I used to do Civil war reenacting (mounted cavalry) and in 2006, 12 of us went out and participated in the Battle reenactment on the Real Birds property. We camped along the LBH River directly across from Medicine Tail Coulee(MTC). We were able to ride to Weir Point, down Cedar Coulee, MTC, across Nye-Cartwright and Luce Ridges and Deep Coulee. You can’t ride on the battlefield so we had to stop just short of Calhoun hill. It was a great experience, especially for someone that’s been reading about the battle and Custer since the 3rd grade.
Now to the battle. I think that Keogh’s Battalion(Co’s I, L & C) were left on the south end of battle ridge to cover the rear of Yates’ Battalion, w/ headquarters) as they moved farther north to find another Ford(D) and to wait for a link up with Benteen’s Battalion that was known to be back on the trail after his scout to the left, as they came down Reno Creek from the divide.
Yates’ company was left on Cemetery Ridge as Smiths Co. E headed to Ford D. While this was going on Co L was in dismounted skirmish order firing on Indians to the west along Greasy Grass Ridge. Indians then started firing on Calhouns position from Henryville to the SE. When Calhoun shifted his skirmish line to fire on this new threat, indians started infiltrating in Calhoun coulee to the west. It was at this point that Keogh, who had both his company and Co. C being held in reserve on the east side of battle ridge, sent Co C to push the Indians back down Calhoun Coulee. They barely had time to dismount when the were overun and had to retreat back to Calhoun Hill along Finley-Finckle Ridge. The Indians pushed them over Calhoun Hill and toward Keogh so fast that Keogh didn’t have time to deploy his company. From here it was every man for himself as the survivors headed toward the north end of Battle Ridge, where Yates’ Battalion and Custer had moved up to when the battle was taking place to the south. At some point E Co. made a movement down toward Deep Ravine to clear it of Indians, but the Indian numbers were overwhelming. Once the hard fighting on the south end started, it was over pretty quick.
I think that up until Company C was sent down Calhoun Coulee, the major concern was that the Indians would break camp and run as the had always done in the past. The Indians had rode 40 miles the week before to fight Gen Crook to a stalmate on the Rosebud. He spent the rest of the summer at the foot of the Bighorn Mountains licking his wounds and fishing.
Tactically, Custer made good decisions with the information he had, except for his refusal to believe the Indian Scouts and specifically Mitch Bouyer about Indian numbers.
Custer wasn’t an idiot when it came to fighting. He was one of the best cavalry commanders the Union had during the Civil War. At the LBH he ran into superior numbers of a determined foe, which he thought were breaking camp and on the run to the north.
A really good book that ties time motion studies with battlefield archaeology and Indian testimony is “The Strategy of Defeat at the Little BigHorn” by Frederic C. Wagner III. Great pictures of all areas of the battlefield in the book also.
That must have been a massively interesting experience to ride on horseback along MTC and the ridges. I’m jealous!
I believe your Custer battlefield analysis probably fits pretty closely to the modern interpretation of what happened. This can be backed up with multiple eyewitness testimony as well from the Indian survivors.
A good intentional holding force to keep the Indians from Reno’s fight at bay (Co’s C, I, L) while Custer with E & F moving to look for a good ford to cross and capture the women and children.
The debate as to when the holding companies fell apart is either with Calhoun changing his company’s direction of fire or with the failed Company C charge to scatter Indians gathering to the south.
Company C got way too close to the Indians IMHO based on my reading and Calhoun probably should never have changed the direction of their fire (but what choice did they have?).
I totally agree with you that Keogh didn’t have a prayer in the world to form a defense. Seems like the Indians rode through them and went back and forth until they scattered or killed them all. Whoever survived ran towards Last Stand Hill and they were horseless.
For the record, I wouldn’t suggest Custer was an idiot with tactics - but he always failed to recon his battles, and with Indians he never trusted his scouts. Here the terrain and heat wore out his already exhausted & thirsty troopers. There was no way his 210 man force could hope to capture even 20 non-combatants and then try to put up a fight against the 2,000 - 2,500 warriors that were there.
*He believed the Indians would “run”. They didn’t.
*He thought they numbered less than 1,000. Wrong.
*He woefully believed that officers who loathed him would be supportive and obedient to his orders.
*Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance. Foreign words apparently.
*Single-shot rifles and limited ammo
*Horses scattered when dismounted for a skirmish line
*The terrain favored the attackers (Indians)
He and his troops were outgunned and shot to pieces.
Also, not sure if this has been mentioned but there were reports of White Renegades or Trappers who fought with the Indians that day. These guys probably married into the Sioux or Cheyenne tribes. One was a sniper who killed several troops who were surrounded on Reno Hill. He was supposedly shooting from “Sharpshooter Ridge”. Somebody shot and killed him from the lower position on Reno Hill.
Thanks for the recommendation on the book, I’ll look at it as I’m always willing to add to the collection.