Posted on 08/26/2023 6:27:49 PM PDT by UMCRevMom@aol.com
Update from Ukraine | Ruzzia runs from the south. Ukraine Lost Pilots and Planes | Glory to Heroes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pMplsQGd48
The summary of the situation of Russian re-invasion to Ukraine covering the recent developments on the battlefield, as of 23rd August 2023 – 22:00 (Kyiv time).
https://militaryland.net/news/invasion-day-546-summary/ [two summaries per week, released on Wednesday and Sunday]
*** Great interactive maps with viewer controlled Map magnification tool to use for each Front!
https://militaryland.net/maps/
Update from Ukraine | Ruzzia runs from the south. Ukraine Lost Pilots and Planes | Glory to Heroes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pMplsQGd48
The summary of the situation of Russian re-invasion to Ukraine covering the recent developments on the battlefield, as of 23rd August 2023 – 22:00 (Kyiv time).
https://militaryland.net/news/invasion-day-546-summary/ [two summaries per week, released on Wednesday and Sunday]
*** Great interactive maps with viewer controlled Map magnification tool to use for each Front!
https://militaryland.net/maps/
VIDEO SUMMATION
26 Aug: Huge Swarm Of Ukrainian Drones CARRY OUT MOST MASSIVE AIRSTRIKE On Russian Bases in Crimea
Divine Justice
175K subscribers
26.08.2023 8:30 p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZUDs8HDGrBM
26 Aug: Huge Swarm Of Ukrainian Drones CARRY OUT MOST MASSIVE AIRSTRIKE On Russian Bases in Crimea!
The Crimean peninsula has become the hell gate of the war between Ukraine and Russia. The gates have reopened today with the latest airstrike on the peninsula, and it looks like they won’t be closed for a long time. The reason for this was that the Ukrainians broke a new record in the last attack on the peninsula. This is the first time we have witnessed such a large number of unmanned aerial vehicles on the peninsula. The residents of Crimea also spent an unforgettable night.
Here are all the details of this historical attack in Crimea. Today, reports that the Russian Navy’s Black Sea Fleet base was shaken by explosions and that this may be the largest unmanned aerial vehicle attack on the base to date, brought the tension in the war to a record level. The Ukrainians’ amphibious operation against the peninsula and the Russians’ loss of S-400 air defense systems due to Neptune missile attacks in Crimea was actually just a preview of Kiev’s offensive actions.
We understood this from the most recent air strikes on Crimea. In reality, so many drones have never been seen in Crimea so far. For the first time, the Ukrainians sent 42 unmanned aerial vehicles to the peninsula. The hum of drones groaned all over the night sky of the peninsula. Eyewitnesses reported the sounds of drones flying over so-called mosquitoes and violent explosions in many areas at the same time.
This is how the Crimean settlements burned by Ukrainian drones. It has been reported that at least 17 UAVs flew over the village of Berehove from 02:00 to 03:10 at night. Local residents reported hearing the sound of a missile flying over the village of Krasnovka. There was also a very loud voice in Tarkhankut. Locals claim that there are many drones in the sky tonight. Noise was also high in Gvardeyske, Cape Meganom and Tarkhankut.
While news of explosions came one after another in Crimea, striking images about this subject were published on social media. The sound characteristics of the drones could be heard in the videos published on the Internet. On the other hand, it was shared that drone buzz is constantly heard in the city of Sevastopol. It was also reported that at least 7 powerful explosions occurred in this city of the peninsula.
Sevastopol Gauleiteri Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed that the drones also flew over themselves. It was claimed that in the city of Sevastopol, not only the sounds of drones, but also a noise similar to the sounds of missiles was heard. Noises similar to this sound were heard in Krasnovka. Under Ukraine’s drone army, the Crimean peninsula had turned into hell. Although the Russians announced that they prevented some of the drone attacks, some posts containing casualty data were coming from some cities on the peninsula.
The place where the drone attacks suffered the most was a massive Russian military base in Perevalne, near Simferpol. It was announced that the base, where many soldiers of Russia’s 126th brigade were located, was hit by drones and there were unimaginable casualties. The destruction of many soldiers of this Russian brigade in explosions and fires following drone attacks has also been confirmed by many media sources. At the moment, there are more than 100 casualties and about 300 injured.
The mayor of the city of Melitopol, Ivan Federov, announced on social media that about 300 Russian soldiers were sent to the hospital with various injuries. In addition, after the drone attacks, ammunition storage areas in the area where the 126th Brigade is located were also hit. Military equipment here was also severely damaged. In fact, the Ukrainians had previously carried out attacks on the military base where this Russian brigade was located. However, this latest attack has given the 126th Brigade a serious shock in its history.
One of the places most affected by the drone attacks was Krasnovka, which was captured by the explosions, as we mentioned. Krasnovka residents also claimed that military trucks carrying food and fuel had stopped near the village for a whole day. It is said that there was damage to Russian resources and military vehicles due to the drone attack. The attack was the largest since the beginning of the war.
Previously, the reports of the Russian Ministry of Defense did not include the figure of more than 40 unmanned aerial vehicles. For the residents of Crimea, the moment of the attack was perhaps the longest night ever. Also, with this latest drone attack in Crimea, it has been the third consecutive day of attacks in the region. If you remember, before the firing of 42 UAVs into Crimea, the Ukrainians once again signed off on another first in their history.
ARTICLE
Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry reacts to further detentions of Crimean Tatars
Ukrainska Pravda
Olha Hlushchenko
Sunday, 27 August 2023, 00:20
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/27/7417244/
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine has condemned the detention of Crimean Tatars on Ukraine’s Independence Day and called upon the international community to “keep putting pressure on Russia”.
SOURCE: a commentary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine concerning the latest detentions of Crimean Tatars
QUOTE: “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine strongly condemns the persecution of Ukrainian citizens by the occupying administration of Crimea on entirely trumped-up charges, and calls upon the international community, including the participants of the International Crimea Platform, to continue putting pressure on Russia in order to secure the immediate release of all Ukrainian citizens who have been illegally convicted by the occupying regime in Crimea, and to introduce sanctions restrictions against officials involved in persecuting citizens of Ukraine.”
DETAILS:
The Foreign Ministry noted that the occupying administration and collaborators in Ukrainian Crimea used the date of 24 August, when Independence Day is celebrated in Ukraine, as an excuse for a new wave of repressions against the Tatars of Crimea.
At 04:00, members of Russian security forces broke into the homes of Crimean Tatars in the city of Bakhchysarai and the Bakhchysarai district to conduct searches.
Members of the Federal Security of Russia (FSB) have detained six people – Ruslan Asanov, Seydamet Mustafayev, Remzi Nimetulayev, Abdulmedzhit Seitumerov, Ametkhan Umerov and Eldar Yakubov. Abdulmedzhit Seitumerov is the brother of two political prisoners from Bakhchysarai who were arrested in March 2020 and sentenced to 14 and 17 years of imprisonment respectively. All the detainees are activists from the Crimean Solidarity organization.
Within 12 hours on 25 August, the criminal occupying authorities of Crimea had drawn up protocols for over twenty detained Crimean Tatars who had come to the Kyiv District Court in the city of Simferopol to support their family members and friends. All of them were handed subpoenas at the police station.
Among the detainees is 64-year-old Remzi Zudiev, father of journalist and human rights activist Luftiye Zudieva. Although he has several confirmed chronic illnesses, he was denied the right to take the medicine he needs.
On 26 August, the so-called court issued a ruling on the arrests of several Crimean Tatars under the Code of Administrative Offenses for periods of between four and seven days.
VIDEOS
1. Ukraine counter-offensive: Forces advance on southern front
Times Radio
495K subscribers
8-26-2023 11:45 a.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wwYYwFBwNr0
2. Over 20% of Russian Aerospace Force losses self-inflicted
Kanal13
1.59M subscribers
Aug 26, 2023 9:00 a.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PtCDQ9T5hFg
ARTICLE
Security Service’s White Wolves unit shows destruction of third Russian tank regiment
Ukrainska Pravda
Roman Petrenko
Saturday, 26 August 2023, 12:13
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/26/7417192/
The White Wolf special unit of the Alpha Special Group of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) has shared a video showing them destroying the third Russian tank regiment already.
SOURCE: SSU
DETAILS:
The Security Service of Ukraine said that soldiers of this special unit have only destroyed 216 tanks since the start of the full-scale invasion.
VIDEO:
https://fb.watch/mGhoRYQ6QZ/
https://fb.watch/mGhtaWFrXd/
https://fb.watch/mGhvglvDgc/
QUOTE:
“Taking into account the fact that the staffing of the tank regiment of the Russian army is 94 units, our guys have already ‘crossed out’ two regiments and are persistently finishing off the third one!
We are destroying the occupiers until complete Victory!”
VIDEOS
1. Putin Doesn’t Care About the Lives of Soldiers: How Wounded Soldiers are Deceived in Russia
UATV English
400K subscribers
8-26-2023 1:15 p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZbI8Ua-Ypkw
2. LIVE Ukraine Robotyne Axis Update
Combat Veteran Reacts
296K subscribers
3,776 watching now Started streaming 6:00 p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=libRERNJl88
ARTICLE
Russians cannot hold defense for all their live – Chief of Defence Intelligence of Ukraine
Ukrainska Pravda
KATERYNA TYSHCHENKO
Saturday, 26 August 2023, 23:41
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/26/7417242/
Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, believes that Russia can maintain the defense on the occupied Ukrainian territories “for the rest of its life” if Ukraine does not take active steps in their liberation.
SOURCE: Budanov in an interview with Krym.Realii (Crimea.Realities, a project by Radio Svoboda)
QUOTE:
“They can hold [the defense – ed.] for a very long time if we don’t take active actions. Believe me, they can hold it for the rest of their life.”
DETAILS:
Budanov emphasized that it is possible to overcome the prepared Russian defense lines in the occupied territories “only with our own blood, there is no other option”.
“It is necessary to break through the defense line. Which, by the way, is what we are doing now. For those of you who say that it is possible to come up with some magical method, it is not possible, it does not exist,” Budanov said.
At the same time, Budanov said he believes that Russia has only human resources, while military reserves have been exhausted.
“He [Putin – ed.] has no more resources except for the military. There is no economy, no military-industrial complex either, and the military reserves are already exhausted... If everything is fine in Russia, the military-industrial complex is growing its capacity, the reserves are inexhaustible, then why are they trying to purchase ammunition in North Korea or Iran, if they have enough? Because there is nothing. They have exhausted their resources,” Budanov said.
VIDEOS
1. Ukraine claims break through of most difficult Russian defenses
Channel 4 News - British public broadcast service
2.69M subscribers
Aug 26, 2023 2:00p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UK_T4C6M1kc
2. US confirmed: Ukrainian Army broke through first line of defense of Russians
Kanal13
1.59M subscribers
Aug 26, 2023 2:00p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDJvTDNaVa8
Tokyo rose
ARTICLE
Total combat losses of Russian Federation since beginning of war - about 260,270 people (+640 per day), 4,390 tanks, 5,379 artillery systems, 8,539 armored vehicles
Censor.net
08:08 26.08.2023 10 15817
https://m.censor.net/en/news/3439727/total_combat_losses_of_russian_federation_since_beginning_of_war_about_260270_people_640_per_day_4390
Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, Ukrainian defenders liquidated about 260,270 Russian invaders.
This was reported by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Censor.NET reports.
The total enemy combat losses from 24.02.22 to 26.08.23 are approximately:
• personnel - about 260270 (+640) people liquidated,
• tanks - 4390 (+12) units,
• armoured combat vehicles - 8539 (+18) units,
• artillery systems - 5379 (+18) units,
• MLRS - 726 (+2) units,
• air defense systems - 497 (+2) units,
• aircraft - 315 (+0) units,
• helicopters - 316 (+0) units,
• UAVs of the operational and tactical level - 4367 (+11),
• cruise missiles - 1411 (+2),
• ships/boats - 18 (+0) units,
• motor vehicles and tankers - 7823 (+33) units,
• special equipment - 804 (+2).
VIDEOS
1. World Today | The collapse of ruble
TVP World
412K subscribers
8-26-2023 Premiered 5:45 p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6RBbSoj0GTY
With the imposition of severe sanctions on Russia, its economy is facing significant challenges. With our guest, Błażej Podgórski from Koźmiński University, we examined the reasons behind the currency’s decline and the actions taken by the Central Bank of Russia to stabilize the situation. We also explored the economic factors at play, as well as their potential impact on the nation’s financial stability and global relationships
2. Ukraine will speed up advance on southern front - commander
Kanal13
1.59M subscribers
Aug 26, 2023 4:30p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=89e4HO_2q20
I’ll just leave this link here from a Joe Rogan podcast to remind everyone why we are supposed to hate Russia.
https://youtu.be/v-vpOt5NIXo?si=ekH2n-pQLrj36kdk
For anyone who is interested in reality-based writing on the topic:
Ukraine's offensive: is it failing?
And are the Pentagon's criticism's of its strategy fair?
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN
AUG 23, 2023Ukrainian soldiers fire with D-30 artillery at Russian positions in the direction of Klishchiivka (Photo by Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images). The Russo-Ukraine War has reached its eighteen-month mark with no end in sight because neither side, for now, has a convincing route to a military victory. The Ukrainian offensive, which began in June, was presented as a means to liberate a substantial amount of territory from Russian occupation, and potentially cause a crisis in Russian military confidence that might oblige Moscow to recognise that the game was up, and that it was time to cut its losses.
This prospect was always optimistic, not only because of the difficulties of retaking well-defended territory but also because of Putin’s reluctance to admit defeat even when his army suffers setbacks. Recently a new narrative has started to take hold in some commentaries on the state of the war, notably from Pentagon officials, to the effect that the offensive is turning out to be a deep disappointment. Questions are now being raised about whether this is a war that Ukraine can ever win. Perhaps it is Kyiv that should be looking to cut its losses, conceding territory in return for peace.
This gloom is overdone. There is still uncertainty about how the current round of fighting will develop. Ukraine still holds the initiative. But the challenges are real and it does Ukraine no favours to suggest that they can easily be overcome. The basic problem, however, is the one that has been present from the start. Bringing this war to an end is a political as well as a military process, and the political process we understand least is in Moscow.
This war is far removed from those of the 18th and 19th centuries when battle would decide the dispute that had caused the war. Classical military strategy was geared to ‘decisive’ battles which would start at dawn and end at dusk. When they were over the results could be tallied – who controlled the battlefield and had broken the opposing army – and the ‘decision’ of war announced. That required both sides to accept the result. Increasingly, however, it became harder to achieve a decisive battle. Even after a defeat in battle if there was some means of continuing the fight and recouping its losses then a country would carry on. More war would appear as a lesser evil than a humiliating peace. Look what it took in 1945 to convince both the Germans and Japanese that they had lost and could not continue.
A Failing Offensive?
The recent flurry of newspaper reports suggesting that the Ukrainian campaign has run into trouble began on 17 August when the Washington Post quoted anonymous US officials lamenting that insufficient territory has been liberated and that vital targets have yet to be taken. Of these the city of Melitopol was highlighted as the ‘gateway to Crimea,’ located ‘at the intersection of two important highways and a railroad line that allow Russia to move military personnel and equipment from the peninsula to other occupied territories in southern Ukraine.’ This was followed by another piece, three days later, continuing the lament, observing that ‘the counteroffensive shows signs of stalling.’ The Russians were far from crumbling, not only ‘putting up fierce resistance’ but ‘even making offensive advances.’
The timing of these stories was surprising. A number of analysts were cautious from the start about how easy it would be to break through Russian lines and the time it might take to make significant progress. (This was my assessment from 10 June in the Sunday Times). It was soon evident that the caution as warranted. The first moves in the offensive, in early June, had not gone well. But it was also evident that the Ukrainians had adjusted their tactics accordingly. As I, and many others, noted hopes for dashing manoeuvres were soon replaced by a more realistic focus on small-scale engagements, eating away at Russian forward positions and logistic networks using Ukraine’s advantages in the quality if not the quantity of their artillery. The expectations of a decisive breakthrough over the coming months were soon swapped for the more realistic prospect of a campaign that could continue until the autumn when it would need to wind down because of resource constraints, especially ammunition, and boggier conditions.
The Institute for the Study of War observed that the intelligence assessment cited by the Washington Post was at best ‘premature’ and that it was odd to make so much of Melitopol as an objective. ‘Ukraine has many options for severing critical Russian ground lines of communication along the northern Sea of Azov coast of which the seizure of Melitopol is only one.’ Yet Melitopol was set as the main objective for the offensive and its not surprising that this is how it is being judged. It may be that other opportunities will come into view over the coming weeks but if they do they will not have been part of the original plan.
It is one of the clichés of strategy that events are unlikely to unfold in ways that meet the timetable and targets of a plan of campaign. (‘No plan survives contact with the enemy – von Moltke; ‘everyone has a plan ‘till they get punched in the mouth’ – Mike Tyson.) This is why armies, and their commanders, tend to be evaluated by their ability to adapt and improvise. It is the rare operation that goes ‘according to plan’ or ‘on schedule’.
Risk Aversion
Part of the negative assessment was a simple recognition that the Russians had done a good job constructing defences that were hard to pass. But there was another part of the critique that caught my attention. The original Post article noted the casualties suffered by the Ukrainians during the early stages of the offensive, adding that:
Joint war games conducted by the U.S., British and Ukrainian militaries anticipated such losses but envisioned Kyiv accepting the casualties as the cost of piercing through Russia’s main defensive line, said U.S. and Western officials.
The article then suggested that the Pentagon had ‘recommended multiple times that Ukraine concentrate a large mass of forces on a single breakthrough point.’ This picked up on a debate that had been underway from early in the year when Kyiv decided to commit substantial forces to the defence of the eastern city of Bakhmut, despite its limited strategic relevance and the high human cost.
The Ukrainians have for months poured tremendous resources into Bakhmut, including soldiers, ammunition and time, but they have lost control of the city and have made only modest gains in capturing territory around it. And while the close-in, trench-line fighting is different in Bakhmut from the problem of mines in the south, the focus has left some in the Biden administration concerned that overcommitting in the east may have eroded the potency of the counteroffensive in the south.
The Financial Times appears to have been talking to the same unnamed officials:
One point of tension between US and Ukrainian officials has centred on how Kyiv has deployed its military. US officials have encouraged Ukraine to be less risk-averse and fully commit its forces to the main axis of the counteroffensive in the south so it would have a chance of breaking through Russian lines to reach the Sea of Azov, effectively cutting Russia’s land bridge in southern Ukraine to Crimea, a critical military hub. Washington has also urged Ukraine to send more combat power to the south, and stop concentrating on the east, where almost half of its forces are engaged. But Ukraine has instead deployed some of its best fighting units in eastern Ukraine in a battle to recapture Bakhmut.
Now the New York Times has weighed in with a similar analysis, complaining that too many troops, including some of the best combat units, are in the wrong places. Again the division of effort between the south and east is critcised, regretting that more has not been moved to the south to push through ‘even if the Ukrainians lose more soldiers and equipment in the process.’ This critique, it reports, reflects American doctrine that always demands
‘a main effort to ensure that maximum resources go to a single front, even if supporting forces are fighting in other areas to hedge against failure or spread-out enemy defenses.’
How valid is this critique?
First, there is a distinction between being risk-averse and reckless. The problem was not that Ukraine was unwilling to attempt company and battalion armoured assaults but that when it did so ‘Russian anti-tank capabilities just proved too strong.’ If they had been mounted on a larger scale it is not clear that the gains would have been much greater, although the casualties would certainly have been higher. A concentrated force for a concerted push would have been spotted and likely caught by Russian artillery. And it would still have been held up by the minefields. The Americans have not recently undertaken an operation of this sort and would only do so with assets the Ukrainians lack. As the New York times acknowledged
‘American officials’ criticisms of Ukraine’s counteroffensive are often cast through the lens of a generation of military officers who have never experienced a war of this scale and intensity.’
The lesson here is not that the Ukrainians failed to achieve what the Americans might have hoped to achieve in similar circumstances but that it was unrealistic to expect them to try. Having tried the Ukrainians reverted to smaller-scale operations that they understood better and knew how to execute. The challenge now is to coordinate these more effectively so that there can be more concentration of force and fire.
Second, there is a debate still underway about the extent of the commitment to the east, and the decision to allow experienced units to fight there while fresh ones were being prepared for the offensive in the south. On the one hand Bakhmut was lost and at a heavy cost to Ukraine. On other other the Russians appear unsure about what to do with the ruined city now they have it. They also took heavy losses and the battle opened up the sharp argument between the Wagner Group and the Ministry of Defence that led to a brief mutiny. It was not an area that Ukraine could have neglected because of its importance to Moscow. It was (and to a degree still is) the main focus for Russian offensive operations. The issue now is whether Ukraine should concentrate on more defensive operations in the east, given that it is going to be a stretch to retake Bakhmut, and commit more forces to the south.
Third, the accusation of risk aversion has normally been directed at Washington. It is now a standard critique of the Biden Administration that while it has done a good job on maintaining alliance unity and providing Ukraine with substantial diplomatic, economic, and military assistance. When it comes to the capabilities that are most vital to current operations - artillery, ammunition, air defences - the Pentagon’s support has made all the difference. The criticism is mainly directed at capabilities that would have helped Ukraine strike targets well behind the front lines, which have either been held back completely, or seen allies make the running (such as the UK with cruise missiles and now Denmark and the Netherlands with F-16s), or have been belatedly authorised. The Ukrainians are still waiting for the long-range Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).
This reluctance to hand over higher-end capabilities has been justified by concerns about provoking Russia into nuclear escalation, although this is no longer seen as pressing a concern as it was last year. Critics argued that the risk was exaggerated and that Russia has already escalated in ways that hurt the Ukrainians. The nuclear risk is obviously not trivial, and it may be that moving carefully and incrementally has allowed possible Russian ‘red lines’ to be passed without major reactions, but one can understand Ukrainian frustration when capabilities start to arrive long after they would have first been useful and while they are routinely suffering attacks on civil society and the economy.
Fourth, casualty aversion has featured highly in decisions on US force employment in recent decades, in part because of concerns that public opinion would not tolerate significant losses in those interventions when the most vital national interests were not at stake. One of the reasons for the US military’s emphasis on manoeuvre over attrition when thinking about full-scale war has been the hope that this could get wars over quickly and keep casualties down. The idea is to avoid crude trades of firepower in favour of operations designed to surprise and disorient the enemy. This approach, however, tends to play down the important of advantages in firepower which can suppress enemy air and artillery and blast holes in defensive positions and so make manoeuvre possible. Ukraine has not enjoyed these advantages.
In some ways, therefore, this criticism of Ukrainian forces for being too risk averse and not punching hard enough seems not only to be misplaced but also a reversion to an earlier American approach to the use of force, before the fixation with manoeuvre, when American generals accepted the bloody logic of direct attacks if that was the only way to a quick victory and avoiding even larger losses over time.
I found one example of the US complaining about the risk aversion of an ally in a book I’ve been reading by James Conroy’s about the January 1943 Casablanca Conference. This is when the Americans and British forged a common strategy for the Second World War. The British Chiefs of Staff were worried that the Americans were too much in a rush to invade occupied France, and that without proper preparations this could lead to carnage. American strategy, according to Conroy, was ‘rooted in the bludgeoning style of Ulysses S. Grant. Americans won their wars with enormous wealth, industry, manpower, and hubris.’
‘They built a powerful army when the need arose, attacked the enemy’s strength as quickly as possible, and took and inflicted casualties until he stopped struggling. Anything less was a distraction.’ (p.19)
These attitudes die hard, but a country fighting with limited resources, and already feeling the losses already incurred, was bound to be more cautious. That was the attitude of the British in 1943 (and wariness about American attitudes to risk were reinforced during the Korean war and could even be seen up to the liberation of Kuwait in 1991). It is unsurprising that it is now Ukraine’s attitude.
We can see a similar mass army mentality displayed by Russia. It has always gone for the numbers, assuming a plentiful supply of troops and armour, sufficient to crush opponents, while adopting an unsentimental attitude to the human costs of war. Hence the Russian command’s attitude towards attrition is not so much to fight differently to conserve resources but to step up production of new equipment and find more soldiers to do the fighting.
What if Ukraine Fails?
Not long before the Ukrainians began their latest offensive I attended a conference which considered the implications of various possible outcomes – success, failure or some sort of draw – for both the course of the war and western policy. I was in a group looking at the consequences of failure. It was depressingly easy to write the scenario. It was clear that the Ukrainians would want to push through from Zaporizhzhia in the South to divide Russian forces and reach the sea (the ‘success’ scenario) and it was equally clear the Russians knew this and had prepared extensive defences. If these defences did their job the offensive would fail: Ukrainian forces would be rebuffed, suffer heavy losses, and possibly be left vulnerable to Russian counterattacks.
As this scenario was discussed I came to the conclusion that this dismal outcome would not lead to a major shift in Western policy. Others argued that this sort of failure, or just a lack of palpable success, was bound to mean an agonising reappraisal. More aid to Ukraine would be seen as throwing good money after bad and the clamour for some negotiated peace with Russia would grow. This case has been made for some time and the recent news reports have given it added vigour.
Yet unless the Ukrainian position became truly catastrophic, it is hard to see why Western governments would or should agree to an about turn. Even if this offensive falters, Ukraine would still not be defeated. It would continue the fight so long as its territory was under a cruel occupation. At the conference those gloomiest about the prospects for Ukrainian success did not suggest that the Russians had the capacity to mount a breakthrough offensive of their own – after all they had been trying during the first months of the year and achieved little. There has been a lot of noise on the Russian blogosphere about how Russian forces have been advancing towards Kupyansk in the east. The Ukrainians seem to see this as a manageable challenge, largely for show, but it can’t be ignored and has the effect of drawing forces away from their own offensive operations.
Such mini-offensives bring Russia no closer to achieving any of its shifting war aims. Surviving the Russian onslaught and liberating occupied territory continues to unify the Ukrainian people. Kyiv’s western backers have not abandoned it. The aid packages keep coming. The costs to Western countries of continuing support are manageable, especially as they are not actually doing the fighting – this situation cannot be compared with the disillusion that set in with Vietnam and Iraq as casualties mounted and a sense of futility grew. If they abandoned Ukraine after one setback, however serious, this would confirm the impression from Afghanistan, that they are unreliable allies, and would be hardly comfort to other countries, say Taiwan, that might hope for future support.
There is now the issue of whether Donald Trump can win the Presidency next year, but even if he did his inauguration would not be until January 2025. And for the moment all that we know about his Ukraine policy is that he believes that he could settle the war in no time at all. (Republicans remain split – for sure some of the would-be presidential nominees want to cut back on support but others in Congress are demanding that Biden give Ukraine more).
Most tellingly, even if there was some temptation to explore a cease-fire there is no reason to suppose that Putin would be interested. From his perspective he does not yet have enough Ukrainian territory to consider his project complete. Once he saw support for Ukraine weakening then he would raise his demands.
What if Russia Fails?
In practice Ukraine is pushing back slowly but surely, imposing heavy costs while eating away at Russian capabilities. Perhaps aware that the recent stories about slow progress were harmful for national morale as well as international support, Ukraine has put more effort into demonstrating that it is moving forward and is confident of eventual victory. Thus one story in the New York Times offers a more optimistic take,. A deputy battalion commander of the 80th Airborne Assault Brigade, fighting on the eastern front, is quoted describing his early disappointment at their inability to ‘punch quickly through to the sea,’ but how now ‘with cunning, with Western equipment, the Ukrainian armed forces are breaking through their defences,’ so that success was ‘just a question of time.’ He claimed that Russian forces were in a relatively poor shape and how they were being worn down by cluster munitions. Even the Washington Post has found space to argue that cluster munitions are causing real problems for Russian forces.
The village of Robotyne which has been fought over for some time is now in Ukraine’s hands. There are still possibilities for further significant advances and some time to achieve them. Ukraine’s forces are fully committed and there are no more reserves to be committed. There is perhaps another couple of months of fighting before the Ukrainians will start to be affected by ammunition shortages. By this time both sides may be feeling weary and depleted after the year’s exertions and be looking to regroup as much as attack.
The hope behind the Ukrainian offensive was that a sufficiently substantial blow would force Moscow into its own reappraisal, scaling back its demands. This was not an unreasonable hope. At some point if the Russian military can no longer cope and begins to retreat then even Putin’s most loyal acolytes would wonder whether there was much point to this war. But it has been evident since last September that Putin was determined to continue the fight, not least because he dare not be seen to have failed. He had even raised the stakes though mobilising more men for the army and announcing that much of Ukraine was now to be considered Russian. It would therefore require quite a military blow to shake up decision-making in Moscow, and that would need the Ukrainians to exceed expectations.
We should not lose sight of the scale of Russian losses thus far and the failure of its own recent offensives. It has been showing signs of stress but the army has not given up, and it manages occasional mini-offensives, while missile and drone strikes hurt the Ukrainians economically and socially as well as militarily. Russia’s economy is not in great shape but nor is it facing a chronic crisis. So even if the Ukrainian offensive prospered there could be no guarantee of its political effect.
The situation with Russia is not at all comparable to 1945. It is not facing an existential challenge – just a fiasco with a supposedly limited operation that went badly wrong. Ukraine is not going to march on Moscow to demand surrender. There are no demands for Russian territory to be handed over, or at least not territory internationally recognised as Russian. If Putin had not raised the stakes by claiming so much of Ukraine for Russia then it might not have been too hard to walk away. The cumulative effect of his disastrous policies has been to turn this special military operation into a struggle for the future of his regime and his concept of the Russian state.
At some point Moscow may decide that it must seek a route out of this morass but we can only guess what it will take to get this decision and when it might occur. We do not know enough about the interaction between the various external pressures on Russia and the internal decision-making. Only on occasion do we get glimpses of the tensions within the elite, of which the Wagner mutiny was the most extreme example. As Ukraine and its Western allies cannot force a decision on Moscow, all that can be done is keep up the pressure and accept that this may have to be done for months, even years. This is not because the war definitely will go on this long but because it might, and because Putin is more likely to seek a way out if he recognises that time is not on his side. This pressure can take a number of forms - at sea, in drone strikes against targets in Russia, attacking supply lines into Crimea, keeping up the pressure on its economy, demonstrating that Ukraine is not too far away from production of ammunition and other war material. If it is likely that fighting will continue well into the next year then that should be reflected in Ukrainian strategy. Grumbles about slow progress should not lead to pressure to push harder than is feasible or prudent during the current offensive. The aim should be to get in as good a position as possible for the coming stages of the war and also to think about how best to sustain and develop capabilities for these stages. Whether Ukrainian forces do well or badly in the coming months it will still be essential to think long-term.
ARTICLE
Last day, Navy units destroyed 15 occupiers, 26 quadcopters and 2 warehouses with ammunition. INFOGRAPHICS
Censor.net
19:46 26.08.2023 5536
https://m.censor.net/en/news/3439803/last_day_navy_units_destroyed_15_occupiers_26_quadcopters_and_2_warehouses_with_ammunition_infographics
The servicemen of the military units and units of the Naval Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which are part of the groups, continue to perform the tasks of repelling the full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation.
This is reported by Censor.NET with reference to Facebook page of the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
“Last day, units of the Navy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine destroyed 15 occupiers, 1 unit of trailer-mounted howitzer D-30, 2 warehouses with ammunition, and 26 quadrocopters. The final losses of the enemy are being specified,” the message says.
VIDEOS
1. Ukraine Outflanks Russian Forces, Takes Miles of Ground | Breaking News With The Enforcer
The Enforcer
156K subscribers
8-26-2023 5:00 p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=stDCoZMcGmI
2. UKRAINIAN ARTILLERY ANNIHILATING A FLEEING RUSSIAN COLUMN OF TANKS AND ARMORED VEHICLES || 2023
Warthog Defense
601K subscribers
8-26-2023 1:00 p.m. EDT
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-liynHqqsHA&t=14s
ARTICLE
During day, 93 occupiers, 19 units of military equipment and 5 ammunition warehouses were destroyed in Tauria direction, - Tarnavsky
Censor.net
16:51 26.08.2023 7683
https://m.censor.net/en/news/3439790/during_day_93_occupiers_19_units_of_military_equipment_and_5_ammunition_warehouses_were_destroyed_in
The work of the Defense Forces continues in the Tauria direction. Artillery units of the Defense Forces of the Tavria direction performed 1,283 fire missions during the day.
This was announced by the commander of the operational and strategic group of troops “Tauria” Oleksandr Tarnavsky, Censor.NET reports.
As noted, in total, during the past day, the enemy attacked Ukrainian positions 27 times and carried out 731 shellings, carried out 2 missile strikes and 24 airstrikes.
Artillery units of the Defense Forces of the Tauria direction performed 1,283 fire missions during the day.
“For the last day, the loss of the enemy amounted to 309 people (93 irretrievably injured, 208 wounded, 8 captured).
19 units of enemy military equipment were destroyed. In particular, 4 tanks, 6 self-propelled guns, 8 artillery systems and mortars, 1 self-propelled grenade launcher.
Also, 5 enemy ammunition depots were destroyed,” he added.
VIDEO WITH SUMMARIZED COMMENTARY
26 Aug: Trapped Ukrainians Escape & CRUSH RUSSIAN FLANKS | War in Ukraine Explained
Reporting from Ukraine
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1DPwmUNwlG0
⚠️ Watch RFU in 20 languages: https://www.youtube.com/@RFU/channels
I am Ukrainian. My country has been invaded by Russia. In this video I will tell you what happened on the five hundred forty ninth day of the war.
Day 549: Aug 26
Today, there are a lot of important updates from the Kherson region.
Last time, I told you that Ukrainians identified an area where Russians relocated mobilized troops who turned out to be completely unfamiliar with the region, immediately exploited it by focusing on hunting down the inexperienced forces, and after the Russian battalion lost up to 25% of its personnel, Ukrainians conducted a landing operation, breached the Russian defense, and even took captive the commander of this battalion.
At first, Ukrainians were successfully advancing and even took half of the village of Kozachi Laheri. A Ukrainian presence on the eastern bank of the river put significant pressure on the Russian commanders to resolve the issue by any means.
Most of the Russian reserves came from the south and arrived at Pidstepne. Unfortunately for Russians, just increasing the number of troops was not enough, as Ukrainians have a tactical advantage – the western bank of the river is much higher, which is why it allows to control the Russian movement near the river completely.
Geolocated footage shows how Ukrainian drone operators started destroying the inflowing reserves before they even got to their positions. Ukrainians released multiple videos of how they blew up Russian cars to the north of Pidstepne. Russians lost so much equipment due to drone strikes that they brought into the region an armored recovery vehicle, BREM-1, to evacuate damaged equipment and an air defense system against low-flying aircraft. Both pieces of equipment were also destroyed by Ukrainian drones. In order to complicate Russian counterattacks, Ukrainians also conducted a HIMARS strike and destroyed a Russian ammunition depot.
Nonetheless, Russians continued to push and soon outnumbered Ukrainians at least 10 to 1. Ukrainian commanders had to reevaluate the situation. The commanders discovered that in an attempt to stabilize the situation around Kozachi Laheri, Russian forces made a large overcorrection and increased the concentration of forces in this sector at the expense of other directions, so after holding the bridgehead for almost a week, Ukrainians withdrew from the central part and immediately attacked Russians to the north and south.
This was a very good decision that immediately brought results. Russian troops on the islands were left virtually with no artillery, mortars or drones. Such a setting allowed Ukrainians to conduct raids virtually with impunity – Ukrainians would launch artillery preparation, force Russians to hide while they got to the island on boats, assaulted their positions, and even took captives.
Russian soldiers became so desperate in the face of certain death that they started flooding Russian military bloggers with reports and evidence and asking them to raise this question as soon as possible in hopes that the public pressure would force the commander of the 205th Brigade to finally do something about it. And the Russian commander of the 205th Brigade has already become notorious for killing some of the best fighters in suicidal assaults near the Antonivskyi Bridge.
Russian soldiers revealed that the average lifespan of a company under such conditions became 2 days, and Russians were losing more than 50 troops per day due to the constant raids. And all commanders of the companies who refused to send their troops on a one-way trip were immediately fired. One company stood up for their commander, but now they are facing criminal charges for mutiny. Another commander who tried to evacuate his troops from the island was not only stopped but sent to a psychiatric hospital.
Russian analysts said that such an unbelievable mess was caused by the brigade and battalion commanders, who got their positions not because of their military experience, which they do not have, but because they never challenge the instructions given by the Russian Ministry of Defense, always produce good reports, and are excellent at hiding real losses.
This is extremely good news for Ukrainians, who are exploiting this opportunity to the fullest extent. The goal here is to push the whole Russian 205th Brigade to the point where it completely loses its combat capability. This will either force Russians to relocate troops from the Tokmak direction, or Russians will lose control over the eastern bank of the river entirely.
*** Select the 3 horizontal dots to view the Complete Transcript [Below video/ top right corner]
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