Posted on 06/12/2022 5:05:12 PM PDT by daniel1212
the U.S. Navy released a long-awaited, but heavily redacted report of its investigation into the circumstances surrounding USS Connecticut hitting an uncharted seamount while sailing in the Pacific region on Oct. 2, 2021, an accident that caused extensive damage. The War Zone has now had a chance to review the entire 67-page document in detail. In the report, investigators describe how a weak command environment and lax attitudes when it came to performing key tasks ultimately put the submarine, which was also suffering issues with some of its sensor systems and other equipment, on a direct path to the accident. It also describes how the crew acted fast to save the stricken submarine that began to sink after making it to the surface after the impact. Here is our full summary of the report and its implications.
In terms of where grounding occurred, the Navy's report only confirms that Connecticut was in international waters at the time of the accident, but it has been widely reported that the submarine was somewhere in the South China Sea at the time..conducting a humanitarian evacuation (HUMEVAC) transit at the time.[snip]
The report includes a review of events leading up to the accident ..in March 2021 it emerged publicly that Connecticut had been suffering from an infestation of bed bugs, which sailors onboard alleged had been the case for at least a year at that point
Then, on April 14, 2021, Connecticut smacked into a pier.
for reasons not immediately clear, Cmdr. Aljilani made the decision to approve the use of a temporary route plan, which skips certain safety checks and approval processes built into certain systems. .What is clear is that Connecticut suffered, or was already experiencing, some kind of mechanical or technical issue during the transit...
At some point, for reasons that are not clear from the unclassified portions of the report, the decision was made to increase the cruising speed from 16 knots to 24 knots...
“Connecticut did not properly mark two ‘underwater danger/underwater hazard’ locations or five areas of ‘discolored water’ as navigation hazards.... “The OOD stated he was concerned with the shallower-than-expected soundings but “The OOD did not consider ordering a lower speed.”
From the details included in report, the events immediately following Connecticut’s impact into the seafloor were chaotic, at least to some degree. The Diving Officer of the Watch (DOOW) twice did not hear or acknowledge orders from the OOD, the first being to change the submarine’s depth to 160 feet and then the second command to slow the speed of the ascent to keep the submarine at that depth. The submarine subsequently leveled off at a depth of 36 feet, at which point portions of the boat had broached the surface.
the “sonar reported severe degradation from the spherical array,”..
Once on the surface, the crew had to deal with the fact that the ship was not deballasting properly and was beginning to sink back down...
Youtube channel “Sub Brief” did a breakdown two weeks ago. Apparently both fathometers were on the blink.
https://youtu.be/IPr7Yrwgly4?t=1585
As usual, in matters such as these, there were many mistakes at many levels. But the OOD's failure to do the safe thing and reduce speed etc...while aware of shallower-than-expected soundings, was the last chance to possibly avoid submerged grounding. I'm wondering if the ship's problems with sensing equipment affected the OOD's judgment. Whatever, safe action should have been taken regardless of other considerations. I was taught to generally believe and act on even suspect indication, when it pointed to danger.
Ping
In days long past now they were Hyman Rickover’s ships and not the Navy’s. That fact was clearly understood by all when I was on active duty. I know he personally interviewed every officer before they were accepted to the nuclear program and every officer again, at least before they took command of one of his ships.
They were Replicators from another galaxy. The SG-1 team fought them. This running aground is a cover story....
This never happened to the Seaview. The only time they were damaged was when a sea monster attacked.... : )
C0, OX, OOD, DIVE, sonar, bedbugs, an engineering crew that doesnt know the diff between cooking oil and shaft lube oil, a trim motor controller that glowed red and smoked, comsub 5, at least they didn’t blame the cooks.
This is what happens when you turn your fighting forces into a social experiment.
Back in the day, Bubblehead command didn’t have a lot of tolerance on watch when underway. No one was allowed “ independent ops” at sea. They was no “ individuality
“In days long past now they were Hyman Rickover’s ships and not the Navy’s. That fact was clearly understood by all when I was on active duty. “
When did you serve? I served 68-74 and didn’t have that feeling.
Perfection for us was having no more than one of the three watchstanders napping. We were not always perfect.
He had a standing invitation to bypass the Pentagon and testify before Congress anytime he chose. He and not the bureaucracy controlled purchasing and personnel assignments. One submarine dumped primary coolant to the bilges, and he was there the next day to fire the CO, EX, chief engineer, and engineering officer of the watch. Maybe that was something known just to the nuclear community.
I was a Navy nuke.
” He and not the bureaucracy controlled purchasing and personnel assignments.”
That’s stretch!
Yeah, back in the mid 1980s had a buddy on a certain CG that shall remain nameless. Off the coast of NC during a night passage they tracked a navigation buoy for 16 miles on radar and ran right into it. They had their orders - this heading, this speed. I guess the watch officer thought they’d just miss it, didn’t want to log a rudder order changing course from what the captain ordered. Must’ve been a good sized buoy, he said it scraped the paint all down one side...SMH
Yes indeed!
The boat's XO was not specifically mentioned in any the open posts. An XO is supposed to be the designated a$$hole so the skipper can be a moderately good guy. I have served as both and my Command Ashore tour was much harder because I did no have an XO. An XO tour is mostly a make it or break it look for suitability for Command.
20 year Mustang
Not really. His biography was fairly clear about that. They could advise but had to consent.
Sub Safe— Rickover safety in ALL aspects underway, and... anywhere. Loss of the Thresher began this in earnest. Not SS-200 (WWII) , the nuclear Thresher. Took down 19 civilian major contractor engineers on the shake down cruise. Failed weld on a pipe normally sealed to outside pressures— and frankly pinpointed to purposeful LABOR sloppy work and slowdowns in the building of the boat. Very sad times for family who were classmates of the Thresher’s captain, and of course for all the families of the total loss of the Thresher. Perfection is the standard— not what we are seeing in this boat— bedbugs? Are they kidding. Mixed crews oh yeah that works out well— even the Israelis don’t do this afaik.
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