Ukraine: military situation update with maps, July 20, 2022
(’Orc’ is associated with the various hoards of 13th century Mongol invaders, as well as LOTR evil villains)
War in Ukraine
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCP2QApi8G2TKc8NZmeDWSUg/videos
Artillery (key to success in this war), Fuller explanation of Orc military structure, Other Bonus articles - see previous postings in “Attack on Europe” (FR title search).
(Numbered printed material below - Some of the items below may be out of date, and not updated yet)
••denotes transcribed dialogue.
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Extras:
Giving A-10 Warthogs To Ukraine Isn’t Off The Table
Top U.S. Air Force officials have left the door open to the possibility of transferring some of the iconic Warthogs to Ukraine.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/giving-a-10-warthogs-to-ukraine-isnt-off-the-table
Excerpt:
The aircraft has some sensitive systems that would likely need to be removed prior to such a transfer, as well ... With regards to training demands, “thanks to prior military exchange programs, Ukraine already has a small number of pilots trained to fly the A-10. (Edit: Potential crop dusters 2003, Worst idea ever in March, now a great idea.)
Inside The NATO Alliance’s RQ-4D “Phoenix” Drone Operations
NATO’s high-flying drone operations ramp up as its capabilities have never been in higher demand due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/inside-the-nato-alliances-rq-4d-phoenix-drone-operations
War In Ukraine Pushes Czechs To Buy F-35s
With an eye on the war raging in Ukraine, the Czech Republic looks set to become the next member of the growing European F-35 community.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/war-in-ukraine-pushes-czechs-to-buy-f-35s
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••Ukraine Economy:
Naftogaz, a Ukrainian super corrupt NG company. Asked for US$5B from Ukraine government, because they need to buy 5Bcm of NG from the European market for the winter. This means they assume a price per 1000cm to be US$1000. Right now, the European Spot Market is US$1600-1700 per 1000cm. There is nothing available now for the price the assume, and that price will not come down, but go up.
••Ukraine Debt:
Request to delay payments was granted by their sovereign creditors (The Paris Club). Private lenders (The London Club) have not yet granted their request. Some of these lenders are: Blackrock, Fidelity (asset management), AMA I Capitol, and Gem Stock Capital.
Positive development for Ukrainian economy.
••Internal Ukrainian Economy:
Rent in Kiev fell by 52% since the beginning of the war. Partially a result of 30% depreciation of Ukrainian currency.
••Agricultural Situation:
Winter crops are generally better plants. Yields are expected to be down 15%. Planted hectares fell from 9.1 to 8.4 million hectares. Crop harvest from winter plantings will be down as much as 25%. WiU interpretation is that yields are driven by the farmers to the extent of how much fertilizer the use. Farmers are trying to reduce their risk because of the uncertainties.
The actual crop problems will arise in 2023 if war persists.
••Russia Oil and Gas Production:
10.8M bbls per day now. Has no oil field services technology of its own (no deep drilling, no fracking tech). All of the oil field services that would have been expected to pull out because of the sanctions, haven’t. So production remains the same.
••Russian Oil Sale Rumors:
Bloomberg reported sales of Russian crude dropped by 30% to India and China. China and India are Russia’s number one and two buyers with Saudi Arabia as number 3 buyer. India bought 1M bbls per day while China was 2-3M bbls per day. May have something to do with the Western proposed ceiling of US$30-40 per bbl for Russian crude.
Russian response was to threaten to stop exports. JP Morgan then predicts US$380 bbl oil. The oil industry, when passed through the economy, may account for 50% of the Russian GDP.
••Russian Internal Situation:
Russian Statistics Bureau reported deflation of 0.017%. The trend is what is important: positive inflation fell to negative inflation. Importers are forced to reduce their prices or lose the market.
••HIMARS Attacks & Implications:
An important part of high Command’s strategy. The next attack on the Antonivsky Bridge over the Dnieper River will make it impassable even for light trucks. This reduces the supply of Orc troops, in the western Kherson region, to one road over the dam near Nova Kahoka which is also being attacked to destroy the road itself. No desire to destroy the dam and creating a huge disaster, killing many people - the Orc breach in WWII killed 100,000 civilians and 5,000 Orc troops.
Loss of the dam road will mean a practical encirclement of the Orc troops. The Dnieper is 200-300 meters wide here and not easy to bridge. So the troops would be trapped. A retreat will cost them most, if not all, of their heavy equipment.
Orc troops are in a much more difficult situation than ZSU troops were in Severodonetsk. Dnieper River is the 3rd largest river in Europe and not easily crossed without special equipment, boats, barges. Could be an easy victory by ZSU troops without actually doing much. This situation looks like a nightmare for Russian command.
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Summary: No changes on the frontline.
HIMARS system hit main bridge (Antonivsky) in Kherson again and severely damaged it, so that’s it’s not passable for heavy equipment anymore.
Also HIMARS systems destroyed large Russian ammunition depot in Skadovsk.
Key areas:
- Izyum bridgehead: no changes
- North Donbass area: no changes
- Donetsk West: no changes
- Kherson bridgehead: no changes.
1. Kharkiv: No changes.
••North of Kharkiv: Intense & elevated exchange of fire - trending to more intensity, but not enough troops to attack toward Kiev.
2. Izyum bridgehead. No changes.
••Orc 21st Brigade may have been pulled to north Donbas frontline a while back. Trend is many of the units which operated east of Kiev in Feb-April are returning to the front.
3. North Donbas: No changes.
••Orc 15th Brigade and 24th sfB are now here. Continuing pressure all along the North Donbas front. No advances.
4. West of Donetsk: Avdiyivka and Maryinka. No changes.
5. Vugledar: No changes.
6. Velyka Novosilka - Gulyapole stretch of frontline. No changes.
7. Kherson bridgehead: No changes.
••Orcs claim ZSU is accumulating troops in Davydiv Brid area.
••Antonivsky Bridge is a key to major route from Mykolaiv to Crimea to Mariupol’ and on into Russia.
••Orc troops in danger are the 20th D, 7th AD, 7th MC, 126th B, 205th B, 10th sfB.
We are sure losing a lot of equipment. It is almost like it is being sold to the highest bidder.
So nearly 3/4’s of the estimated initial invasion force of 1200 tanks.
I wonder how many tanks Russia has added to the effort since the start?
Why was the previous thread pulled by the Admin Mod?
Thanks PIF.
Don’t let the bastards get you down Speedy.
Improvise, Adapt, Overcome.
This is the original story that was on this thread before (??trolls screamed to admin??) and had the thread pulled
In early July, Putin invited the military in the Lugansk region to “rest and build up their combat capabilities.” Soon, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the start of “activities to replenish combat capabilities”, during which the military can rest and repair equipment - the so-called “operational pause”. Despite this, Russian troops continue to shell Ukrainian cities every day. The biggest tragedies occurred in the city of Chasov Yar in the Donetsk region and in Vinnitsa - there Russian missiles on July 9 and 14, according to the Ukrainian side, claimed the lives of 43 and 25 people, respectively.
On Sunday, July 17, the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported that Russia is likely planning to exit the “operational pause.” According to the head of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky, there was no pause, and Aleksey Arestovich, an adviser to the presidential office, also believes. “New Newspaper. Europe” spoke with military expert Pavel Luzin about what is happening at the front, whether it can be called an operational pause and what to expect in the coming months.
NNG: Can the activity of Russian troops in Ukraine be called an “operational pause”?
Pavel Luzin: We see that the offensive of the Russian troops somehow stalled after Severodonetsk and Lisichansk. Russian troops are marking time both in the south and in the east of Ukraine. And, as a matter of fact, this is all called “operational pause”, but this does not cancel the fighting. The war will continue for an indefinitely long time, even if it turns into a frozen conflict. But now it is far from a frozen conflict. Because what goals has Russia achieved? None. Russia has a problem with resources - both manpower and equipment, but they are trying to come up with something.
Russia wanted a truce with Ukraine on Russia’s terms, but they failed. They achieved this through diplomatic channels, all sorts of leaks were from Patrushev, from Peskov. And they tried to achieve a truce with the tactics of this air artillery terror, which they use against Ukrainian cities. But it doesn’t work. They are now trying to buy time through negotiations on Ukrainian grain, but they are not working out either.
Since they do not have a truce, then naturally they still have to regroup the troops, replenish them, rotate and establish some kind of logistics.
They are trying to do this - that’s the whole “operational pause”.
How long it can last, no one knows. The question is that when you go on an operational pause, you lose some initiative, and will Ukraine take advantage of this? So far, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are not conducting major offensive operations. They just hit the Russian warehouses with artillery received from the West. And that’s it, they just exhaust the Russian army.
NNG: How do you assess the likelihood that a general or partial mobilization will be announced in Russia?
Pavel Luzin: They may try to announce a general mobilization, but it is technically impossible. That is, roughly speaking, it would even be good if the Kremlin announced it - it would paralyze the entire system and collapse. But the Kremlin does not announce anything of the kind: apparently, it is also afraid of the consequences.
The problem will begin already at the stage of dispatching subpoenas, because military registration and enlistment offices do not know where conscripts live. Some of the conscripts live at the place of registration, and they can be found, but a significant part of the reservists live somewhere. In Russia, over the past ten years, 40 million people have changed their place of residence without changing their registration. Of these 40 million, let’s say 20 million are men.
Have you collected these poor fellows at the regional collection point - and how to control them? They can already arrange for you a “happy life”. Plus where to send them next? Troops at the front, some units remain in their garrisons. If you send a crowd of forcibly mobilized to a military unit, what will the officers do with them? Mobilization is always violence, for which an apparatus is needed. The Russian army has the same mobilization apparatus as the Soviet one, that is, it has not been functioning for several decades.
And how can you partially mobilize? Let’s take the grenade throwers: if all the grenade throwers have to come to the front, then no one will come. Nurses, nurses, and all people with a medical education who are liable for military service, geographers, cartographers will have to appear - but this does not happen.
Technical mobilization is impossible in Russia. The Russian army does not have organizational structures to carry out mobilization.
We can compare with the Ukrainian army, where there is mobilization. But Ukraine is a republic, and people have an idea, an understanding of their republican responsibility. They themselves come and defend their land, they do not need to be forced. What do we have, the Kremlin trusts the citizens or the citizens trust the Kremlin? In an authoritarian system of power, mobilization is possible only by violent means, as the Soviet government did. She came to the village in a small armed detachment and took the men into the army by force, and then mixed them up. The men were under the control of the same armed officers, who could either punch them in the teeth or shoot them. It worked like Mao’s army in China from the 30s to the 50s: come to the village in a small detachment, take the peasants, send them to another province where they don’t know anything, and now they are a pack, which is called an army. In Russia now it is impossible. We have no republic. And there is no democracy.
Those who are already serving in the army remain. There are people who simply have nowhere to go from the army, but there are ideological ones, but their number is declining naturally. Accordingly, what was on the eve of the war, and what is now, is heaven and earth. If the Russian government understands at all what is going on in the army, it will adapt to the opportunities that it has.
NNG: And how is Russia doing with weapons?
Pavel Luzin: My assessment is that the lion’s share is used up, and soon the artillery will have problems. If you continue to shoot at the pace that they use artillery, then by the end of the year there will be a shortage of shells. There are no bottomless Soviet warehouses - what was, either fell into disrepair over the years, or was already used up in two Chechen wars.
Production capacity is also very limited. Since 2014, a recovery program has begun, and old shells fired in the late Soviet and post-Soviet times have been changed. It is difficult to calculate them, but it can be estimated as follows: approximately 570 thousand shells of various types and calibers were restored per year, and about a million new ones were produced.
The Russian army on the eve of the attack on Ukraine had about 15 million shells, and now they have used up six to seven million, if we take the numbers that they voice for faith.
If shelling continues at this pace, there will be an acute shortage by the end of the year.
I do not think that Russia has the opportunity to receive military assistance from some other countries. From which - Iran, North Korea? It doesn’t look like they have a good military industry. Russia is trying, of course, to scrape together something there, to raise this topic in negotiations. But what will this give the countries themselves, what is their interest? China, in turn, is playing on two fields at the same time. For him, Russia is primarily fuel, which he burns to buy time to prepare for a possible conflict with the United States over Taiwan or with his other neighbors over territories, for example, waters in the South China Sea. But if China supplies at least one drone to Russia and this is recorded on the battlefield, this will dramatically change the political situation of China, it does not need such a reduction in freedom of maneuver.
NNG: Can a situation arise that in a few months, when Russia will use up its reserves, and Ukraine’s resources will grow due to the supply of weapons from the West, Ukraine will have an advantage?
Pavel Luzin: Naturally. Apparently, this is what they are trying to achieve: they are waiting, saving up, in order to strike later. Russia has a problem not only with the replenishment of troops, but also with the troops that are now deployed. Because some of them have been along the Russian-Ukrainian border since February 24 or even before the start of the war. It’s been almost five months there, and the standard business trip deadline is six months. They are already thinking about how to crawl out of there, each individual soldier. When six months have passed, people will have more reason to demand a withdrawal. The longer the military sits in the field, in the combat zone, the worse they fight. Troops need rest and withdrawal. We can recall the Chechen wars, the Syrian war, even Afghanistan - a business trip lasts six months, and then that’s it. Because a person loses professional competence if he is in a combat zone for more than six months.
NNG: Should Ukrainians be afraid of an attack from the territory of Belarus?
Pavel Luzin: “[Belarus to Russia] won’t help much in any way. You can create additional problems [for the Ukrainian army], but this will mean the end of Lukashenka. Lukashenka survives by sitting on two chairs. He always has some room for maneuver, it is shrinking, but so far there. And if you get involved in a war, then you are already spent, waste material, even Putin will not need you, Lukashenka cannot afford this, but he can be forced to do so. We cannot completely rule out that Lukashenka will eventually succumb to Putin’s pressure. But does it change something radically? Does he have some kind of super powerful army?
The Belarusian army is still not Russian. They have an understanding of their national interests. They themselves feel like a people that is different from the Russian one, and this also plays an important role. So to say, the anti-colonial agenda can develop very quickly in the Belarusian armed forces. It is only Putin who believes that the Belarusians are a branch of the Russian people, just like the Ukrainians. But Lukashenka, it seems to me, still has some brains, not everything is repulsed. His main interest is the preservation of his own power.
NNG: Recently, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation named the commander of the Vostok group, General Muradov. How would you rate his competence?
Pavel Luzin: In my opinion, not a single Putin general with good brains exists. It is simply physically impossible in this system - they would not have survived in it, they would not have grown to the ranks of generals. This galaxy of Putin’s generals is distinguished by absolute loyalty and humility. That is, they are ready to carry out any order, but never have their own opinion. As military leaders, they are also no. These are people who started their careers in the late Soviet Union or in the post-Soviet years, and then they could still think. But the main career of a general and senior positions in the Russian army was already taken under Putin. And they would never have taken these positions if they had their own opinion, retained the flexibility of thinking, independent decision-making.
[Decisions on Russia’s war in Ukraine are made by] a gathering of generals sitting in Moscow, at the National Defense Control Center. They listen to what Vladimir Putin and his entourage from the FSB and FSO want. And he gives orders to the generals on the ground - Muradov, Kutuzov and others who are dying. The Kremlin does not trust its own military and does not want any bugs, swans or Rokhlins to appear, so there is a constant shuffling. This galaxy of Putin’s generals is the same, there are no outstanding generals or bosses.
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This post is hilarious!