Posted on 11/11/2002 1:23:27 PM PST by l8pilot
Evidence Builds for DiLorenzos Lincoln by Paul Craig Roberts
In an excellent piece of historical research and economic exposition, two economics professors, Robert A. McGuire of the University of Akron and T. Norman Van Cott of Ball State University, have provided independent evidence for Thomas J. Dilorenzos thesis that tariffs played a bigger role in causing the Civil War than slavery.
In The Real Lincoln, DiLorenzo argues that President Lincoln invaded the secessionist South in order to hold on to the tariff revenues with which to subsidize Northern industry and build an American Empire. In "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer Relationship" (Economic Inquiry, Vol. 40, No. 3, July 2002), McGuire and Van Cott show that the Confederate Constitution explicitly prohibits tariff revenues from being used "to promote or foster any branch of industry." By prohibiting subsidies to industries and tariffs high enough to be protective, the Confederates located their tax on the lower end of the "Laffer curve."
The Confederate Constitution reflected the argument of John C. Calhoun against the 1828 Tariff of Abominations. Calhoun argued that the U.S. Constitution granted the tariff "as a tax power for the sole purpose of revenue a power in its nature essentially different from that of imposing protective or prohibitory duties."
McGuire and Van Cott conclude that the tariff issue was a major factor in North-South tensions. Higher tariffs were "a key plank in the August 1860 Republican party platform. . . . northern politicians overall wanted dramatically higher tariff rates; Southern politicians did not."
"The handwriting was on the wall for the South," which clearly understood that remaining in the union meant certain tax exploitation for the benefit of the north.
October 16, 2002
Dr. Roberts [send him mail] is John M. Olin Fellow at the Institute for Political Economy and Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal and a former assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury. He is the co-author of The Tyranny of Good Intentions Evidence Builds for DiLorenzos Lincoln by Paul Craig Roberts
In an excellent piece of historical research and economic exposition, two economics professors, Robert A. McGuire of the University of Akron and T. Norman Van Cott of Ball State University, have provided independent evidence for Thomas J. Dilorenzos thesis that tariffs played a bigger role in causing the Civil War than slavery.
In The Real Lincoln, DiLorenzo argues that President Lincoln invaded the secessionist South in order to hold on to the tariff revenues with which to subsidize Northern industry and build an American Empire. In "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer Relationship" (Economic Inquiry, Vol. 40, No. 3, July 2002), McGuire and Van Cott show that the Confederate Constitution explicitly prohibits tariff revenues from being used "to promote or foster any branch of industry." By prohibiting subsidies to industries and tariffs high enough to be protective, the Confederates located their tax on the lower end of the "Laffer curve."
The Confederate Constitution reflected the argument of John C. Calhoun against the 1828 Tariff of Abominations. Calhoun argued that the U.S. Constitution granted the tariff "as a tax power for the sole purpose of revenue a power in its nature essentially different from that of imposing protective or prohibitory duties."
McGuire and Van Cott conclude that the tariff issue was a major factor in North-South tensions. Higher tariffs were "a key plank in the August 1860 Republican party platform. . . . northern politicians overall wanted dramatically higher tariff rates; Southern politicians did not."
"The handwriting was on the wall for the South," which clearly understood that remaining in the union meant certain tax exploitation for the benefit of the north.
October 16, 2002
Dr. Roberts [send him mail] is John M. Olin Fellow at the Institute for Political Economy and Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He is a former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal and a former assistant secretary of the U.S. Treasury. He is the co-author of The Tyranny of Good Intentions
Well for starters how about his signing an arrest warrant for the Chief Justice because he disagreed with Lincoln's interpretation of the Constitution.
Mr. Greeley, by the way, was pleased by the prospect of secession as it would rid the country of slavery.
For starters there is very little evidence that the story of Lincoln signing an arrest warrant for Taney is true. Taney was never in jail, was never arrested, no copy of the warrant has ever been found, and Taney stayed on as Chief Justice until his death in 1863. The whole story is based on one man's account, Ward Lamon. So, I'm afraid you'll have to try again.
You're right, this makes Lincoln's position on slavery crystal clear.
You are asking the wrong question. The question with a short answer would be: cite an instance where he honoured it.
No doubt it could, but it would be irrelevent, wouldn't it, Limppintle?
You guys can mouth this mantra till your tongues fall out. It doesn't really matter. Constitutionally, neither should unilateral secession have been forbidden. But more important is the question: what purpose was served, or whose interests were served, by coercively preventing unilateral secession - any purpose which the federal government was ostensibly supposed to serve? I think not. It did serve the kind of interests that Charles Beard suggests were really behind the Federalist's constitution, which they somewhat fraudulently foisted on the country.
The main point I wanted to make concerns the lesson that was apparently universally learned from our war of secession. No one contemplating entrance into a federation appears to be willing to do so without an unambiguous guarantee of a right to unilateral withdrawel. The lack of such was a major reason (among numerous others) why the U.S. Senate refused to approve joining the League of Nations in 1919. Even the EU, socialist creation though it is, is apparently including such a provision in its proposed constitution.
"What is now combatted, is the position that secession consistent with the Constitution -- is lawful, and peaceful. It is not contended that there is any express law for it; and nothing should ever be implied as law, which leads to unjust or absurd consequences. The nation purchased, with money, the countries out of which several of these states were formed. Is it just that they shall go off without leave, and without refunding? The nation paid very large sums, (in the aggregate, I believe, nearly a hundred millions) to relieve Florida of the aboriginal tribes. Is it just that she shall now be off without consent, or without making any return? The nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit of the so-called seceding states, in common with the rest. Is it just, either that creditors shall go unpaid, or the remaining States pay for the whole? A part of the present national debt was contracted to pay the old debts of Texas. Is it just that she shall leave, pay no part of it herself?
Again, if one state may secede, so may another; and then when all shall have seceded, none is left to pay the debts. Is this quite just to creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view of ours when we borrowed there money? If we now recognize this doctrine, by allowing the seceders to go in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do, if others choose to go, or to extort terms terms upon which they will promise to remain...
If all the states, save one, should assert the power to drive that one out of the Union, it is presumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once deny the power, and denounce the act as the greatest outrage upon State rights. But suppose that precisely the same act, instead of being called "driving the one out," should be called "the seceding of the others from that one," it would exactly what the seceders claim to do; unless, indeed, they make the point, that the one, because it is a minority, may rightfully do, what the others because they are a majority may not rightfully do. These politicians are subtle, and profound, on the rights of minorities. They are not so partial to that power, which made the Constitution, and speaks from the preamble, calling itself "We the People."
A. Lincoln, 7/4/61
The government has the right and responsibility to maintain itself against its domestic foes.
Abraham Lincoln in 1860.
Walt
Lincoln did not seek political office after 1848 until he ran for senator. He seems to have become dissatisfied with politics and his success. Lincoln of course had almost no formal education, his mother died when he was nine and his father was functionally illiterate and opposed to "book learnin' " any way. Lincoln's step mother was supportive and treated him like one of her own. He loved her dearly.
But having been elected to Congress, he seems to have had a "is this all?" sort of feeling. He was 41 when he left Congress. He may have been having a mid-life crisis, and he was a very melancholy guy on the best day. It's thought that he had at least two bouts of suicidal depression. Lincoln did not run or seek re-election in 1850; he stepped aside for another player in the Illinois political machine -- this person was defeated.
From 1850-54, Lincoln was --not-- a politician. He didn't seek office.
But when he saw that slavery might expand, instead of being on the path of ultimate extinction that the framers wanted, he became reanimated, and the rest, you know.
Walt
After the rebels fired on Old Glory Greeley called for force to put down the rebellion.
Walt
I won't look, but I bet you can find this story on the League of the South website, even though their honcho is a professor of History. There is no credible evidence that this ever happened.
As this story is --so-- important to the neo-reb myth, I post a long excerpt from the ACW moderated newsgroup:
"The story seems to stem from the following paragraph in Jeffrey Rogers Hummel's 1996 book _Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men_ (p. 154):
"_Ex parte Merryman_ appears in Civil War histories from many angles. . . But almost never brought up is Lincoln's warrant for the arrest of Chief Justice Taney. I have seen this mentioned in only two locations: Frederick S. Calhoun's official history, _The Lawmen: United States Marshals and Their Deputies_, rev. edn. (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), pp. 102-04; and Harold M. Hyman,_ A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution_ (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 84. Their sources are two independent manuscript collections, which lends credence to the claim's reliability, although I have personally examined neither collection."
Curious about this claim, I consulted both sources. Hyman states that "in an unpublished memorandum, Francis Lieber noted that Lincoln contemplated Taney's arrest, and issued Ward Hill Lamon, marshal for the District of Columbia, permission to arrest him"(p. 84). Calhoun goes into a bit more detail, recounting Lamon's exact claims that "after due consideration the administration determined upon the arrest of the Chief Justice" and that "It was finally determined to place the order of arrest in the hand of the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia"(Lamon himself was Marshal of D.C.). However, Lamon said, Lincoln had instructed his friend to "use his own discretion about making the arrest unless he should receive further orders(p. 103)". These further orders never came, and Lamon (obviously) did not arrest Taney.
This is an odd story. Lincoln referred to Lamon as "my particular friend" and clearly valued him as a companion. But there is no record, as far as I can tell, that Lincoln ever consulted Lamon on a decision of high political importance, much less that he entrusted Lamon with such a decision. Also, it was not clear if these were in fact two independent sources; Lieber could have been merely recounting Lamon's claims about such a warrant, rather than vouching for them independently. Still, Francis Lieber was a highly respected lawyer, the principal compiler of the US military code, and his assertion would carry some weight.
The manuscript sources listed are (by Hyman) "Lieber Papers no. 2422"; and (by Calhoun) "'Habeas Corpus', n.d., unpublished draft manuscript. Both are stored at the Huntington Library, in San Marino, California.
Although I would have liked to visit the Huntington (I drove past it on a recent trip to California; it is in a beautiful botanical garden), time and budgetary constraints were in the way. So I wrote a letter, reproducing the relevant quotations from all three books and asking if I might be able to hire someone there to look into the manuscript sources a bit.
I received a very interesting reply from John Rhodehamel, Norris Foundation Curator of American Historical Manuscripts. He had checked the records, and reported that there are not two sources, only one: Lamon. Hyman's reference to the Lieber papers was in error, apparently caused by a confusion of source numbers: Rhodehamel states that "the corresponding document in the Lieber coll., (LI 2422), is not relevant, nor does the Lieber coll. subject index for "Taney" yield anything related to Lamon's story." However, the manuscript "Habeas Corpus", referred to by Calhoun, is LN 2422. Therefore, Rhodehamel concludes: "I think it's clear that Hyman was really citing LN 2422 when he credited 'Lieber papers no. 2422'".
This leaves the whole matter resting on Lamon's manuscript. I ordered a photocopy of it from the Huntington.
I have now examined it, and it's even less convincing than I would have thought. The document takes up five handwritten pages; I'd estimate it's about 1800 words long. There is, as Calhoun notes, no date. The latest date in the document is in 1863, but (as pointed out in an accompanying note written by Don Fehrenbacher in 1976), the context indicates the document was composed well after the events referred to. Also, according to Fehrenbacher, the document is _not_ in Lamon's handwriting. This does not mean it is spurious (most authors or researchers in the 19th century had secretaries copying their drafts), but neither does it inspire confidence.
"Habeas Corpus" appears (to me) to be the beginning of a projected treatise on the Lincoln administration and the writ of habeas corpus. It begins with a list of the suspensions of the writ, and long quotations from relevant legal documents, especially Taney's opinion in the Merryman case (although Lamon, or perhaps his copyist, persistently spells it "Merriman"). After recounting Merryman's arrest, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and that petition's acceptance by Taney, Lamon gives his version of the Lincoln administration's reaction (p.3):
"After due consideration the administration determined upon the arrest of the Chief Justice. A warrant or order was issued for his arrest." Lamon was given this document (whatever exactly it was) by Lincoln himself, but told to use his own judgement about actually making the arrest, unless Lincoln gave further instructions. Lamon goes on: "This writ was never executed, and the Marshal never regretted the discretionary power delegated to him in the exercise of this official duty."
Lamon says no more about the supposed arrest order. The "Habeas Corpus" document continues with more quotations from legal opinions and military orders, as well as from Democratic party resolutions opposing the Lincoln administration's policies. Then it ends suddenly, with no conclusion. There is nothing about what ended up happening to the original writ, warrant, or order.
After reading the full text, Lamon's story seems even odder than before.
A Federal law enforcement officer, handed a legal document authorizing the arrest of the Chief Justice, would be unlikely to refer to it as vaguely and variously as Lamon does. The issuance of such an arrest order would clearly be of major historic importance, and would tend to make relevant details stick in the mind. Details like whether it was a warrant, a writ, or an order; by whom and when it was issued; and who was present when the document was handed over. Lamon quotes multiple paragraphs from Taney's _Merryman_ opinion, a public document, but passes over the alleged warrant (or whatever it was), a historic matter of which he has sole knowledge, in only a couple of sentences.
After I informed Jeffrey Rogers Hummel of Rhodehamel's findings, Hummel emailed me stating that "If Ward Hill Lamon is the only source reporting that Lincoln isued an arrest warrant for Taney, then the report is certainly not credible." (He gave me permission to quote him publicly). Seeing the exact words of the report makes it even less credible.
I apologize for the brevity of my quotations from Lamon; I am seeking permission from the Huntington library to include some more extensive quotes from Lamon's manuscript, but I have not yet received it.
I am still researching a couple of aspects of this: I am looking for a sample of Lamon's handwriting so I can confirm "Habeas Corpus" was not handwritten by him, and I am looking for more biographical material on Lamon.
Also, if anyone else has come across the "Lincoln tried to arrest Taney" story in credible or quasi-credible publications or online sources, I would be interested in hearing about it."
[end]
Walt
Article Two, Section One, para 8.
Walt
"The government has the right and responsibility to maintain itself against its domestic foes."
The government is an institution, and as an institution of course its only true reason to be is its own maintainance and perpetuation. But according to its stated purpose, as a government of a democracy, its self-maintainance is not its primary responsibilty. Preservation and protection of the rights of its citizens are its primary responsibilities and those responsibilities supercede its own maintainance should the two aims conflict, as they did in 1861. But you probably can't understand that, because you seem to adher, like Lincoln, to the fascist view that the citizen is absolutely subordinate to the state.
This assertion is perfectly characteristic of your typically muddled thinking.
I guess we are back to the "Bill of Privileges" thing again.
Walt
More muddled thinking and profound lack of historical understanding on your part. The Bill of Rights was never thought of as granting those rights, but as listing rights possessed by the citizenry which the government was obliged (supposedly) to respect and protect.
O.k., one instance, and one only. I said it would be a short answer.
One of its -stated- purposes is to make the Union more perfect.
"As he hears his own lips parroting the sad cliches of 1850 does the Southerner sometimes wonder if the words are his own? Does he ever, for a moment, feel the desperation of being caught in some great time machine, like a tread mill, and doomed to eternal effort without progress? Or feel, like Sisyphus, the doom of pushing a great stone up a hill only to have the weight, like guilt, roll back over him, over and over again? When he lifts his arms to silence protest, does he ever feel, even fleetingly, that he is lifting it against some voice deep in himself?"
-- Robert Penn Warren, The legacy of the Civil War", p.56-57
Walt
ROFL!!
What Abraham Lincoln thought about secession is pretty doggone important, pea brain.
It's all "boo--hoo-hoo!! Mean old Lincoln kicked our butts!" from the neo-rebs.
In any case, the common sense of what President Lincoln said is so obvious that you don't even quote it.
Walt
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