In this context, neither was Napoleon. Herodotus wrote about the Persian campaign into the steppe to teach those darned Scythians a lesson.
Not quite.
The aims, strategies and organisation of Napoleon and Hitler’s invasions were significantly different.
Napoleon’s primary objective was geopolitical coercion rather than outright conquest: he sought to force Tsar Alexander I’s Russia back into compliance with the Continental System, his economic blockade against Britain, after Russia withdrew from it in 1810. The invasion aimed at a quick military defeat of Russian armies to compel a favorable peace, subordinating Russia within French-dominated Europe without intending to dismantle or occupy the state long-term. Capturing Moscow was not an initial goal but a later fallback after failing to decisively engage Russian forces at the border.
In contrast, Hitler’s aims were ideological, economic, and expansionist: the total annihilation of the Soviet Union as a Bolshevik entity, the seizure of vast territories for Lebensraum (living space) and resources like oil and grain, and the establishment of a German colonial empire in the east. This was a war of extermination and permanent occupation, with plans to resettle Germans and exploit or eliminate Slavic populations.
Napoleon’s strategy centered on rapid forced marches and attrition to provoke a decisive battle early on, relying on overwhelming numbers to dismantle Russian armies through direct confrontations like the Battle of Borodino (a bloody but inconclusive engagement).
Hitler’s Barbarossa, by contrast, was a modern Blitzkrieg operation emphasizing surprise, speed, and encirclement: a three-pronged assault (Army Groups North, Center, and South) along a 1,500-mile front to destroy the Red Army at the frontiers through massive “cauldron” battles, preventing any organized withdrawal eastward. The plan, outlined in Directive No. 21, targeted key objectives like Leningrad, Moscow, and Ukraine in 6-10 weeks, leveraging mechanized warfare to capture resources and industrial centers quickly. Hitler explicitly drew lessons from Napoleon to avoid chasing retreating forces, instead prioritizing immediate annihilation and even delaying a push on Moscow in 1941 to focus on flanks, citing Napoleon’s occupation of the capital as ineffective.
In fact, Hitler was obsessed with Napoleon’s campaign, frequently referencing it and believing he could succeed where the French emperor failed by avoiding a retreat and holding positions during the 1941 Soviet counteroffensives. German military planners also researched the historical precedent, but overconfidence in a quick victory, ideological biases against the Soviet system, and the expectation that the USSR would collapse like Tsarist Russia in World War I led them to ignore key lessons. This hubris, rather than ignorance, contributed to the failure.
[Apparently Adolf Hitler was no student of history.]
Whereas Hitler was fully supplied as he advanced. His problem was twofold - (1) his excessive haste wasted large numbers of German troops and (2) massive US resupply prevented a rerun of Germany’s WW1 victories over Russia. Instead of Russia being at a material disadvantage due to its poverty, US aid to Russia gave it something it lacked in WW1 - superior firepower.