, conduct mounted and dismounted vertical envelopment operations and reduce reliance on ground lines of communication by conducting large volume aerial sustainment of deployed forces. The aerial sustainment capability is enabled by the capability to lift loads in excess of 20 tons and by advanced self-loading and discharging load-handling system flat racks incorporated into the AMT design. The AMT will be capable of shipboard operations, enabling it to conduct ship-to-air to objective area delivery of troops and supplies without transiting vulnerable airports or seaports of debarkation. The ability of an enemy to inflict U.S. casualties by attacking supply convoys along extended ground lines of communications will be severely degraded. These capabilities will reduce support structure requirements -- thereby enhancing Army deployability and reducing demands on strategic lift. As the AMT concept has matured, a number of existing and projected alternative materiel solutions have been examined and found wanting in providing the range of capabilities designed for the FCS unit of action. Fixed-wing aircraft such as the C-17, C-130 and future advanced tactical transport are not capable of vertical takeoff or landing or shipboard operations and are therefore more vulnerable to anti-access strategies. Present rotary-wing and tilt-rotor systems lack the range with the payload capabilities required for operational and tactical maneuver of the FCS system of systems. Also, the heavy lift VTOL capability of all our services has aged. The AMT concept offers a viable augmentation or replacement for such venerable work horses as the Army's CH-47 fleet and the U.S. Marine Corps CH-53.
An asymmetric enemy will obviously have invested heavily to counter the certainty of overwhelming U.S. air power. The threat to AMT will consist of man-portable air defense systems, close combat surface-to-air missile systems, air defense artillery systems, small arms and air-launched missiles and gunfire. The AMT survivability suite will incorporate an integrated suite of state-of-the-art laser, infrared and radio frequency aircraft survivability equipment plus joint tactical radio system based linkage to a network of joint and Army sensors, shooters and deciders. This will provide early warning and joint suppression of enemy air defenses. Survivability will also be enhanced by the capability to operate from secure bases and avoid prepared landing areas.
A number of materiel solutions have been identified for system level analysis to determine suitability and technical feasibility as the primary AMT candidate. These include tilt rotors, compounds such as a reverse velocity rotor helicopter, conventional helicopters and super-heavy lifter cranes. While there are advantages and disadvantages to each materiel concept, the winning solution will need to produce an AMT small enough to be configured for ship storage. This is because the future force will rely on fast sealift as a primary deployment means and self-deployment may not be feasible or desirable -- given anti-access strategies of potential adversaries. The cargo weight and range requirements for the AMT are obviously nonnegotiable if FCS brigades are to be empowered to conduct operational maneuver from strategic distances. Rotor wash should be equal to or less than present medium-lift helicopters for the AMT to be employed in close proximity to dismounted troops.
While the eventual form of the AMT is uncertain, there are clearly reasons to pursue the AMT concept. First, the FCS must be capable of being lifted into restricted terrain if it is to be capable of dominating the future operational environment. Second, the Army must reduce dependence on APODs, SPODs and GLOCs to reduce force vulnerability to anti-access strategies. Third, the Army's own analysis and gaming has shown that the difference between a future force with AMT and one without AMT is profound. Finally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's advanced mobility concepts study technology panel concluded there is high potential that technology can be matured to produce the AMT at an affordable fly-away cost.
Occasionally a system is fielded that changes the nature of military operations. World War I saw the tank used to eliminate a stalemate between entrenched adversaries. World War II saw the use of air power to destroy an adversary's industrial capacity. Korea showed the capability of aerial medical evacuation to reduce mortality and morbidity. Vietnam saw the helicopter change the nature of ground maneuver. In the 21st century, the AMT could provide a joint commander the freedom to choose the launch point to insert highly mobile and lethal forces simultaneously into critical points of an area of operations without reliance upon interim staging bases, overflight routes or lengthy buildup of forces. This would, indeed, change the nature of rapid contingency operations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LT. GEN. H. THOMAS FIELDS JR., USA Ret., serves on the Senior Advisory Board of the Army Aviation Association of America. An infantryman with more than 34 years active service, he has served at every level of command from platoon to division. His last assignment was chief of staff/deputy commander, U.S. Pacific Command.
Rotorcraft is not the only technology available. Blimps are currently in use to transport large, heavy objects to places unreachable by conventional means
Oh, you mean like how Iraq bought all that good modern stuff in the 1980s?
Hint: it doesn't matter what they can buy. It matters what they can actually use in a war.
The Russians and Chinese have decent air and ADA technology and nuke capacity.
Of the three statements in that sentence, only the last is true.
There are a number of ways to prevent air superiority.
Using nukes is not a viable option, unless Russia or China are really, really intent on committing national suicide. Yes, there are a number of ways to prevent air superiority exclusive of nukes--but there are a number of ways to defeat those measures, too.
BTW, the only plausible "China" scenario I see has us aligned with Russia, and my money's on the "Yangtze Station" scenario (we re-establish gunboat patrols on the Yangtze River to deal with the various local bandits and warlords).
Not just superiority, but complete annhilation of the enemy's air defenses. With the number of shoulder-fired SAM devices out there, hiding among civilian zones, that annhilation may not be practically achievable. Once the heavy defenses are neutralized, then the locals merely pop away at ANYTHING that flies as it will then be one of ours.
Sure, the USMC isn't doing it the way this guy is projecting. My point is that an airmobile capability off of the big gators such as Kearsarge or Wasp has been around for them for a while, making this notion presented here not such a big leap, especially when one considers that the Army already has large airborne and airmobile units.
However, he does sound as if he's veering into pipe dream territory, i.e. deploying mechanized units from the air. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding though, the piece was kind of hard for me to read.
The trick is to insert into areas where the people aren't--but that the enemy MUST be able to traverse.
Imagine trying to defend every foot of a major highway. It forces the enemy to try to be strong everywher--which they can't.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.