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Summary: “How to Lose a Thermonuclear War”

By Lieutenant Valentine Vena, U.S. Navy — U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2026

The article argues that the United States faces a growing nuclear-deterrence problem as China rapidly expands its nuclear arsenal while the United States must continue to deter Russia. The author warns that the United States could lose its strategic advantage following a nuclear exchange, even if it survived the initial conflict.

China's expanding nuclear arsenal

China's nuclear stockpile has grown substantially. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates cited by the author, China had more than 600 operational nuclear warheads in 2024, compared with an estimated stockpile in the low 200s in 2020. If its expansion continues, China could possess more than 1,000 warheads by 2030.

The author argues that China's limited participation in arms-control negotiations and lack of transparency increase the risk of miscalculation. Previous arms-control arrangements largely assumed a two-power nuclear balance between the United States and Russia, an assumption that no longer adequately reflects the strategic environment.

The danger of fighting two nuclear powers

The article cites a 2019 Princeton University simulation in which a U.S.-Russian nuclear conflict consumed between 930 and 1,080 American nuclear warheads. Such an exchange could cause tens of millions of casualties while destroying important government facilities and nuclear command-and-control infrastructure.

After such a conflict, the United States might have insufficient surviving weapons and damaged command systems to credibly deter China. This is the central danger identified by the author: even if America survived a nuclear war with Russia, it could emerge vulnerable to coercion or attack by another nuclear peer.

The Navy's role

Ballistic-missile submarines are central to American deterrence because their stealth makes them difficult to locate and destroy. In 2025, they carried approximately 70% of the United States' deployed nuclear warheads.

However, the planned Columbia-class submarine fleet will consist of 12 boats replacing 14 Ohio-class submarines. Each Columbia-class submarine will carry 16 ballistic missiles, compared with 20 on the Ohio-class boats as currently configured. The author argues that this reduction deserves reconsideration given China's growing capabilities.

The proposed solutions

Vena recommends four principal measures:

Include China in arms-control agreements: Future arrangements should address both Russia and China rather than simply extend bilateral restrictions.
Use diplomatic leverage: The United States should identify political, security and economic incentives that might encourage Beijing to negotiate.
Strengthen nuclear weapons production: Modernize the industrial infrastructure needed to maintain and expand the arsenal if necessary.
Reassess the nuclear triad: Consider deploying additional warheads and delivery systems, including potentially more Columbia-class submarines.

Conclusion

The author's central argument is that nuclear deterrence must adapt to a world in which the United States faces two major nuclear competitors simultaneously. Arms-control agreements designed for the Cold War may no longer provide sufficient protection, while expanding American capabilities without provoking an arms race presents a difficult challenge.

The article advocates combining multilateral arms control with modernization and greater nuclear-force capacity to preserve the credibility of U.S. deterrence.

Source: Read the full article at the U.S. Naval Institute.