Posted on 10/19/2023 3:55:17 PM PDT by MeganC
On February 15, Russia’s RIA Novosti state news agency quoted retired U.S. Colonel Douglas Macgregor’s interview with the “Judge Napolitano - Judging Freedom” program, streamed on YouTube that same day.
The Russian translation of Macgregor’s claim isn’t precise but represents his ideas accurately:
"We just don't have ammunition to send. We have reached the limit; our own reserves are rapidly coming to an end."
This statement is misleading and fits into the Kremlin’s anti-U.S. and anti-Ukraine propaganda targeting Russia’s domestic audiences.
In reality, for most categories of ammunition, the U.S. can provide support to Ukraine indefinitely. Only for two types of ammunition -- 155 mm artillery ammunition, which includes a wide variety of non-precision projectiles, and 155 mm Excalibur GPS-guided precision artillery shells -- the United States may have a shortage in the coming years if it doesn’t replenish.
However, the U.S. has already moved to increase munitions production to avoid shortages. Another way to prevent ammunition shortages is to purchase it from third countries. The U.S. military has already purchased Soviet-standard 152 mm and 122 mm artillery shells and 125 mm tank shells outside the United States.
According to the Pentagon, “Since 2014, the United States has committed approximately $24 billion in security assistance to Ukraine and approximately $21.2 billion since the beginning of Russia's unprovoked, full-scale invasion on February 24.”
Russian use of Macgregor’s misinformation
On December 15, 2021, when the United States was warning about an imminent Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Kremlin was denying any such plans, RIA Novosti reported it was unlikely that the Ukrainian army could withstand a Russian military invasion for more than three to four days. The agency quoted an article in The National Interest written by Macgregor and former CIA officer George Beebe:
“Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to assume that Russian ground forces would reach their operational objectives along the Dnieper River in as little as seventy-two to ninety-six hours.”
However, the Russian troops were unable to reach their goals in the Dnipro River basin even by mid-March 2022.
As of January 2, 2023, Ukraine had liberated 40% of the territory that Russian forces occupied after last year's invasion.
RIA Novosti quoted Macgregor again on March 6 as telling Fox Business that the Russian army in Ukraine was being very careful to protect civilians:
“The colonel noted that the Russian side is trying to act as carefully as possible and minimize damage, unlike, in particular, the US army in Iraq. He also expressed the opinion that the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is inevitable, and President Zelensky is trying to delay it by any means.”
That claim was also false. Ukrainian and international authorities, including the United Nations, reported mass atrocities against Ukrainian civilians allegedly committed by the Russian troops, some of which potentially constitute war crimes.
Amnesty International, a London-based human rights group, reported on February 25, 2022, that the Russian army had carried out indiscriminate missile and bomb strikes on civilian targets in Ukraine. In just the first five days of the war, at least 102 Ukrainian civilians were killed (including seven children) and 304 injured, according to the United Nations.
On March 25, 2022, RIA Novosti quoted Macgregor as falsely claiming in an interview with the “Judge Napolitano - Judging Freedom” YouTube show that a majority of the residents of eastern Ukraine were Russians. Calling the Russia-occupied regions of eastern Ukraine “these republics,” in language used by the Kremlin’s disinformation campaign, Macgregor said:
“These republics are fundamentally pro-Russian. And, in general, mostly Russians live in eastern Ukraine. … They should not be forced to speak Ukrainian, write Ukrainian, they are not Ukrainians.”
But the 2001 census, the last before Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, showed that most of eastern Ukraine residents are ethnic Ukrainians, with ethnic Russians the region’s largest minority.
This map shows the % of ethnic Russians in each region of Ukraine. pic.twitter.com/xyTbhGLyLj
— Samuel Ramani (@SamRamani2) May 27, 2021 The Voice of America asked the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to comment on Russia’s use of Macgregor’s erroneous forecasts and analysis in its domestic disinformation.
“Douglas Macgregor is a private citizen, exercising his 1st Amendment rights as an American, and so his views are his own and not representative of official U.S. or DOD policy,” DOD spokesman Lt. Col. Garron Garn said.
Macgregor did not answer Polygraph.info’s inquiry.
Really?
What is incorrect about my reading of it?
I have, actually, communicated with Ukrainians and Russians who negotiated it and the START 1 Treaty.
Putin has, openly, admitted that Russia broke the Budapest Memorandum.
Perhaps you have information that I’m not privy to.
I would be happy to review it and if I am wrong, I will, openly, admit it here.
The funny thing is that the following text has nothing to prove the headline, just excuses. How does the fact that the US increased the production and bought up more ammo makes McGregor’s stuff “misinformation”?
[Eagles6] There would be no war if Vlad had not broken the Budapest Memorandum and invaded a sovereign nation.[Ultra Sonic 007] If I had a drink for everytime someone on FR incorrectly invoked the Budapest Memorandum, I'd be dead of liver poisoning.
Ukraine wanted a Treaty and was refused. They settled for a Memorandum. A Memorandum is not a Treaty. A Memorandum is never a binding agreement.
Neither the United States, nor anyone else, assured Ukraine's sovereignty or security. Ukraine has not been attacked with nuclear weapons ... yet.
The MEMORANDUM is a MEMORANDUM and could not and did not create any binding legal promise by the United States, Russia or anybody else.
The actual language of the Memorandum makes clear the limits of what was assured.
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Budapest, 5 December 1994.
MEMORANDUM ON SECURITY ASSURANCES IN CONNECTION WITH UKRAINE’S ACCESSION TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONSUkraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,
Welcoming the Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state,
Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified period of time,
Noting the changes in the world-wide security situation, including the end of the Cold War, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces,
Confirm the following:
1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
2. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the Principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
4. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
5. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.
6. Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America will consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments.
This Memorandum will become applicable upon signature.
Signed in four copies having equal validity in the Ukrainian, English, and Russian languages.
Since the day it was signed, the Memorandum was worth slightly less than the paper it was written on. Since being nullified by an actual treaty, the Minsk Accords, the Memorandum is worth nothing at all. It was never worth more than a referral to the UN Security Council where all named parties except Ukraine held a veto; or to a consultation among the states.
His predictions are remarkable for how wildly wrong they are. He has made such inflated claims of Ukrainian losses, he stated on Redacted with Clayton Morris that Ukraine has raised and lost three entire armies, just to keep up with his claims. If Ukraine lost one entire army the war would be over.
He really does not care about Ukraine or Russia, now Hamas or Israel. They are just political soapboxes for him to use.
“No post civilization”
That’s true in Ruzzia because they have yet to try civilization.
Confirm the following:
1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
Thank you.
You have made my point.
Confirm the following:1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
I quoted that and the entire text of the Budapest MEMORANDUM to you. It is still just a MEMORANDUM. It is a political assurance, not a legally binding guarantee. A treaty affords a guarantee. Ukraine wanted one of those but was unable to obtain such a high level document. What they settled for was like a pinky swear.
The Budapest Memorandum was not a Treaty and its purpose was not to guarantee the sovereignty of Ukraine; but giving up the nukes was a condition precedent imposed upon Ukraine jointly by Russia and the United States in order to receive official recognition. Ukraine had agreed and bound itself to get rid of the nukes in 1992 with the Lisbon Protocol. According to Volodmyr Vasylenko, Ukraine’s former representative at NATO, who took part in drawing up the conceptual principles and specific provisions of the Budapest memorandum: “Ukraine had to give up nuclear weapons for it to become sovereign state and its independent status to be recognized all over the world.” As Ukrainian President Kravchuck stated, "All the control systems were in Russia. The so-called black suitcase with the start button, that was with Russian president Boris Yeltsin. ... Additionally, the West threatened Ukraine with isolation since the missiles were supposedly aimed at the United States." Therefore, "the only possible decision" was to give up the weapons, according to Kravchuk.
Moreover, Ukraine did not first agree to get rid of the nukes with the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine signed in agreement to the Lisbon Protocol of May 23, 1992 to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the shortest possible time. The Protocol and the correspondence of President GHW Bush leave no room for misunderstanding. Ukraine delayed and delayed and tried to submit a partial surrender of nukes which was met by a refusal to even receive it. Then they got their mind right and signed for recognition. The United States and Russia joined in turning the screws on Ukraine to get rid of the nukes.
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf
START Treaty
LISBON PROTOCOL of May 23, 1992
Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
ARTICLE VThe Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear weapon states Parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all necessary action to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices.
Letter from US President G. H. W. Bush to Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk, June 23, 1992
Dear Mr. President:On May 23 in Lisbon, five nations signed a protocol which opened the way for all five to ratify and become parties to the START Treaty. This historic accomplishment recognizes the essential role of Ukraine in fulfilling the obligations of the former Soviet Union under the Treaty. Imlementation of the START Treaty will enhance stability by substantially reducing nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms and by laying a foundation for further reductions. The United States looks forward to working with Ukraine as a full and equal partner in implementing the Treaty and reducing the burden of nuclear weapons that are a legacy of the former Soviet Union.
As part of this agreement, Ukraine will adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the shortest possible time. This is an important step along the path laid out in the statement of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the non-nuclear status of Ukraine. When the Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated in 1968 the United States formally declared its intention to seek immediate action in the United Nations Security Council to provide assistance to any non-nuclear weapons state party that is the object of aggression or threats of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Mr. President, let me formally state that the United States stands by that commitment to Ukraine.
[...]
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/qviw5v-c5kmg/28.pdf
Letter from President George H. W. Bush to President Leonid Kravchuk via Privacy Channels. December 4, 1992.Over the past year, the United States and its partners have welcomed Ukraine into the western community of nations. Ukraine is a party to csce and the CFE treaty, and a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Ukraine has demonstrated its commitment to peace by the bravery of your peacekeepers now on duty in Bosnia. Ukraine's pledge in its declaration of sovereignty to be a non-nuclear state has been particularly welcomed throughout the world.
The Budapest Memorandum's non-binding assurance given to Ukraine was:
4. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) action was sought and Ukraine received such UNSC action as it is likely to get. As Ukraine and the rest of the world well knew when Ukraine signed the NPT and the Memorandum, Russia holds a Security Council veto.
Security "assurances" are non-binding political promises, unlike the legally enforceable "guarantees" of treaties. It is like the difference between a pinky swear and an enforceable contract. And the assurance was to refer any non-nuclear aggression to the UN Security Council.
Volodymyr Vasylenko, Ukraine’s former representative at NATO, who took part in drawing up the conceptual principles and specific provisions of the Budapest memorandum:
“the form and content of the Memorandum ... show that, unfortunately, the Budapest talks on giving Ukraine security guarantees did not eventually result in a comprehensive international agreement that creates an adequate special international mechanism to protect our national security.”
According to V. Vasylenko, “Ukraine had to give up nuclear weapons for it to become sovereign state and its independent status to be recognized all over the world.”
Ukraine's forgotten security guarantee: The Budapest Memorandum
DW News [German]
Date 05.12.2014
[Excerpts]
Twenty years ago, the Budapest Memorandum marked the end of many years of negotiations between the successor states of the Soviet Union and leading Western nuclear powers. Ukraine had a special place in the talks.After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the eastern European country inherited 176 strategic and more than 2,500 tactical nuclear missiles. Ukraine at that point had the third-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons in the world after the United States and Russia.
But Leonid Kravchuk, then the president of Ukraine, told DW that was only formally the case. De facto, Kyiv was powerless.
"All the control systems were in Russia. The so-called black suitcase with the start button, that was with Russian president Boris Yeltsin."
Western pressure
Ukraine could have kept the nuclear weapons, but the price would have been enormous, Kravchuk says. Though the carrier rockets were manufactured in the southern Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk, the nuclear warheads were not. It would have been too expensive for Ukraine to manufacture and maintain them on its own.
"It would have cost us $65 billion (53 billion euros), and the state coffers were empty," Kravchuk said.
Additionally, the West threatened Ukraine with isolation since the missiles were supposedly aimed at the United States. Therefore, "the only possible decision" was to give up the weapons, according to Kravchuk.
[...]
"Nowhere does it say that if a country violates this memorandum, that the others will attack militarily," said Gerhard Simon, Eastern Europe expert at the University of Cologne.
German journalist and Ukraine expert Winfried Schneider-Deters agrees, telling DW, "The agreement is not worth the paper on which it was written."
Cyber-Security: The Threats from Russia and the Middle East, Ferry de Kerckove, CGAI Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, (2019), at 2-3: (footnotes omitted)
On the latter point, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances (not “guarantees”), although considered an important landmark, had a single purpose: to convince Ukraine to abandon its nuclear weapons in exchange for a commitment by the signatories to provide it with support: “1. The United States of America, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE [Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Final Act, to respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.” The memorandum, although formally signed, is not a treaty. Indeed, “Although signatories ‘reaffirm their commitment’ to Ukraine in many passages, the memorandum requires them to do almost nothing concrete, in the event that Ukraine’s sovereignty – territorial or political – is violated. There aren’t any hard enforcement mechanisms.” Ukraine is the subject of the memorandum, rather than a full participant. Furthermore, according to Volodymyr Vasylenko, Ukraine’s former representative at NATO, who took part in drawing up the conceptual principles and specific provisions of the Budapest memorandum, “the form and content of the Memorandum ... show that, unfortunately, the Budapest talks on giving Ukraine security guarantees did not eventually result in a comprehensive international agreement that creates an adequate special international mechanism to protect our national security.”
Why care about Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum
Steven Pifer Thursday, December 5, 2019
Brookings.edu
[excerpt]
Washington did not promise unlimited support. The Budapest Memorandum contains security “assurances,” not “guarantees.” Guarantees would have implied a commitment of American military force, which NATO members have. U.S. officials made clear that was not on offer. Hence, assurances.Beyond that, U.S. and Ukrainian officials did not discuss in detail how Washington might respond in the event of a Russian violation.
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Ukraine-Nuclear-Weapons
ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATIONUkraine, Nuclear Weapons, and Security Assurances at a Glance
FACT SHEETS & BRIEFS
Last Reviewed:
February 2022Contact: Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, (202) 463-8270 x107
[EXCERPT]
1994 Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances
To solidify security commitments to Ukraine, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on December 5, 1994. A political agreement in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Accords, the memorandum included security assurances against the threat or use of force against Ukraine’s territory or political independence. The countries promised to respect the sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine. Parallel memorandums were signed for Belarus and Kazakhstan as well. In response, Ukraine officially acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on December 5, 1994. That move met the final condition for ratification of START, and on the same day, the five START states-parties exchanged instruments of ratification, bringing the treaty into force.
The Budapest Memorandum was a POLITICAL agreement, not a binding LEGAL agreement. But what of those "principles of the Helsinki Accords?"
https://www.britannica.com/event/Helsinki-Accords
[excerpt]
The Helsinki Accords were primarily an effort to reduce tension between the Soviet and Western blocs by securing their common acceptance of the post-World War II status quo in Europe. The accords were signed by all the countries of Europe (except Albania, which became a signatory in September 1991) and by the United States and Canada. The agreement recognized the inviolability of the post-World War II frontiers in Europe and pledged the 35 signatory nations to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to cooperate in economic, scientific, humanitarian, and other areas. The Helsinki Accords are nonbinding and do not have treaty status.
As with the Budapest Memorandum, the Helsinki Accords were a NONBINDING statement of political intent and did not have treaty status.
Finally, in 2014 a revolutionary group overthrew the lawful government and seized control of Ukraine. The Budapest MEMORANDUM did not involve the revolutionary government. The Minsk Accords was a real treaty, unlike the Budapest MEMORANDUM. Moreover, as shown, the Ukiraine authorities clearly recognized that the Budapest MEMORANDUM gave no guarantees of security. And the fact is that no nation involved, including the U.S. and the UK, felt any obligation to provide boots on the ground military support for Ukraine.
No war was fought, or is being fought, over a Russian violation of the Budapest MEMORANDUM.
Angela Merkel made exquisitely clear that the Minsk Accords were entered into in bad faith for the purpose of gaining time for Ukraine to rearm. The Minsk Accords were a ceasefire agreement that was never implemented. THAT conflict did not end but is ongoing. DPR and LPR declared independence in 2014. Each has maintained its own government since 2014. Russia did not officially recognize them until 2022. It then established diplomatic relations with each, and entered into a mutual defense agreement with each. Ukraine engaged in FAFO.
“At this point their initial war aims have been soundly defeated.”
If this is so, Ukraine can demand peace negotiations from a position of strength.
Ukraine’s condition for peace is the complete withdrawal of the Ruzzians from Ukrainian territory.
He’s been very pro-Russia and overly critical of the US and NATO since he retired. He is a regular contributor to RT (Russian TV network), as is the discredited Scott Ritter (both of whom are very, very bitter men who hold a grudge against their own country). The guy has been wrong since Day One about most everything regarding the Russo-Ukrainian War.
None of that is evidence that he's bitter over a promotion he didn't get before he retired from the Army in 2004, as you've alleged.
Given the current class of officers populating the Pentagon, I wouldn't be surprised if more Freepers agreed with this sentiment.
“None of that is evidence that he’s bitter over a promotion he didn’t get before he retired from the Army in 2004, as you’ve alleged.”
He was passed over for promotion, and he retired in 2004. He was reportedly livid that his subordinate, H.R. McMaster — who had served as a captain under Macgregor, and with whom Macgregor later had some operational disagreements — was promoted to Brigadier General in 2008, with rapid promotions up to and including Lieutenant General. That was a particularly bitter pill for Macgregor to swallow, as he was of the mindset (as it related to McMaster), that, “I (Macgregor) taught him (McMaster) everything he knows!”
He said that in any conventional armored fight with the Russians would result in the US not only being defeated, but annihilated. Then, egoist that he was (and still is), he said the US Armey could only defeat the Russians in armored warfare if it employed HIS blueprint.
Macgregor was known during his army career as a hothead and short-sighted, who was good at immediacy and a confined mission, but was wholly unable to handle the “what-ifs,” or the “bigger picture,” which is essential for star rank. While Macgregor likely saw himself as a modern George Patton, his superiors saw him more as a modern George Custer.
Regardless, even this 2015 article highlighting McMaster and MacGregor's differences (and similarities) shows that the man has been consistent about what he believes, and that his opinions about military readiness — far from being motivated by bitterness — are rooted in legitimate concerns about the current state of the U.S. armed forces: "In effect, the debate between Macgregor and McMaster is a battle over whether the Army’s BCT structure is capable of matching up against what Army thinkers call a “near peer” competitor, like Russia. Though it may sound to outsiders like a disagreement over crossed t’s and dotted i’s, the dispute is fundamental–focusing on whether, in a future conflict, the U.S. military can actually win. Even inside the Pentagon, that is very much in doubt. A recent article by defense writer Julia Ioffe reported the “dispiriting” results of a Pentagon “thought exercise” between a red team (Russia) and a blue team, NATO. The “table top” exercise stipulated a Russian invasion of the Baltics, the same scenario proposed by Macgregor. “After eight hours of gaming out various scenarios,” Ioffe wrote, a blue team member concluded that NATO “would lose.”"
But sure, keep saying that it's only bitterness motivating MacGregor to say that the current US military wouldn't fare well in a battle against a peer competitor. (I happen to be one of them, which is why I think our proxy war in Ukraine has been an exercise in foolishness.)
[MacGregor] was wholly unable to handle the “what-ifs,” or the “bigger picture,” which is essential for star rank.
As compared to toeing the line, or being utterly ruthless or a political cutthroat? (Because when I think of modern generals like Mark Milley, being able to handle "the bigger picture" is the first thing that comes to mind...not.)
That's a gentle understatement about these two.
Oooh, sounds like I struck a nerve.
You just jump right over the fact that Macgregor’s superiors wanted him nowhere a star because of his short-sidedness, inflexibility, and hubris; he was insufferable, which is the death knell for advancement in any endeavor. A star means one MUST be flexible, and MUST be politic in one’s attitude; and Macgregor possessed neither of those qualities; and apparently, still doesn’t possess them.
His actions since retiring serve to confirm that.
Think about it: He’s so stubborn, so inflexible, and so full of himself that he has been wrong on practically everything about the Russo-Ukraine War and will never admit it; and the Russians love him because he says EXACTLY what Russia wants to hear: He is a propaganda goldmine for Russia.
“As compared to toeing the line, or being utterly ruthless or a political cutthroat?”
You don’t sound like you ever served in the military, but military officers, especially the more senior military officers, are not expected to “toe the line”; they are expected to follow orders and carry them out to the best of their ability...REGARDLESS of their personal feelings. If they had a disagreement with an order, they could even put it in writing (which may or may not end their careers, depending on how the subject of the disagreement came out in the end); but then get on with the business at hand. Superiors expect their subordinates to voice their misgivings, but those misgivings are expected to be logical, and supportable; but in the end those misgivings are to be set aside and the orders followed to the best of the officers’ abilities. Also, if the officer felt that strongly about his or her position, he or she could always resign their commission. But, Macgregor? Some of his contemporaries said he would stew over a disagreement. That attitude likely cost him a star.
And, did you forget that Macgregor was the insufferable Wesley Clark’s go-to guy for the Balkans campaign? Did you forget that Macgregor drew up the game plan for it? How did that work out?
Only in your imagination; all I originally observed is that you claimed Macgregor's opinions are rooted in bitterness, per your quote here: "He is bitter towards his own country because he thinks he got short shrift because he was not promoted to Brigadier General. He is a spiteful, vindictive little man."
I asked for evidence that his opinions about Russia-Ukraine are rooted in being bitter over not getting promoted, which you've yet to actually substantiate in any meaningful sense. Even when you cite an ostensible feud between Macgregor and H.R. McMaster, the 2015 article I cited shows that there were people within the Pentagon saying his criticisms were, at the very least, not unfounded (“Doug Macgregor is a pain in the ass,” retired Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt notes, “but that doesn’t make him wrong. Serious people take him seriously.”); with even McMaster himself stating on the record that rumors of a feud with Macgregor are exaggerated.
With that being said: it's quite possible that his mentality and temper were reasons he didn't get promoted; I don't know for certain.
That still doesn't substantiate your claim that his opinions about Russia-Ukraine are due to his bitterness over not getting promoted, much less that he's vindictive or spiteful against his own country.
And after the sterling results we've "achieved" in the past 20 years with Afghanistan and Iraq, much less the extent of the current infiltration of wokeness in the ranks, I don't think it's spiting America to say that getting involved in an armed conflict with a peer competitor is a poor decision.
And, did you forget that Macgregor was the insufferable Wesley Clark’s go-to guy for the Balkans campaign? Did you forget that Macgregor drew up the game plan for it? How did that work out?
Irrelevant to my original question, but thanks for asking.
“Only in your imagination; all I originally observed is that you claimed Macgregor’s opinions are rooted in bitterness, per your quote here: ‘He is bitter towards his own country because he thinks he got short shrift because he was not promoted to Brigadier General. He is a spiteful, vindictive little man.’”
Hey, his contemporaries have said that he is petty and vindictive, and a hot head. He was passed up for promotion three times, which basically ended his military career.
He has not said anything positive about the US military since he retired in 2004. And, what was going on in 2004? The GWOT. And the War with Iraq. He was hardly complimentary about the US military at that time, or since.
And, who is one of the biggest publishers of his positions?
Russian news outlets. They love him. Think about that: Just as Nazi Germany trotted out Charles Lindbergh in the 1930s as a “voice of reason” who demanded US neutrality vis-a-vis Europe (and he was awarded a medal by Nazi Germany for his position), so Russia trots out Douglas Macgregor.
Anyway, since you cited a Wikipedia article, perhaps you should have posted the entire article, instead of just a snippet. Here is the whole thing:
He even wanted to get rid of the Marine Corps:
Are you one of those who think Macgregor got a raw deal in not getting promoted? I don’t. Hell, his very involvement in the planning of the Balkans debacle should have ended his career all by itself.
“Ukraine’s condition for peace is the complete withdrawal of the Ruzzians from Ukrainian territory.”
They’re not going to get that. Russia won’t give up the Crimea and Ukraine doesn’t have the strength to drive them out.
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