Defense Bleatings?

The Washington Times ^ | December 19, 2003 | Arnaud de Borchgrave

[Mel Gibson]

An article of faith among most Arab policymakers is that the U.S. gave Saddam Hussein a yellow-to-green light to invade Kuwait in 1990. Some of them will concede, albeit off the record, the yellow light was probably inadvertent and a reflection of inept diplomacy. Others state flatly, also off the record, that it had switched from yellow to green and that it was deliberate.

The option of a U.S. red light that signaled clearly "do not cross the Kuwaiti border" is dismissed out of hand. No such signal was ever given by the U.S. There is also much evidence that coddling a tyrant became the better part of valor for three U.S. presidents — Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George Bush (41).

Yellow or green will almost certainly be in the arsenal of any Saddam defense team. A group of Jordanian lawyers has already volunteered to organize a legal defense fund for the former Iraqi president. Jordan was one of two nations, with Yemen, who declined to join the coalition of almost 30 nations assembled by George Bush the elder (41).

The Arab world's conspiracy theorists argue that when 100,000 troops and 300 tanks were poised at Kuwait's border in late July 1990, about to attack, the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, gave Saddam the distinct impression the U.S. didn't care what happened. She had just returned to the U.S. Embassy from a meeting at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry when she got word that she was to come back to the ministry immediately. Without any explanation as to where she was going, she was taken to see Saddam. It was her first meeting with the president.

In a much-reported exchange, Miss Glaspie told Saddam "your inter-Arab disputes do not concern the United States but we strongly believe they should be settled peacefully." Next day, Miss Glaspie left Iraq to pick up her mother in London and begin a long planned home leave.

On July 31, two days before the balloon went up, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly testified before Congress that the U.S. had no defense treaty with Kuwait or other Persian Gulf countries. On Aug. 1, the Bush 41 administration approved the sale of advanced data-transmission devices to Iraq. And the day after that, Aug. 2, 1990, Saddam gave his generals the green light to invade Kuwait. Throughout the Arab world's 22 countries, present and former policymakers believe this was the direct result of that ill-fated meeting with the U.S. ambassador when she flashed what Saddam interpreted to be either a yellow or green light.

Ask Arab interlocutors, again off the record, why the U.S. would have wanted Saddam to take over Kuwait? The answers are usually variations on the same theme: As a pretext to bring America's full military power into the Gulf to establish a protectorate over its vast oil resources.

[Mel Gibson]

I first heard of the evil of Saddam Hussein's Iraq through Arnaud de Borchgrave's Insight Magazine in the mid 80's. Once again the ineptitude of James "The Incompetent" Baker III comes into play as then Sec. of State overseeing Amb. April Glaspie the American Ambassador to Iraq. I have not heard about April Glaspie in over a decade. De Borchgrave is one of the most informative and insightful foreign affairs correspondents.

[DarthMaulrulesok]

OF COURSE we supported Saddam in the 1980's!! what would have been better, the US containing Iran (which had and has an aggressive, expansionist policy) with our OWN troops or taking advantage of regional rivalry to do the job for us, with minimum cost and risk. We balanced Russia with China in the same way and for the same reasons.

As a result, we didn't have to confront Iran directly except at sea (where we held all the cards) in 1987-8.

The result for us was the best possible - both sides were exhausted with neither gaining any significant advantage. Iran was unable to export their revolution except to Lebannon and perhaps the Sudan. Not bad, for us, given that the Saudis were fighting pitched battles against Iranian pilgrims in 1979 in Mecca. Good thing we never had to fight Iran directly during the last phase of the Cold War - who knows what Russia might have done if they thought we were too busy.

Yes, we may have dropped the ball in 1990 - but even if we had given a "red light" would Saddam have paid attention? He attacked a country with 3 times his population because he thought he could get away with it. He had a lot of battle-tested troops, plenty of weapons, short lines of supply and attack, chemical weapons for back up - He had no reason not to feel confident that he could make a "caravan raid" take Kuwait, and get away with it.

[RLK]

Arnaud is one of the top conservative editors and minds in the country. He digs in beyond superficiality.

[leadhead]

He'll probably be offered Herman Goering's cigar.

[truth_seeker]

Whatever led up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the size of the opposing coalition, and the fact the coalition gave Iraq ample time to retreat without conflict, are not even mentioned.

Based on Saddam's overall history, I'd be much more inclined to believe that HE misread Glaspie's words of warning, concerning the US position, than the idea we gave him a yellow-green light.

Muslim and arab sources are about as reliable for truthtelling as Baghdad Bob.

The brutality of Iraq when invading Kuwait should not be overlooked, not to mention setting afire the oil resources.

The world is better off, now, both for kicking Iraq out of Kuwait, and then finishing up the overthrow of Saddam.

[claudiustg]

There seem to be a number of versions of what April Glaspie said to Saddam. Here are two versions:

---Ed Jajko adds more information on April Glaspie: "In my previous message concerning Ambassador April Glaspie's meeting with Saddam Hussein, 25 July 1990, I gave citations to web pages that have versions of the transcript of the meeting. That was out of librarian's habit, simply directing people to the sources. Here, with citation again to the web pages, are quotations, lifted out of context, of the relevant words. There are significant differences between the two versions:

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/ARTICLE5/april.html

Saddam Hussein - As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - What solutions would be acceptable?
Saddam Hussein - If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in our war with Iran - we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in Saddam's view, including Kuwait ) then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States' opinion on this?
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - We have no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960's, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)

On August 2, 1990 four days later, Saddam's massed troops invade and occupy Kuwait.

http://www.chss.montclair.edu/english/furr/glaspie.html

THE NEW YORK TIMES INTERNATIONAL
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 1990
Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting with U.S. Envoy




GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears to us?

Ronald Hilton - 2/23/03 ---

The meeting with Saddam appears to have been a career breaker.

---April Catherine Glaspie (born 1942) was U.S. ambassador to Iraq until the 1991 Gulf War. Some time after that, she was U.S. consul general in Cape Town, South Africa, and at some other time, she worked for UNRWA on the West Bank.---

Spreading joy wherever she went no doubt.

[Mr. Mojo]

the size of the opposing coalition, and the fact the coalition gave Iraq ample time to retreat without conflict, are not even mentioned.

Bttt, and good point; Arnaud omitted quite an important detail or two.

[meenie]

We worked for a stalemate, that is surely right. The concern was more directed toward keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East, for this was the latter stages of the Cold War. The Soviets and US were both trying to play both ends against the middle. They both were furnishing arms to both sides with the Soviets favoring Iran and the US favoring Iraq. Iraq received more help than Iran because it was a smaller military in numbers than Iran.

[August West]

I think you mean pipe.