Iran Update, August 6, 2024
Unspecified US officials told Axios on August 5 that the US intelligence community expects Iran and its Axis of Resistance to conduct two waves of attacks in its retaliation against Israel for the death of Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31.[1] US intelligence officials reportedly briefed a potential scenario to US President Joe Biden and US Vice President Kamala Harris in which Hezbollah would conduct an attack on Israel in a wave separate from another Iranian and Axis attack. Intelligence officials noted that it is not clear whether Iran and the Axis or Hezbollah would launch the first attack. One unspecified US official cited by Axios said that intelligence reports suggest Iranian and Hezbollah planning is a “work in progress.”
Iran and its Axis of Resistance would likely use the first wave of the attack on Israel to assess Israeli air defenses in preparation for the second wave of the attack. The April 2024 attack consisted of only one large volley of drones and missiles fired from Iran.[2] CTP-ISW noted on August 4 that Iran and its allies could use multiple attacks targeting Israel to learn and adjust their attacks as they observe how successful they are.[3] Iran and the Axis could adjust the volume or type of projectiles fired at Israel, targets, and launch locations.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2024
Russian officials are continuing coordination with Iran ahead of the Iranian retaliatory strike against Israel out of concern for Russian interests in the region. Reuters reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered a message via Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu that Iran should act with restraint and avoiding targeting civilians when retaliating against Israel.[28] An unspecified Iranian diplomat claimed to IranWire that Russia is opposed to Iranian strikes that could lead to the death of civilians due to the large number of Russian citizens who live in Israel. The report did not make clear how an Iranian official would understand the calculus behind the Russian decision making.[29]
Russia is also reportedly assisting Iranian efforts to improve its air defenses against Israeli attacks, according to the New York Times.[30] The New York Times, citing two unspecified Iranian officials including an IRGC member, stated that Russia began delivering advanced radars and air-defense systems to Iran.[31] Iranian media has previously reported that Iran sought to acquire Russian air defense systems to improve Iran's air defense network and defend against Israeli attack, according to the New York Times.
The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) highlighted a “notable increase” in Iranian statements on Iran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon, corroborating previous CTP-ISW reporting. ODNI published the 2024 annual report in compliance with the “Nuclear Weapons Capability and Terrorism Monitoring Act of 2022” on July 23.[32] The ODNI assessed that ”Iran probably will consider installing more centrifuges” and increasing its enriched uranium stockpile ”up to 90 percent in response to additional sanctions, attacks, or censure against its nuclear program.”[33] The ODNI also emphasized a ”notable increase” of Iranian officials’ statements on Iran's nuclear activities, including their ability to produce a nuclear weapon. This corroborates previous CTP-ISW reporting since May, which has noted that senior Iranian officials have normalized public discussions about Iran's ability to procure a nuclear weapon.[34]
The death of a Houthi drone expert responsible for training Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in the July 30 US strike in Iraq indicates a possible Iranian-backed effort to improve the targeting capabilities of the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias against both US forces and Israel.[21] The United States conducted a self-defense strike that killed a senior Houthi commander and drone expert at Kataib Hezbollah's Jurf al Sakhr facility in Iraq on July 30.[22] The Houthis confirmed that the strike killed the commander, who had traveled to Iraq to train other Iranian-backed Iraqi militias in drone tactics.[23] An Iraqi journalist also reported that four other Houthi fighters died in the strike and that all five Houthis were buried in Wadi al Salam in Najaf, Iraq.[24] The Houthis have years of experience conducting successful drone attacks targeting facilities in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that are protected by US air defense systems, such as the Patriot and THAAD.[25] The Houthis more recently have proven that their drones can evade Israeli air defense systems, at least in isolated incidents.[26] This is notable given the relative lack of success Iraqi-backed militias have had in targeting US positions in the region. Houthi instruction may therefore be aimed at improving the success of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against both the United States and Israel.
The Houthi decision to deploy this commander to Iraq to train Iraqi militias suggests that Iran and the Houthis seek to rapidly accelerate the training of these militias. Iran and the Houthis could have presumably decided to send small numbers of Iraqi militia members to Yemen for training as part of a “train-the-trainer”-style program. The drone expert's presence in Iraq, however, would have enabled him to train much larger numbers of Iraqi militia members much more rapidly, allowing the knowledge to be disseminated directly without an intermediary trainer. The Iraqi journalist also reported that the Houthis were coordinating with Kataib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Ansarallah al Awfiya, and other Iranian-backed militias, which would be consistent with an effort to train larger numbers of fighters and Iraqi militias more efficiently.[27]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2024