Iran is still attempting to establish a permanent naval base on Sudan's Red Sea coast following unsuccessful bilateral talks in March 2024. The Wall Street Journal initially reported in March 2024 that Iran unsuccessfully tried to persuade Sudan to allow Iran to build a permanent naval base in Port Sudan on the Red Sea.[11] France-based, Sudanese outlet the Sudan Tribune reported on July 16 that the Sudanese Armed Forces rejected an Iranian proposal to permanently station an Iranian military vessel in Port Sudan in exchange for continued Iranian military aid to the Sudanese Armed Forces.[12] The July 16 report stated that Iran modified its initial proposal to instead request to establish a dual-use commercial and military port at Port Sudan. Iran's initial proposal was to establish a solely military-use port, according to the Wall Street Journal.[13] The most recent proposal was also rejected by Sudanese officials, according to the Sudan Tribune report. The July 16 report likely indicates that Iran continued talks with Sudan after its initial talks as reported by the Wall Street Journal in March 2024.
Sudanese Armed Forces officials reportedly rejected these Iranian proposals due to concerns about potential backlash from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Western countries. Port Sudan is located approximately 200 miles west of Saudi Arabia—separated by the Red Sea. A senior Sudanese intelligence adviser to the Sudanese Armed Forces stated in March 2024 that Sudan rejected the initial proposal to ”avoid alienating the US and Israel.”[14] Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel all have direct access to the Red Sea, and an Iranian presence on the Red Sea would enable Iran to support longer-range naval operations to disrupt international shipping to any of these states, should Iran choose to do so.[15] Sudan's rejection of these proposals has not visibly affected Iran's decision to supply drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Iran has supplied the Sudanese Armed Forces with drones, such as the Mohajer-6, to use against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces in the ongoing Sudanese Civil War.[16] CTP-ISW previously assessed in March 2024 that Iran would use a naval base in Sudan to support out-of-area naval operations and attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-17-2024
January 2020, Supreme Leader Khamenei
Following Khamenei’s proclamation of a “harsh revenge”, his official account on X (then Twitter) published an image of Trump on a golf course under the shadow of a drone, hinting at his targeting. That post has since been deleted. Khamenei’s official website also released an animation with the same theme, showing IRGC forces killing Trump using a robot.
December 2020, Qaani, Commander of IRGC Quds Force
On the anniversary of Soleimani’s assassination, his successor, Ismail Qaani, hinted at the intention to target Trump in an address to Iran's parliament. “American agents involved in the assassination of martyr Soleimani should learn the secretive life of Salman Rushdie because the Islamic Republic will avenge his unjustly-spilled blood.”
January 2021, Qaani, Commander of IRGC Quds Force
Qaani reiterated his threat in yet another occasion to commemorate his predecessor. This time more directly: “Trump and others who were with him are all known to us. From [Mike] Pompeo, who no one humiliated as much as martyr Soleimani, to the US president and all those involved in this crime, [they] are all under the microscope (not only of Muslims but) of all free people of the world.”
January 2022, President Raisi
“If Trump and (former Secretary of State Mike) Pompeo are not tried in a fair court for the criminal act of assassinating General Soleimani, Muslims will take our martyr's revenge.”
July 2022, Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian
Two years before dying in a helicopter crash, Iran's foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said what had happened to Soleimani would “never be forgotten.” He did explain Iran's legal and diplomatic efforts, including appeals to the International Law Commission. In an interview with Iran's state TV, he said: “One action we have taken has been to place the perpetrators and instigators of this crime on the terrorist blacklist, and those who have been listed do not sleep easily… They wanted to resolve this through intermediaries, but we rejected their offer.”
February 2023, Hajizadeh, Commander of IRGC Air Force
Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the IRGC Aerospace Commander, appeared on a TV program to explain Iran's actions to avenge Soleimani. He said, “We did not intend to kill [US soldiers]. God willing, we will kill Trump, Pompeo, [Frank] McKenzie, and the military commanders who ordered [Soleimani’s assassination].”
Iran Update, July 18, 2024
Members of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle told Western Media that Khamenei sought to promote the candidacy of Masoud Pezeshkian due to Pezeshkian’s ability to “foster unity.”[1] Individuals close to the supreme leader told Western media that Khamenei received intelligence reports in May 2024 revealing that only 13 percent of Iranians would participate in the snap presidential election following former President Ebrahim Raisi’s death. Unnamed regime insiders stated that Khamenei subsequently “orchestrated” the election to result in the victory of moderate candidate Masoud Pezeshkian due to Khamenei’s fear that low voter turnout would “damage the clerical establishment’s credibility.” Regime insiders told Western media that Khamenei stated Iran needed a president who could “appeal to different layers of society” while “foster[ing] unity among those in power” and without challenging Iran’s ruling theocracy. This may be part of an effort to emphasize the regime’s stability and message to the West that attempts to undermine the regime will fail and that negotiations will prove the only successful way to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Iranian officials believe that the United States and the West have used and are using media and other non-military means to fight a “soft war” against Iran to subvert the regime and eventually overthrow it. These Iranian officials, by presenting the facade of stability, appear to be attempting to discourage these efforts.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-18-2024
... or prevent the Paydari group and Mirbagheri from getting more power.