Found this excerpt at the site posted by “observer”, am reposting it with location - https://realrawnews.com/2021/06/military-tribunal-convicts-bill-clinton/
and also the source material (whole pdf) here: https://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/renzo.pdf
Have not studied law and have no other comment here at this time.
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observer
observer
Reply to Victor
2 days ago
asked and answered many articles ago. Enemy combatant designation under emergency declaration.
lawreview(DOT)vermontlaw(DOT)edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/renzo(DOT)pdf
Military Trials of Civilians (pg-448,449,450)
On June 29, 2006, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed by Congress in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, impliedly authorized the President to create military commissions for enemy combatants “in appropriate circumstances” and subject to the limitations of Articles 21 and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).13
Although the Court in Hamdan declined to make a specific ruling as to whether the President has the inherent Article II authority in the absence of action by Congress to convene law-of-war military commissions, the majority nonetheless stated that “authority [to establish military commissions,] if it exists, can derive only from the powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in time of war.”
14 The Hamdan majority recognized that the issue of military-commission trials raises “important questions about the balance of powers in our constitutional structure,”15 and Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion cited “the risk that offenses will be defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by [the Executive] without independent review.”
16 In addition to addressing the balance of power between Congress and the President, the Court in Hamdan reaffirmed that Congress’s power to create military tribunals, including military commissions, is subject to constitutional limitations.
17 The baseline constitutional limitation that governs this issue was drawn 140 years ago in the Supreme Court’s landmark decision Ex parte Milligan. 18 Milligan and its progeny established that the Constitution’s jury-trial guarantees prohibit the military trial of a detainee apprehended within the jurisdictional reach of operational Article III civilian courts unless, during wartime or other national emergency, the government convinces those same civilian courts that the detainee is not a civilian but an enemy combatant.
19 To show enemy combatant status, the government must prove that the prisoner is a member of, or acting under the command of, the enemy’s armed forces.
20 Hence, if the detainee is a civilian, that detainee-civilian is entitled to a trial by jury in a civilian court in the absence of a complete breakdown of the institutions of civil government rendering the civilian courts unable to function.21 On the other hand, a detainee found to be an enemy combatant is subject to military jurisdiction, including the trial of any alleged criminal offense by military tribunal.
22 This Article will demonstrate that a military commission convened in areas where Article III courts are open and functioning has no jurisdiction to try a detainee unless the civilian courts have determined that the detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and not as a civilian.” . . .”