Officer: Saddam trained al-Qaida pre-9-11

Officer: Saddam trained al-Qaida pre-9-11
Iraqi paper says Fedayeen supervised hijack drills in summer 2001

Saddam Hussein ordered the training of al-Qaida members two months before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, according to an independent Iraqi weekly.

The Fedayeen, under the command of Saddam's late son Uday, directly supervised 100 al-Qaida fighters who were split into two groups, reported Al-Yawm Al-Aakher, citing an Iraqi officer identified by the initial L.

One group went to Al-Nahrawan and the second to Salman Pak, near Baghdad, where they were trained to hijack airplanes, the officer said in an article translated by the Washington, D.C.-based Middle East Media Research Institute.

According to the testimony of Iraqi military defector Sabah Khalifa Khodada Alami, Iraqi intelligence had a Boeing 707 fuselage at Salman Pak used to train groups how to hijack planes without weapons. His claims were consistent with commercial satellite photos showing the fuselage. Saddam's regime insisted to U.N. inspectors Salman Pak was an anti-terror training camp for Iraqi special forces.

The Iraqi weekly, quoting the anonymous officer, said senior Fedayeen officers visited the al-Qaida fighters almost daily, "especially during the final days when they transferred them, late at night in two red trucks that belonged to the Ministry of Transportation, to an undisclosed destination."

"I witnessed that with my own eyes because on that day I was the duty officer," he said.

The officer recalled one day a Land Cruiser belonging to Saddam's personal security force, Al-Amn Al-Khass, arrived, and a senior officer, one of Saddam's personal bodyguards, stepped out.

After a two-hour meeting with a select group of officers at the Special Forces school, the officer said "we were informed that we would have dear guests, and that we should train them very well in a high level of secrecy – not to allow anyone to approach them or to talk to them in any way, shape or form."

About 100 trainees arrived a few days later, he said, a mixture of Arabs, Arabs from the Saudi peninsula, Muslim Afghans and other Muslims from various parts of the world.

The training, he said, was under direct supervision of a major general he identified only by his initials, M. DH. L, who he said now serves as a police commander in one of the provinces.

Most left Iraq after completion of their training, but others stayed through the last battle in Baghdad against coalition forces earlier this year.

The officer said he remembers the leader of the group was a Saudi cleric named Muhammad "who was a fervent and audacious individual and did not require much training."

"He was highly skilled, and could fire accurately at a target while riding a motorcycle," the Iraqi officer said. "Additionally, he used to deliver fiery sermons calling for jihad and for fighting the Americans anywhere in the world."

Surprisingly, he continued, "this man's picture, alongside the commander of the Special Forces school, was televised several times before the beginning of the war and the fall of the former regime."

At the beginning of the Iraq war this year, the officer said, "we were surprised to see the same people whom we had trained return to the Special Forces school and with them 100 additional individuals. The high command asked us to retrain them and to divide them into several groups to be deployed in various areas in Iraq."

"Truth be told," he said, "most of these individuals competed to go to war and to the front lines. Therefore, under pressure they participated immediately in extremely fierce battles that astonished the Iraqis and the Americans."

On April 5, about 100 of the foreign trainees were sent to the 11th company division on the front lines in Nasiriya.

"And for the sake of history," he said, "I will say that this division's endurance was due to some formidable fighters, the commanding officer and members of al-Qaida who fought with intensity and brutality that are seldom matched, while they were praising Allah: Allahu Akbar [Allah is great] … Allahu Akbar. …"

These battled, which took place for 17 days, forced coalition troops to withdraw and re-enter from the industrial areas of Nasiriya, he noted.

Others went to al-Kifl, he said, and participated in "extremely brutal battles."

"Not many of them retreated and they sacrificed their lives to Apache [helicopter] fire, amid the admiration of the Iraqis and the Americans themselves," he said. "The proof is that some of them blew themselves up in the midst of American forces."

PREPARED TESTIMONY BY DR. PHEBE MARR
Author, Specialist on Iraq
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
August 1, 2002

The Economic Elite The third pillar of the regime is the economic elite, often referred to as an economic "mafia". It is a product of the state's control over oil and other resources, which it distributes through a patronage system, controlled by Saddam's family and clan. But the largesse is spread into all communities, tying important Kurdish, shi'ah, and sunni elements to the regime. Most are contractors who owed their wealth to government patronage; a smaller number are industrialists. While this group can provide the support, the contacts and some of the know-how to revive the economy, it cannot be expected to provide alternative political leadership. In fact, it is not a true private sector independent of the state. Indeed, one of the best changes that could be introduced would be to separate this economic class from the state, and to move toward the creation of a true, and more independent, private sector.

Dispite what your earlier insulting post stated, I've been busy. Some of have to work for a living, you know...

OK, let's see...

In your first post, from May 2000, the article states, "Cooperation with the Iraqi regime earns him perks..."

I'll bet they did.

I understand that life was difficult in sanctions-enforced Iraq, sanctions, it might be added, that were the direct result of Saddam's misbehavior. But that is neither here nor there.

While everyone must have an income to eat, and no one works for free, in the context of our discussion we must ask, what would be the consequences of Al Shammari's non-cooperation?

I think we all know the answer to that one.

The question here is, given that, can this really be called patronage?

This guy has killed for less. I agree, Saddam played the tribes like an orchestra, but the only ones in Iraq under his tender mercies who truly qualified for patronage were family, a few (very few) close friends, and Baathists who proclivities were already well known to the inner circle.

Given that, wouldn't nepotism be closer to the truth?

Websters 7th Collegiate gives us 5 definitions for the word, and for purposes of this discussion only one fits - "the power to make appointments to government jobs on a basis other than merit alone".

The problem with this is, in Saddam's Iraq, most of those who wielded power were advanced on the basis of merit! In a most perverse manner, this state was a meritocracy! They merited power and advancement precisely because they'd shown Saddam what they could do, and were most willing to do.

The other article you post regards Dr Phebe Marr, whom I have great respect for. However, in a recent interview she states that a "large majority" have no stake in Iraq's future. That is a rather stunning, sweeping generalization that seems in direct conflict with the stated goals of the modernization of that country. It is a view I can quite come to accept. Perhps she will proven right, but know this - that "large majority" now has better prospects for itself than any time since 1968.

In the article you cite, she correctly views the "mafia" aspect of the economic realities in the country in that time. But while a "spreading of largesse" undoubtedly occurred, it should be asked, for example, "What happened to the $1.9 billion that was appropriated by the UN for the 'Oil For Food' program?"

It's already been been shown that not too many Iraqis got much, if any, food from this, but that Saddam and his pals took care of themselves first, and then gave the army first dibs on the remainder. First and foremost, he always made sure which way the guns were pointing.

Those were good posts you made, in and of themselves, but they don't quite make your case for you. You are undoubtedly well-versed on this subject, but my initial premise stands - that while corrupt, Saddam's Iraq relied on unrelenting terror to insure his continued survival, and that paying off segments of that society was simply a cost-effective means of insuring compliance. It's easier and faster to pay someone off, for sure, but he was just as willing to slit a throat as he was to make a payment. I can't quite see that as patronage. Sorry.

That's the way I see it.

CA....

I must admit to being a tad confused by your post. You have clamed repeatedly that a patronage system did not exist in Iraq.

A dictator as ruthless as Saddam, who already controlled, and exercised that control over, a well-furnished military, has no need whatsoever to implement a "patronage" system.

He did not draw support from the Sunnis in exchange for "jobs" and "favors". He did not have need of, and indeed did not have, a political patronage system.

Patronage was not one of his weapons of choice, as it were.

In your most recent post you professed admiration for Dr. Phebe Marr. Contrary to your argument, Dr. Phebe Marr clearly describes a patronage system as one of the pillars of support for the Hussein regime. Dr. Phebe Marr describes a system of patronage that extends far beyond Saddam's family, a handful of close friends, and Baathists (scratch the nepotism argument).

By the way, I would like to see a single shred of evidence that Saddam awarded jobs based on merit.

Do you still consider my argument "absurd" (Insulting post?) as you stated in one of your first replies to me?

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