Posted on 10/27/2004 10:46:28 PM PDT by Old_School_Federalist
A few items mentioned by John Kerry during the debates so concerned me that I felt compelled to write papers regarding them. This related his statements regarding Afghanistan and the construction of our military. These statements alarmed me as a veteran because they demonstrated an obvious misconstruction on the part of Senator Kerry regarding military operations and the organization of our forces - a dangerous factor in a candidate for our nations Commander-in-Chief. During the debates, when these statements were mentioned, I felt they received very little clarification from the main stream media. For anyone to make such statements, as both the Senators did, demonstrates to me that that individual either lacks a knowledge regarding the subject matter or is preying on the naivety of the constituency for mere political gain. I was very pleased to see that the President recently began to address one of these issues. However, I respect that the people of this country need to receive the facts regarding these issues from as many different sources as possible.
I would request that everyone who agrees with the position of these documents please forward them to as many individuals as possible.
During the presidential debates, a repeated talking point emerged from the Kerry/Edwards camp – being mentioned twice by Senator Kerry during the first Presidential debate, twice again by Senator Edwards during the Vice Presidential debate, alluded to once again by Senator Kerry during the second debate, and finally repeated again by Senator Kerry in the last debate. This point, to quote Senator Kerry was that “we didn't use American forces, the best trained in the world, to go kill [Usama bin Laden]. The president relied [instead] on Afghan warlords and he outsourced that job[1]”. This provides either a perfect demonstration of a misconstruction on the part of the Kerry/Edwards campaign regarding composition and orchestration of the conflict in Afghanistan or an intentional twisting of facts to promote political ends.
Yes, it is true that the conflict in Afghanistan was conducted principally by the indigenous population. This is a fact that does not need to be denied and in fact should be proudly admitted by both the current administration and the Pentagon. However, anyone with a cursory knowledge of the history and culture of Afghanistan and the structure of the American Special Forces units involved in the conflict recognizes the sensibility of this decision and would undoubtedly argue that the conflict as directed could not have been conducted any other way.
The prospect of an outright invasion of Afghanistan with traditional forces (infantry, armor, etc.), “were not necessarily attractive[2].” First, for about 10 years, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics conducted an active campaign in Afghanistan. This campaign evolved to encompass hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops and utilized the most advanced Soviet technology of the time (a technology by the way which was then roughly comparable to our own). This invasion by the Soviet Union was thwarted by a strong Afghanistan resistance comprised of localized guerrilla bands. The quick mobilization and construction of these guerrilla forces and their willingness to fight side by side with a differing administration[3] demonstrated an unswerving resistance by the local population to any foreign invasion. The Soviets suffered countless casualties in the frustrating effort to defeat the warlords. The Afghan tribes simply hated foreigners[4]. Thus, the prospect of an outright invasion of Afghanistan with traditional American forces did not offer extraordinary high prospects for quick success as the likelihood was high that we would then be fighting the very warlords who ultimately became our allies.
Second there would be the obvious issue of buildup. This would have taken months as military bases and this and that [supply lines, support operations, etc.] would have to have been established[5]. In short, the quickest, best option for the liberation of Afghanistan and the destruction of both the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda terrorist network was the use of Special Forces and the indigenous resistance units (the Northern Alliance and other forces resistant to the Mujahidin and the Taliban Government).
The key to understanding this type of unconventional warfare and why it had to be conducted the way it was is to respect the structure and purpose of the Special Forces units within the United States Military. “During conflict, SOF [Special Operation Forces] may be most effective in conducting economy-of-force operations, generating strategic advantage disproportionate to the resources they represent. SOF can locate, seize, or destroy strategic targets; obtain critical intelligence; test an enemy's defenses; diminish his prestige; disorganize, disrupt, and demoralize his troops; and divert important resources[6].” This does not denote, therefore, a group of “supper soldiers” designed to take the place of infantry during conflict but rather a small group (only approximately 4,500 Green Berets[7]) of specially trained individuals designed to act as force multiples during combat. The key here is for each Special Forces soldier to provide the combat effectiveness of 8 to 10 regular infantry soldiers allowing a 12 man Special Forces A-team to render the fighting power of a light infantry company[8] (about 100 to 120 men).
Special Forces achieve this multiplying factor not because they are necessarily 8 to 10 time stronger then regular Army soldiers, nor 8 to 10 times smarter than regular Army soldiers, nor 8 to 10 times better shots that regular Army soldiers, they accomplish it because of the tactics they use. One such tactic is to train and prepare indigenous forces to perform the tasks necessary to successfully achieve US military objectives. In short, this means they are 10 times more efficient because they quickly assembly forces of locals to help do the job. In Afghanistan these forces were the Northern Alliance. Because our Special Forces helped prepare these soldiers and then utilized their talents and skills to accomplish our objectives, the campaign was a success.
The Senators would have the people believe that we should have sent elements from the 10th mountain division stationed in Uzbekistan into the area. However, this force appears to have only constituted around 1,000 and 2,000 troops[9] apparently performing roles principally related to base protection[10]. When this number is compared with the approximately 20,000 fighters comprising just the Northern Alliance[11] it is obvious why local soldiers were utilized to comb the large areas of land than needed to be searched.
The Senators apparently fail to recognize that a search operation such as this is more akin to a police man hunt than a military operation. In this type of affair, military battle tactics, strategy and training are less important than intimate knowledge of the region – even the FBI makes heavily use of local law enforcement when conducting man hunts, because they know the area. The local indigenous forces know the region far better than we ever could. They grew up there. They know all the hiding places because they spent years using them against the Soviets. Point blank, the best chance of finding bin Laden was to use the people who knew best where to look.
Moreover, when Senator Kerry implied that because our soldiers were the best trained in the World as though that would make them better qualified for search efforts, he demonstrated a general misunderstanding about the structure and purpose of American military training.
First, the best trained of our Army’s soldiers, the Green Berets, constitutes a combined force of only about 4,500 men a force only about 1/5 the size of that which the Northern Alliance had available in the region.
Second, part of the reason Special Forces are successful is that they are specifically trained for the various regions of the World (South America, South East Asia, Europe, Africa and Central Asia and the Middle East, etc.). Therefore, out of that 4,500, only a fraction has the regional knowledge to be truly efficient in Afghanistan.
Third the training that Senator Kerry alluded to is not the police or law enforcement training that would come into play during such a man hunt, but rather basic infantry and combat training. The 10th Mountain Division, to cite the Senators example, most of the members of which (excluding Military Intelligence and Military Police units) have received almost no training in the area relating to criminology, the interviewing of informants, the interrogation of suspects, or the locating criminals. They are therefore effectively no more qualified to perform such tasks than the Afghanistan forces which the Senator statement implied were comparatively untrained.
Finally, we must remember that the majority of our regular Army forces, the only units which could offer the numbers necessary to impact a search of such extraordinary size and scope, are composed of young service members who enlisted within the last 10 years (since the 1991 Gulf War Conflict), thus by and large, the majority of our traditional combat forces had little or no combat experience. US Military training is designed to gracefully and humanely prepare soldiers for combat. The general problem with this is that no graceful, humane method of training can ever truly prepare soldiers for the horrors of combat. Thus, our training efforts are designed to do the best they can to provide our soldiers with the best chance of survival. However, this training can never be compared to the years of veteran combat experiences obtained by the Afghanistan rebels who have been fighting the Taliban for over 10 years and some of whom were fighting the Soviets before that. These forces do not need combat training, as they have lived in combat most of their lives. To imply that they are not as well trained because they didn’t spend 3 months humping a rucksack at Ft. Banning, Georgia demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding on the Senators’ part as to what truly constitutes combat training.
In addition to all of these considerations, the geographical and geo-political ramifications of the Senators objections must be considered. A quick glance at a map reveals to any observer that the entire country of Afghanistan is land locked. This means there is no access for US troops without moving through another sovereign nation. American relations with most of these countries (Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan) are tenuous at best, and the nearest body of water is the Indian Ocean 300 miles away through Pakistan. Any military operation performed against Afghanistan would require consent from one or more of them in order to perform over flights and the necessary troop movements through their country. Nations that are considering granting another country’s military forces rights to operate within their boarders generally want specific information about what type of operations are going to be conducted. Unfortunately, during the early period of the conflict when these negotiations have to be made that information is not always readily available[12]. This ambiguousness complicated, extended and strained the negotiations. These countries, like any other, are also concerned with their own National security. Those who served in or studied Korea know well what happened the last time China felt a large US force was too close to its borders. It took numerous negotiation sessions between the US and Uzbekistan before they would allow some level of military operations[13]. The United States also had to ensure that the Russians were comfortable with our activities in the area and did not perceive a large buildup as a threat to their security. While all of this culminated in agreements with other nations to utilize their sovereign territory to conduct military operations in Afghanistan it required agreements on the part of the United States that our operations would be constrained to a certain size and scope so that these nations could be assured that our interests in the region were strictly related to al Qaeda the Taliban Government and Afghanistan and were in no way a long term interest in the region or a jeopardy to these governments that were supporting us.
Thus, the decisions made with regards to the military operations in Afghanistan had to factor in (1) the historical realities and composition of Afghanistan, (2) the organization of our military assets, (3) the geographical and geopolitical structure of the region, (4) the deployment capabilities of our military and (5) the opportunities provided by the strongly splintered divisions existing within Afghanistan. Regardless of what the Senators would have us believe the choices made by the administration in listening to the military leaders who have been trained to recognize these factors and develop plans appropriately were the right decisions. What is frightening, however, is that the Senators are unable to recognize this. One would hope that such considerations which are apparent to private citizens would be further recognized by the public officials with whom we have entrusted the composition of our laws. One would wonder why, when a private citizen, with very limited resources, can unravel enough of the complexities of the situation to understand and justify the actions as has been done here, our elected officials with the resources of the United States Senate and the ability submit direct inquiries to the military are unable to do so. One would finally wonder what type of leadership we can expect from individuals who are either unwilling or unable to recognize some of the most basic components of a modern day military operation. One must wonder indeed.
| [1] | Senator John Kerry – Presidential Debate, Coral Gables, FL [Transcript provided by Fox News]; URL: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,134152,00.html |
| [2] | Moore, Robin – The hunt for bin Laden [Copyright© 2003, Robin Moore]; Random House, Inc., New York, NY, USA; ISBN: 0-375-50861-9; DEWEY: 958.1046 MOO; page 18 |
| [3] | ibidem; page 17 |
| [4] | ibidem; page 18 |
| [5] | Woodward, Bob – Bush at War [Copyright© 2002, Bob Woodward]; Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, NY USA; ISBN: 0-7432-0473-5; DEWEY: B BUSH; page 43 |
| [6] | Staff Writer – U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) [Copyright© 2004, GlobalSecurity.org]; GlobalSecurity.org, Alexandria, VA; URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arsfc.htm |
| [7] | Interview conducted with US Army Special Forces recruitment officer |
| [8] | opere citato – Staff Writer; U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne); same page |
| [9] | Staff Writer – Operation Enduring Freedom – Deployments [Copyright© 2004, GlobalSecurity.org]; GlobalSecurity.org, Alexandria, VA; URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom_deploy.htm |
| [10] | opere citato – Moore; page 52 |
| [11] | opere citato – Woodward; page 35 |
| [12] | ibidem – Woodward; page 129 |
| [13] | ibidem – Woodward; pages 117, 124, 128, 129, 134, 148, 152, 159, 160, 164, 172-173, 181, 203 & 289 |
During both the Vice Presidential and the last Presidential debate Senators Edwards and Kerry divulged some components of the Kerry / Edwards plan to combat terrorism. Specifically, Senator Edwards stated that if elected they would, “double the special forces so we can find terrorists where they are[1]”. On the surface, this would seem to the uniformed observer to be a sensible perhaps even a brilliant plan. After all, if one is good, two must certainly be better. In fact some would wonder, since it is such an obvious plan, why the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretaries of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines, and the various General Officers slotted to oversee the operations of our military establishment haven’t already thought of it. However, to most members of our military, senior level DOD administrators, the large constituency of veterans throughout the country the numerous reasons why the plan will fail do not need any further explanation. The belief that simply doubling our Special Operations forces would result in greater effectiveness from that force is a fallacy similar in nature to the belief that if one Ferrari can go fast, two Ferrari’s tied together would go twice as fast. This belief further reiterates the disjoined perception of Special Forces composition maintained by both of the Democratic Executive candidates.
Even elementary school students understand the use of the term special. Even they would understand it to mean “distinguished by some unusual quality[2]”, or put simply – unique. For US Special Forces, this distinguishing characteristic is expressed in their four Special Operation Forces truths[3]:
1) Humans are more important than Hardware.
2) Quality is better than Quantity.
3) Special Operations Forces cannot be mass produced.
4) Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.
These truths clearly articulate why the Special Forces do not want the Kerry/Edwards plan. They represent why 3 years after the September 11th attacks, no one in the current administration or military establishment has had this unfeasible “epiphany”.
Membership in America’s Special Forces represents very unique selection criteria. First, all Special Forces soldiers are “triple volunteers”. That means they first volunteered for the branch of service in which they serve, they next volunteered for Airborne Operations training and finally they volunteered for the Army Special Forces Acceptance and Selection Course (or the equivalent Navy, Marine or Air Force selection course). Thus the first obstacle impeding a doubling of Special Operations Force strength is locating willing volunteers.
Second, as the second SOF truth reveals, the quality of Special Forces are far more important then the quantity of men, so these volunteers must be capable of passing the rigorous training standards that comprise the Army’s Special Forces Qualification Course (or the equivalent Navy, Marine or Air Force Special Forces training course). These courses have been specifically engineered to weed out anyone who is not capable of performing at “Special Forces levels”. As the Special Forces constitute the best of the best of the best of all US Military forces, it should not be surprising that only a small percent is capable of passing this meticulous standard.
Third, the third SOF truth clearly specifies that “Special Forces can not be massed produced”. Thus, unfortunately Senator Kerry and Senator Edwards, unlike hamburgers at the local fast food restaurant, your plan to run the elite fighting men of our Special Forces off assembly lines just will not work.
Finally, it takes between 1 and 2 years (depending on the specialization and language) to produce a single Special Forces soldier[4]. This is the level of training and painstaking evaluation placed into each soldier. Bear in mind that any failure to pass any of the numerous evaluations throughout the training will eject the soldier from the program – a ‘B’ is not a passing grade at SFQC. This is another reason why such a small percentage of soldiers that enter the program successfully win their Green Beret[*] (or Orange Beret, Navy Seal Trident, or other appropriate designator for their branch of service).
The last point is particularly telling as it demonstrates the inconsistency of the Senators own arguments. On the one hand, they acknowledge the American Special Forces soldier as the best trained in the world[5]. On the other they believe we should mass produce these highly trained soldiers. This can only be done by lowering our standards and reducing the training requirements.
Special Forces unit composition seems to be another element that neither Kerry nor Edwards has considered. Special Forces units are not just haphazardly constructed they -are rather specifically targeted. It is because of this targeted focus such as extensive language skills, cross-cultural training, regional orientation, and understanding of the political context of their operating arenas that they are unparalleled in the U.S. military. It is these skills that enable them to work as effectively with civilian populations as they do with other military forces to influence situations favorably toward U.S. national interests, and it is this ability to apply discrete leverage is one of SOF's most important contributions to our national military strategy[6]. Therefore, a “cross the board” doubling of the Special Forces units will not produce the results the Senators desire as it would increase to an unnecessary point the size of the targeted forces for regions (such as the Caribbean) that do not deserve the high level of scrutiny required by other areas (such as the Middle East)
Another problem with any rapid doubling of the Special Forces unit strengths is how the training of these new Special Forces recruits will be conducted. New Special Forces personnel can only effectively be trained by existing Special Forces personnel. The problem is that while the current system is capable of handling the number of new recruits required to increase current levels at a reasonable, sustainable rate – the active policy of the current administration, it does not have the capacity to handle the over eighteen-thousand recruits that would be required to double current Special Forces unit strengths. Remember, these are elite units, only about 25%[7] of the soldiers who enters the program have the mettle to successfully win the Green Beret and only 30%[8] of the soldiers in the United States Military meet the intellectual and physical criteria to even try out for the program. This means that it would take 18,600 candidates entering the program to produce the approximately 4,500 Green Berets required[9] to double the size of this force. These numbers are just for the Green Berets, only one of our Special Forces Units; it does not consider the training and screening needs for other Special Operations Forces units such as the Army Rangers or the Navy Seals. Currently the training program for Special Forces is only designed to handle 3,100 soldiers a year which produces about 750 new Green Berets. Point blank, in order to handle the increased training load suggested by Senators Kerry and Edwards in any reasonable time a significant number of active Green Berets would have to be taken out of their current positions – protecting Americans from terrorists and other foreign threats. Removing a large chuck of our front line warriors, would not seem to any militarily trained mind to be the best approach to protecting the people of the United States.
The points raised in this paper are not trivial ones when we collectively go to the polls in November to select our next Commander-in-Chief. On the one hand we see an experienced Commander, lessening to the advice and recommendations of the trained General Officer corps of our military. On the other hand is an individual with no experience as the Chief Executive of the world’s largest military power, second guessing the very commanders he is expected to lead. We must remember that General Tommy Franks and the United States Central Command successfully liberated two very large nations with less loss of life than any similarly sized conflict in the history of warfare. These are unprecedented accomplishments, however apparently the Senators feel that their extensive studies in the art of military maneuver and war far exceeds that of 20 year General Officers who obviously don’t know what they need. Franks has said categorically that there was no question that the resources needed to do the job were where they needed to be when they needed to be there[10]. To any military student this would appear obvious from the results – two foreign government regimes toppled with an absolute minimum (compared to every equivocal conflict in history) loss of American life. Yet some how apparently this is not what the Democratic Senators want. They would far rather force our Special Forces to violate every single one of their core tenants simply because it sounds like a good plan to the constituency. They seem to want a type of Special Forces that is not very special. The citizens of this country must ask themselves on Election Day if this sounds like the type of mettle we want in our next Commanders-in-Chief.
[*] The term “win their Green Beret” is a metaphoric references to the “Ballad of the Green Berets”, support personnel assigned to Green Beret units also where the Green Beret. The actual distinguisher for a Special Forces soldier is the Special Forces tab worn above their unit designator.
[1] Senator John Edwards – Vice Presidential Debate, Cleveland, OH [Transcript provided by Fox News]; URL: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,134579,00.html
[2] Staff Writer – Merriam-Webster’s Coalgate Dictionary [Copyright© 2004 Merriam-Webster, Inc.]; Merriam-Webster, Springfield, MA, USA; URL: http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?va=special
[3] Staff Writer – HQ USASOC Special Forces Information, Primer [US Army Special Operations Command – declassified publicly released]; United States Army, Fort Bragg, NC, USA; URL: http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/truths.shtml
[4] Staff Writer – 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne) [Copyright© 2004, GlobalSecurity.org]; GlobalSecurity.org, Alexandria, VA; URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/1swtg.htm
[5] Senator John Kerry – Presidential Debate, Coral Gables, FL [Transcript provided by Fox News]; URL: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,134152,00.html
[6] ibidem – U.S. Army Special Forces Command (Airborne);
URL: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/arsfc.htm
[7] Interview conducted with US Army Special Forces recruitment officer
[8] Ibidem
[9] Ibidem
[10] Hannity and Colmes – General Tommy Franks on the Iraq [War] and the Debate [Copyright© 2004, Fox News Inc.]; Fox News Inc.; URL: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,134240,00.html
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